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This thesis develops and applies neo-Coxian analysis to understand 
patterns of US oil diversification motivations. Because mainstream IR 
approaches lack a historical perspective and do not consider 
reflexivity due to their overt rationalism, a historicism method is 
employed to uncover the motivations for US oil diversification in this 
research. Critical Theory, which prioritizes a ‘holistic view’ of IR, helps 
to uncover these motivations through analysis of oil diversification 
processes, to understand how they have changed when viewed from 
a duration-based perception which includes a ‘diachronic’ time period 
and also a ‘synchronic’ one moment snapshot. Whereas rational IR 
approaches are supported by established methodologies, researching 
from a reflexivity perspective requires innovative methodological 
strategies. Here, three cases were chosen to examine US oil 
diversification motivations, namely the Keystone XL pipeline, the Iraq 
War and the Arctic Drilling in the context of Energy Revolution. All are 
considered key cases for illustrating such motivations. Primary data 
was collected from official archives to identify how political agents 
have viewed oil diversification, within the three case studies. Semi-
structured elite interviews with social actors (e.g. policymakers, 
business, NGOs) were also conducted to support data collection. The 
theoretical analysis shows that Coxian Critical theory can explain US 
oil diversification motivations and can help to uncover the patterns of 
these motivations through the interaction of ideas, material 
capabilities and institutions, thereby providing an original contribution 
to knowledge. However, when a Coxian interpretation is reviewed, 
social dynamics as a new structural sphere arises as one of the 
important factors of US oil diversification motivations in the new 
millennium. The research finds that the patterns of US oil 
diversification motivations can be classified under: 1. oil politics, 2. 
domestic politics and 3. foreign policy. Moreover, there are also 
contradictions (i.e. 1. economy-biosphere, 2. national-state interests 
and 3. national-transnational benefits) that are the products of the 
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system, which should be accepted as patterns and triggers of the 
system. However, their existence is not persistent and depends on the 
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1. Introduction  
 
Diversification is a policy approach aimed at providing energy 
security. The importance of energy diversification is derived from its 
requirement for reciprocity. On a global scale, mutual relationships 
between energy suppliers and consumers lead to reciprocal foreign 
policy arrangements (Monaghan 2005). Given its increasing 
importance to national energy and foreign policy, this thesis 
consequently explores oil supply diversification (i.e. suppliers) 
motivations in the case of the USA, a globally significant state for both 
energy production and consumption. At this point we (the author) 
should be clear in terms of the definition of the ‘state’, since there is 
an ambiguity about what it is (Hay et al. 2006; Dryzek and Dunleavy 
2009). To use commonly used conceptualisations, the state is 
composed of political and civil societies in a set of organized 
governing institutions (ibid.). The USA, a country consisting of 50 
federated states, is accepted as a state in global politics. Therefore, 
when we talk about nation/federal/country and state level differences, 
we are actually referring to the subparts of the US federal system.  
Oil’s importance in global politics has been evident since the early 20th 
century. While oil sometimes has been a target of foreign policies, it 
has also been a tool of foreign policies. Its importance for industries 
and transportation leads states to become more dependent on oil. 
Moreover, it is relatively cheap to transport and use compared to other 
fuels. Despite the recent growth of renewable energy sources, it is 
expected that oil will remain the most important fuel until the 2040s 
thereby still being an object and subject of security issues (Johannson 
2013a; 2013b). Oil’s importance in global politics is highly connected 
with prices. Oil prices determine a country’s vulnerability to accessing 
this resource. The current era is characterized by high price 
fluctuations linked to various sources of price fluctuations (e.g. 
political problems, supply disruptions, natural disasters).  
17 
Thus, the oil market, which involves a commodity, has become a 
‘politicised market’ (Vivoda 2008: 10). To reduce their vulnerability on 
oil, importing countries employ ‘hard power’ military interventions, 
diplomacy, and investment to ensure security of supply. In addition, 
many states (e.g. the USA, EU, Japan, China, India) have introduced 
policies and strategies for diversification to reduce their vulnerability 
to oil provision (Stokes 2005; Rosner 2009; Lesbirel 2004; Kiriyama 
and Kajikawa 2014; Chakraborty and Katakey 2014).  
The current literature sees diversification policy as the most important 
strategy for reducing national oil supply vulnerability in terms of price 
fluctuations and political distributions (Yergin 2006; Stringer 2008; 
Cao and Bluth 2013; Kiriyama and Kajikawa 2014). This feature 
pushes us to study oil diversification in more detail, with both empirical 
and theoretical dimensions significant to this debate. Empirically, the 
questions of ‘how and why do countries such as the US engage in oil 
diversification?’ should be examined. Consequently, the next question 
is `how can we theoretically interpret these political issues?’  
When answering both the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, several empirical 
considerations are important. Diversification might be attributed to 
multiple factors such as different production sources, suppliers, 
transport routes, technologies and energy import contracts (Dirks 
2006; Bahgat 2006; Rosner 2009; Ang et al. 2015), i.e. supply and 
demand sides. However, in this research, oil diversification will be 
studied in terms of suppliers, since the US is a major oil producer, 
consumer and importer country and is globally significant in all of 
these areas. Oil supply has become very important in the US context 
and oil supply policies cannot be studied without considering 
suppliers. Thus, there is a spatial dimension to diversification. 
However, this spatial scope also involves a temporal dimension in 
terms of how diversification policy evolves. This temporal process is 
naturally directed by the US’ internal and external politics. Here, we 
find that suppliers are defined as supplier countries in the literature, 
but supplier states should also be included in the US case. 
18 
One potential approach for explaining these complex spatial and 
temporal aspects of oil diversification is critical theory (Chapter 3). 
This theoretical approach potentially provides us with a credible 
explanation, because it includes dialectics between ideas and 
materials, and reciprocal causality to understand the significance of 
possible determiners in global politics. Moreover, because critical 
theory sees “people as historical agents”, it provides both social and 
historical perspectives to study global politics (Budd 2008: 176). The 
term ‘global politics’ is used, because the term ̀ international relations` 
(IR) is based on a Westphalian nation-state understanding. Although 
we accept that the state (see above definition) is the key factor in 
global politics, we think that the term ‘inter-national’ is a legalised 
contemporary structure because of its status quo context. Its status 
quo context is derived from a positivist perception. Here, there is a 
separation of observer and observed leading to value- and time-free 
explanations. Thus, positivism makes its arguments based only in the 
context of specific time events. However, there has not always been 
a ‘nation-state’ in history – the notion of the Westphalian state is 
obviously historically dependent. Although we try to see reality, we do 
not legalise it.  
When the state is the key factor in the global arena, structural 
dimensions in the world have become necessary to analyse it. The 
current world system has been a US-based uni-polarity for the past 
half century. It means that the US feels responsibility for the 
institutions, markets and political arena across the world, even in 
different regions. Any counter movement against this structure means 
a counter movement against the US or vice versa. This relationship 
has been evident since the end of the Cold War, which occurred after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. However, the US 
hegemony has been discussed more intensely since the Iraq War, 
which began in 2003 (Cox 2004; Stokes 2005). An increasing counter 
movement against the US means changing this structure. On the 
other hand, the US is the largest crude oil importer and producer 
country (CIA World Factbook: 2019). As mentioned above, when the 
19 
oil price is affected by foreign policy, it also affects the foreign policy 
of states. In the context of the US, oil diversification motivations are a 
‘reflection’ of the current global system, domestic conditions and how 
they are changing through mutual interactions. Thus, the US is the 
main focus of oil diversification motivations in this research, both 
empirically and theoretically.  
US oil diversification motivations will be studied through three specific 
high profile cases, which are the Keystone XL pipeline (KXL), the Iraq 
War, and Arctic Drilling in the context of the so-called ‘Energy 
Revolution’ (Chapters 5,6,7). KXL has a more regional dimension 
compared to the international dimensions of the Iraq War, but in 
addition, there are also environmental concerns which contradict 
economic and state-level concerns/benefits, which in turn oppose 
national-level (federal) political preferences.  The Iraq War’s causes 
and effects on US oil diversification are highly related to US foreign 
policies and the US’ position in the world. However, there is also a 
domestic effect in the Iraq War. During the war period, these 
dynamics, transnational and national benefits, have become 
contradictory. Lastly, Arctic Drilling in the context of the Energy 
Revolution shows the transition between domestic, foreign and oil 
policies in a debate encompassing the economy vs. environment and 
state vs. nation conundrum. This study demonstrates that 
diversification has emerged as a key driver of policy since the early 
millennium but that important research questions remain unanswered, 
namely: Is diversification only related to US oil dependency or are 
there any additional foreign policy targets? Are domestic policies 
affected by foreign policy targets? In the context of the US, how much 
of its hegemonic/empire position and its foreign and domestic 
dimensions are related to oil diversification motivations? The shifts in 
US oil diversification motivations lead to these questions.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured into four sections. The 
following section focuses on the rationale behind this research. This 
section will be divided into two parts, which are the empirical and 
theoretical puzzles addressed in this thesis. The first part (i.e. the 
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empirical) will provide a brief history of the global oil market and then 
specify the rationale of the study by focusing upon the importance of 
oil and oil diversification in global politics, as well as US oil politics. 
The second (i.e. the theoretical) part will justify the focus of the study 
on oil diversification, US behaviour and its effects on global policies 
and global events’ effects on US behaviour. The second section 
introduces the research aims, objectives, and main research question 
and sub-questions. The third section focuses on the contribution my 
research will make to the existing literature. Finally, an outline of the 
thesis chapter structure is provided.  
 
1.1.     Rationale  
This research seeks to theoretically understand oil diversification as a 
global (i.e. spatial) process (i.e. temporal) through a focus on the US 
as a signifier of these events (see Chapter 2). In this sense, the thesis 
fills a significant gap in the literature on oil diversification which, as 
explained below, tends to be understood via the lens of positivist IR 
theory and, in doing so, rather ignores the potentially valuable 
contribution of critical theorists, including their historical-dialectical 
arguments, to this debate. In fact, as argued throughout this thesis, 
such research makes an important contribution to the academic 
literature through both empirical and theoretical innovation. 
1.1.1. Empirical Puzzle  
 
1.1.1.1. A Brief History of the Global Oil Market 
In order to uncover US oil diversification motivations in the period of 
the new millennium historically, there is a requirement to determine 
how the global oil market has evolved and accumulated during this 
period. The history of the oil market presents some key points for 
understanding the structure of the oil market and also sometimes 
understanding the global political economy.  
In the early 20th Century, Standard Oil which provided nearly 90% of 
the refined oil in the US was a commercial trust enjoying a near 
21 
monopoly in the US oil market. After the Supreme Court’s antitrust 
legislation in 1911, Standard Oil was split into Chevron, Exxon and 
Mobil (now ExxonMobil). During this period other oil companies (i.e. 
BP, Royal Dutch/Shell, Gulf Oil and Texaco) were becoming 
internationalized. Subsequently named the “Seven Sisters” they 
ensured a monopoly of the global oil market between 1950 and 1973 
(Sampson 1975). Preceding the 1973 Crisis, they held 85% of global 
oil production. Apart from the oil reserves that they controlled, they 
held all upstream (exploration, production), midstream (transportation, 
refining) and downstream (marketing, distribution) areas of the oil 
market. Thus, they were able to determine the magnitude of oil 
production as well as oil prices. At the time, there was no Keynesian 
interventionist approach regarding this sector, i.e. government 
intervention was constrained. It was the Cold War era and US allies’ 
(i.e. Europe and Japan) economies were also developing, therefore 
rapidly increasing their oil demand. While demand in Europe rose 
thirteen-fold as it recovered from war (World War II) bv , Japan’s 
consumption rose 137-fold (McNally 2017: 106). However, the 
development of the Israeli state supported by the USA caused Middle 
East supplier countries, which still had the biggest oil reserves and 
provided the Seven Sisters’ market power, to nationalize their oil 
production. During the Cold War, the Soviets’ increasingly flooded the 
market with cheap oil, also undermining the Seven Sisters’ power. 
These events provided the context to how the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was founded in 1960. After 
the Suez Crisis in 1956, an oil shortage occurred and after the Egypt-
Israel war in 1967 an oil embargo was imposed on Western countries. 
OPEC were ineffective in changing the market. However, the 
embargo after the Yom Kippur War in 1973, particularly on the USA, 
led to a significant re-organisation of oil markets. Reasons for these 
structural changes included declining US oil production, down to 
16.5% of global output in 1973, meaning that US imports and import 
dependency had increased enormously (Painter 2014). While the US 
pulled out of the Bretton Woods system, related to maintaining the 
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gold exchange standard, the value of the dollar had decreased along 
with the oil revenues of oil supplier countries. Thus, the motivation 
behind the 1973 embargo and the power of its effect were not only a 
political issue. After the crisis, the definition of the oil market changed. 
New supplier countries joined the market and the US administration 
declared `energy independence` as a key strategic objective for 
`energy dominance` (The White House 2019a). It was the first time 
that diversification became significant in US policy thinking.  
Diversification was an issue not only for the US but also for the US’ 
allies in the Cold War era. In total, 71% of Japan’s oil imports came 
from the Middle East in 1970 (Licklider 1988). OPEC nations were the 
source of 70% of total U.S. petroleum imports in 1977 (EIA 2019a). 
Today this figure is down to 29%. There were several long term 
institutional and policy effects of the crisis, including the foundation of 
the International Energy Agency (IEA) based in Paris in 1974, the US 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) in 1977, the US Department 
of Energy (DOE) in 1977, Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR) and 
The Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards under 
Energy Policy and Conservation Act (Congress 1975) and the Carter 
Doctrine1 as a policy.  Another consequence was the realisation that 
for any one actor to control global oil production and prices was no 
longer possible.   
While there were some sudden price changes in history, with oil prices 
going up (e.g. World War I) or down (e.g. the discovery of oil in East 
Texas which occurred during the Great Depression), they were 
accompanied by a trust or monopoly of control mechanism. The 1973 
crisis destroyed these mechanisms and created price fluctuations that 
have endured in the period since. The increasing power of National 
Oil Companies (NOCs) and the growing number of supplier countries 
has changed a previously relatively stable market. Any crisis since this 
time has consequently had a huge effect on prices, leading to supply 
 
1
 A foreign policy initiative that enables the US to employ military force against any country 
that attempted to gain control of the Persian Gulf region.  
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cuts/increases. The Iranian Revolution (1979), the Soviet Invasion of 
Afghanistan (1979), the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), and the Iraq 
invasion of Kuwait (1990) are examples. Although OPEC showed its 
power in the market, the 1980s was not a bright period for the 
organisation. The effect of the 1973 crisis led to increasing supply 
production from different actors (e.g. Norway, Mexico, US) and oil 
demand collapsed because of the effect of the crisis on the global 
political economic system. Moreover, it was the advent of the era of 
neoliberalism, which promotes market-oriented policies for the global 
political economy in parallel to a Hayekian view. Market-oriented 
decisions started to be followed by OPEC countries. While OPEC 
played a destructive role in the 1973 crisis, it has had a constructive, 
stabilising role in the market in recent decades. By this point, a market 
based view had become dominant. 
The investments in oil started showing their effects after 10 years. The 
1973 crisis had its results during the 1980s and early 90s. Because 
these investments were not sustained, the late 90s started 
experiencing problems. While the 90s had a less volatile oil market, 
the 1997 Asian crisis hit oil demand. Increasing prices led to a more 
distinguished supply-demand imbalance. This situation led to OPEC 
and non-OPEC actors cutting production. The aftermath of 9/11 led to 
economic weakness, thereby decreasing oil demand. This time, oil 
supply was decreased in response. However, it did not lead to oil 
prices being stabilised, because there was uncertainty about supply 
combined with increasing demand from India and China.  During late 
2002 and early 2003, Venezuelan oil workers’ strikes and the Iraq War 
combined with election violence in Nigeria to cause disruption to the 
global oil market. Moreover, the IEA did not use its strategic reserves 
and prices were pushed up dramatically. Not all disruptions (e.g. 
Iranian Revolution) led to shortages, but there was an oil market 
tightening (McNally 2017: 171). While the Iraq War has undermined 
liberal ideas around the global economy, thereby the hegemony of the 
US, market oriented perceptions have been maintained by all actors. 
The oil market was also triggered by increasing oil prices. The 
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dimensions of energy security consequently changed again in 
response. 
1.1.1.2. Importance of Oil  
Oil is the most consumed energy resource globally. Under the 
globalisation era, while numbers of developed countries have 
increased, this situation has led to increased competition between 
them over oil. As a commodity, oil is affected by this competition. 
However, the main oil producing countries have political instabilities 
and these types of political obstacles are seen even in transit routes 
(e.g. both sea and land). Thus, besides economic competition for oil 
resources, there is also a political dimension visible between states. 
As one of the most consumed energy resources, oil ‘reflects’ current 
global conditions and is a powerful signifier of international security. 
In this sense, oil security reflects and is reflected by global conditions 
more than any other energy security issue. Oil has a global market, 
because it is still widely available, easy to transport and available to 
multiple industrial processes from energy generation to manufacturing 
(CIEP 2004). This situation highlights the global importance of oil 
prices. Any event might easily trigger wider repercussions because of 
oil’s global importance, for example the 1973 Oil Crisis was initially 
sparked by the Arab-Israeli conflict. Oil price fluctuations strengthen 
oil’s importance on national (i.e. a Realist perspective) and economic 
(i.e. a Liberal perspective) security for states.  
1.1.1.3. Why focus on Oil Diversification? 
Diversification might be attributed to many areas such as different 
sources, suppliers, transport routes, technologies and energy import 
contracts (Dirks 2006; Bahgat 2006; Rosner 2009; Ang et al. 2015). 
Therefore, it is important to specify what is being studied. In this 
research, oil diversification will be studied in terms of suppliers. Thus, 
we cannot follow diversification across all its sources and must 
necessarily be selective. Technological diversification is not included 
within this study because technology is not readily diversified, rather 
it has progressed. Lastly, import contracts are related to suppliers. 
Although the literature refers to supplier countries, when it says 
25 
‘suppliers’, this study has found that supplier states of the US should 
also be considered as part of its diversification strategies. It is one of 
the contributions of the study with the help of consideration of 
domestic dynamics. Thus, oil diversification will be defined, in this 
study, as diversifying supplier countries and states. 
For various scholars, diversification of oil policies should be 
interpreted as the best solution for reducing oil vulnerability, thereby 
ensuring energy security (Yergin 2006; Stringer 2008; Cao and Bluth 
2013; Kiriyama and Kajikawa 2014). Thus, most scholars believe 
Churchill’s idea is still valid in that “Safety and certainty in oil lie on 
variety and variety alone” (Kalicki 2007: 79; Stringer 2008: 127). While 
some believe oil diversification reduces dependence on oil prices 
(Kalicki 2007), others assert that oil diversification cannot reduce the 
dependence on oil prices, because oil has a global market (Nivola and 
Carter 2010). Oil is fungible. Any disruption might affect global oil 
prices. However, it is certain that oil diversification policies reduce 
dependence on supply disruptions (Ang et al. 2015). The current world 
energy supply structure includes minor disruptions (e.g. weather, 
natural disasters, labour strikes, or technical failure/accident) and 
terrorist attacks. The importance of disruptions and terrorist attacks 
cannot be ignored.  Economic reasons, minor disruptions and terrorist 
attacks mean that oil is also a political problem. Thus, oil as a 
commodity has become a strategic commodity.  
1.1.1.4. Why focus on US Oil Diversification? 
A study of global oil diversification should include analysis of the USA, 
for several reasons. Although the US is one of the most important oil 
producer countries, it is the most significant oil importer country (CIA 
World Factbook 2019). The US relationship with oil production and 
importation is caused by its domestic oil needs. The US is the leading 
oil consumer country (EIA 2015). Thus, securing supplies of crude oil 
has become a very central issue for the US. Moreover, because of 
oil’s huge importance in the world, oil has become a central focus of 
US foreign, security and, increasingly, environmental policy. These 
realms are the key points required to uncover the patterns of US oil 
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diversification motivations. Under the global system, whereas states 
try to increase their suppliers, supply and demand competition is 
hugely affected by these policy decisions too. At this point, US oil 
diversification has become a global issue because of the diversity of 
the US’ oil trade partners. It imported crude oil from 79 countries in 
2016 (EIA 2017). Studying US oil diversification therefore tell us much 
about this phenomenon on a global scale. 
The necessity to look at US oil diversification motivations is therefore 
evident, but there appear four main deficiencies in the literature on 
this subject. Firstly, existing arguments are mainly driven by scholars 
using problem-solving IR theories2, which are Realism and Liberalism. 
However, a significant problem is that these theories ignore a 
historical perspective in social relations, whereas social and state 
relations go through changes in the oil diversification process. 
Besides their lack of consideration of a historical perspective these 
theories give only a partial explanation of both sides of the oil trade 
(i.e. supplier and demander countries), although, as this study argues, 
state relations emerge through behaviour rather than in behaviour 
(see Chapter 4). Secondly, the problem-solving perspective typically 
views oil diversification from an importer side and cannot cover 
general oil diversification motivations, because it is a reciprocal 
process. Thirdly, although the state is manifestly the most important 
actor in the international arena, it is certainly not the only influential 
actor. Societal effects on oil diversification motivations should be also 
analysed. This effect can only be adequately evaluated with the 
acceptance of state-society complexity, which considers political, 
economical and social aspects of inter- and intra-states relations (see 
Chapter 3). Lastly, in the literature, there is no study which compares 
different cases in terms of US oil import motivations. A comparison of 
different cases provides for a more holistic and reliable analysis of 
patterns for oil import motivations.  
 
2 These theories use value- and history-free explanations with the help of ceteris paribus 
assumptions which reduce parameters, while Critical Theory seeks out complex processes 
“as a whole rather than seperate parts” (Cox 1981: 129). 
27 
1.1.2. The theoretical Puzzle  
 
1.1.2.1. Oil Diversification from a Theoretical Perspective 
In the IR literature, there are two main theoretical positions on oil 
diversification motivations, which are derived from Realism and 
Liberalism. A Realist perspective has a more pessimistic view since it 
focuses on state self-interest under conditions of international 
anarchy. According to Realists, oil means national security because 
its demand continually increases and it is a strategic commodity 
(Klare: 2008b), vital to state survival. To reduce national security 
threats, Realists argue that states should consequently diversify their 
suppliers (Luft and Korin 2009a). Moreover, diversification means that 
every state acts only in its own interests. The US policy of `Energy 
Independence` therefore does make sense in the context of Realism, 
since it becomes a matter of national interest for states to diversify 
away from reliance on others. However, for Liberals, the energy 
security perspective is more about the terms of `availability` and 
`affordability` (Yao and Chang 2014: 597). Oil diversification provides 
both of them. Thus, Liberals see economic security being weighed 
against national security. Moreover, Liberals believe that when states 
increase diversification, they try to establish a good relationship with 
suppliers and transport countries (Yergin: 2005). Importers, which are 
mainly developed or developing countries, therefore help exporters 
and transporter countries in terms of developing infrastructure. This 
activity leads to more social and political stability in these countries. 
Thus, Liberal arguments emphasise `interdependence` rather than 
`independence`, which may be considered more of a Realist concept. 
When one side consequently highlights competition (i.e. a Realist 
perspective), the other side puts an emphasis on cooperation (i.e. a 
Liberal perspective). However, both agree about oil policies, whereby 
oil diversification policies affect foreign policy and vice versa. For the 
purposes of this study, we agree with Realists and Liberals in this 
respect but diverge from their analysis in other respects. This thesis 
therefore argues that a historical-dialectical method addresses 
significant gaps left in our understanding of oil diversification by these 
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mainstream positivist approaches. This thesis does not falsify their 
arguments but provides a broader and deeper picture than theirs. The 
ontological assumptions and strategic concerns of those theories are 
actually historically contingent and changeable. Critical Theory’s two 
main assumptions, people as historical agents and state-society 
complexity, will be used to overcome the issue. 
To reduce oil policy to a process of securitization (Vivoda 2008; 
Vivoda 2009a; Cohen et al. 2011) is too reductive, as it is often not 
debated (solely) in security terms. However, in this study, oil 
diversification motivations will be studied as a foreign policy matter, 
for reasons outlined below. For this purpose, we define security as 
‘reducing threats or reducing damages of threats’ (see Chapter 2). 
However, the term ‘oil policies’ is not entirely suitable for use within 
this definition. There is some divergence between states about the 
actual nature of oil diversification policies such as the influence of 
“geography”, “political relationship”, the “availability of oil and 
transportation infrastructure”, “refining capacity”, “policy” and 
“resources” (Vivoda 2009a: 4620), but also the actual objectives of oil 
policies. Thus, oil security requires both defensive and also offensive 
policies. For example, the KXL oil import project from Canada to the 
US was rejected by the Obama administration because of potential 
environmental damage. However, the Obama administration’s 
decision can be interpreted as a result of attempts by the 
administration to project a more positive environmental image for the 
US globally (Klare 2014a), particularly at a time when the US’ 
leadership on climate change issues was being questioned. Thus, oil 
diversification policies and motivations should be studied as a foreign 
policy matter.  
1.1.2.2. US Oil Diversification from a Theoretical Perspective 
As an alternative to positivist IR theory or a securitization approach, 
this thesis adopts a critical perspective, specifically drawing on the 
work of Robert Cox. As discussed in Chapter 3, this approach 
potentially provides several advantages vis-à-vis positivist IR theory. 
Primarily, it allows our understanding of oil diversification to be 
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extended to engaging with its historical nature but also notions of 
hegemony and structural dynamics in ways not possible through 
positivist theory. This thesis argues that critical theory allows us to 
move beyond value- and history-free explanations that can only 
provide a momentary picture rather than displaying dynamic change 
as a historical process that is a product of patterns on structural 
interaction. Under this point of view, the Coxian triangle (material 
capabilities, institutions and ideas) should be operationalised into the 
US oil diversification motivations to provide a balanced view on 
structure-agency and materials-ideas transitions. On the other hand, 
Cox’s explanation of global political economics in terms of how he 
defines hegemony and how the hegemonic power decreases should 
be used to check empirical findings related to the triangle’s 
operationalisation on US oil diversification motivations.  
From a critical perspective, which is mainly associated with a Coxian 
interpretation, US oil policies, thereby oil diversification policies, are 
not only about US geographical, economic and environmental 
dimensions, there is also an effect of the US` position in the world. 
The US is symbolically representative of the current unipolar system 
which can be linked to the collapse of Soviet Union in the late 1980s. 
This position means that there is no counter-superpower operating 
against US activities in the rest of the world. The “Ideas”, “Material 
Capabilities” and “Institutions”3 of the US have been strengthening US 
hegemony in the world (Cox 1981: 136). Furthermore, these structural 
forces of the US have been interacting in social spheres which are 
“social forces”, “forms of state” and “world order” (Cox 1981: 138). In 
addition to Cox, we believe that there is also an important influence of 
social dynamics on structural spheres in the new millennium. Thus, 
there are some questions that require answering, for example: how 
much are the US’ power and the global oil market interconnected? 
What are the sources of problems in these areas? Did US policies 
trigger or empower the problems of other countries? On the economic 
side, what is the effect of US energy companies on US foreign 
 
3 These three are defined as the forces of structure that interact reciprocally and contiunally. 
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policies? When oil prices are affecting importer country economies 
negatively, have US oil companies been strengthened because of 
high oil prices or any other factor? On the other hand, if the US wants 
to import more from its neighbours, does regionalism affect US 
policies? Here, we argue that there is a role for critical theory, which 
includes materials, institutions and ideas interactions, in responding 
to these questions from a historical perspective. Thus, the topic should 
not be analysed through a pure political-economic perspective but 
with the consideration of structure (social relations and physical 
production) and superstructure (ideology and political organizations) 
that encompasses both materials, institutions and ideas dynamics 
over time.  
 
1.2.     Research Aims, Objectives and Questions  
 
1.2.1. Research Aims and Objectives 
State behaviours, reflected in foreign and domestic policies, change 
according to different time, space and context dimensions. They can 
be analysed by focusing on one specific topic, for example the key 
area of oil diversification. Oil as a global `strategic` commodity has 
both economic and political aspects and it provides a highly significant 
area in which to analyse state foreign and domestic policy decisions. 
Moreover, oil is not only an object of these decisions, it is also a 
subject of them. For researching oil diversification, the USA is the best 
national case in which to analyse decision-making, both theoretically 
and empirically, due to the structure of the global unipolar system and 
its position as the leading oil importer.  
This research therefore aims to uncover general patterns of US oil 
diversification motivations with the help of a critical perspective, rather 
than mainstream IR approaches (i.e. Realism and Liberalism) which 
have dominated academic explanations to date, and in so doing 
reflect back on the value of such an approach for interpreting decision-
making. The research aims and objectives are: 
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• To critically review published studies on US oil diversification 
in order to identify gaps in their explanations: 
The existing literature will be evaluated according to critical 
theory`s principles (e.g. people as historical agents, state-
society complexity).  
• To develop a novel critical IR theory perspective in order to 
uncover US oil diversification motivations, thereby adding to 
the existing literature; 
A Coxian IR interpretation will be reviewed according to the 
new millennium`s realities. Thus, if they exist, new structural 
spheres may be found.  
• To construct a reflexivist epistemological and duration-based 
historicist methodological stance in order to apply this theory to 
the US case study on oil diversification; 
A Coxian IR theory will be operationalized through the 
combining of basic assumptions and stances of Critical theory 
and reflexivist epistemology to develop a novel methodology.  
• To examine the value of such a revised critical IR theory 
perspective for explaining US oil diversification; 
The theory will be assessed with the help of primary data which 
will be collected from official archives and semi-structured elite 
interviews, plus secondary data derived from official and 
academic sources. 
 
1.2.2. Research Questions 
This thesis examines the motivations for oil diversification in the US 
case. There is one main question and three sub-questions. These 
sub-questions are framed in order to find the best answers for the 
main question. Using critical theory, our sub-questions have been set 
up to have both synchronic and diachronic perspectives see Chapter 
4). The questions are framed to comprehend both a theoretical and 
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an empirical puzzle. As with problem-solving theory, we seek to reveal 
the current patterns of oil diversification (i.e. synchronic). However, on 
the other hand, we also try to find the triggers of those questions which 
have arisen in the historical process, which have been evolving since 
the early millennium (i.e. diachronic). Our main and sub-questions are 
therefore: 
How can the Iraq War, Keystone XL Pipeline and Arctic Drilling 
in the context of the Energy Revolution be theoretically 
interpreted to uncover general patterns of oil diversification? 
• What have been the definitions of oil diversification in US policy 
cycles and how have they been changing over time? 
 
• To what extent do these definitions fit the ‘material capabilities-
ideas-institutions’ arguments of Cox? 
 
• What are the limitations of this theory for explaining patterns of 
US oil diversification? 
 
1.3.    Contribution to the Literature 
This research contributes to three areas of scholarship, which are 
empirical, theoretical and methodological. The first contribution is 
aimed empirically at extending our understanding of US oil 
diversification motivations which is the main focus of the research 
(pure empirical contribution). Secondly, Coxian theory is presented 
along with its critiques in the literature and our contribution to 
developing Coxian theory, i.e. neo-Coxian arguments (pure 
theoretical contribution). Thirdly, a Coxian IR interpretation is used to 
determine energy security and more specifically on oil diversification 
motivations (theoretical and empirical contribution). Lastly, this Coxian 
IR interpretation is combined with a reflexivist epistemology in addition 
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to ontological corrections (theoretical and methodological 
contribution).  
The thesis, firstly, contributes to the literature is with regards to US oil 
diversification motivations. A review shows that there are six important 
points in the literature that should be looked at more closely. The first 
point, which focuses on arguments about the lack of a historical 
perspective, suggests that we accept people as `historical agents` 
(see Chapter 4). States’ relationships are going through changes in 
process. The second point evident in the literature is that there is no 
perspective on supplier sides, even amongst the `interdependence` 
defenders. However, oil diversification involves suppliers and 
demanders and the motivations of oil importers are also affected by 
suppliers` behaviours. As discussed below (see Chapter 4), people 
and states act not in behaviour but rather through behaviour. Thus, 
suppliers of US oil imports should be also looked at through their 
interests and interactions with the US. Thirdly, any sources of US oil 
diversification motivations ignore the domestic effect on US foreign 
and oil diversification policies. Separation of state and society cannot 
give an adequate view of US oil diversification, because there is state-
society complexity in the global arena (see Chapter 3). The fourth 
point is that there is no study which examines US oil diversification 
motivations through comparing different cases. Previous studies 
typically employ single, non-cumulative cases, making any 
generalisation problematic. In this study, while recognising the 
problems of generalisation from small N samples, three cases are 
nonetheless used to uncover US oil diversification motivations, 
thereby adding greater strength to the findings. Fifthly, oil producer 
states should also be considered as part of diversification (see 
Chapter 7). Thus, suppliers mean supplier countries and supplier 
states. Lastly, there is insufficient literature on KXL and Arctic Drilling 
in the context of the Energy Revolution. Moreover, the albeit limited 
Arctic Drilling literature is mainly concerned about the Arctic National 
Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) which is obviously related to the context. 
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However, this work provides sufficient grounds for using both these 
case studies to offer a historical-dialectical point of view. 
As a continuation of our critique against the literature, we have found 
that the general patterns of US oil diversification motivations are 
composed of the triangle of oil politics, domestic politics and foreign 
policy. The findings can also be applied to the pre-millennium era. 
However, every period also has their contradictions that are the 
products of the reflections of patterns in that period. The economy-
biosphere contradiction has been put placed within the context of oil 
politics. National-transnational benefits (Stokes and Raphael 2010) 
can become contradictory during the process as part of US foreign 
policy. Lastly, the dynamics between state-nation interests become 
more problematic in terms of domestic politics in the millennium. They 
are the triggers of the process, but not persistent.  
Secondly, Coxian theory is predicated on assumptions that balance 
materials and ideals, structures and agents and power and morality. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 3, Cox struggles to show 
transitions between issues of structure and agency, and state and 
society. This struggle leads to a misinterpretation of Cox by the 
literature. The first contribution is that operationalising Cox into a 
specific topic helps us to see this transition clearly. Secondly, Coxian 
critiques are outlined in order to see how Cox is interpreted by others, 
because there is no study that synthesises critiques of Cox after the 
study of Cox and Schechter (2002). The third part of this contribution 
is a review of Coxian structure dimensions. It is conducted with the 
help of Sinclair’s (2016) critique. ‘Social dynamics’ is added to the 
structure spheres. In this way, misunderstandings of Coxian analysis 
are eliminated with the help of operationalising the theory. Fourthly, 
however, the definition of institutions provided by Cox are too 
historically static. We know that they maintain global order, but our 
investigation shows their roles involve more active participation during 
the declining of this order.  
Thirdly, although there are studies on US hegemony, energy security 
and oil diversification motivations (Stokes 2005; Stokes and Raphael 
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2010), administration effects, changes in US policies (i.e. domestic 
and foreign) and the effects of US foreign policies on the US (plus 
responses from other countries) are also studied. While the 
arguments about world order and US hegemony are derived from 
Cox`s studies (see Chapter 3), the key motivations of oil diversification 
could be found via Coxian IR interpretation. Specifically, it should be 
noted how he draws upon the terms hegemony, the triangle of ideas-
material capabilities-institutions and the triangle of social forces-forms 
of state-world could be operationalized on the US oil diversification 
motivations. While these terms are used as basic concepts and 
transferred to oil diversification motivations in the US, additional 
arguments are also used in this research. Although the basic terms of 
his Neo-Gramscian interpretation is used for understanding US 
hegemony, reciprocal causality (i.e. inner states and inter-states) is 
used to find “rationally knowable principles” which are inspired from 
Vico and Ibn Khaldun, in the oil diversification motivations (Cox 1992: 
148). The importance of production, social forces and a dialectic 
approach which are drawn from Marx are the other realm that are 
used to find patterns and the triggers of the system. Lastly, synchronic 
and diachronic time frames which are sourced from the work of 
Fernand Braudel (1995 [1972]) are used to develop historical view on 
changing dynamics of US oil diversification motivations. 
Laslty, according to Cox (2008: 89), “more holistic, more relativistic, 
and more historically oriented approaches” are emerging.  Thus, we 
are living under the complexity paradigm at the moment. To better 
interpret the current global structure, reflexivist epistemology provides 
the most optimal opportunities. Reflexivity`s key assumptions, which 
are the intertwining of the observer-observed, and facts-values bring 
together ideas and materials. While ideas are directed by materials, 
there is also a feedback to materials from ideas. This becoming 
ontology (i.e. diachronic) which includes being (i.e. synchronic) 
provides a more active understanding and thereby creative 
explanation of global politics. However, it does not mean that a being 
ontology is entirely discounted. It is one of the ontological corrections 
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of Cox, while his theory is conceptualized in reflexivist epistemology. 
Although he suggests diachronic and synchronic views, he (2008) 
prioritises becoming rather than being. Besides the diachronic 
perspective, specific cases/events (i.e. synchronic) which also have 
systemic accumulation will be also looked at. Critical reflexivist 
approaches differ from positivism`s ahistorical explanations and law-
like generalizations in IR, and provides us with a patterns-based 
approach. Patterns are reflected in different images at different times, 
space and contexts. Oil diversification motivations should be found 
within patterns and then global arguments can be asserted. However, 
this leads to the second ontological correction of Coxian theory. While 
he avoids using the term `cause`, this research transforms his 
structural forces into the notion of structural causes (see Chapter 4). 
It is agreed with Kurki (2008) that Cox is afraid of using `cause` in 
order not to be trapped in positivism, but accepting `first cause` does 
not require a cause-effect relationship. Causation is accepted as only 
an ontological issue rather than epistemological in this research. 
 
1.4.     Thesis Structure  
The remainder of the thesis is structured into eight chapters. The 
second chapter explores the academic debates on energy security to 
identify gaps in the literature. Research questions are identified 
according to these gaps in the literature. There are six main parts to 
this chapter. Initially, security perspectives are provided through 
energy security definitions, concepts and perspectives. Theoretical 
perspectives on energy security are then discussed. Thirdly, the 
literature on oil, oil diversification and oil diversification motivations are 
outlined. The fourth section focuses on US oil diversification 
motivations, because the US is the only case used in this research. 
The fifth section is the key part of this chapter, because it combines 
all key points in the literature which are theoretical security, energy 
security perspectives and oil diversification motivations.  
Counterarguments are also discussed in this section. However, a 
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critique is provided to emphasise the necessity of using a critical 
perspective in the last section. 
The third chapter outlines the theoretical approach of the research. 
Critical theory is used for this research, drawing on a Coxian 
interpretation. The thesis develops the argument about our 
understanding of oil diversification, through its focus on hegemony, 
state-civil society and power-morality relationships. The main themes 
of critical theory are provided. Then, the main theoretical arguments 
are derived from the work of Cox or scholars who have subsequently 
developed his ideas. A Gramscian interpretation of hegemony is the 
basic concept employed to understand US oil diversification 
motivations theoretically. However, Cox`s structural forces that are 
operationalised to uncover the process of US oil diversification 
motivations empirically, are described along with Cox`s explanation of 
his times and future scenarios. We also provide critiques of Cox and 
our contribution to Coxian interpretations, i.e. a neo-Coxian analysis. 
Lastly, we show how Coxian structural forces that are identified as 
causes in this research will be operationalised to uncover US oil 
diversification motivations. 
The fourth chapter discusses the methodology of the research, which 
is critical reflexivity. A brief discussion of the philosophy of science is 
initially given to show the ontological foundations of the study. After 
giving the basic assumptions of positivism, realism and interpretivism, 
critical reflexivity and its benefits are presented. To understand what 
reflexivity asserts, design considerations are then given. Historicism 
is used for this research because critical theorists see people as 
historical agents, but the historical-dialectical approach is used to 
compare case studies. Later on in this section, case study choices 
and their roles are discussed. The last sub-part of this section 
describes how historical views are addressed through historical 
analyses, which is embraced as a duration-based perception. 
Duration is constituted by diachronic (historical process) and 
synchronic (current moment) time dimensions. Lastly, in parallel to our 
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critical reflexivist position, we provide a reflexive analysis section that 
shows how the research was undertaken. 
Chapter five explores the KXL in terms of US oil diversification 
motivations. The chapter starts with an introduction to the KXL, 
followed by examination of the literature on it. After providing 
highlights from a timeline of KXL and the historical background of US-
Canada oil relations, the process is described in detail using primary 
data collected via interviews and online sources from the US and 
Canada. The empirical structure also includes theoretical analysis 
based upon a duration based perception. Because of differentiated 
time structures, the processes are classified under three presidencies: 
George W. Bush (2001-2009); Barack H. Obama (2009-2017); and 
Donald J. Trump (2017- ). Following the presidential eras, data and 
its theoretical analysis are discussed in terms of the value of a Coxian 
view which also includes discussion of our neo-Coxian arguments.  
The sixth chapter explores the second case study of the thesis, the 
Iraq War. The first section the study provides context to the conflict by 
examining the literature on the war and then placing the thesis 
research into this context. The third section provides highlights of a 
timeline and historical background to the war. They are followed by a 
detailed theoretical analysis according to structural causes. Since 
every case is unique, the process of the war is classified according to 
the war’s key events for oil diversification. These are: Pre- and Early 
War: 1998-2004; The Era of Oil Law: 2005-2008; and Iraqi Oil 
Contracts with IOCs: 2009- . Primary data were collected via 
interviews, online sources and archive documents. Later on, data and 
their theoretical analysis are discussed in terms of the value of a 
Coxian view which also includes the discussion on our neo-Coxian 
arguments.  
The seventh chapter explores Arctic Drilling in the context of the 
Energy Revolution. As in the other two case studies, the chapter starts 
with an introduction to the main themes and a critique of the existing 
literature, which in this case is limited. The third section highlights the 
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timeline and historical background to Arctic Drilling. They are followed 
by a detailed theoretical analysis according to structural causes. 
Primary data were sourced from interviews, online sources and 
archive studies. The process is classed according to different 
Presidential administrations: George W. Bush (2001-2009); Barack H. 
Obama (2009-2017); and Donald J. Trump (2017- ), since the 
accumulation of the process is differentiated according to different 
governments. The process is then discussed in terms of the value of 
a Coxian view, which also includes consideration of our neo-Coxian 
arguments. 
The eighth chapter tests the suitability of the theory for US oil 
diversification motivations. This chapter is composed of five sections. 
It initially answers the first sub-question. US oil diversification patterns 
are synthesised to show how they have changed through time in the 
cases. To do this, it provides the brief historical background to US oil 
diversifications, what the case studies show and findings of these 
cases in the new millennium. The next section answers the second 
sub-question through discussing the following themes: uncovering the 
case studies’ patterns and interpretations, including the core value of 
the research to the US oil diversification motivations literature. The 
third sub-question is discussed in terms of limitations of the theory and 
the scope for neo-Coxian theoretical innovation. The fourth section 
discusses the limitations of the research methods. The last section 
provides recommendations for future research based upon the use of 
neo-Coxian interpretations to fill gaps in explanations of US oil 
diversification motivations. Normative implications of critical theory 
and how they may lead to future research are also discussed. 
The final chapter concludes the study by reflecting back on the 
research aims/questions and objectives, situating the findings within 




2. Literature Review  
 
This chapter situates the thesis research in the extant literature, to 
develop the gaps and research questions identified in Chapter 1. 
Here, it initially sets out the main arguments in the security studies 
literature to show how it has been dominated by IR Realist and 
Liberalism debates based upon a positivist epistemology. It then 
outlines how these mainstream theories have permeated the energy 
security studies literature, constituting a dominant theoretical 
paradigm. Critiques of this positivist paradigm within energy security 
studies are then discussed as a prelude to examining the implications 
of these theoretical arguments for studying oil diversification. A 
significant point then developed is that these theories may be 
inadequate for studying oil diversification motivations due to their 
narrow empirical focus on either state self-interest or economic 
cooperation, most notably their limited considerations of historical 
agents, structures and the synchronic-diachronic nature of evolving oil 
diversification motivations. One potential response, it is argued, is to 
engage in critical theoretical analysis to overcome these theoretical 
limitations. 
 
2.1.     Security Studies  
IR literature is a very broad church. Security is one of the most 
important subject areas in this literature. To understand the 
motivations for oil diversification within this body of research, and 
thereby energy security, security definitions need to be first examined.   
Within the literature, the notion of security is dominated by Realist and 
Liberal theory. These two interpretations constitute two sides of early 
debates in IR (Hoffman 1987; Dalby 1991), and still enjoy enduring 
popularity. Both theories also reflect a positivist understanding of IR. 
However, as this Chapter will argue, positivist understandings are 
increasingly inadequate since they only present a partial view of 
security. Thus, a critique of the energy security and oil diversification 
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literatures suggest that it has not widely been investigated using more 
critical, post-positivist or non-positivist perspectives – thereby 
presenting a significant gap in research. Initially, Realist and Liberal 
security understandings are presented in order to develop this line of 
argumentation. 
2.1.1. Realist Perspective 
Security, which means reducing threats or reducing damages of 
threats, is one of the most important areas of IR theory (Collins 2013). 
Although most IR theories offer explanations for security, Realism is 
one of the most important among security studies. Because Realists’ 
basic concerns are states, security and power, they are interested in 
inter-state competition and cooperation. However, states’ strategic 
behaviours are determined by an international structure that 
distributes the capabilities of states. Thus, Realism has a structure-
based point of view. International security cannot be studied without 
an acknowledgement of the contribution of Realism. 
Realism explains international security problems in reference to some 
basic terms, which are “states, power and international anarchy” 
(Glasner 2013: 14). In this view, there is not any authority over the 
international arena and states are therefore trying to secure 
themselves under an anarchy situation. States can secure themselves 
with power. Power includes wealth, population, technology and 
military capacity (ibid.). Power is steered by the state, which is a 
rational and unitary actor in the international arena. But one problem 
with Realism is that these terms are used according to a positivist 
perspective and even Realists themselves do not agree on 
terminology (Rose 1998). For example, when power allows a state to 
secure its position internationally (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001), 
there is no agreement about what security then entails. Therefore, it 
could be asked: what is a more secure position? And how much power 
is necessary for a state to secure itself? Thus, Baldwin’s (1997: 13-
17) questions, which are based on Wolfers (1952), have become more 
important in guiding research: “security for whom?”; “security for which 
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values?”; “how much security?”; “from what threats?”; “by what 
means?”; “at what cost?” “in what time period?”.  
Because of different perceptions of these terms, there are different 
types of international security explanations encompassed by Realism 
(Rose 1998; Glasner 2013). Thus, the international system is 
interpreted in different ways within Realism. For example, for Waltz 
(1979) states are trying to survive under an anarchic international 
system. States should adopt a “self-help” position to ensure the 
balance of power (Waltz 1979: 111). However, offensive realists see 
the international system as more competitive, so states attempt to 
maximize their power under the anarchic international system 
(Mearsheimer 1994; 2001). Compared to Waltzian explanations and 
Offensive Realism, Defensive Realists are more interested in context, 
so they believe cooperation is also possible as much as competition 
(Jervis 1978).  
A security dilemma is established due to the relationship with potential 
adversaries. If states care about their adversaries’ insecurities, they 
can reduce own insecurities. Thus, the key point for defensive realists 
is not power, rather danger (Waltz 1986). If the extinguishing of 
danger is pursued by states, there will be “much less room for 
increasing cooperation” as offensive realists believe (Jervis 1999: 51). 
When cooperation is possible, a zero-sum world perspective is also 
not expected from defensive realists. This understanding arises from 
an assumption that status quo powers can agree with expansionist 
powers to reduce conflict and this demand can be replied to positively 
by expansionist powers, because there is not only conflict of interests, 
but also a mixture of common and conflicting interests in international 
politics (Jervis 1999).  
While Realism is hugely popular within security studies, it nonetheless 
has problems in its application. Despite different priorities, the Realist 
view has a value- and history-free perception that cannot explain 
change in the system and has a materiality-based structure that 
cannot adequately explain foreign policy mechanisms (Lynn-Jones 
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2012). Moreover, Although Liberalism has a relative advantage over 
Realism in terms of explaining internal security dynamics, it is also 
based on principles (e.g. integration) that cannot be applied to all 
regions. What security studies require is a much wider view that can 
reflect back on these assumptions during the research process. 
2.1.2. Liberal Perspective 
Liberalism is the other important positivist theory of International 
Relations. With its scientific perspective, it shares some arguments 
with Realism, however, it also has different assumptions and thereby 
conclusions. For example, contrary to popular belief, Liberalism also 
“identifies states as the most important actors” (Morgan, 2013). Unlike 
Realism, Liberalism focuses upon states’ relationships with domestic 
and transnational dynamics to explain state behaviours. However, 
Liberals time-free explanation of these dynamics also entails a 
structural explanation, as in Realism, because temporal change in 
societal and transnational dynamics are ignored. This aspect of 
Liberalism, in which the state is seen as the most important actor, is 
criticised by Critical Security Theorists (Devetak 2005, Bilgin 2008). 
According to them, states are not the ends of security policy and they 
should be de-centred in scholarly studies as well as in policy practice 
(Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010). For Liberalists, besides the 
importance of states, there are also other factors which affect foreign 
policies, which are international governmental organizations, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), multinational corporations within 
the international system, elites and other domestic actors within 
domestic systems. Through this interaction, contrary to Realism, 
Liberalism believes in an inside-out approach to security. Thus, 
Liberalists put forward political, economic and social factors as 
important in affecting the international system and they have a more 
optimistic view about cooperation and integration that contrasts with 
the power-based perceptions of Realism. Mutual gains, rather than 
rational self-interest, can order the international system.  
Liberalism forwards four types of interpretation, which are 
“commercial or economic liberalism”, “human rights liberalism”, 
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“international organization or institutions liberalism” and “democratic 
liberalism” (Morgan 2013: 30). Commercial or economic liberalism 
normatively supports free-trade ideas and believes that capitalism can 
bring wealth and higher living standards. This belief is optimistic 
regarding the potential for cooperation. Human rights liberalism 
asserts the significance of international human rights norms in 
supporting cooperation. International organization or institutions 
liberalism tries to solve security problems with organizations or 
regimes. Institutional Liberals believe that states can cede much of 
their sovereignty to a central authority to create a more secure 
international system. Contrary to institutional liberalism, Realists 
believe that states establish organizations to help themselves in 
reaching goals (Jervis 1999: 54). Whereas Realists believe that states 
stand alone, Liberals believe that states act together. Thus, unlike 
Realists, Institutional Liberals emphasize “interdependence” 
(Keohane and Nye 1977). If states cede their sovereignty to 
international authority, it can be said that they are not rigid about 
sovereignty and authority (Morgan 2013: 34). The last belief of 
Liberalism, that democracy brings peace, stems from democratic 
liberalism. This idea’s basis relies on the philosophical arguments of 
Kant (Navari 2008). According to this idea, if every country has 
become a democracy, there would not be not war.  
Compared to other forms of security studies, Liberalism has a distinct 
advantage. Liberalism is not just a theory, rather it also reflects ideas 
and practice. However, strong criticisms against liberalism emerge 
from this point. Even though the problem of separation of theory and 
practice are discussed below, we need to know the potential 
contradictions of Liberalism now. For example, there is an inherent 
contradiction when some countries (e.g. China, Russia) violate human 
rights or do not implement democratic rules but have also totally 
adopted the current global economic market, a situation tacitly 
accepted by democratic countries. The other criticism relates to 
Western norms. As mentioned above, a belief in the necessity of 
spreading democracy and other liberal norms to the whole world 
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belongs to Western philosophy. Pressure on non-Western countries 
to accept Western norms can and does lead to a backlash.   
 
2.2.     Definitions, Concepts and Perspectives of Energy 
Security 
What then do these different IR perspectives mean for studying 
energy security? Energy security is a huge discussion topic in IR, 
because there are so many perceptions (Luft and Korin 2009a). For 
some scholars (for example, Cao and Bluth 2013), it is a topic of 
national security, whereas others (Manning 2000) see it as belonging 
to the market. Besides this discussion, some believe (Mulligan 2010) 
that energy is a material good which is provided by nature, thereby 
the environment. However, in the existing literature, the meaning of 
energy security generally depends on a market perspective.  
The market perspective is evident in many studies, with importer-
exporter and temporal approaches significant. When energy security 
is defined “as the availability of energy at all times in various forms, in 
sufficient quantities, and at reasonable and/or affordable prices” by 
the Clingendael International Energy Programme (2004: 37), it is seen 
as meaning reliable supplies at reasonable prices for the economy 
and industry, a feature shared by Dorian et al. (2006). Thus, sufficient 
quantities and affordable prices are the key factors in energy security, 
according to the existing literature. Classical energy security 
definitions are grounded in the 1973 Oil Crisis and the 1980s-1990s 
neoliberal dominancy. However, these definitions are seen as market 
based. From these definitions, one perspective that can be inferred is 
that they generally look at security from an importing countries’ 
perspective. Although the majority of the literature reflects an 
importer/developed countries perspective, the definition of energy 
security also logically depends on exporter countries (Vivoda 2009b; 
Goldthau and Sovacool 2012). Also, the importance of transit routes 
cannot be ignored in the energy security definition (Luft and Korin 
2009a). However, besides such theoretical and spatial approaches, 
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temporal perceptions should not be forgotten (Stringer 2008; Cherp 
and Jewell 2014). For example, the oil price fluctuations, which began 
in the 1970s, the Gulf War of the 1990s, the Iraq War, Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005, the global economic crisis of the new millennium and 
Covid-19, have had a huge effect on energy security perceptions at 
different points in time.  
Besides these theoretical, temporal and spatial effects, there are also 
socio-cultural and socio-political aspects to defining energy security 
(Chevalier 2006). For example, Yao and Chang (2014) believe that 
governments consider social and cultural factors in energy policy 
decision-making. Thus, governance has become more important than 
before and democracy’s effects also should not be ignored, because 
governments do not only try to serve their nations, but also serve their 
political parties. Governments sometimes ignore energy security or 
environmental security for supporting their position or using an 
environmental concern rhetoric to serve their political parties. What 
we have after these effects is a situation where energy security 
generates different perceptions from different scholars. For Stringer 
(2008: 123), it means energy supply infrastructure for the global 
economy, but also includes “military, diplomatic, informational and 
economic” elements. On the other hand, Kiriyama and Kajikawa 
(2014: 415) categorize energy security into four perspectives, which 
are “geopolitical, economic, policy related and technology”. Thus, 
energy security is not only perceived as involving military and national 
security or the economy, it can also include environmental and 
geopolitical perspectives. It therefore depends on which elements of 
the energy security dimension or dimensions is/are chosen by the 
definer. The literature on energy security can consequently be 
classified under four titles: theoretical; spatial; temporal; and socio-
cultural and socio-political works (see Table 2.1). 
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Table 2.1: Different approaches to energy security 
In general, energy security relates to different types of dimensions and 
includes different components. It is difficult to separate them, and also 
context dependency should not be forgotten. In this study, energy 
security will be discussed in terms of foreign policy conceptions. 
Foreign policy analysis will privilege all these factors. However, in 
order to analyse it, initially energy should be defined within the security 
concept. Is energy an object of security or a subject of security or 
both? If it is an object, it will be exposed to security threats. If not, it 
will be a generator of security threats (Johansson 2013a; 2013b). As 
Johansson’s (2013a: 599; 2013b: 200) classification shows, energy is 
an object under “security of supply” and “security of demand” sides, 
but it is a subject under “economic & political risk factors”, 
“technological risk factors” and “environmental risk factors”. Beyond 
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the energy-security nexus, Cherp and Jewell (2014: 416) evaluate 
energy security using Baldwin`s (1997) three questions “security for 
whom, security for which values and from what threats”, when Von 
Hippel et al. (2011: 6719) asks “what to protect, what risks to be 
protected from and how to protect” questions which are forwarded by 
Tanaka (1997). Similarly, Leung et al. (2014: 317) evaluate energy 
security along with “what to protect, from what risks and by what 
means” questions. 
In concluding this section, energy’s relationship with security and also 
energy security dimensions and perceptions have been given, along 
with their categories. Which dimensions are prioritized in this literature 
will now be discussed according to different theoretical perspectives. 
2.2.1. Realist Perspectives 
As mentioned above, Realists believe that states pursue power out of 
self-interest under conditions of international anarchy. Although 
different types of Realism think differently regarding some areas, they 
share some points which are the importance of power, the importance 
of the state as a unitary and rational actor and the importance of the 
anarchic international system (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001). Thus, 
they do not entirely ignore the economy, energy or institutional actors, 
because they believe that states pursue power. These types of 
materials and factors (economy, energy, or institutional actors) serve 
states in gaining more power. States use them only for their own 
benefits (Hancock and Vivoda 2014). Because of this self-interest, 
there are consequently different types of Realist explanations for 
energy security that evaluate how states approach it, namely: 
corporations; markets; and conflicts. 
The first explanation focuses on corporations. Due to global neo-
mercantilism/resource mercantilism, which involves state-sanctioned 
capital relations, NOCs have gained much more power in recent 
decades (Raphael and Stokes 2015). However, although some 
importer countries (e.g. China, India) follow these policies, exporter 
countries support this strategic policy more than importers. Thus, neo-
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mercantilism has spread to whole regions of the world. We can find 
this in some periods of history (Correljé and Linde 2006; Hancock and 
Vivoda 2014). For example, Hancock and Vivoda (2014: 1) argue that 
some years were conflictual (1970s-1980s) and NOCs were 
dominant, but some periods were more cooperative (late 1980s-
1990s). On the other hand, Correljé and Linde (2006: 532) believe that 
the current international system depends on post-1945 tenets, and 
they refer to it as Markets and Institutions. However, historical events 
(e.g. Iraq War, 9/11) have forced states to respond to the international 
system. Institutions and Markets have become more unreliable. Some 
states started to change their policies according to Regions and 
Empire (Correljé and van der Linde 2006: 536-537). Under the 
Regions and Empire approach, importer states are trying to solve 
supply disruptions, according to their policies, while exporter states 
are trying to follow bilateral agreements by which they can get more 
gains. Qinhua (2007) also supports this argument about exporters, 
believing that under the current international system, international 
organizations and International Oil Companies (IOCs) belong to 
Western countries, which are the main rule-makers. When exporters 
want to change this order, conflict or competition can start between 
importers and exporters. 
The second explanation is related to the first one. Although Realists 
do not ignore market power, they do not trust it either (Klare 2009a; 
Luft and Korin 2009b), because nearly 80 per cent of the world’s oil 
reserves are controlled by government owned companies (ibid.). Even 
though the market provides benefits much greater than conflict, it is 
not available in every instance: “In some cases, the materials at stake 
will be viewed as so essential to national survival or economic well-
being that compromise is unthinkable” (Klare 2002: 23). Furthermore, 
a global market can lead to conflict with some resources more 
valuable and states can become more conflictual (Klare 2002). Klare 
(2009a) continues his arguments about the market using the US case. 
Even though markets can be trustworthy, the US, it is argued, should 
protect its overseas oil delivery lines with military force. Conflicts in 
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the world cannot be ignored and decisions should be made according 
to them.   
Thirdly, Realists see the international system as conflictual and some 
regions which are specifically oil producing are considered more 
unstable (Cheon and Urpelainen 2015). Besides the danger of 
competition between states, conflicts are making the international oil 
system more dangerous. In this view, states use and should use more 
military force, because the problem is not about security, but is about 
degrees of insecurity. Insecurity is seen on land and at sea, because 
localized insurgency, separatist warfare, regional conflict and 
potential power wars increase degrees of insecurity (Klare 2009b). 
Thus, the problem not only involves oil producer countries. Transit 
lines are also important. The Strait of Malacca in South East Asia is a 
good example because it includes terrorist attacks, competition 
between states and geographic obstacles (Ziegler 2006). If states 
increase their military force, it will not only protect their demands, it 
will also affect future perceptions. Klare (2009b) believes that if all 
states increase their military power, they will try to avoid wars because 
of fear of attack from others, i.e. mutually assured destruction. Thus, 
Realists see energy security as a national security issue. National 
security is a key point for foreign policy decisions according to Realists 
and they see oil security policies as related to foreign policies. For 
example, the US “not only safeguards oil transport routes and oil 
producing regimes, but also contributes to political goals” in the Middle 
East (Metcalf 2013: 18-19). This position contrasts with Liberal views 
of energy security (see below). 
Derived from a security perspective, Realist Energy Security (Klare 
2009a; Klare 2009b; Luft and Korin 2009b) sees three important 
factors, which are corporations, markets and conflicts, contributing to 
energy security. As with Liberal Energy Security, which is shown 
below, their key terms and arguments are credible, but in their specific 
context. For example, there was conflictual context before and after 
73 crisis which the 1980s-1990s had a market based situation which 
was parallel to the wider neo-liberal wave. Liberal and Realist Energy 
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security cannot explain more general time and space dimensions. 
Conflicts are a reality of our world, and there are some results which 
arise from conflicts like economic and political uncertainties, and 
decisions which are caused by these uncertainties. These 
uncertainties lead to more protective policies such as mercantilist 
understanding of corporations and acting without trust of the market. 
However, this only provides a picture of one moment in time. States` 
foreign policies can lead to more conflictual world politics, and then 
these states can be affected by events which are actually being 
influenced by states. Thus, we believe that there is reciprocal causality 
in world politics, not looking at it from one point. The 1973 Oil crisis 
and Iraq War can be given as examples of this view. Besides 
reciprocity in world politics, there are also more general (i.e. spatially 
and temporarily) sources which will be mentioned below like the 
structure of world politics. As a problem-solving theory, the current 
realist perspective is able to see the realities of our world, but it is not 
plausibly able to explain the motivations for these realities. Thus, 
realists are limited by their perceptions.  
2.2.2. Liberal Perspectives 
Liberals generally focus on economic dimensions, or factors that 
affect the foreign policy decisions of states and elements which relate 
to economic dimensions. Their perceptions of energy security are 
influenced by assumptions which are related to these three effects 
(dimensions, factors and elements). There are three key points 
informing Liberal perceptions of energy security, which are a belief in 
markets and capitalism, interdependency and the activity of non-state 
actors.  
The first point relates to a belief in markets and capitalism. Liberals 
believe that there is a global energy market, which shapes global 
energy security (Luft and Korin 2009b). Under market conditions, 
states act rationally and they only follow the maximization of their 
profits. Trade is a better option than inter-state competition and it is 
difficult to see a mercantilist energy market (Fettweis 2009). Thus, 
they believe that market conditions are more optimal than Realist 
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beliefs which support resource mercantilism or neo-mercantilism. 
States which do not follow mercantilist policies accept free-market 
capitalism and want only stable global conditions. Even though these 
basic arguments are shared by Liberals, there are differing 
interpretations about the role of markets. Questions arising from this 
point are ‘What is the market?’ and ‘How is it shaping state 
decisions?’.  
According to Chester (2010: 891), there are two competing market 
paradigms which are “the pure Walrasian market” and “the market 
which is a social, political and historical construct”. The first variant is 
“assumed to clear automatically via price adjustments”, when the 
second of them is the “fruit of complex social and historical 
developments” (Chester 2010: 892). According to Chester (2010), 
both market definitions argue that the state has no active role in the 
market. However, the other argument about market order does not 
ignore state or government effects. Thus, some scholars (Helm 2002; 
Verrastro and Ladislaw 2007) believe that states should intervene in 
the market. Helm (2002) thinks that although there is an international 
energy market, it is complex because of government interventions. 
States intervene with four different strategies, which are “tax 
revenues”, “broad industrial and social objectives”, “on environmental 
grounds” and “security-of-supply reasons” (Helm 2002: 174). On the 
other hand, Verrastro and Ladislaw (2007) think that energy has a 
very important position in national and global economies, and that 
states which are importers and exporters try to change market 
dynamics according to their profits. Resource nationalism is therefore 
accepted under market conditions. However, Liberal scholars (Helm 
2002; Verrastro and Ladislaw 2007) totally disagree with Realist 
arguments and they (Helm 2002; Verrastro and Ladislaw 2007) 
believe that current conditions should be changed. Consequently, two 
different explanations of the state-government relationship are 
established. Beyond whole market definitions, Fuerth (2005) and 
Yergin (2005) see any challenges to the market as equal to any 
challenges to the US. Thus, Fuerth (2005) and Yergin (2005) 
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associate the market with US hegemony. This is the other main liberal 
perspective on the market.  
The second key point made by Liberals is highly related to market 
beliefs concerning interdependency. According to Liberals there is an 
interdependency condition under market order (Yergin 2006; 
Verrastro and Ladislaw 2007). There are two characteristics of states 
which are as producer and consumer. How much one side wants to 
buy energy resources, the other side wants to sell its energy 
resources just as much. Security of supply is as important as security 
of demand. Thus, there is “a mutual interdependency” between 
suppliers and demanders (Verrastro and Ladislaw 2007: 98). 
Although this perspective can be accepted from importer/developed 
countries, it cares about both sides of states (i.e. importer and 
exporter). The key point from this argument is that it opposes Realist 
arguments. Realists believe in, as is mentioned above, the existence 
of mercantilism. The next step of mercantilism is energy 
independence (Luft 2009; Samuelson 2011). Existence of security 
threats is a reality, and states should solve their insecurity conditions 
according to a Realist perspective. They generally quote from US 
President Nixon’s and then Carter’s energy independence emphasis 
that aims at freeing the flow of oil from foreign sources of supply to the 
US (Klare 2009a, 2009b; Luft 2009; Metcalf 2013). Liberals however 
do not accept energy independence, because the market in their view 
is self-ordering (Yergin 2005; Verrastro and Ladislaw 2007). If there is 
a supply disruption, it cannot be a self-reliant, because there is not a 
zero-sum game between importers and exporters (Černoch and 
Jirušek 2014), and problems can be solved only with cooperation. In 
justifying this position they (Verrastro and Ladislaw 2007: 99) argue 
that “of 193 countries in the world, none are energy independent”, 
providing a counter to Realists claims. 
Thirdly, although Liberals agree with Realists’ arguments on states as 
unitary actors, they also privilege non-state actors such as institutions 
in the global economic order, multinational corporations, civil society 
groups, governmental players and individuals (Hancock and Vivoda 
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2014). Due to the lack of a global governance system, these actors 
define the global energy security system. The target of institutions and 
corporations is therefore providing a more secure global system 
without war, and domestic actors act rationally according to this idea. 
Thus, cross-national variations cannot be explained with a state-
centric perspective (Hughes and Lipscy 2013). Leung et al. (2014) 
analyse China’s energy policies and its roots. According to them 
(2014), there is an interplay reinforcing the relationship between 
issues, ideas and institutions to focus on oil security policies. There is 
a complex energy security system set up to maintain Chinese oil 
policies. Thus, national and trans-local dynamics, and rational and 
ideational perceptions exist.   
Institutional dynamics are also considered important by Liberals. Helm 
(2002), in contrast, emphasises the importance and domination of oil 
companies. Besides the economic benefits of their dominance, there 
are also costs associated with these companies. According to him 
(2002: 176) “these companies are often vertically integrated, with the 
resulting incentives to discriminate between their own customers and 
those of rival suppliers”. Powerful companies are therefore a threat to 
both their customers and their rivals. This situation damages the 
market approach and in his view the market needs to be re-balanced 
as a result (Helm 2002: 177). To explain the importance of institutions, 
Yergin (2006) discusses the IEA and why it was set up. He (2006: 75) 
believes that the IEA was established by industrialized countries to 
defend themselves against the exporters’ oil weapon strategy. In this 
argument, the oil weapon means oil exporter countries using oil prices 
as a weapon against importers. More specifically, whenever exporters 
want to, they can stop or reduce oil production. Thus, they can affect 
oil prices suddenly and limit importers’ decisions about oil imports and 
other foreign policy decisions such as the 1973 oil crisis. Regarding 
this point, the questions that arise include: Why were the IEA and 
OPEC set up?; and Are institutions set up to support national power?.  
Contrary to Realist Energy Security`s three arguments, which are 
corporations, markets and conflicts, Liberal Energy Security therefore 
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asserts three main assumptions: belief in markets and capitalism; 
interdependency; and the activity of non-state actors. Liberals belief 
in the market’s self-ordering structure is significant. States want to act 
under the market conditions in order to maximise their own profits. 
Both sides’ (Realists and Liberals) arguments could be seen as valid. 
Also Liberals’ market explanations should be used. Whether Yergin 
(2005) and Fuerth (2005) support US hegemony with a liberal market 
perspective or not, current liberal market conditions should not only 
evaluate with mercantilist policies, rather also US hegemony, its 
effects on mercantilist policies and how US hegemony is affected by 
these mercantilist policies. Moreover, although there is no 
independence in energy policy (i.e. a Liberal argument), some states 
are trying to get more independence in energy thereby foreign policies 
such as US (a Realist argument). How interdependence is structured 
and its potential effects on independence targets should be assessed. 
Lastly, although both sides accept the state as a unitary actor, Liberals 
also assert non-state actors like institutions (e.g. NOCs) in contrast to 
Realists` structure-based explanations. Both sides’ perceptions are 
therefore valuable and moreover should be used. However, as argued 
in this thesis, only a critical perspective that adopts a holistic view can 
comprehend these assumptions without prioritizing any of them.   
2.2.3. The Alternative Approach and Climate Change  
Geopolitical (Realist) and Market (Liberal) approaches’ arguments 
about energy security are outlined above. As mentioned, they 
constitute the principal arguments on energy security in the IR 
literature. Whereas Realists assert their arguments with a pessimistic 
view, Liberals believe in more optimistic global conditions. Both sides’ 
positivistic approach leads to them more material- and state-centred 
approaches while Liberals also consider non-state actors. Although 
their arguments cannot be denied easily, because their arguments 
seem coherent theoretically and supported by examples, whether 
some areas are covered by both sides’ arguments is a moot point. 
The key point is the degree to which these arguments reflect the whole 
of reality. The explanatory scope of theoretical explanations is also 
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important. Rather than taking a snapshot of energy security at specific 
points in time and space, we care about the temporal evolution of 
these dimensions. 
Because of this, there are two more additional approaches to energy 
security which could be labelled as the “Alternative Approach” and 
“Climate Change” perspectives that aim to fill in the blanks left in the 
literature. These two approaches either use a material- or norm- and 
state-centred approach.  Both approaches will be described under the 
same title because their arguments relate to geopolitical and market 
approaches. Although they are presenting new arguments, we can 
see the influence of geopolitical and/or market approaches.  
Youngs (2007) and Tunsjø (2010) present alternative approaches to 
the first two theories. They (Youngs 2007; Tunsjø 2010) accept 
geopolitical and market approaches and try to synthesise them into 
one theory. Tunsjø (2010) does this by accepting the key terms of 
both sides. For example, it is argued that there is a totally competitive 
energy market because of the existence of a zero-sum game and 
states should cooperate under this system. States can reduce market 
risks with cooperation which includes “hedging and risk management” 
(Tunsjø 2010: 28). Hedging is given, because the percentage of 
government based oil companies are not ignored. Diversification is 
the best option for hedging, because states encompass tools that are 
finance, politics, military, and diplomacy (Tunsjø 2010: 31). Youngs 
(2007) stresses the necessity of the market-government nexus. He 
(2007) evaluates his theory using the EU-Russia relationship. There 
is a market based rhetoric that belongs to the EU governance system. 
After Russia’s rejection of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), the EU 
has tried to apply market principles to Russia. Thus, Russia wanted 
to participate in the global market system and accepted it. Whereas 
the EU tried to impose its values on Russia, both sides agree on the 
benefits. While the EU spread its values to another state, Russia 
benefitted from trade with the EU. As an economic and an energy 
sector, both sides received gains from trade and mutual dependency. 
Despite their initial good relationship, framed by dialogues and 
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agreements starting after 2000, the reality of the market system was 
far from what is seen: the period thereafter was characterized by 
conflict when Russia ceased supplying EU states in the Ukraine gas 
crisis. Producer countries therefore follow norm-based foreign policy 
to a point. However, that said, EU-Russia energy trade is still 
continuing. Thus, there is not a balance between the EU`s internal and 
external dimensions nor between market and strategic approaches in 
the world. To provide balance, “conjoining markets and politics” is 
therefore necessary (Youngs 2007: 15). 
Environmental concerns started in the 1960s; however, its 
consideration in IR, and thereby energy security, only began at the 
start of the new millennium (Collins 2013). Politics or economics were 
important in the Cold War or Post-Cold War dynamics until the 
millennium; however, after that time a new global order has presented 
new problems. Besides expanding consumption, increasing 
environmental concerns place energy security within this wider debate 
(Stringer 2008). Environmental concerns are accepted as a third 
dimension of energy security, along with market and geopolitical 
concerns (Victor and Yueh 2009; Ciută 2010). These explanations 
generally depend on a norm-based perspective. Because of that, they 
do not totally disagree with Realist and Liberal explanations, but ask 
the “why” question as an additional critique. Although Ciută (2010) 
does not focus on environmental problems, he utilises norm-based 
approaches in examining energy security. He (2010) believes that any 
problem can exist only under its context. It means that every situation 
is located under its conditions. Thus, it should not be mixed with other 
conditions.  If there is a problem in the market, it is on the market and 
not in energy security. And also, under market conditions, competition 
for energy resources cannot be ignored. Every competition and 
cooperation should be evaluated according to its context. When in 
some contexts energy is an object, in other contexts energy is a 
subject for energy security. Thus, the `right` concept of energy 
security appears a normative rather than an analytical choice’ (Ciută 
2010: 129). 
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Kuzemko and Bradshaw (2013) evaluate a normative energy security 
approach for environmental concerns. According to them (2013), 
there was a dominance of neo-liberal ideas in the West in the 1980s-
1990s. Environmental concern was one of them. However, 
environmental concern has now fallen behind other liberal thoughts. 
Economics was seen as more important than the environment and the 
market was blamed for ignoring this point (Kuzemko 2013). On the 
other hand, when the Western media emphasised energy 
independence between 2001 and 2006, a strategy now pursued by 
non-Western states (Bordoff et al. 2010). When geopolitical 
competition has increased between Western and non-Western 
countries after the mid-2000s, environmental concerns have also 
found themselves increasingly discussed as part of energy security. 
Thus, at the same time climate change, geopolitical and market 
factors are seen as significant (Kuzemko 2013). The problem is that 
under us and them perspectives, how can the climate change problem 
be solved? The answer is important, because environmental 
problems can be only solved by cooperation between countries.   
The other important point about energy security and environmental 
concerns is the contradiction between them (Mulligan 2010; Berdoff 
et al. 2010; Froggatt et al. 2013). If fossil fuels are consumed, climate 
change problems increase, meaning ensuring energy security can 
lead to environmental impacts. Thus, although climate change is seen 
as outside of energy security problems, it is highly connected with it. 
Only renewable energy solutions can solve the contradiction between 
energy security and climate change (Froggatt et al. 2013), but 
renewable energy is expensive due to infrastructure costs. Although 
there is now a positive trend in terms of renewable energy investment 
and consumption, oil is still more profitable for investors and thereby 
preferable for consumers. What the shale revolution has done in the 
US has had massive effects relative to renewable energy investments 
and policies such as the EPAct and EISA. Renewable energy has 
helped to reduce gasoline prices, but the shale revolution has made 
the US a game changer. The costs of energy are increasing, if 
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environmental concerns are accounted for in energy pricing policies. 
Thus, the problem is about quantity of energy consumed and its effect 
on the environment. There is not any direct relationship between 
environmental concerns and oil diversification in the literature. Oil 
diversification can lead to consuming more energy, thereby affecting 
the environment, so motivations for oil diversification is affected by 
environmental concerns indirectly. 
After our Realist and Liberal energy security interpretations, Youngs` 
(2007) and Tunsjø`s (2010) arguments might be easily understood, 
because they are only synthesising Realist and Liberal arguments. 
However, the same critiques still exist. In response, we do not only 
combine both sides (i.e. realist and liberal) arguments, we also try to 
look at behind the scene. At that point, Ciută`s (2010) condition based 
explanation is closed to us, however, his explanation is based on a 
normative choice. However, historical-dialectical view that considers 
ideas-materials continual transition can put the context in a historical 
line. The same arguments might militate against Kuzemko and 
Bradshaw (2013). We believe that normative elements are triggered 
by material realities and they are affecting these material realities. It 
is argued that there are more than one structural dynamic and more 
than one agent interests. Thus, what we believe that alternative 
approaches only partially fill the gaps in realist-liberal explanations, 
therefore we need to look beyond positivist theory. 
 
2.3.     Oil, Oil Diversification and Motivations of Oil 
Diversification 
An important signifier of energy security is oil security, since it is the 
most important energy source globally and there are many concerns 
over access to oil and hence interest in oil diversification. Because of 
these reasons, the importance of oil and the oil diversification 
literature will be given in this section. 
Since the First and Second World Wars, oil has assumed a key 
position in IR. Its importance has expanded to a position where it 
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affects all sectors of life. Despite oil’s importance now decreasing 
because of other energy resources such as shale gas and 
renewables, it is still the most important energy resource. 
Transportation still depends on oil (Cao and Bluth 2013) and it is 
relatively cheap to use and to transport compared with other fuels. 
However, although some threats such as terrorism and conflict 
jeopardise the security of supply, states cannot give up oil usage due 
to its economic benefits. These benefits cannot be ignored, because 
any oil price fluctuations affect almost everything (e.g. food, furniture, 
governments’ re-election chances). Owing to its huge importance, 
Vivoda (2008: 10) characterises “the international [oil] market as a 
`politicised` market”, because governments want to interfere in this 
market. Thus, the “world will not run out of oil for both technical and 
policy reasons” (Dorian et al. 2006: 1990) and it is not surprising to 
see oil security as an energy security issue (Dirks 2006; Vivoda 2010). 
As mentioned above, although there are different interpretations of 
energy security dimensions, the current literature identifies four key 
dimensions which are “economic, geopolitical, environmental, and 
military and national security” (Wu 2014: 5) or “geological, economic, 
socio-political and environmental” (Sovacool 2011: 7472). Any 
challenge to these four dimensions affects energy security or security 
in the case of oil. Oil is a commodity. It follows that oil prices are the 
most important symbol of oil security. When oil prices are affected by 
oil/energy security, they also affect energy security. This feature has 
been visible since the 1973 Oil crisis. Since that time, oil price 
fluctuations have always been evident. To escape from price 
fluctuations and other security factors mentioned above, states are 
trying to establish more secure oil imports. Diversification is seen as 
the most important policy to ensure energy security (Yergin 2006; 
Stringer 2008; Cao and Bluth 2013; Kiriyama and Kajikawa 2014). 
Most scholars believe Churchill`s idea is still valid in that “Safety and 
certainty in oil lie on variety and variety alone” (Kalicki 2007: 79; 
Stringer 2008: 127). Before explaining the motivations for oil 
diversification (to address the why question), as a beginning we need 
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to understand what diversification is and how countries can diversify 
oil supplies.  
General definitions of diversification refer to importing any source from 
different countries (Cohen et al. 2011). However, some scholars 
understand diversification as diversifying different sources and 
suppliers (Bahgat 2006; Kalicki 2007; Stringer 2008). Besides the 
different sources and suppliers explanation, there are also other 
explanations that include other factors. For example, Rosner (2009) 
sees diversification as availability for supplier countries, transport 
routes and energy sources in the case of EU imports. In the same 
case (i.e. EU), Chevalier (2006) also uses three areas of 
diversification including technologies, primary sources and 
geographical diversity of imports. Ang et al. (2015) identify source, 
spatial, energy mix, technology and transport route diversification. 
Highly connected with these arguments, Dirks (2006) notes 
alternative fuels, technology, sources of energy imports, product 
imports, energy import contracts and market participants. As areas of 
diversification besides the diversification of energy policies on 
conventional fossil fuels, Cohen (2007: 1) expands the meaning of the 
energy mix to non-traditional oil sources “such as oil sands, oil shape, 
deep off-shore oil, and heavy crude oil”.    
An economic perspective asserts that importer countries can reduce 
their vulnerability to price fluctuations and to exporter countries’ 
potential oil as a weapon policy with diversification (Kalicki 2007). 
However, this perspective is criticised by others (Nivola and Carter 
2010). Counter-arguments assert that the oil market is global, not 
regional like the gas market, because oil can be transported easily 
and more cheap. Therefore, any dramatic events (human or naturally 
inspired) anywhere can affect oil prices in the world. There is no door 
to escape from fluctuations in oil prices. However, although importer 
countries cannot escape from oil price fluctuations, they can reduce 
vulnerability to supply disruptions (Ang et al. 2015). Thus, we have 
passed to a geopolitical perspective. The other important argument 
concerns military security. Oil rich countries and oil transport routes 
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are generally associated with unstable regimes (Stringer 2008). To 
reduce vulnerability to disruptions caused by events, importer 
countries are trying to expand their import sources. These disruptions 
can happen because of human activities (e.g. terrorist attacks, Gulf 
Crisis) and natural events (e.g. 2005 Hurricane Katrina).  
Besides economic and geopolitical factors, some studies focus on 
systemic and non-systemic risks (Lesbirel 2004; Vivoda 2009a). 
Lesbirel (2004: 10) explains systematic and specific risks. Systematic 
risk is a non-diversifiable risk. Thus, any events involving systemic risk 
affect the whole market. Specific risks, which are diversifiable risks, 
are more unique or specific. Lesbirel (2004) attributes economic 
factors to the systemic side and political factors to the specific side. 
On the other hand, Vivoda (2009a) emphasises the context 
dependency of diversification and gives indicators of oil import 
diversification in the cases of the US, China and Japan. There are two 
features identified, which are country specific and systemic types. 
Country specific types are “oil import dependence ratio”, “total oil 
imports”, “change in total oil imports”, “Middle East oil import ratio”, 
“non-regional oil import ratio”, “total oil stocks”, “vulnerability 
perception” and “past experience”, while systemic types are 
“instability in major supply disruptions”, “non-market strategies” and 
“exporter concentration” (Vivoda 2009a: 4618). He (2009a: 4620) then 
gives the limitations of oil import diversification which are “geography”, 
“political relationship”, “availability of oil and transportation 
infrastructure”, “refining capacity”, “policy” and “resources”. 
In this study, oil diversification is accepted as a diversification of 
suppliers. Thus, diversification is defined in its spatial context. US oil 
diversification is analysed from both economics and political factors 
and both systemic and specific risks and implications, to uncover 
patterns of the motivations for diversification. 
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2.4.     US Oil Diversification 
US oil diversification policy is a topic of oil security, thereby energy 
security. To understand more clearly what the US oil diversification 
motivations are, US energy security perceptions should initially be 
considered. Sovacool and Brown (2010) assert that energy security is 
defined by the definers which are generally engineers, economists, 
consumers/users, producers and politicians. However, the main 
energy security conception includes three pillars which are related to 
national styles, geology and geography (Sovacool and Brown 2010: 
80). These three pillars are evident in US energy security and four 
main outcomes arise which are “availability of sufficient supplies at 
affordable prices, protecting Middle East suppliers and shipping lanes 
against piracy and attack, maintaining a SPR, and reducing physical 
threats to energy infrastructure” (Sovacool and Brown 2010: 80). On 
the other hand, the US Chamber of Commerce (UCC) (2016: 29) 
proposes four main sub-indexes to analyse US energy security risk 
which are geopolitical, economic, reliability and environmental. 
Because of their relations with foreign policy, the first two factors have 
30% importance, whereas the others have 20% importance in terms 
of energy security risk (ibid.). Lastly, Salameh (2003: 135) believes 
that four main themes direct US energy security policies, which are 
diversity of the fuel mix (e.g. oil, natural gas, nuclear power), diversity 
in the geographic origin of energy, conservation and energy efficiency 
and managing growing dependence on oil imports.  
 
The main pillars, which are given above, show us the main points of 
US energy security. As can be determined easily, the last source 
(Salameh 2003) presents more practical arguments. These 
arguments include one more perception of oil in terms of its 
importance. In 2016, 37% of US energy consumption was petroleum 
which includes crude oil and natural gas plant liquids (EIA 2017). 
Moreover, crude oil is the largest source of US energy imports (CIA 
World Factbook 2019). Because of the importance of oil diversification 
policies, we need to find indicators which represent the importance of 
oil import diversification. Vivoda (2009a: 4618) asserts four systemic 
and seven specific (country) types of indicators. Specific indicators 
are “oil import dependence ratio, total imports, change in total oil 
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imports, Middle East oil import ratio, Total Oil Stocks, Vulnerability 
perception and Past experience” (Vivoda 2009a: 4618). Vivoda 
(2009a) believes that after analysing US oil quantitative indicators, 
successful US diversification policies can be easily identified. 
However, the main motivations of US oil diversification are evaluated 
qualitatively in this research. In the literature, the motivations of US oil 
diversification policies are based upon four main factors which: are 
energy independent policy; oil’s relation with foreign policy; avoiding 
shortages; and duality of transnational and national (i.e. US) interests.  
 
The first argument asserts the importance of oil independence targets 
in US oil policies. Dependence on Middle East oil was first discussed 
in the US after the 1973 Oil Crisis. In this event, the US supported 
Israel in the Arab-Israeli war and OPEC then raised oil prices for US 
exports in retaliation. This event then precipitated the oil crisis and 
recession in the USA. In 1974, President Richard Nixon announced 
the danger of dependency on any one country for energy imports 
(Nixon, 1974). Then in 1977, President Jimmy Carter made energy 
independence the central ambition of his presidency. Dependence on 
foreign oil was defined as a danger for US national security (Carter, 
1980). An oil independence target was then defined by the George W. 
Bush administration. The target was replacing the huge amount of oil 
imported by the USA from the Middle East with domestic production 
(Bush, 2006). This process affected the definition of energy 
independence used in relation to the USA. Sovacool (2007: 5506) 
therefore defines `energy independence` in this context as “ending all 
oil imports, eliminating imports only from the Middle East, merely 
reducing dependence on foreign imports, and entirely weaning the 
country of oil”. Using this argument, the Middle East is seen as a 
danger because of its control of oil and its countries` relationship with 
the US (Andrews 2005). This relationship is argued to be based on 
conflict and hostility.  
The basic emphasis in this argument is based on where the oil import 
derives from. The target actually is not diversifying the suppliers, 
rather it is seeking to reduce reliance on the Middle East. However, 
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there are two different disagreements with this idea. One of them is 
from an oil price perspective. This view asserts that oil is fungible 
(Brown and Huntington 2015; Crane et al. 2009). In short, this term 
means that oil has a global market and any incident anywhere will 
affect global oil prices, because world oil prices move together (Brown 
and Huntington 2015: 10). Thus, a state cannot insulate itself from oil 
price effects. There is no independence. It can be deduced that this 
side sees diversification policy as infeasible (Brown and Huntington 
2015; Crane et al. 2009). The second counter argument separates 
dependency and vulnerability (Salameh 2003 and UCC 2016). If the 
importer state diversifies its oil suppliers, although it cannot reduce its 
dependency, it will reduce its vulnerability. In this view, the US should 
act to prevent using oil as a political weapon by OPEC which is what 
happened in the 1973 crisis. There is a global oil market and it can 
only be sustained with `interdependence` rather than an 
`independence` target, as the latter is unrealistic. Thus, the second 
view is closer to diversification policies than the first and its argument 
illustrates the relationship between diversification policies and foreign 
policy.  
The second argument is related to diversification`s importance for 
foreign policy. At this point, it is seen in the context of two basic 
arguments which are derived from liberalist and realist perspectives. 
The liberal side emphasises an interdependency and optimistic 
perspective based on cooperation between states. A CNA Report 
(2009) asserts that there is an interdependent oil market. Under this 
system, the US cannot be truly independent of anything in terms of 
energy matters (CNA 2009: 2). The US should therefore act according 
to what the system requires. Diversification policies rely on the 
reciprocal relationship between exporters and importers. Both sides 
need each other. If the state wants to diversify its suppliers, it should 
have a good relationship with other countries. Thus, this perspective 
sees that diversification policies shape foreign policy, because they 
have a trigger effect. Rutledge (2005) exemplifies this argument with 
US foreign policies on Central Asia. While the US increases its imports 
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from Central Asia, it can also improve its friendly relationship with ex-
Soviet Union countries. Foreign policy then becomes an output of 
diversification policy. 
On the other hand, the Realist perspective sees oil and oil 
diversification policies more as a tool of foreign policy (Klare 2012; 
Klare 2014b), thereby reversing this relationship. This perspective 
gives more importance to geopolitics. The US foreign policy targets 
remind us of the Carter Doctrine, which was proclaimed in 1980, which 
stated that the United States would use military force if necessary to 
defend its national interests in the Persian Gulf, and its different 
reflections (Klare 2009a). Klare (2012) argues that the expansion of 
US military power can be supported with diversification policies. Along 
with the diversification policies, the US would have more allies and 
trading partners and it can easily expand its military capacity to protect 
them. George W. Bush`s (2002) affirmation is shown as an example 
to emphases on the Western Hemisphere, Africa, Central Asia and 
the Caspian region. Klare (2014b) continues this line of argumentation 
to evaluate the Obama administration’s actions on the KXL project, 
because for him “Obama`s principal international objectives were to 
withdraw from ground wars in the Middle East and refurbish the US 
image abroad”. Here, arguments on green technology and the 
environment were used as justifications for oil diversification. 
However, Klare (2014b) cares more about energy independence 
rather than the American image. When the KXL was withdrawn, US 
reliance on Middle East oil increases. However, the US can push 
severe sanctions on Iran, when it has less reliance on Middle Eastern 
oil. 
The third argument made relates to shortages of global oil supplies, 
which include terrorist attacks, storms, accidents, blackouts, wars and 
surges. At this point, we see once again the US turning away from the 
Middle East, but this argument is more about the region`s volatile 
politics and economics rather than the region`s huge oil reserves and 
their potential effects on global oil prices (O`Sullivan 2013). This 
situation leads to instability, thereby oil import shortages. To improve 
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energy security, using this argument, the US needs to diversify from 
more risky towards more stable democratic states (Clemente 2015). 
Besides the volatility of the Middle East, its distance to the US also 
cannot be ignored. The oil which comes from the Middle East travels 
“long-haul” and arrives in the US market after several weeks, whereas 
the oil which comes from Venezuela is “short-haul” and arrives in a 
few days (Rutledge 2005: 97). However, in terms of supply 
disruptions, the Middle East and its volatility is not the only problem. 
There is one more reason to diversify oil import suppliers, namely 
natural hazards. In 2005, Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf of Mexico 
brought a new dimension to oil security (Chevalier 2006: 1). Besides 
the human-resourced obstacles, there is also the huge importance of 
natural factors. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 show that the US 
should not only worry about the Persian Gulf, but also the Gulf of 
Mexico (Yergin 2005). These hurricanes impacted on an energy 
affected US economy and national security, thereby domestic and 
foreign policy through supply, price and systems (infrastructure) 
issues (Chow and Elkind 2005: 147-152). The importance of 
diversification is the basic element of supply issues, because more 
than one-third of US oil production was affected by these incidents 
(Chow and Elkind 2005: 147). 
The fourth perspective concerns the relationship between US oil 
diversification motivations and the contemporary global system. There 
are two main logics which concern the US: national and transnational, 
which operate within the US empire system (Stokes 2005; Stokes 
2007; Stokes and Raphael 2010). When the US state intervenes or 
acts in any country, it is not directly for the protection of American 
capital per se, but for transnational capital. However, on the other 
hand, scholars argue that “the USA is the first state among capitalist 
equals” (Stokes 2005: 228). For example, in the Iraq War case, the 
US opened up Iraqi oil to the world capitalist system which is led by 
core capitalist powers and has acquired crucial energy sources via 
world markets.  When looked at energy matters closely, it can be seen 
that US policymakers see energy security as one of the most 
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important issues related to foreign and security issues (Stokes and 
Raphael 2010). Moreover, oil’s importance to energy resources 
means it has a central position. US oil diversification motivations have 
a strong relationship with the state`s global targets. While the US 
wants to open up the global South’s economy to the global economic 
system, diversification policies have given beneficial support. 
Whereas the US is trying to diversify imports from the Gulf and 
establish an American hegemony in other oil rich zones in the South 
such as West Africa, Central Asia, the Caspian and Latin America, 
military aid and training programs help to facilitate US policies. These 
“counter-insurgency” programmes help to stabilize the global South 
and integrate their oil and economy within a globalising world (Stokes 
2007). Thus, diversification of oil, counter-insurgency, US foreign 
policy and the global economy are interpreted as key factors. 
The main literature about US oil diversification motivations have four 
main standpoints which are: energy independence; diversification’s 
relation with US foreign policy; oil shortages; and the dual logic of 
transnational and national (i.e. US) interests. There are four points 
which show the gaps in the understanding of US oil diversification 
motivations in the literature. The first point seen in the arguments is a 
lack of historical perspective. Only the last argument (i.e. the dual logic 
of national and transnational interests) is exceptional, because it is set 
up through comparison of the early internationalization and 
transnationalisation era. However, even this literature does not 
intentionally focus on historical context. On the other hand, we accept 
people as `historical agents` (see Chapter 4) and we believe a 
historical view can help us understand how dynamics can have 
different interactions in different times because of the accumulation of 
process. States` relationships are changing in this process. The 
second deficit seen in the literature is that there is no perspective from 
supplier sides, even in the `interdependence` defenders. Oil 
diversification is happening between suppliers and demanders and 
motivations for oil imports are also manifestly affected by suppliers’ 
behaviours. As discussed in Chapter 4, people and states act not in 
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behaviour rather through behaviour. Thus, suppliers of US oil imports` 
policies and behaviours should also be examined since even 
`interdependence` argument defenders (i.e. Liberals) do not examine 
this. Thirdly, any sources of US oil diversification motivations ignore 
the domestic effect on US foreign and oil diversification policies. 
Separation of state and society cannot give an adequate argument of 
US oil diversification, because there is state-society complexity in the 
global arena (see Chapter 3). The last deficit is that there is no study 
which seeks to uncover US oil diversification motivations through 
comparing different cases. All arguments in this literature are asserted 
without empirical testing or by employing single cases: a significant 
challenge to their validity. 
   
2.5.     Theorizing Oil Diversification Motivations in the IR 
Literature 
As discussed above, IR theories’ interpretations of oil diversification 
motivations are shaped by their energy security perspectives. 
However, oil diversification itself is a more specific and detailed topic 
in the energy security literature, with two main theoretical explanations 
applied. Here, Realist and Liberal interpretations are evident in the 
literature but other theories are largely absent (Tunsjø 2010). Also, as 
mentioned above, an environmental perspective does not readily 
address the motivations for state oil diversification.  
2.5.1. Realist Interpretations  
Realism focuses on analysing insecurity conditions in IR and 
normatively tries to find ways of reducing potential damages for states. 
However, the dominant literature is interested specifically in the US 
(Klare 2008a, Luft 2009). Realist oil diversification interpretations are 
hence similar to their energy security approaches and diversification 
is seen as one of the most important policies that states can adopt to 
enhance security (Luft 2009). To interpret oil diversification 
motivations, the first step for Realists is finding state insecurity 
motivations, and then solving them. There are three arguments about 
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state motivations for oil diversification presented by Realists, which 
are oil’s importance in terms of national security, independence 
security perceptions and foreign policy. 
When considering national security, oil’s position in the global energy 
system is significant. Population, industrialization and urbanisation 
are on the rise globally. Thus, global demand for energy is increasing, 
while oil demands are expanding. Although oil’s importance as an 
import commodity can decrease with the diversification of fuel policies, 
the transportation sector still depends on oil. Thus, oil demand goes 
up and oil becomes a strategic asset for ensuring national securities 
(Klare 2008b). Under the Realist national security argument, reliance 
on imported oil should be reduced and diversification is seen the best 
optional policy for achieving this target (Luft and Korin 2009a). 
Security of oil imports is therefore seen more as a national security 
issue than one of economic security. In this simple cause-effect 
solution, diversification of oil increases national security. 
Secondly, in the independence argument the centre of gravity of world 
oil production has shifted from North to South but the South has 
political instabilities such as ethnic extremism and criminal violence 
(Klare 2008a). A result of the South`s instability, the consumer 
countries’ oil imports reflect a national emphasis on increased 
diversification. Under this Realist logic, countries which import oil from 
different suppliers and transport routes will not depend on any one 
specific area due to their diversification policies. Besides supplier and 
transport route problems, there is one more concern that the Realist 
perspective cares about, namely terrorism. Robert Ebel observes that 
militarily “Pipelines are very soft targets” and “They're easy to go after. 
It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out where you can do the 
most damage, both physical and psychological, with the minimum 
amount of effort and the minimum chance of being caught” (cited in 
Vieth and Rubin 2003). Although the dominant literature looks at these 
threats from the importer country perspective, there is also lessons for 
exporters. Importer or exporter states cannot trust other states, 
because the global energy market does not solve the problems of 
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international anarchy. Here, interdependency cannot solve security 
problems or reduce security threats or the damages of threats and 
can increase them. Diversification of oil is an important strategic policy 
objective for states to decrease oil import disruptions, thereby leading 
to more independence policies. 
The final reason is highly connected with first and second arguments. 
Owing to oil’s importance and political instabilities in the world, 
Realists argue that oil diversification is employed as a tool of state 
foreign policies. For example, the US is trying to import its oil from 
multiple regions. The Caspian Sea and West Africa are just two 
examples. Since the Clinton presidency, the US has given military 
training and assistance to these regions to provide more stability 
(Klare 2009b). Diversification, which is necessary for more secure 
energy policies, has therefore been supported with military 
agreements because oil rich countries generally have political 
instabilities. In parallel with its diversification policies, the US sphere 
of influence consequently increases. On the other hand, China’s 
energy diplomacy policy, which means having a good relationship with 
oil exporter countries, is another example of how foreign policy is 
constructed around oil diversification motivations (Qinhua 2007). To 
ensure a balance of power, China follows energy diplomacy (Qinhua 
2007). Thus, not only a hard balance of power but also a soft balance 
of power is cultivated. 
To summarise, oil diversification motivations are interpreted by 
Realists in terms of national security, an independence security 
perception and foreign policy. When we synthesise these arguments, 
we see that oil diversification motivations connect with state foreign 
policies, because states’ foreign policy decisions are affecting and 
affected by security problems in the world. However, oil diversification 
motivations cannot just be limited to a state-centric view.  
2.5.2. Liberal Interpretations   
Although Liberals view energy security more optimistically than 
Realists, their oil diversification interpretations are less optimistic than 
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their general energy security perspectives. One reason is that for 
states, oil diversification motivations depend on negative effects. Oil 
diversification tries to provide a more secure position either 
economically or politically. States need to diversify their routes and 
suppliers because of current or potential supply problems.  This policy 
is seen as the best option to ensure energy security (Yergin 2006). 
However, the Liberal theoretical approach differs from Realists. There 
are three perspectives used by them to explain oil diversification 
motives, which are economy, interdependency and foreign policy.  
The first motivation concerns the economy. Liberalism tells us much 
about economic factors and, in turn, that the economy is very 
important in oil diversification policies. For liberals, energy security 
can be defined as a “reliable and adequate supply of energy at 
reasonable price” (Bielecki 2002: 237). Thus, providing an availability 
and affordability of oil is very important (Yao and Chang 2014) and 
diversification is necessary to ensure these two aspects. Also, 
whereas liberals are concerned about economic security, they do not 
totally forget or ignore supply shortfalls in unstable supplier regions 
(Yergin 2006). Oil exporter countries and transport routes, particularly 
in the Middle East, generally exhibit political instabilities and any 
disruption in these areas affects importer countries. On the other 
hand, like other commodities, energy has a global market and supply-
demand balance in the energy market should always be watched 
(Bielecki 2002). Whereas global consumption has been expanding 
from the West to all over the world, it is difficult to provide a market 
balance. Diversification policies can therefore help to counter importer 
countries’ vulnerabilities in the market and help to reduce instabilities 
in the supplier regions. Therefore, according to a Liberal view, 
diversification can reduce systemic risks (Månsson et al. 2014). 
Interdependency is another important aspect of Liberal interpretations 
of oil diversification. Vulnerability and sensibility are two important 
terms in the interdependence perspective (Keohane and Nye 1977). 
Importer countries’ vulnerabilities to market conditions can, it is 
argued, be solved through diversification. However, not only one side 
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gains. Diversification needs infrastructure (e.g. technology, Research 
and Development [R&D]). As importer countries therefore invest in oil 
exporters, market conditions become more stable (Yergin 2005). 
Thus, price volatilities can be reduced, alongside other potential shock 
effects (Helm 2002). This condition is beneficial for exporters because 
they need infrastructure. Although infrastructure is emphasized, the 
problem is not about geology, rather, is about politics (Bielecki 2002; 
Yergin 2005). Political conditions can be solved with political decisions 
however they are not made by only one side, thereby it should be a 
cooperative process. Thus, in Liberalism, oil diversification brings 
together all sides (importer, exporter and transport countries) to 
cooperatively act together. 
Finally, oil diversification policies show that states do not compete; 
instead they cooperate, influencing foreign policy decisions. Whereas 
importers invest in the exporters and transport routes, countries 
receiving this investment accept it as a way of reducing instability. 
States are not then motivated by competition as Realists would argue, 
rather by cooperation – a key feature of Liberal views on global 
governance. Bilateral and multilateral agreements on oil 
diversification present examples of this cooperation (Helm 2002; 
Yergin 2006). In addition to oil diversification’s effect on the global 
economy, there is also an effect on foreign policy (Yergin 2005). 
Because of diversification policies, importer countries can get two 
gains, namely reducing dependence on oil imports and gaining foreign 
partners (Cheon and Urpelainen 2015).  Diversification policies 
therefore lead to more open foreign policy areas for importers.  
In the Liberal perspective, because of the different assumptions made 
on the scope for cooperation, a more optimistic perspective is 
presented that contrasts with the pessimism of Realists. However, 
they emphasise infrastructure (i.e. interdependency) and the 
economic realities of oil as much as national security and 
independence. Both sides look at oil diversification from differing 
standpoints but there is one common point; the key points of foreign 
policy for oil diversification and key points of oil diversification for 
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foreign policy. Because of these points, we will look at oil 
diversification motivations in terms of foreign policy analysis rather 
than security studies.  
 
2.6.     The necessity of a Critical Perspective 
As two positivist perspectives, Realism and Liberalism understand 
energy security with shared and also different assumptions. This 
understanding reflects their perception of oil diversification 
motivations. The state is seen as the most important actor in the 
international arena, a key point on which their arguments rely. We 
agree with them, but it is important to note from a critical perspective 
that we cannot separate state and civil society. States are necessarily 
directed by social forces. Facts and values are important factors which 
are downplayed by a positivist perspective. Although this separation 
of facts is criticized, it should be accepted that this separation can lead 
to them providing more successful explanations, depending on 
context (Cox 1981). As problem solving theories, Realism and 
Liberalism accept some points in their evaluation and ignore others 
(Cox 1981). However, in thinking ‘critically’ it is argued that neither 
observer nor observed can be accepted as value-free. An analysis of 
US oil diversification motivations should, it is argued in this thesis, 
then consider these realities. After accepting these realities, the 
researcher will realise self-awareness and more objective 
explanations will, theoretically, be possible.  
The other problem is separation of theory and practice. Separation of 
the elements which are in reality intertwined provide more practical 
explanations, however, global conditions are made by more general 
factors. Beyond the static ‘snapshot’ interpretation of positivist 
theories, we argue that a holistic approach is required to better 
understand oil diversification motivations. The global order relies on 
social and historical roots, so interpretation should follow their paths. 
Thus, the state is important but it is not the outcome of global 
conditions, rather it is an intermediate determining factor.  
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As a more pessimistic perspective, Realist explanations have three 
main arguments about energy security which are increasing the power 
of national corporations, unreliability of markets and existence of 
conflicts (Raphael and Stokes 2015; Klare 2009b). On the other hand, 
Liberal explanations present counter arguments which relate to a 
belief in markets and capitalism, the existence of interdependency 
and non-state actors (Helm 2002; Yergin 2006; Hancock and Vivoda 
2014). Both sides’ arguments seem correct when they are evaluated 
theoretically, with multiple examples used to confirm their 
assumptions. However, every explanation can potentially be shown 
as ‘right’ under its context (Vivoda 2009a; Ciută 2010). For instance, 
most cited examples in the literature concern the relationship between 
Russia and the EU around energy politics (e.g. Correljé and van der 
Linde 2006; Kuzemko 2013). This relationship is seen as completely 
differently between the early 2000s and the mid-2000s, and from the 
mid-2000s until now. Both sides’ arguments can be supported easily 
and successfully in these years, because they focus upon `one 
moment` in time. However, wider temporal and spatial realities should 
be acknowledged. Positivist arguments ignore temporal dimensions, 
so they are seen as correct for these specific ‘moments’; however, 
they do not explain reality exactly in terms of its evolving temporal 
context. We argue that a more holistic, critical perspective needs to 
be used, otherwise elements of this ‘reality’ will be missed in analysis. 
Thus, analyses need to look at reality itself, not an abstraction of 
reality (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010). 
Regarding oil diversification motivations, both sides have successful 
explanations, because they argue specific ‘interests’ are significant. 
Both sides agree about oil diversification`s effect on foreign policy, but 
there is a disagreement about which type of interest is the most 
important: either economic (i.e. Liberal) (Cheon and Urpelainen 
2015); or national security (i.e. Realism) (Qinhua 2007). When 
Realists mention oil’s importance in the market, they actually mean 
oil’s use as a strategic commodity (Klare 2008b). Control of oil then 
becomes an indicator of state power. However, Liberals see oil 
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primarily as a commodity. It can be interpreted as a national security 
problem. Lastly, Realists assert security problems in the international 
arena, whereas Liberals believe the existence of interdependency and 
its effects on oil diversification motivations (Yergin 2005). Criticisms 
made regarding their explanations for energy security are therefore 
relevant for oil diversification. Thus, their explanations only reflect 
their assumptions. Both structural and domestic factors and both 
economic and political factors are seen as active in shaping oil 
diversification motivations. However, the observer can choose 
motivations, but the motivations chosen depend on where the 
observer stands and how she/he looks. Having assumptions on how 
global politics work can only work in the period researched, while 
having assumptions on how global politics accumulates can provide 
much wider and deep inquiry. In contrast to positivist theory, critical 
theory can not only potentially provide alternative motivations for oil 
diversification, it can also explain how these motivations are affecting 
oil diversification policies. Replying to the question of `how?` in oil 
diversification can provide a temporal-spatial perspective and thereby 
historical interpretation. In this way, triggers of oil diversification 
motivations can also be understood. 
In summary, the chapter provided a review of the literature on energy 
security, oil diversification and US oil diversification. The gaps in the 
literature, which is mainly shaped by positivist perspectives, is 
discussed in terms of these areas.  Given the problems in applying 
positivist IR theories to explaining energy security, oil diversification 
and oil diversification motivations identified above, it is argued that a 
critical theoretical approach could potentially help fill these gaps in the 






3. Theory  
 
Chapter 2 identified a ‘gap’ in the literature on oil diversification in that, 
despite a large number of studies on this subject, it had not been 
considered from a critical IR perspective, potentially leaving a 
significant shortfall in our understanding. Hence, the Chapter argued 
that there is a need to consider the value of this approach for 
explaining energy diversification in ways that are not readily available 
to positivists. Problematically, while there is evident potential for 
critical theory to significantly expand our knowledge, it is not 
homogenous and there is no single theoretical view, particularly within 
IR. These theoretical views can mainly be divided into the Frankfurt 
School, Marxian/Gramscian analyses, Feminism and Post-
Structuralism (Rengger and Thirkell-White 2007). However, traditional 
critical theory can be divided into the Frankfurt School and 
Marxian/Gramscian analyses, and Robert W. Cox is one of the leading 
exponents of Critical Studies in IR. Although the Frankfurt School, 
Marx and Gramsci’s influences can be seen in his works, he rather 
eschews such labels, defining himself as a theoretical “non-
conformist” (Cox 2012: 17). Therefore, if we can accept him as a non-
conformist, his arguments and the type of explanation developed by 
him will be used. Thus, this research is heavily influenced by his works 
while also seeking to extend forward the work that Cox started, to 
update and develop his arguments to add theoretical novelty to the 
literature.  
In order to do this, the chapter firstly draws out the key theoretical 
concepts and assumptions presented within the main dimensions of 
critical IR theory, then situates a Coxian interpretation in relation to 
these arguments by discussing its reflections on reality. An analysis 
of critiques made of Coxian arguments is then provided and, finally, 
these challenges are linked to the notion of oil diversification to 
provide a novel ‘neo-Coxian’ theoretical-analytical framework to guide 
subsequent analysis of the thesis case studies (see Chapter 4). 
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3.1.     The Frankfurt School of Critical Theory 
Although Critical Theory’s roots can be originally attributed to 
philosophers such as Kant, Hegel and Marx, its twentieth century 
manifestation is most associated with the Frankfurt School (Wyn 
2001). Some of the key exponents of the Frankfurt school are Max 
Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm and Jürgen Habermas. 
Here, their work is classified as ‘critical’, because they opposed 
positivist (i.e. traditional) understandings of social processes. 
Whereas positivism separates fact and values, subject and object, 
observer and observed, the Frankfurt School criticises this position 
because its proponents believe that these separated terms are 
actually intertwined and hence indivisible (Rothe and Ronge 2016) 
(see Chapter 4).  
Members of the Frankfurt School use Kantian, Hegelian and Marxian 
concepts, because firstly “the Kantian point that reflection on the limits 
of what we can know is a fundamental part of theorizing, [and] 
secondly, a Hegelian and Marxian point that knowledge is always, and 
irreducibly, conditioned by historical and material contexts” (Devetak 
2005: 139). Thus, according to these scholars theories cannot be 
separated from social and political life and its self-reflective context. 
Neither can they be separated from history. Using the notion of the 
dialectic and emphasising the economy they are seen as neo-Marxist 
in their assumptions. However, the Frankfurt school has not totally 
accepted a Marxian interpretation of the economy. According to them 
(Horkheimer 1993 [1931]; Rothe and Ronge 2016), the economy is 
not the only material being and not the only baseline of structure. 
Although the economy is a basic underlying structure, there is also a 
mutual relationship between the economics and political arenas as 
material dimensions. Moreover, there is also a mutual relationship 
between materials and ideas. Originally developed by Gramsci and 
then inspired by Cox (1993a: 56), this relationship is seen as 
reciprocity between structure (social relations and physical 
production) and superstructure (ideology and political organizations). 
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Thus, there are economics, cultural and political aspects to Frankfurt 
School theorising. 
 
3.2.     A Coxian IR Interpretation 
While heavily influenced by such critical theory, Cox’s initial point of 
departure starts with a methodological position which includes 
ontological assumptions and an epistemological perspective. His idea 
about `knowledge` and `knowledge process` is highly influenced by 
the Frankfurt School`s basic line of argumentation. In the positivist 
context, the separation of observer and observed requires a 
separation of value-facts and the researcher assumes that she/he can 
exclude her/his ideas, ideology and background from her/his 
research. Moreover, a value-free perspective leads to history-free 
explanations, because a researcher examines only what she/he sees 
at the current point in time. However, to understand change to social 
reality, historical dimensions should necessarily be considered. If 
history becomes a part of the explanation, a value-based perspective 
must be used in its interpretation. If these effects on facts and 
historical concepts are not considered, the factors determining global 
politics cannot be easily captured. To understand global politics, Cox 
therefore starts with comparing problem-solving (rational) and critical 
theories (Cox 1981). In his view, problem-solving theory views the 
world it finds and asks why that order came about in order to find a 
cause-effect relationship. This positivist epistemological perspective 
uses the logic of ceteris paribus (take a limited variable for study and 
suppose others are stable) and this understanding of cause-effects to 
provide practical theory for explaining the ‘why’ question, i.e. why did 
this social process occur? Critical theory, however, adds a `how` 
question to problem-solving’s scientific and technological 
perspectives questions of `who gets what, when and why` and tries to 
understand more general conceptions of ‘how’ social processes 
evolve both temporarily and spatially.  
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3.2.1. Perspective on Theory 
Problem-Solving theory takes the world and social relations as it finds 
them. Thus, all social and power relations are accepted as static, 
thereby also their reflections on institutions. The world is accepted as 
it is given (Cox 2008). However, for critical theories, all social relations 
have origins and change over time. Thus, there is not a law-like 
explanation; rather it is the changing process which is of interest 
(Leysens 2008). This process is directed by its origins and basic 
patterns. The origin of social processes occurs in a societal context 
(i.e. social, economic and political) and has shared points, so they 
affect each other. Thus, a successful theory must see all complex 
processes “as a whole rather than separate parts” (Cox 1981: 129). 
To better see this general picture, theory needs to use a historical 
perspective (i.e. Critical Theory) rather than ahistorical explanations 
(i.e. Problem-Solving Theories). However, we should be wary of 
making claims on the universal explanatory power of Critical Theory: 
the critiques of problem-solving theories do not mean that all their 
explanations are wrong. Ceteris paribus assumptions which reduce 
parameters, problem areas and particular problems and finds laws or 
regularities and provides them with successful explanation. To arrive 
at that point, critical theories should use a synchronic perspective 
(looking at the current moment) in addition to a diachronic perspective 
(historical explanation). Thus, the often-held assertion that critical 
theory does not concern the real world is not true but critical theory is 
not as practical as problem solving theory since it looks at historical 
accumulation rather than investigating chosen variables. According to 
Cox, “History generates theory” and “this theory is not absolute 
knowledge, not a final revelation or a completeness of rational 
knowledge about laws of history” (Cox 1993b: 135). 
Traditional IR theory privileges the centrality of state interests, either 
with outside-in (Realism) or inside-out (Liberalism) views. While a 
state’s importance in the global arena cannot be ignored, the state 
should not be separated from civil society. Critical theory within IR is 
therefore based on a “state/society complex” (Cox 1981: 127) in which 
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state interests are situated in this context. This complexity leads to 
changing processes in society. Thus, social and political theory should 
consider a history-based background, because theory, it is argued, is 
itself a product of historical circumstances. For this reason Cox argues 
that “Theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (Cox 1981: 
128). In other words, theory reflects the origins of global 
circumstances and must respect its contextual limitations. Hoffman 
(1987: 237-238) consequently sums up Coxian Critical Theory with 
seven basic points, which are that it:  
“stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks 
how that order came about… contemplate[s] the social and 
political complex as a whole… entails a theory of history 
(process of continuous change)… questions the origins and 
legitimacy of social and political institutions and how and 
whether they are changing… contains problem-solving theory 
and has a concern with both technical and practical cognitive 
knowledge… contains a normative order… is a guide for 
strategic action for bringing about an alternative order”.  
Before the discussing a Coxian Critical IR interpretation, we should 
position his stance relative to mainstream IR theories. Cox`s 
standpoint is highly connected with Realism, because he accepts and 
uses Machiavelli`s and E.H. Carr`s explanations. Both these Classical 
Realists use a “historical mode of thought” (Cox 1981: 131). However, 
after the work of Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz, realism theory 
became neo-realism, which is the ideological form abstracted from the 
realist historical framework referred to as the “American product” (Cox 
1992: 169). This product is built upon behaviouralism, which asserts 
that human relations are happening in behaviour rather than through 
behaviour (see Chapter 4). Thus, while neo-realists follow `common 
rationality`, they also follow a value- and history-free perspective. For 
neo-realists, predictions follow from examining the foundations of 
social processes. However, in reality there is no effective prediction in 
social contexts. Material capabilities have always been changing, so 
the future cannot logically be predicted (Cox 2008). The belief in 
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changing processes distinguishes Cox’s arguments from the 
superstructure perspective of neo-realism. However, these counter-
arguments against neo-realism do not mean that they are totally 
ignorant of realism. Social context and human relations have always 
included contradictions and struggles. Indeed, classical realism 
recognises these points and explains them with a historical mode of 
thought that includes economic, social and ideological forms besides 
politics. The importance of these notions is accepted by a Coxian 
interpretation. However, Cox’s (1997: XVI) new realism “differs from 
classical realism in broadening the range of determining forces 
beyond state power” and “differs from neo-realism in its concern with 
structural change and in understanding this change in historical 
terms”. 
The historical process is used in explanation rather than `scientific` 
arguments which focus on evolution and predictable regularities (Cox 
1976). Thus, the critique made against neo-realists is also applicable 
for liberal institutionalists. The theory should understand the current 
moment (i.e. Realism) initially, so then it can develop and change the 
future (i.e. Liberalism). Before seeing reality, the future cannot be 
changed successfully. This is the counter argument to Liberalism. A 
value-free approach is another problem with Liberalism. Value-free 
explanations cannot see reality, because facts are made and found 
by values.  
The definition of the state and its position in the global context is the 
most important topic for comparing the Coxian IR interpretation with 
neorealism and liberalism. According to the neo-realist perspective, 
the state is the only actor within an anarchic international system that 
defines its decisions. The main actor of the international system, 
which is the state, has no definition. Consequently, the “State is a 
state is a state” within the Waltzian approach (Cox 1981: 239). This 
definition considers only political factors in the designation of 
statehood. However, current inter-state relations should consider 
capital effects. Capital effects do not include only the economy, but 
also social aspects. Thus, civil society is as important as the state and 
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because of this reason, every political, economic and social factor 
should be considered. On the other hand, although neoliberalism 
considers the importance of the economy, the critique of it comes from 
another perspective. When neoliberalism prioritises the importance of 
the economy, it explains it with the importance of institutions. For 
example, the global economic market is supported by global 
institutions. Neoliberalism therefore seeks to explains how the current 
institutional structure is given. However, economical and institutional 
dimensions have always been changing, i.e. they are not ‘given’. To 
explain only what is given conserves and promotes the current 
structure, but change should be set free. In this respect, drawing on 
Giambattista Vico, Cox (1981: 132-133) believes that 
“Human nature (the modification of the mind) and human are 
identical with human history; they are to be understood in 
genetic and not in essentialist terms (as in neo-realism) or in 
teleological terms (as in functionalism)” 
3.2.2. The Creation of Cox 
The relationship between knowledge and interests is one of the most 
important topics for the Frankfurt School and can be seen as its 
defining feature. Whereas traditional positivist theory assumes that 
knowledge is derived from the activity of describing the world, 
Horkheimer, who was influential on Cox, believes that knowledge is 
not independent of our existence: rather it is integral to social 
relations. These social relations are not static but dynamic, because 
they always change according to their associated facts. ‘Facts’ in this 
sense are social and historical products. Thus, knowledge is always 
“situated” (Rupert 2003: 186), because it is conditioned by its historical 
and material context. Cox (1993b: 134) does not have a target 
objective to contribute “a universal and absolute knowledge, but to 
devise a fresh perspective useful for framing and working on the 
problems of the present”. 
The definition of knowledge and condition of facts rely on changing, 
however, the process of changing is unlike that envisaged in pure 
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historical materialism. There is a disagreement between Marxian 
concepts and Critical Theory. In the Marxian concept, human 
consciousness has a passive role because of the mechanistic and 
deterministic role of history (see Chapter 4). Although Cox agrees with 
the importance of material based explanations, there is also a link 
between the materialist world and ideas (Leysens 2008). Thus, ideas 
and material conditions are bound together and not reducible one to 
one another (Cox 1993a). This perspective is derived from Gramsci. 
According to Cox, all global politics interpretation depends on this 
point. The importance of materials and ideas relations brings us to the 
importance of norms. Thus, it is distinguished from a Marxian 
`historical economism` (Gramsci 1971). This perspective also affects 
ideas about consciousness. The other main difference between 
critical theory and Marxism focuses on technology (Hoffman 1987). 
Marxism embraces technology as a good thing. However, for critical 
theorists, contradictions are everywhere and technology brings 
negative impacts as much as positive effects. 
Material conditions direct ideas and then are directed by ideas. This 
contradiction is the basic phenomena in social life. When it is 
transferred to IR, it can be interpreted as a power and morality 
relationship. Power, morality and their relationship have always been 
changing, but the fact of power and morality remains (Cox and 
Schechter 2002). Thus, the term of power continues, but power 
relations change through history. Here, “The dominant political 
authority (state or empire) in one era gives place to another” (Cox and 
Schechter 2002: 58). Morality also has no universality. There are two 
reasons for it. Firstly, every region (space) has own moral judgments 
and set of values at specific times. Secondly, moral judgements are 
defined by the dominant power of one group, in every spatio-temporal 
reality which is a specific region and a specific time. Thus, the content 
of power and moral judgements can change, but the patterns of the 
power and morality have always existed and they will continue to exist. 
Global politics should consider these two patterns. The most 
important point in a Coxian power definition is that power is not only 
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derived from state. There are three different power sources, which are 
state, economic and social (Cox and Jacobson 1977: 357).  
Power, which is defined by materials and also ideals/ideology, is the 
basic concept of Coxian theory. Here, the dominant power group 
defines the moral judgements of legitimacy of its position. The 
legitimacy of domination brings hegemony. Thus, neither military nor 
economy, or even a combination of them provides hegemony. In this 
sense, “In the structure of hegemony, cultural and ideological factors 
are decisive” (Cox 1992: 179). The contexts of legitimacy and ideology 
brings to civil society in social order. In terms of the state context, Cox 
draws upon Gramsci`s formulation which is “State = political society + 
civil society” (Gramsci 1971: 263). From this perspective, “Civil society 
is both shaper and shaped, an agent of stabilization and reproduction, 
and a potential agent of transformation” (Cox 1999: 4-5). Thus, civil 
society is not defined in terms of a pure economic condition as Marxist 
interpretation would infer. Rather, it is a combination of leadership and 
movement from below. The coherence between state and civil society 
leads to more secure and successful organization. Moreover, besides 
civil society, there is also a “covert world” which includes organized 
crime, terrorist networks, intelligence operatives, and the drug trade 
(Cox 2008: 92). The covert world destroys established orders and 
damages security confidence. To protect its position, dominant groups 
or administrations need to solve these problems or act together. 
Military activities and ideology can be used by one group or together 
with others.  
Bringing civil society into line leads to a critique of the common 
characterisation of global politics. The current name is derived from a 
Westphalian interpretation of the nation-state system and its 
combination with capitalism. States’ relations are generally attributed 
to the national context. Although it is a current condition that we live 
in now, there has not always been a nation-state system: in fact, this 
notion is relatively recent. As an alternative, the term “global politics” 
covers a more general spatial and temporal area than the term 
“international relations” (Cox 1993b: 132). Moreover, although the 
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term of global politics is used, it refers to `political economy` because 
of the economy`s relationship with politics.  
A Gramscian sense of hegemony and its structure is transferred into 
this notion of global politics by Cox. Accordingly, structures are 
socially and historically constructed and they are “the product of 
recurrent patterns of actions and expectations” (Cox 1993b: 138). 
Three categories of forces interact in a structure: material capabilities; 
ideas; and institutions (see Figure 3.1). Definitions and the contents 
of them and the relationship between each other have been changing 
in the particular cases, but in reciprocal and no one-way determinism. 
Thus, there is not a mechanistic process, but they create limitations. 
 
       Ideas 
  
          Material Capabilities                                           Institutions       
Figure 3.1: Structural Forces (Cox 1981: 136) 
Material capabilities are productive and destructive potentials. These 
exist as technological and organizational capabilities and in their 
accumulated forms. Ideas can be intersubjective meanings and 
collective images of social order held by different groups of people. 
They include multipolar and even opposed social discourses. 
Institutions maintain a particular order. They are particular amalgams 
of ideas and material power. This reciprocal relationship of the 
political, ethical and ideological spheres of activity within the economic 
area avoids reducing everything to economics or to ideas (Cox 1993a: 
56). Thus, to set up and maintain hegemony, domination should be 
supported by institutions, because they are dealing with internal 
conflicts and inconveniences. On the other hand, ideas should be 
understood in the material capabilities context, because material 
aspects include both social relations and the physical means of 
production.  The position of ideology and political organisation in the 
production process, which they shape and are shaped by production, 
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resembles the superstructure. Thus, the base comprised of material 
conditions and superstructure do not have to be the same character 
as it is in the Marxian concept (Gill 1993: 37-38).  
The method of historical structures includes three spheres (Cox 1981: 
137-138); the organisation of production (more particularly with regard 
to the social forces), forms of state (reflection of state-society 
complex) and world orders (forces` configurations). These three levels 
are interrelated and they have a non-linear relationship. Transnational 
social forces have influenced states through the world structure (e.g. 
capitalism). Whereas world order affects forms of state, forms of state 
also affect the development of social forces through the kinds of 
domination.  
              Social Forces 
 
Forms of State                                 World Order 
Figure 3.2: Structural Spheres (Cox 1981: 138) 
Reflecting back on this earlier work, Cox and Schechter (2002: 28) 
emphasise the importance of synchronic and diachronic perspectives. 
A synchronic dimension sees the world or society as what it is.  
Synchronic parts are therefore more spatially oriented rather than time 
oriented. Time is accepted at a zero point, and then all observations 
are based on it. Thus, synchronicity is a snapshot of the structure of 
the world or society in its `mediated totality` (ibid.). On the other hand, 
a diachronic dimension sees the world or society as ruptures and 
conflicts that bring about system transformation. The belief of 
transformation elicits a more time oriented approach rather than 
space oriented. A diachronic dimension is a `process of presentation` 
rather than mediated totality (Leysens 2008: 87). The most important 
point to consider is that time and space cannot be separated or be 
thought of as opposed. Therefore, a spatio-temporal analysis should 
be used. In this research, structural forces are accepted as causes of 
the historical process because of the methodological arrangement of 
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Coxian Theory (see Chapter 4). This process shapes historical 
spheres. The patterns of the historical process are reflected under the 
historical spheres. The contents of a synchronic perspective are 
defined in the historical process (diachronic) patterns and they can 
change the historical processes.  
Cox defines the term hegemony as “a structure of values and 
understandings about the nature of the order that permeates a whole 
system of states and non-state entities” (Cox 1993b: 140). Although 
values are universal, interpretations and understandings of them are 
local but relatively stable. Ideas of dominant strata expands and is 
maintained by its owner. Thus, the hegemonic concept of world order 
is founded not only upon regulation of inter-state conflicts but also 
upon a globally-conceived civil society (Cox 1993a: 61). International 
organisations, which are a product of hegemony, legitimate norms of 
the world order and co-opt the elites from peripheral countries and 
absorb counter-hegemonic ideas (Cox 1993a: 62). The difference 
between the Coxian hegemony definition, which is inspired by 
Gramsci, and problem solving theories’ hegemony is about the 
perception of consensus and coercion. Liberal (Keohane 1984) and 
Realist (Waltz 1979) hegemony perspectives are based on a static 
theory of politics, an abstract ahistorical conception of the state and 
appeal to universal validity. Whereas Liberal and Realist hegemony is 
based on economics and politics dimensions which are mainly defined 
in terms of consensus (i.e. Liberal) and coercion (i.e. Realist), the 
Coxian hegemony definition is based on a continual process of 
historical change, spheres of production and the exploitative character 
of social relations (Bieler and Morton 2004: 86). Thus, Coxian 
hegemony is a combination of economics, politics and social 
dimensions in terms of combination of consensus and coercive 
(Rupert and Solomon 2006). 
Kinhide Mushakoji (1997: 83-108) is inspired by Cox. His work 
focuses on multilateralism in the modern world and compares modern 
and pre-modern eras. According to him, the Modern era in global 
politics changed after establishment of the Westphalian system. 
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Fewer numbers of institutions, which performed some of the functions 
of government, have given their place to the state as a central 
authority. Their place was power, legitimacy and identity (Mushakoji 
1997: 84). However, these terms are defined by the modern context, 
because the Western modern formal `world order` has affected the 
understanding of world interpretation. Rationality and Progress 
emphasises have been brought into social areas and the basic terms 
of global politics (e.g. individual, society, state) have been defined 
according to this context. These terms have been defined in the 
“absolute value to concepts” (Mushakoji 1997: 89). Changing 
definitions of the basic terms has affected the definition of power, 
legitimacy and identity.  
While power is transient, it is a fact that the weak are subjugated by 
the strong. Whereas legitimacy must come from the eternal essence 
in the pre-modern era, it turns brute force into power. Legitimacy is 
not decided by God anymore, rather by humans. While identity was 
not absolute and accepted by other communities, it has become a 
formal framework for a legitimate group. The consciousness of social 
groups is a historical product rather than a determined condition. It 
means that consciousness of class has always changed. For 
example, “identities” consciousness like gender, ethnicity, religion and 
nationality are the common reality in our world (Cox 1999: 15). How 
people identify themselves differentially depends on context that is 
determined by the accumulation of the past. In terms of legitimacy, 
Cox (2008: 92) asserts that when governments provoke fears among 
the public, as is now a common aspect of the “war on terror”, they are 
preparing for oppressive measures. The relationship between fear 
and legitimacy is a `transhistorical truth`. This situation reflects the 
legitimacy in global governance. “The overwhelming “hard power” of 
“Empire” has generated “terror” as the response of those who utterly 
reject “Empire” (Cox 2008: 93). After the basic terms of modern era, 
we can look at a reflection of Cox` basic arguments for the 
contemporary era.  
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3.2.3. Reflection of Cox 
Cox (1981) transfers his key terms of reality for the Pax Britannica and 
Pax Americana eras. The internationalisation of production and the 
internationalisation of the state are the key terms of these areas, 
thereby they still continue (Cox 1981: 144-147). The 
internationalisation of the state gives precedence to certain state 
agencies –notably finance and prime ministries - to adjust domestic to 
international policy. On the other hand, the internationalisation of 
production is about the expansion of production. The problem arises, 
when the two internationalisations are combined. Although rhetoric 
asserts the importance of industrialisation, it is only available for 
finance, not for workers. Workers are limited by their nationally-
defined social formations.   Although internationalisations of 
production and state are important, how they are constructed is the 
key point. Cox (1993b) tries to find triggers for them from structural 
analysis. As a reflection of social forces, forms of state and world 
orders, he (1993b: 140-147) asserts that hegemonic, Westphalian 
and globalization factors are significant. 
The hegemonic idea is based on liberal arguments which are 
dependent on interdependence between states; however, it faces with 
Westphalian key understanding which stresses the importance of 
territorially based power (Cox 1993c: 263).  Moreover, globalisation 
challenges the classic Westphalian state system which is a nation-
state. The United Nations reflects the crisis of this system clearly. 
United Nations institutions were born in the Westphalian order 
founded upon a belief in state sovereignty; however, it targets the 
global arena, but, it has broadly reflected the priorities of American 
public opinion (Jacobson 1997: 165). These contradictions lead to 
new priorities in the global context. Since the 1980s, the US 
hegemony has been decreasing, because of dualism in the system. 
During the 1970s, the neo-liberal system faced internal challenges 
such as the OECD, the Club of Rome and the Trilateral Commission 
because of the disintegration of neo-liberalism and the historic bloc 
which is the coherence of structural elements (i.e. institutions, ideas 
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and material capabilities) (Cox 1993c: 266). This leads to change as 
a `hyper-liberalism` in the Thatcher-Reagan eras (ibid. 267). It is the 
separation of state and economy envisaged by classical liberalism. 
Employers have gained more power over workers since that time as 
capital has gone global. Unlike the neo-liberal approach, the state-
capitalist approach does not post any consensual regulation of the 
world market as regards multilateral trade and financial practices. The 
state-capitalist form involves a dualism. On the one hand, a 
competitively efficient world-market-oriented sector, and on the other, 
a protected welfare sector (ibid. 270). 
When the states increased their power with these economic targets, 
they have faced more problems. Increasing economic globalisation 
has constrained states’ autonomies and the states that cannot resist 
the current structure have chosen macro-regionalism against US 
economic power (e.g. Germany, Japan) (Cox 1993c: 262). It means 
increasing states relationships in the regions. However, there is also 
a micro-regionalism (ibid.). Larger economic global and macro-
regional spaces weaken the autonomy of states. Micro-regional 
demands increase in countries (e.g. Catalonia, Lombardy). Thus, it is 
a sub-state process. When the dominant US ideology (i.e. neo-
liberalism) and institutions are not able to stabilise or persuade these 
demands, it will resort to another option which is military force (Cox 
1999: 12). Using military forces (e.g. Gulf War, Iraq War) rather than 
using ideology and institutions to create new enemies and ideology 
which can bring together all basic actors, leads to the image of Empire 
rather than Hegemony (Cox 2008: 90). 
In the current era, because of reasons which are mentioned, the 
global structure has become an American Empire, Westphalian inter-
state system and civil society (Cox 2008: 90-91). Transnational 
corporations influence domestic policy in countries where they 
operate, while military cooperation is constructed under the leadership 
of the core of `Empire`. On the other hand, the sovereign state 
understanding which is derived from the Westphalian inter-state 
system, is weakened by Empire (ibid.). There are two challenges to 
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the Westphalian inter-state system and Empire. Firstly, the inter-state 
system and its creations like the United Nations are directed by the 
Empire and secondly, strengthening the bonds linking the citizen to 
political authorities. While a second factor protects the economic and 
social organisations of the states, it also strengthens the plural world 
perspective. However, in the global context, decisions are not made 
by pluralist acts. An Empire can ignore the Westphalian basic principle 
(i.e. non-intervention) and act how it wants to. The Iraq War can be 
given as an example. Lastly, civil society is constructed within states 
and within Empire. It leads to a transnational form of organisation. The 
environment and women`s rights are defended by this form of 
transnational organisation. The basic fact is that, increasingly, civil 
society is not centralised like Empire and sovereign states (ibid.). 
Thus, it is a resistance to Empire`s homogenizing force, but it can be 
manipulated easily. The covert world which is mentioned above, can 
be used for these manipulations. 
Thus, when we look at this feature more closely, we are seeing three 
different contradictions in the current system which are production and 
finance, real economy and biosphere, and contradiction in social 
relations (Cox 1999: 17-18; Cox and Schechter 2002 82-107). Firstly, 
finance has a synchronic (space-oriented) perspective which ignores 
the time dimension and can undermine the social legitimacy of capital 
and the productive apparatus itself, because its fragile condition can 
damage the requirements of production which is a certain stability 
(Cox 1999: 17). Whereas finance occupies a more globally oriented 
space, production (diachronic process) has a more locally focused 
space. There are significant banners of mobilization. Two basic points 
(i.e. nationality and class) in global context which are derived from the 
nineteenth and twentieth century, is triggered by this contradiction 
(Cox and Schechter 2002: 88). Secondly, the onward expansion of 
consumer demand is the driving force of the global economy, 
however, it damages the biosphere. However, consumers demand 
both products and a clean environment (Cox 1999: 17; Cox and 
Schechter 2002: 107). Lastly, because of post-Fordism which is 
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reinforced by global finance, Fordist-era social safety nets have been 
diffused, because specialized products and jobs and new information 
technologies have lead that excluded categories like immigrants and 
women workers have become a key generating means of production. 
The fragmentation of the old working class has generated 
strengthened capital and weakened and divided labour (Cox 1999: 
17-18; Cox and Schechter 2002: 107).  
Along with the above arguments and contemporary world 
explanations, Cox (1992: 179-180) sees five different possibilities for 
the future of hegemony on a global scale: 
“1. A revival of the declining hegemony; 2. A revival of the 
universals of the declining hegemony underpinned not by one 
state but by an oligarchy of powerful states that would have to 
concert their powers; 3. The founding of a new hegemony by 
another state successfully universalizing its own principles of 
order; 4. A non-hegemonic order lacking effective universal 
principles of order and functioning as an interplay of rival 
powerful states, each with their client states, most probably 
based on an organization of rival world regions; and 5. A 
counterhegemonic order anchored in a broader diffusion of 
power, in which a large number of collective forces, including 
states, achieve some agreement upon universal principles of 
an alternative order without dominance”. 
 
3.3.     Analysis of Coxian Critique  
The preceding section provides a `Reflection of Cox`, whereas its 
practicality is critically evaluated in the section below (see Chapter 8). 
However, after showing a Coxian interpretation, it will be explained 
why this research is heavily influenced by Cox rather than any other 
Critical Theorists, critiques of Cox’s thinking made by other IR thinkers 
and how deficiencies in Coxian interpretation can potentially be solved 
within a neo-Coxian critique. To analyse Coxian critiques in the IR 
literature, initially, Cox`s difference within Critical Theory will be 
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examined in order to see the importance of Cox in critical theory. 
Then, the critiques of Cox are given. As a last step, a review of Cox is 
developed in order to update these arguments for contemporary 
analysis of oil diversification. 
3.3.1. Cox`s Difference  
Cox`s difference from other Critical Theorists can be classified under 
four main points. While the first two arguments assert a non-
Eurocentric perspective by Cox, they also show how Cox escaped 
from being a Eurocentric. Moreover, this situation leads to better 
explanations in order to understand IR events. The third argument 
asserts the importance of balance between opposite terms (e.g. 
agency-structure, material-ideal) to understanding human and global 
political economy conditions. Moreover, using time-based concepts 
(i.e. synchronic and diachronic) on these terms provide chances to 
explain more clearly. Lastly, Cox (1981) believes there is a 
constructive relationship between theory and history, so he leaves an 
open door to be reviewed in the future. 
Critical theorists are inspired by Hegel. However, his term `immanent 
critique` led to a Eurocentric understanding and explanation emerging 
within Critical Theory. Immanent critique is defined as “without 
reference to an independently articulated method or to transcendent 
criteria” (Hutchings 1999: 99). Three important thinkers in IR agree 
with the importance of immanent critique in order to avoid approaching 
IR with abstract ethical principles (Linklater 1989; Hutchings 1999; 
Robinson 1999). They (Linklater 1989; Hutchings 1999; Robinson 
1999) believe that theorists must engage critically with the 
background normative assumptions and fit between modes of thought 
and forms of political organization. Although Cox`s (1981: 128) most 
cited phrase “Theory is always for someone and for some purpose” 
can be shown as an example of immanent critique, this sentence does 
not totally address immanent critique. It could be derived from two 
sources. Firstly, Cox does not address `immanent` openly. Secondly, 
a Coxian interpretation sets up a balance between material and ideal, 
power and morality, structure and superstructure. The balance is 
95 
provided with emphasis on `reciprocality` between opposite forces. 
While reciprocality takes the normative assumptions into the theory, 
the same term protects the theory from normative-based arguments. 
Moreover, we know how Cox criticizes the normative based 
explanation, when he evaluates Hedley Bull (Cox 1993b: 137). 
Subjective perception of the world should be given an objective 
explanation (see Chapter 4). 
The second difference with Cox is related to another Eurocentric term 
which is emancipatory interest. Emancipatory interest is defined as 
“freeing people from those constraints that stop them carrying out 
what freely they would choose to do” (Booth 1991: 539). Many critical 
theorists do not use this term because of integrality with Kant and 
Marx (Ashley 1981; Linklater 1999; Booth 1991). Emancipation relies 
on Western `rationality` based explanations and terms. It is believed 
that emancipation can be a target objective. While emancipation is 
seen as a security in IR (Booth 1991), it can also be interpreted as a 
main and absolute target of states. However, security is no such thing. 
States can only strive to a less dangerous position for themselves, 
because logically there is not an absolute freedom in global politics. 
The world has already globalized and every state action and even civil 
society demands can affect the whole world (Cox 2004). Thus, state 
relations run with mutual effects. While Cox does not follow Eurocentic 
rational and progress concepts, his arguments provide a better 
explanation.  
The third advantage of using Coxian interpretation is about the 
balance between structure and agency. Critical Theorists can easily 
be interpreted as structuralist (Ashley 1984; Dalby 1991). However, 
the main point for us in IR is a balance between opposite terms. The 
terms which are accepted as opposite to each other, are defined in 
terms of spatial dimensions. When we also consider a temporal 
dimension, it is seen that opposite terms supersede the others’ 
position. Thus, it is easy to understand which factors are structure- 
and agency-based; however, it is difficult to separate which one of 
them triggers another. In terms of a trigger, the same arguments can 
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be asserted regarding material and ideational issues. At this point, 
Cox’s (1999) synchronic and diachronic emphasis are very important; 
however, problems with Cox arise from this feature. Although he 
emphasises important concepts and asserts correct arguments, some 
points do not seem clear as is mentioned below. Although a Coxian 
interpretation is not undermined by Marxian or Neorealist structural-
based explanations, even with the help of Gramsci-inspired and well-
defined notions of `structure` and `superstructure` (Cox 1993a: 56), 
Cox does not explain the connection and transition between structure 
and agents clearly for Sinclair (2016). This research will investigate 
how this transition can be understood.  
Lastly, Cox`s view on theory-history construction creates the last 
advantage. Although Critical Theory considers the importance of 
history-based perceptions compared to problem-solving theories, his 
(Cox 1981: 128) most quoted argument, “Theory is always for 
someone and for some purpose [italics from original]”, shows that his 
theory is situated in a history context. “History generates theory” and 
“this theory is not absolute knowledge, not a final revelation or a 
completeness of rational knowledge about laws of history” (Cox 
1993b: 135). Thus, he leaves an open door to be reviewed according 
to a new historical context in the future. We can easily add social 
dynamics as a new structural sphere without contradicting Cox. A neo-
Coxian interpretation is a theory that Cox actually asks future 
researchers to consider. 
3.3.2. The Critiques of Cox 
In the literature, there are different types of criticism of Cox; however, 
the main critique comes from the need for people to assert their own 
interpretation of his work. Because of this reason, there are also 
contradictions between critiques made of Cox (Schechter 2002). 
Other critiques of Cox can be classified under nine titles which are: 
being an Eurocentric, lack of historical materialist analysis, 
ontological, epistemological and methodological deficiency, 
inspiration by Weber, being a pessimist and optimist, state-centrism 
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and the position of state, overestimation of the military`s importance,  
non-specificity, and unclear argumentation (see Table 3.1).  
In terms of Eurocentrism, there are three main arguments regarding 
Cox. The first (of the arguments) relies on dominancy and hegemony 
in a Coxian interpretation. For Pasha (2005: 548-551), a Coxian 
transnational hegemony definition (firstly national then the 
translational) and its practicality (firstly European or American and 
then whole world) ignores the rest of the world.  Pasha`s (2005) 
argument relies on the hypothesis of mutual relations between the 
West and the Rest and the definition of hegemony is queried in terms 
of its position in the core and periphery. It can be interpreted as a 
historical critique. Thus, Pasha (2005: 549) thinks the rest of the world 
is ignored historically and analytically by Cox’s focus on Europe. The 
second argument relies on hegemony and its connection with culture 
(Pasha 2005; Pasha 2008). This argument is posed against neo-
Gramscians more widely but Cox is also mentioned (Pasha 2005: 248; 
Pasha 2008: 204). Neo-Gramscians are interpreted as reductionist in 
terms of culture, because after hegemony is structured by economic 
based power, culture follows it. Thus, culture is defined by economic 
power. However, culture and consciousness materialization have 
mutual effects in Gramsci’s arguments. Gramsci is therefore 
misunderstood. The last argument is a class definition within the 
Eurocentric perspective. Keyman (1997: 120) believes that Cox`s 
concept of mode of production relies on a social classes analysis, 
although Cox tries to use the term inter-subjectivity. The reductionist 
characteristic of Coxian inter-subjectivity which priorities class 
relations, leads to privileging class over non-class identities. Thus, 
according to his interpretation, Coxian inter-subjectivity rises from its 
class emphasis. In contrast to Keyman`s critiques, Dale and 
Robertson’s (2003) interview with Cox should be examined. In it, Cox 
emphasises the origins of myths, language and religion and their 
intersubjective relations with material conditions in terms of civilization 
(Dale and Robertson 2003). Thus, identity constitution is defined more 
clearly.  
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The second main critique comes from the historical materialist side. 
This critique includes three parts. The first is related to the overstating 
of ideology. Burnham (1991) thinks that with the Weberian pluralism 
effect, Cox tries to find a middle point between idealism and economic 
arguments. This point can be derived from the interaction between 
material capabilities, ideas and institutions. However, the insertion of 
ideas and culture into the economic process leads to an 
“overestimation of the importance of ideology” (Burnham 1991: 79). 
Although finding the middle point between ideas and economy 
provides an advantage, it also fails to recognize the importance of 
capital relations. Morton`s (2003a; 2003b) criticism of Cox starts with 
supporting for Burnham`s argument in accusing Neo-Gramscians, 
who include Cox, as liberal pluralist interpreters rather than historical 
materialists. Thus, the second part, which is a liberal interpretation of 
Gramsci rather than historical materialist interpretation, arises. For 
Morton (2006), Critical International Political Economy, which includes 
Cox, has an anti-historical perspective and the lack of historical-
materialist perception leads to an understating of class struggle. In 
contrast to Morton, Germain (2007) asserts that Morton has a 
historical materialist explanation with the refusal of ideas, so he is not 
able to explain historical process widely and deeply. Rather, 
Colingwood inspired Cox`s “historical idealism” is able to explain 
historical process with the emphasis of motivations and self-
understandings of people (Germain 2007: 129). The last part of the 
critique refers to a lack of production explanation. Budd (2007a) 
believes that Cox`s rejection of Marxian theory because of its `static 
and abstract` analysis in terms of the mode of production is wrong, 
because Marxism`s mode of production is constituted by internal 
contradictions, which is more active than Cox thinks. From the 
opposite side of the historical materialist arguments, Bernstein (2000) 
asserts that Cox overstates the importance of economic factors; 
however, economic based explanations need to be considered with 
ideational explanations.  
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The third critique, which involves is an ontological, epistemological 
and methodological deficiency, has four main parts. The first is related 
to the ontological, epistemological and methodological complexities of 
Neo-Gramscian interpretations. For Germain and Kenny (1998), the 
main Gramscian concepts like hegemony, civil society and historic 
bloc were used to explain the national context. When they are used 
for interpreting international phenomena, more complexities arise. 
Moreover, the meaning of concepts is damaged when they are used 
for contemporary events in terms of historical idealism.  The second 
of the critiques is about agency-structure and state issues in terms of 
ontology. The arguments come from the critical realist point of view. 
From this perspective, if there are intersubjective relations, there will 
be two sides. Thus, there is a dualistic social ontology (Joseph 2008: 
101-102). This lack of ontological depth in Cox’s assumptions, it is 
argued, leads to insufficient explanations of the social world. Joseph 
(2008) as a Critical Realist asserts the ontological distinction between 
structures and agents, because for him, Cox does not explain the 
difference between agency and structure. This condition of Coxian 
interpretation leads to an unsuccessful intersubjective relationship 
emphasis. In contrast to inter-subjectivity, he asserts the terms of 
structure and superstructure that are derived from Gramsci (Joseph 
2008: 114-115). From a Critical Realist perspective, there is one more 
critique of Cox. Although van Apeldoorn (2004) supports the Coxian 
interpretation to include its normative emphasis, he finds deficiencies 
in terms of the state issue.  Van Apeldoorn (2004: 154) believes that 
Cox has a more state-centric explanation; however, there is an 
“importance of the role of the agency in creating the conditions at the 
level of the state”. This is what the functionalist view requires. In terms 
of agency-structure, there is one more argument, which criticises Cox 
as a reductionist (Schechter 2002). Thus, there is a third part of this 
critique. Although the reductionism discussion is highly related to the 
agency-structure issue, it has more of an epistemological reflection 
rather than an ontological one. Both Spegele (1997) and Hobson 
(1998) agree that Cox tries to be a non-reductionist with the emphasis 
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on `reciprocality`, but that he is not able to avoid reductionist 
arguments. A Coxian argument relies on the terms of “production” and 
“base-superstructure model” derived from Marx (Spegele 1997: 221; 
Hobson 1998: 357). From the opposite side, Berry (2007: 13) believes 
that Cox is not a reductionist, because structure “is one moment in a 
continual process of structural change orchestrated by human 
beings”. A clear structural perspective provides a balance between 
agency and structure. The last critique is from another foundationalist 
epistemology, positivism (Smith 1999). Thus, we have one more 
epistemological critique. The critique from the positivist side is 
understandable, because Cox`s critical theory is in opposition against 
problem-solving theory which derives from a positivist epistemology. 
From the positivist side, Critical Theorists like Cox are accused of not 
using universally valid laws (Schecher 2002: 5) but it is this feature 
that critical theory actively seeks to avoid. 
The fourth critique of Cox relates to his inspiration by Weber. At this 
point Weber`s argument is not criticized; rather, a Coxian 
interpretation is seen as more than Weberian pluralism oriented 
(Smith 1996). The emphasis on pluralist empiricism is the first part of 
this critique. This argument is same as Burnham`s (1991) 
interpretation of Cox and neo-Gramscians, as mentioned above. Like 
Weber, finding a middle point between economism and idealism is a 
good idea, because that point considers the structural variability and 
the historical specificity of data. However, this pluralist empiricism 
“lacks the power to explain either the systematic connection between 
values, social relations and institutions or the extent to which the 
historical appearance of capital as a social relation transforms the 
social order in such a way that all relations are subsumed under the 
capital relation” (Burnham 1991: 78). Moreover, Burnham (1999) and 
Saad-Filho and Ayers (2008) extend critiques of the methodological 
approach used by Cox. Cox`s methodology is seen as a mid-point 
between Weber and Marx, who have two incompatible 
methodologies. Thus, Cox does not address critical theory in relation 
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to problem-solving theory clearly because of his methodological 
complexity. 
Fifthly, whereas some see Cox as an undue pessimist, others see Cox 
as an undue optimist (Cox and Schecter 2002). The first person to 
interpret Cox as an undue pessimist is Gareau. Gareau`s (1996) 
critique of Cox starts with Cox`s International Labour Organization 
experience. Cox is alleged to have a jaundiced view of international 
institutions after his ILO years. In response to Cox, the argument 
presented is that international institutions are not seen as 
organizations of the US hegemon; rather, they challenge the 
hegemony. The second critique under this title relates to Cox`s 
perception of civil society. From this perspective, civil society is not 
particularly strong or well organized in Coxian interpretations. 
However, Shaw et al. (2000) are more optimistic about civil society 
and its effects on multilateral agreements. From the perspective of 
civil society, there is one more critique of Cox. Transnational civil 
societal groups and coalitions like Greenpeace and OXFAM provide 
more optimistic expectations for the future (Macdoland 1994). A 
Coxian interpretation of civil society is often seen in one-dimensional 
terms in opposition to transnational capitalist hegemony.  
On the other hand, some scholars think that Cox is an optimist. The 
first part of this critique comes from a realist perspective. As a 
problem-solving theorist, Waltz (1986) interprets critical theory as 
utopianism. Like Waltz, Mearsheimer (1994) also criticizes critical 
theorists as attempting to create a more peaceful state order which 
has not been practiced yet. Although Mearsheimer (1994) mentions 
Cox a few times, his critique is more targeted towards critical theorists 
generally. In the second part of this critique, more specifically about 
Cox, Hampson (1997: 735) accepts Cox`s evolving global society as 
a multilateral interpretation as utopian because of its bottom-up 
characteristic. Spegele`s criticism of Cox is also about his undue 
optimism, but Spegele`s (1997) criticism is about the awareness of 
people. For him (1997), Cox tries to make people aware rather than 
transforming their self-understandings. 
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The sixth critique is about state-centrism and the position of the state. 
Here, the first criticism relates to the civil society concept. Cox is 
accused of limiting civil society in national terms (Shaw 2000). When 
the civil society`s internationalization and transnationalization 
structure is kept in view, civil society which is limited in a national 
context, leads to state-centrism (Robinson 1998). Thus, the position 
of the state is defined by civil society’s positioning. This critique can 
be extended in terms of transnationalization. Burnham (1997: 153) 
accuses Coxian interpretations of globalization to be authored by 
states. However, in contrast, Budd (2007b: 337) believes that “the 
realization of capitalism`s potential for globalization is not automatic 
but dependent on the intervention of states”. Whereas this 
intervention of states affects transnationalist structures, this structure 
also shapes states. Thus, the state is transformed “into agents of the 
global” (2007: 337). The second critique accuses Cox as being a 
state-centrist, as suggested by Kütting (2001) and Saad-Filho and 
Ayers (2008). Cox is argued to see state actors as the most important 
factors in the international arena and as a result changes in the 
international arena can only be created by actors. Cox`s actor-
focused statist approach is interpreted as a traditional approach in IR 
(Kütting 2001). Thus, Cox is seen as an unsuccessful Critical Theorist. 
The third critique in terms of his state position comes from Berry 
(2007). For him (2007: 19-20), the Coxian interpretation of state and 
its position in the global arena evolves through time. While in the 
beginning, Cox describes states as a `transmission belt`, he (2002) 
changes his interpretation in his The Political Economy of a Plural 
World thereby creating more depth in Coxian methodology.  
In opposition to the above arguments, there are two arguments 
asserting that Cox ignores the importance of the state. Linklater 
(1989) thinks that Cox`s analysis understates the peripheral role of 
weak states. For Cox and Schechter (2002: 11), Linklater argues that 
Cox understates the residual power of the state. On the other hand, 
Laguerre (1999) also thinks that separation of civil society and political 
society in Coxian interpretations is unnecessary. If they are equally 
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intertwined, there is no need to separate them. This critique, which is 
about state structure, asserts that separation of civil society and 
political society shows the state as less important than it is. 
The seventh critique of Cox relates to the military. The first side of this 
argument asserts that Cox gives high importance to the military in 
terms of global political economy (Glassman 1999). Moreover, “Cox 
is accused of not even granting states the `residual` military-security 
role that neo-liberal institutionalists like Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. 
Keohane” identify (Cox and Schechter 2002: 4). Comparing the above 
argument, Linklater (1989) asserts a different argument in terms of the 
military. He (1989: 31) criticizes Cox by arguing that he does not 
discuss the threat of violence in IR. Thus, this argument can be 
accepted as an opposite to the first argument, because this 
emphasises a lack of military explanation in Coxian interpretation. The 
third aspect of the critiques of the military comes from Budd (2007b). 
For him (2007b), a Cox interpretation of military evolves through time, 
because Cox sees a contradictory relationship between military power 
and capitalist transnationalization after the Cold War. After this 
recognition, Cox sees military force as an important aspect (Budd 
2007b: 341). 
The eighth critique is about the specificity and generality of Cox. Cox 
is accused of not focusing enough attention on issues like feminism 
and ecology (Cox and Schechter 2002). For example, LaFerrerière 
(2001: 213) wants to see ecology as an autonomous actor in the 
Coxian interpretation of world politics. However, Cox has a more 
positive image in terms of gender issues because of his emphasis on 
ideas besides the economy. Although his interpretation is accused of 
promoting more economic based arguments (Bernstein 2000: 504), 
the ideas emphasis can encompass gender issues (Whitworth 1994). 
In terms of specificity and generality, another critique relates to neo-
Gramscians more widely. Germain and Kenny (1998: 13-14) 
emphasise the importance of meaning and the history of ideas. In 
terms of the history of ideas, Gramscian concepts cannot be applied 
to all spatial and temporal contexts, because they have their own 
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context and they seem to apply in every context. The open 
interpretation of the concepts stretches their meanings. 
The ninth critique of Cox refers to the unclear nature of his 
interpretation (Cox and Schechter 2002). There are two main 
interpretations of this critique. One is about state definition. Baker 
(1999) finds a weak point in the Coxian internationalization of the state 
definition. It is ill-defined, in his opinion, because domestic factors and 
ideas in the transformation of the state are overstated. On the other 
hand, Shaw (2000: 265) sees a Coxian interpretation of state is not 
clearly defined and follows a realist definition; however, the realist 
definition of state is no more than a superficial understanding. In terms 
of unclear points, Saad-Filho and Ayers (2008: 148) finds the Coxian 
interpretation abstract and eclectic.  A Coxian interpretation uses 
history and transformation concepts in the global order, because it 
leads to the social world definition as more open and context-
dependent. However, these terms heavily depend on the internal 
consistency of the analytical framework (Saad-Filho and Ayers 2008: 
150). Moreover, a Coxian class interpretation is static and ideal-typical 
rather than dynamic and historically specific. Despite his efforts, it is 
difficult to see class changes and movements clearly in his arguments.  
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Table 3.1: Critiques of Cox 
There are some recurrent issues which can be found in the different 
critique types. Cox’s understanding of the state is the one of them. It 
is discussed in terms of ontological problems, state-centrism and state 
positions and also unclearness of arguments sections; however, in all 
areas, different types of arguments on Coxian state interpretation are 
given. Civil society is another issue in the critiques. However, there 
are four types of arguments presented on Cox regarding civil society 
about how it leads to optimism, pessimism, state-centrism and a weak 
state definition. In the critiques, there are two issues (i.e. state position 
and military) which are used for how a Coxian interpretation changes 
through time. Another critique classification can be conducted on 
perception differences. Thus, the critiques come from different 
perceptions and priorities to the same topic lead opposite arguments 
in the same topic. The topics which have two opposite critiques, are 
overstating/understating of economy, reductionism/non-reductionism, 
civil society in terms of pessimism/optimism, civil society in terms of 
state position, whether it leads to weak state or state-centrist 
perceptions, the state`s position in terms of transnationalisation 
whether it affects transnationalization or it is affected by 
transnationalization, important/unimportant military, clear/unclear 
state definition.  
We mainly find the opposing arguments are unnecessary. In Coxian 
terms, the economy is stated as equal to political dimensions, while 
material dimensions are accepted as equal to ideas. Moreover, Cox 
emphasises the importance of structure, whereas he also sees the 
importance of agents, which is heavily influenced by the work of 
Colingwood, to be able to shape structure. In terms of the military, we 
accept how Cox’s arguments change through time, but they are 
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acceptable because the end of the Cold War has had a huge impact 
on global issues. In the current conditions, the importance of the 
military cannot be ignored.  
However, the most important issue is state structure. Our contribution 
to Coxian interpretation of critical theory will be mainly predicated on 
this point. Although Cox declares how he sees the agency-structure 
issue clearly and this perception does not cause reductionism or non-
reductionism, we do not see how this process is occurring. Moreover, 
there is also an unclear position of civil society in contrast to political 
society. To understand civil and political societies’ position, both 
should be looked at. It is difficult to see how the forces (i.e. material 
capabilities, ideas and institutions) are developing in the structure 
spheres. Unclear process description leads to discussions of 
reductionism/non-reductionism and weak state/state-centrism. The 
last topic is therefore specificity. We cannot blame Cox for not 
focusing on any specific issue, if he only looks at the broader picture 
and sets up general theoretical assumptions: others should therefore 
add specificity to his arguments. His theory can consequently be used 
on specific issues and, we argue in this thesis, US oil diversification 
motivations can be studied with the help of a Coxian interpretation. 
Moreover, operationalizing Coxian theory on a specific issue can help 
to analyse such uncertainties (transition between agency-structure, 
the positioning of civil society-political society, how the forces are 
running). 
3.3.3. Review of Cox 
Beside the above critiques, there is one more critique forwarded by 
Sinclair (2016). This critique is mentioned separately, because it 
includes constructive elements and non-critical elements. For Sinclair 
(2016), Coxian theory was developed in the 1980s and 1990s; 
however, it needs to be adapted to the contemporary world given the 
significant changes that have occurred in the global order. Besides 
adaptation, there are also three main points which can be accepted 
as problems in Coxian theory. “First, the possible perception that the 
approach was more structural and determinist than was the case” 
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(Sinclair 2016: 512), although Cox (1981: 135) clearly says that 
structure does not determine “but imposes pressures and constrains” 
and agency acts according to this condition. “Second, a seemingly 
narrow ontology” because of his state/society complexity concept, 
although this complexity emphasises a plurality in the form of states 
(Sinclair 2016: 512). Thus, Sinclair (2016: 514) thinks that “structure 
and ontology is clear and visible; however, how things move and why, 
is not”. Lastly, “potential confusion between the purpose of the two 
`triangles` and how they are related to each other” (Sinclair 2016: 
512). Sinclair (2016) tries to solve these problems and restore the lack 
of agency. However, we think that operationalisation of the structural 
causes into a specific topic can help to see how this transition 
happens. We agree that Cox requires better ontological arrangement, 
but it will be discussed in the methodology (see Chapter 4). 
To solve these problems the forces and spheres of Coxian structure 
is reviewed. In terms of forces, Sinclair (2016: 516) asserts that 
`competing ideas`, which highlight conflict between collectively held 
ideas instead of `ideas`. This intersubjective notion can connect with 
`social facts` which is added to institutions “in order to capture the 
everyday understanding of institutions as organizations” (Sinclair 
2016: 517). Thus, ideas are separated into two different areas as 
competing ideas and intersubjective norms. The ̀ Material capabilities` 
of Cox is separated into two areas: `production` which is interpreted 
by Marxists; and `reproduction capabilities` which include 
reproductive technologies and gender dynamics (Sinclair 2016: 517). 
In terms of spheres, the `social dynamics` conception is added 
(Sinclair 2016: 517), because `social forces` of Coxian terminology is  
narrowly understood by production process and it does not include 
social issues like gender, race, sexual orientation, disability, age, and 
so on (Sinclair 2016: 515). Thus, this new sphere (i.e. social 
dynamics) is about human conflict and cooperation. “Struggles by 
social movements about things such as human rights and the 
biosphere” need to be recognized (Sinclair 2016: 515). Thus, Sinclair 
(2016: 517) creates one forces triangle and one spheres diamond. 
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         & reproductive             social facts 
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Figure 3.3: Forces redux in Sinclair (2016: 517) 
         social forces  
 
        forms of state           world order 
 
               social dynamics  
Figure 3.4: Spheres redux in Sinclair (2016:517) 
Sinclair`s (2016) study presents a very useful discussion in order to 
see how Coxian interpretations can be used on present issues and 
how the agency-structure issue can be resolved, but we have some 
agreement and disagreements with Sinclair. In Coxian terminology, 
ideas are two kinds which are intersubjective meanings and collective 
images of social order. While the former means covered collaboration 
in general understanding, the following one includes different 
perspectives by different groups. These perspectives might compete 
each other. Thus, Coxian `ideas` include two dimensions, while one 
of them includes competitions and contradictions. There is no need 
for separation of ideas. Moreover, we do not see the necessity of 
separation of productive and reproductive capabilities.  It is a good 
idea to practice Coxian terminology on the contemporary world; 
however, contemporary world events in IR are not run by reproductive 
issues. Gender dynamics have been heavily discussed in Western 
countries since the early 2000s, and extend to the whole world; 
however, material capabilities are still defined by productive and 
111 
destructive events. Material capabilities can be derived from a 
moment, whether it is productive or destructive or how much 
productive and destructive it is.  
The biggest contribution by Sinclair comes with `social dynamics`. A 
Coxian interpretation needs to include it because of three reasons. 
Firstly, it can help to see the transition between the agency and 
structure issue. Secondly, it provides a clearer civil society emphasis 
in the national and also transnational context. The civil society 
definition provides a clear state position, because, when the social 
dynamics are added to spheres, political society`s position in the 
forms of state becomes much clearer. The last reason is being able 
to update a Coxian interpretation for the contemporary context. Thus, 
following Sinclair (2016), we only add social dynamics into the 
spheres of structure. Our analysis will be based upon one triangle and 
one diamond (see Figure 3.5; Figure 3.6). 
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Figure 3.5: Structural Causes in this research 
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Figure 3.6: Structural Spheres in this research 
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3.4.     Theoretical Framework on Oil Diversification 
Motivations 
Hegemony is the basic concept of a Coxian global politics 
interpretation; however, hegemony is not constructed by just material 
based effects but also ideational factors. The US is the hegemony of 
the world and its current structure can be understood as a unipolarity.  
The US` hegemony is based on material and ideational factors, but 
there is also a discussion whether US is hegemony or empire (Cox 
204). Empire reflects more material based acts (e.g. military 
interventions, economic sanctions). Although unipolarity still 
continues, its contents and interpretations by other countries has been 
changing. While the image of empire rather than hegemony is caused 
by US foreign policies, reaction of the empire affects US foreign 
policies and domestic politics. Besides these discussions over how 
US policies are directed to change the US image as an Empire in the 
global context should be examined. This is how social forces, forms 
of state and world order are entering into foreign policy analysis. 
These three spheres of historical structures reflect structure`s itself 
and its changing dynamics. Global economics and social markets on 
the one side and the Westphalian state order on the other side cannot 
be ignored. These factors must be used and a Coxian structural 
analysis has already been mentioned in the section of “Reflection of 
Cox”.  
The basic elements of the structure, thereby hegemony, are material 
capabilities, ideas and institutions. These three factors decide 
hegemony, its behaviours and then are affected by hegemony. All 
these terms also have a reciprocal relationship with historical 
structures (i.e. social forces, world order, forms of state and social 
dynamics). Thus, current material capabilities, ideas and institutions 
are decided by historical structures and in the time process they can 
cause new historical structures. Why we name them as causes rather 
than forces will be discussed in the Methodology (chapter 4).  
Oil as a commodity is one of the most important topics in this context. 
It has global importance; moreover, it can also be considered a 
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strategic commodity (see Chapter 2). Thus, oil`s importance is not 
limited to only economic, but also political, factors. While some states 
use it as an `oil weapon`, others try to decrease vulnerability to this 
`oil weapon`. Terrorist organizations see the importance of oil and act 
accordingly. Beyond these problems, oil is a commodity and it is used 
to improve or maintain life conditions. It is a main commodity for 
supporting the welfare state, which is the source of legitimacy in 
modern era. It means that oil also has an importance for social factors. 
Thus, we see reciprocal interaction between economics, politics and 
social aspects on the oil issue. On the other hand, the importance of 
oil diversification policies has already been mentioned (see Chapter 
2). 
The strategic importance of oil can be studied in terms of material 
capabilities and institutions. Oil has a material capabilities context and 
there are institutions for energy and more specifically oil (e.g. EIA, 
OPEC). Moreover, oil is not an isolated topic from the global political 
economy, so non-oil institutions can also interfere with the oil market. 
On the other hand, ideas increase the importance of society in 
different aspects. The importance of legitimacy and absolute limits of 
identity increase the importance of society. There can also be 
ideational splits. Thus, causes of a historical structure (i.e. ideas, 
material capabilities and institutions) include and interact with forces 
of oil structures. However, it is worth reminding ourselves that this is 
the structure of American Empire, Westphalian inter-state system and 
civil society. These conceptions, which are established by Cox 
according to structural spheres, are the assumptions used in this 
study. Thus, we are investigating operationalized versions of 
structural causes in relation to oil diversification motivations (see 
Figure 3.7; Figure 3.8), but the system is determined by structural 
spheres that are already given by Cox`s explanation. We will use 
structural causes to uncover process, but also investigate our 




Figure 3.7: Structural Causes 
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Figure 3.8: Structural Causes` operationalisation on US oil diversification 
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4. Methodology: Operationalizing Cox  
 
This chapter explains the methodological basis of the thesis, showing 
how the thesis objectives were addressed in practice during the thesis 
research. These objectives were tackled by using a reflexivity 
approach, which draws upon identification of US oil diversification 
motivations amongst policymakers to analyse them using the Coxian 
‘triangle’ of structural causes and spheres. More specifically, it 
employed a historicist approach to detecting these motivations. 
The remainder of this chapter adopts the following structure. Firstly, it 
outlines the ontological and epistemological discussions in the 
literature and the basis of the research, which is reflexivity. Secondly, 
it then describes why a historicist (and specifically historical-
dialectical) approach was considered suited to meeting the objectives 
outlined. The research used qualitative data from documentary and 
elite interviewing sources to uncover patterns of oil diversification 
motivations predicted by the theory in each policy case, along with the 
rationales cited by actors as being especially significant to its 
development. In terms of comparative historical analysis, the logic 
behind the case selection and the roles of the three cases are 
detailed. They are followed by a description of how historicism will be 
interpreted in the cases. Finally, this chapter details the self-reflexive 
investigation adopted along with the researcher’s perspective on how 
knowledge will be produced in the study. 
 
4. 1.     The Philosophy of Research 
Research methods should be based on a coherent ontological, 
epistemological and methodological approach. All of these three key 
elements should be supported by well-informed collection and 
interpretation of data. To maintain coherency, the ontological, 
epistemological and methodological approaches should be identified, 
and then the researcher’s own approaches should be detailed – which 
is a particularly important when using a reflexivity perspective.  
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4.1.1. Science and Paradigms 
In explaining the thesis research, the notion of a ‘paradigm’ will be 
employed to inform the methods. To understand different paradigms 
in the social sciences, thereby IR, the meaning of a paradigm should 
be defined initially. To define what a paradigm is, its historical roots 
should be understood. Thus, the historical roots of research 
paradigms will be introduced shortly.  
Following on from Hume, Descartes and Kant’s notion of causality, 
rationality and knowledge discussions, which will be discussed below 
in terms of their positivism roots, the Vienna Circle members as logical 
empiricists introduce a more mathematics and logics weighted 
explanation of science. Thus, in this view ideas are not derived from 
experience as Hume and Descartes assert, rather derived from pure 
reason as Kant believes (Jackson 2011). This belief in analytical truth 
is predicated on the verifiability principle and eliminates meaning-
based phrases with logical analysis (Neufeld 1995: 26). In opposition 
to this view, Karl Popper replaces verifiability with falsifiability. It is the 
inversion of the Cartesian problem (Jackson 2011). Thus, along with 
mind-world dualism, falsification does “the testing of hypothetical 
conjectures about the world against that world, and seeing which 
conjectures survive the process” and seeks to disprove “falsehoods” 
(Jackson 2008: 135). This dualist critique of earlier thinking asserts 
that “we know more than we did before” and we are always getting 
“nearer to the truth” (Popper 1970: 57). This is the ‘cumulative’ sense 
of the Popperian idea. In this respect, “Preconceived theory” is more 
important than experience and observation (Popper 1970: 52). 
Following Popper, two lines of thought have been established by Imre 
Lakatos (1970a) and Thomas Kuhn (2012 [1962]). Kuhn adopts a 
more opposed position than Lakatos against Popper. Unlike Popper`s 
notion of the growth of knowledge, Kuhn asserts that there are  
discontinuous jumps between paradigms and “moments where an old 
paradigm, the worth of which has been called into question by a 
plethora of unresolved puzzles [italics added], is replaced wholesale 
by a radically different set of assumptions” (Jackson 2011: 55). This 
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revolutionary jump rarely happens and paradigms cannot be 
commensurable, because Kuhn`s paradigmatic argumentation 
includes more socialisation perceptions. On the other hand, as a 
student of Popper, Lakatos defends the idea that a process of learning 
occurs from errors, which derives from Popper. However, he accepts 
Kuhn’s discontinuous jumps and the uncertainty of falsification 
(Jackson 2011). Lakatos’ study is predicated on paradigmatic 
explanations, using the notion of a scientific research programme 
(Lakatos 1970b).  
Paradigms are determined by three key assumptions, which are 
ontology, epistemology and methodology. In defining terms, 
“[o]ntology is the study of being that is the nature of existence and 
what constitutes reality” (Gray 2014: 19). In other words, an ontology 
is a worldview that informs how researchers perceive reality. Thus, 
the ontology asks about the world “what is there that can be known 
about it?” (Furlong and Marsh 2010: 185). There are two ontological 
positions: foundationalism, which believes there is a real world out 
there, independent of our knowledge; and, anti-foundationalism which 
sees the world as socially constructed. It is worth pointing out that the 
first ontology informs natural sciences and most elements of social 
sciences. In contrast, the second ontology determines that the 
observer is in the observation area and he/she is interacting with the 
social process being studied.  
While ontology “relates to the nature of the social and political world”, 
epistemology is about “what can be known about it” (Hay 2007: 117). 
Thus, we initially accept that whether the world does/does not exist 
independent of our knowledge (i.e. ontology), then we try to 
understand what knowledge means in relation to this worldview (i.e. 
epistemology). Besides that, the research methodology which is 
influenced by “the theoretical perspectives adopted by the researcher, 
and, in turn, by the researcher`s epistemological stance” exists to 
determine data gathering and help interpret it (Gray 2014: 19). For this 
thesis, a reflexivity epistemology is adopted, grounded in anti-
foundationalist ontology. This stance in turn determines a more 
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qualitative research method. A justification for this position is now 
made along with a brief critique of alternative epistemologies. 
4.1.2. Alternative Paradigms 
In this research, an anti-foundationalist (i.e. mind-world monism) 
ontology, which accepts that the observer is intertwined with the 
observed, will be used. This ontology is mainly opposed to a positivist 
epistemology. We believe that mind-world monism provides us with a 
more general and holistic perspective to understand (and not only 
explain) social phenomena. Mind-world monism should not be 
interpreted as a position which is against quantitative and materialistic 
approaches. However, in this study, a qualitative approach will be 
used through collecting and interpreting of data, and material realities 
will be studied alongside ideational factors. 
There are two main ontological approaches in the philosophy of 
sciences which are “Foundationalist/Objectivist/Realist” and “Anti-
Foundationalist/Constructivist/Relativist” (Furlong and Marsh 2010: 
185). As can be deduced from their names, foundationalism has been 
the main scientific approach for hundreds of years. Because 
constructivism (this constructivism is not the political constructivism in 
IR) has been developed in contrast to naturalism, it is also called anti-
foundationalism. The roots of foundationalism rely on Western 
Enlightenment thinkers. Some of them need to be mentioned, 
because reflexivity approaches’ basic themes depend on Western 
thinkers such as Kant, Hegel and Marx (Neufeld 1995). The 
foundationalist approaches’ basic theme is mind-world dualism. 
Descartes is one of the most important figures in developing this 
notion. For Descartes, “absolute certainty of his own existence 
extended only as far as his mental processes” (Jackson 2011: 46). 
Thus, he isolated the mind from the rest of the world with the help of 
rationality. In contrast to Descartes, Hume asserts that “our ideas are 
not innate to us but arise from experience” (Kurki 2008: 34). 
Knowledge is defined by individual observed events and observations 
are transmitted perceptions. Knowledge is created beyond 
impression-derived ideas. This idea led Hume to develop scepticism 
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about what can be known, however, the important point for us is that 
he also followed mind-world dualism like Descartes. Responding to 
them, Kant agrees with Hume about what constitutes the Real World, 
however, for him the mind acts as an interpreter of impressions. Thus, 
“Kant shifted the ontological terrain from nature to the human mind” 
(Moses and Knutsen 2012: 176). This argument is very important, 
because natural worlds and laws of nature arise from the Human 
Mind, not from nature or Real World observations as previous thinkers 
believed. Consequently, the Real World (the noumena) cannot be 
observed and we only interpret our perceptions of it (the 
phenoumena). After that point, we see in the literature 
counterarguments to objectivist/naturalist arguments, because the 
human mind became the central point of Kantian arguments.  
Dualism has two main components, which are externality and 
determinacy (Jackson 2008). Whereas externality is derived from an 
object-subject separation, determinacy is derived from natural law. In 
terms of knowledge, valid knowledge mirrors the world, because 
knowledge corresponds to the world. However, we see it specifically 
in positivism, rather than realism (this is not political realism in IR), 
because according to realists, there are also unobservable realities. 
Moreover, if we separate realism as scientific realism (Putnam 1982) 
and critical realism (Bashkar 2008), critical realism adds a more social 
element to the conception of scientific knowledge.  
In contrast to them, mind-world monism does not believe in the central 
importance of thoughts/actions/discourses but there are also things 
(the world) that should be understood. Thus, monism is not simply 
idealism, dualism or materialism. For example, political constructivist 
theory in IR is identified with asserting the importance of ideas/social 
elements to state decision-making (Wendt 1987); however, it accepts 
object-subject separation and proponents are defined as critical 
realists. For Critical Realists, although social phenomena are 
ontologically subjective, epistemologically objective statements are 
possible (Searle 1995). It therefore asserts a more value-orientation 
than positivist approaches. Thus, dualism and monism cannot be 
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separated as materiality and ideationally, but in terms of how the 
observer sees world (see Figure 4.1.). After consideration of how 
these positions interpret the world, a classification might be 
complicated. 
   
Ontology            Foundationalism          Anti-Foundationalism  
 
Epistemology     Positivism  Realism                 Interpretivism 
     
Methodology   Quantitative          Quantitative and       Qualitative  
                Privileged              Qualitative                Privileged 
Figure 4.1: Furlong and Marsh`s (2010: 186) Epistemology figure 
Positivism and realism have a foundationalist ontology. While 
positivism’s basic assumptions depend on observations from the real 
world, as realists believe that all observation is mediated by theory. 
Both sides agree about the causal relationship between social 
phenomena. However, realism and interpretivism do not believe that 
a separation of empirical and normative values presents value free 
explanation (Furlong and Marsh 2010). In terms of the Kantian view, 
William Whewell presents us with clear constructivist arguments (see 
Moses and Knutsen 2012). In terms of methodology, he (2012 [1840]) 
believes that scientists do not begin with observations, rather with 
questions. After finding possible answers, they test them in a process 
of active tinkering. In terms of ontology, the independent Real World 
presumption is limited to foundationalists.  
In the interpretivist position there is no objective truth in terms of 
methodology, because the world is socially constructed. Social 
phenomena are interpreted according to the researchers’ perception. 
Even the term `science` is contestable in the social context.  In terms 
of ontology, constructivists believe in mind-world monism. Although 
the physical world is material, we cannot say the same thing in the 
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social world context, because there are many social worlds. In terms 
of epistemology, they are pluralists. Thus, “knowledge is carried by 
individuals but anchored in collectives” (Moses and Knutsen 2012: 
200). In terms of methodology, they accept regularities and patterns 
like positivists, but they believe that these patterns are socially 
constructed. However, according to postmodernist Gray (2014: 20), 
intrepretivists believe that “meaning is constructed not discovered 
[italics from original]”. It means subjects construct their own meaning 
in different ways, even in the same phenomena. Thus, they use a 
being ontology such as foundationalists, rather than a becoming 
ontology. Although we agree with Gray’s (2014) criticism, his 
argument is more structural based. However, actors are constructing 
reality in respect of what they have discovered. On the other hand, 
King, Keohane and Verba (1994) believe that interpretivism can be 
accepted in methodology. They (1994) see interpretivism as a next 
step of scientific inferences. 
In summary, all three methodologies are evident in the social 
sciences. The problem for foundationalist perspectives, which are 
linked to positivism and realism, is that when they separate the 
observer and observed, they also separate facts and values in society. 
Society is, however, made by values and objective observation then 
becomes impossible. They can only be found via consideration of 
changing dynamics in human nature, including the researcher`s 
perceptions. 
4.1.3 Reflexivity 
In this research, the observer will be accepted in the observed context. 
Monist ideas will provide us with a more value based approach. But 
also we accept a being ontology (Parmenides) inside of a becoming 
ontology (Heraclitus), so we can see more general patterns of life in 
terms of change, and reflections of these patterns in specific moments 
and places. Changing in being is accepted as a guiding principle for 
research investigation and it will be captured across a period of time 
through adoption of a reflexivity approach. When we say reflexivity, 
we mean critical reflexivity which in turn is inspired by Critical Theory. 
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In the social sciences, thereby in IR, the ignorance of human values 
and an ahistorical approach which belongs to positivism lead to a 
search for new methodologies to support constructivist interpretivism. 
At this point, critical theory (e.g. Frankfurt School, Feminism, neo-
Marxism) emerges as helpful. While some believe postmodernism is 
located in critical theory (Neufeld 1993), others put postmodernism as 
a different side of the anti/post-positivist perspective (Gray 2014). 
Critical Theory and reflexivity consider the knowledge-production 
relationship much more than interpretivism. It establishes a 
relationship between ideas and materials, which is important because 
human life is conditioned by both. Although critical theorists try to 
move away from universal-covering laws and deductive-nomological 
explanations associated with positivism (Neufeld 1995), they try to 
uncover universal principles, rather than focusing on local 
contingencies such as interpretivists do (Chernoff 2007). Universal 
principles are necessary, because, although problem-solving theories 
are criticised, their successful explanations cannot be ignored (Cox 
1987). To understand general patterns of universal truths or “rationally 
knowable principles”, which are inspired by Ibn Khaldun and Vico, new 
approaches should be found (Cox 1992: 148). 
To understand what reflexivity encompasses and where reflexivity is 
located within IR, a short review of IR arguments will be given. There 
are three main debates in IR. The first debate is realism versus 
liberalism. The second debate is history versus science. The third 
debate is positivism versus post-positivism. Compared to the first two 
debates, the third debate is not about “individual propositions or 
hypotheses, but in terms of larger conceptual schemes”, because it is 
more about specifying the “analytic framework” for IR research 
(Neufeld 1993: 61). Thus, we see more of a paradigmatic discussion 
within this debate (Cox and Sjolander 1994). Reflexivity which is a part 
of post-positivism (Neufeld 1993) has three key terms. In essence, 
these themes relate to “the preoccupation with meta-scientific units 
(paradigmatism), the concern with underlying premises and 
assumptions (perspectivism), and the drift towards methodological 
124 
pluralism (relativism)” (Lapid 1989: 239). Beyond the three debates, 
Kurki (2008: 89) believes that rationalism has changed within 
positivism in IR in the last decade and there is a new (i.e. fourth) 
debate between “reflectivists” and “rationalists”. Rationalists identify 
themselves in comparison with the reflectivists (Keohane 1988). It can 
also be interpreted as a paradigmatic debate. 
The roots of reflexivity rely on three Enlightenment thinkers, Kant, 
Hegel and Marx (Neufeld 1995). As a reply to Descartes, Kant asserts 
that empirical reality is apprehended in a priori categories of the mind. 
There is clearly a monist perspective to this thinking. However, looking 
for the universality of reason ignores societal constructions that are 
an interaction of autonomous individuals. On that point, Hegel uses 
intersubjectivity and human consciousness to solve this problem 
(Neufeld 1995). A priori has evolved to address the categories of 
reason and the world history consciousness of freedom is a central 
tenet (Hegel 1988: 163). While reason has become a central tenet, 
world history depends on rationality and reason has changed in the 
time period (Jackson 2011). Although its rationality emphasis 
resembles the arguments of Descartes, the temporal structure of 
reason emphasis is a major difference. At that point, it is seen that the 
roots of Critical Theory; “Critical theoretical reflection would be 
understood to involve more than the questions (Kant) would be seen 
to ̀ [entail] a critique of rational action or forms of life` (Hegel)” (Neufeld 
1995; 18). Thus, “the role of critique” is “more than `negative 
judgement`”, because it includes historical movements (ibid.). 
Whereas Hegel uses the creative role of `Geist` (sprit), he also uses 
self-reflection of Geist. Thus, his critique is not against mainstream 
approaches, but to human life itself. Later on, Marx transfers Hegel`s 
reason to labor. Thus, the historical-dialectic which is a central point 
of critical reflexivity is used in Hegel`s history by thinking (Leysens 
2008), but it is used in Marx`s history with thinking and acting. For 
Marx, “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various 
ways; the point, however, is to change it” (Marx 1975 [1845]: 30), i.e. 
it has a normative dimension. 
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Positivism asserts mind-world dualism and also the limitation of 
knowledge to experience. Because of this hypotheses testing and 
empirical generalisation has become a central point (Chernoff 2007). 
On the other hand, critical realists believe in the existence of the real-
but-unobservable realities. To explain this, past experience has 
become a central point. This leads to a more transcendental argument 
(Jackson 2011: 156). However, the future might be different from what 
happened in the past. As an alternative to both positions: 
“Reflexivity grounds or warrants empirical claims by relating 
them neither to a mind-independent world nor to a set of cultural 
values, but to the practices of knowledge production 
themselves” (Jackson 2011: 157) 
While reflextivists do not separate the observer from the observed, 
they also do not separate knowledge from the social position of 
scientific researcher. However, there is no strong cultural values 
emphasis in reflexivity, because the knowledge and interests/power 
relationship is a central point. On this point, Cox`s often quoted 
sentence summarises his central approach “Theory is always for 
someone and for some purpose [italics from original]” (Cox 1981: 
128). A scientific researcher’s self-awareness is consequently an 
important aspect to how theory is used. Knowledge is not derived from 
the external world but from “our” world (Neufeld 1993: 57). 
Consequently, knowledge is not only grounded in a foundationalist 
belief of senses or observation, because “knowledge is developed in 
a circular and not linear way” (Chernoff 2007: 137).  
In short, there are three core elements of reflexivity in IR; “self-
awareness”, “politico-normative dimension of paradigms” and an 
“absence of natural observation language” (Neufeld 1993: 55). The 
first element relates to the position of the observer in the observed. 
The second element is about value free understanding, which is 
derived from Comte, the Vienna Circle and Popper. Reflexivity does 
not separate value from facts. When we transfer it to politics, it means 
power and morality are intertwined. Both terms are defined in the 
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specific paradigm. There is no universal power and morality definition. 
Thus, relating these views to our case, US oil diversification 
motivations will be looked under the specific paradigm which shows 
time gaps and its global politics structure. The last element is about 
“active and vital role played by the community of researchers in the 
production and validation of knowledge” (Neufeld 1993: 56). The “truth 
as correspondence” is therefore opposed by reflexivity (Neufeld 1993: 
55). 
Using reflexivity protects us from the ontology and epistemology 
contradiction which exists in positivism. Whereas object and subject 
are separated, the researcher should find objective forces in social 
interactions. However, there are no objective forces. Because of this, 
these interactions are inferred by behaviour. Thus, interactions, which 
are actually intersubjective meanings, are explained in terms of 
behaviour (Sanders 2002). However, actors’ behaviour affects others’ 
behaviour, because actors do not communicate in behaviour, rather 
through behaviour (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986: 765).  Each side is 
intersubjectively affected by others’ behaviour. It is a reflection of a 
reciprocal causality in terms of human context. Reciprocal causality 
provides us with a more general understanding of possibilities, 
because we are not limited by behaviouralism’s one-sided 
explanations. We believe Cox`s (1986) stance, which has a historical-
dialectical approach and prioritises intersubjective practices, can be 
conceptualized according to reflexivity. Reflexivity aims at “opening 
up the positivist epistemology to more interpretive strains” and aiming 
to solve the ontology and epistemology contradiction (Kratochwil and 
Ruggie 1986: 766).     
In the literature, there is a difference in usage of reflexivity and 
reflectivity. Critical theorists use the term reflexivity, because reflexive 
science makes “a claim about the mind-world hook-up characteristic 
of its practitioners” (Jackson 2011: 158). On the other hand, 
foundationalists use the term reflectivity, because reflectivists 
emphasize the importance of human reflection (Keohane 1988). 
However, there is a difference between reflexive science and human 
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capacity for reflection. We defend the science of reflexivity. Reflexive 
science has a scientific explanation of human reflection. Although at 
this point we need to define what we mean by science. Natural and 
social sciences sometimes do not use the same methodologies. But 
under the term science, they should have common points. Jackson 
(2011: 193-195) draws a very clear picture of science with three key 
points. Firstly, the methodology should be clear and systematic (ibid.). 
Secondly, systematic connection should consider “explicitly or tacitly 
rules and procedures that other members of the scientific community 
acknowledge”, thus public criticism is important (ibid.). Lastly, it must 
be worldly knowledge which means “realms of actuality that a 
methodology takes to exist, whether that realm of actuality is limited 
to phenomenal experience or whether it also includes real-but-
undetectable dispositional causal powers or yet-to-be-realized 
dialectical syntheses of divergent perspectives and the social group 
that hold them” (ibid.). If research meets these three requirements, we 
can accept it as a `science`. Thus, the term `social science` can and 
will be used in this thesis.  
In comparing reflexivity and reflectivity, the source of any definitional 
problems is terminological ambiguity. According to the Macmillan 
Dictionary (2017), reflect means “to show the existence or nature of 
something”, while reflex means “a movement that your muscles make 
without you thinking about it or being able to control it”. While ‘reflect’ 
defines both the passive act of revealing and the active act of 
reflection on something (Hamati-Ataya 2012), reflex defines a specific 
(re)action and subject-based understanding. This subject-based 
interpretation underlies its epistemic/ontological frame (Fierke 2002). 
As a science method, reflexivity is “a self-defining process that 
depends on monitoring of and reflection upon, psychological and 
social information about possible trajectories of life” (Elliott 2001: 37). 
Thus, while reflexivity asserts “reflection-in-action”, reflectivity accepts 
“reflection-on-action” (D`Cruz et al 2007: 85). The important difference 
between reflexive and reflection arise from here. While reflection-on-
action means a more determinative process, reflection-in-action 
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means much indeterminate acting. Actors also act through behaviour 
rather than in behaviour, because behaviour in the latter is affected by 
events/behaviours in the process. Thus, reflexes are indeterminate, 
immediate and non-linear (Lash 2003). Moreover, there is also critical 
reflexivity:  
“Critical reflexivity is therefore not a way of purifying the social 
scientist`s own view of a situation, but is instead a way of 
making sure that this view is sufficiently rooted in the concrete 
situation of the group with whom the social scientist is aligned 
– the social group whose vision she or he seeks to advance” 
(Jackson 2011: 176) 
Although Critical Reflexivity looks to a conception of knowledge-
production, knowledge is related with lived social practice rather than 
cultural values (Jackson 20011). Culture cannot be prioritized, 
because human society is bound up in organizational structures, 
norms, behaviours and ideologies (Freire 1972, cited in Cunliffe 2004: 
409). Thus, critical reflexivity prioritizes how knowledge is constructed 
through our interaction.  
In order to see and show the knowledge construction process, the 
researcher of this study used critical reflexivity. For example, he wrote 
a diary in the US, when he collected data to allow subsequent 
reflection on personal biases and contexts during data interpretation. 
It means that methodological reflexivity was used in terms of self-
consciousness, which is a “canonical feature of participant-
observation” (Lynch 2000: 29). The researcher subsequently cares 
about “reflective and refractive processing of ̀ reality`; the dependence 
of appearances on observational `standpoints`; and the need to 
correct biases that distort … access to the object of study” (ibid.).  
The main focus for reflexivity is how knowledge is structured and how 
the research process evolves through time. Thus, reflexivity requires 
a historicist perspective rather than causal analysis (Kurki 2008). By 
not following causal analysis, it therefore provides “data-driven study” 
rather than “data-centred approaches” (Alvesson and Sköldberg 
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2009: 283). Reflexivity means that data, and thereby data analysis, is 
still important but data analysis must be combined with temporal, 
spatial and contextual dimensions. This understanding of data 
requires much more qualitative interpretation rather than quantitative, 
however, it does not mean that quantitative methods cannot be used. 
Therefore, in practice “[i]f we can avoid the trap of regarding 
quantitative results as robust and unequivocal reflections of a reality 
`out there`, there is no reason to be rabidly “anti-quantitative” 
(Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009: 8). Here, we can alter Furlong and 
Marsh’s (2010: 186) figure to illustrate this observation (Figure 4.2):  
 
Ontology       Foundationalism            Anti-Foundationalism  
 
Epistemology Positivism    Realism     Reflexivity      Interpretivism 
     
Methodology Quantitative  Quantitative    Qualitative     Qualitative                      
           Privileged      Qualitative      Quantitative    Privileged                       
Figure 4.2: Redux of Furlong and Marsh`s (2010: 186) figure 
Reflexivity is not merely related to a historicist perspective, it also 
includes knowledge-production and how knowledge-producers are 
located in ethical meaning (Hamati-Ataya 2012). Thus, reflexivity is 
also important in terms of ethics. When we say ethics we give two 
different meanings which are “procedural ethics” and “ethics in 
practice” (Guillemin and Gillam 2004: 261). As can be deduced from 
its name, procedural ethics is, for example, the completion of the 
application form mentioned in the `data collection` section of this 
thesis.  But we also need to move beyond this rather instrumental 
interpretation to consider `ethics in practice`, i.e. how can ethics be 
connected with reflexivity? The answer starts with the how question, 
because the reflexivist researcher asks two questions, which are 
“What do I know?” and “How do I know what I know?” (Hertz 1997, 
viii). Highly related to these questions is the `how is knowledge 
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generated?` question. In order to respond to this question the process 
between values and research must be considered. A researcher’s 
choice of “research design”, “research methodology” and “theoretical 
framework” are governed by the researcher’s values and how these 
values are shaped (Guillemin and Gillam 2004: 274). To realize this 
process, ethical priorities lead to this process, which is critical 
reflexivity or being reflexive.  
In summary, using reflexivity provides advantages compared to other 
methodologies. The knowledge and production relationship is a key 
point in the reflexivist metholodogy. When reflexivism analyses the 
knowledge process in the production process, it tries to establish 
universal understanding rather than local (i.e. intrepretivism), but also 
moves away from universal law (i.e. positivism). Secondly, the 
knowledge process is prevented from hypotheses testing (i.e. 
positivisim) and experience based (i.e. critical realism) and 
establishes a non-linear direction which means complex realities in 
social phenomena. Thirdly, as a post-positivist methodology, 
reflexivity accepts three main points which are paradigmatism, 
perspectivism and relativism. It provides us with a more holistic, more 
relativistic and more historically contingent approach. Fourthly, 
although reflexivist arguments are framed against a positivist 
approach, their roots also depend on Enlightenment thinkers. The 
critique does not only mean going against a positivist approach, it also 
encompasses the critical roots of social phenomena. It provides us 
with a more active understanding. This point will be detailed in the 
next section. Fifthly, reflexivity insulates us from the ontology versus 
epistemology contradiction in the positivist sense. Behaviour`s effect 
in social life is very clearly positioned and arguably more realistic than 
how positivism understands it. Lastly, reflexivity provides us with the 
consideration of an ethical dimension in terms of `ethics in practice`, 
because it recognises the importance of `being reflexive`.  
Coxian IR theory is based on a power and morality relationship. 
Reflexivity`s knowledge process and its universal principles are highly 
connected by this relationship. The terms of power and morality have 
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a universal and perpetual existence, but their meaning changes 
through space and time dimensions. Under global world conditions, 
universal principles can be found with the help of reflexivity. The 
complexity character of reflexivity is the other benefit for combination 
with a Coxian IR interpretation. There is a reciprocal relationship in 
the social context. A cause-effect dimension is often hard to establish, 
but finding general patterns-based process is a shared characteristic 
between Cox and reflexivity. Historical perception and the importance 
of paradigms are another point. While there are paradigms in the 
philosophy of science context (reflexivity is one argument), there are 
also paradigms of global politics (e.g. a Coxian argument). It means 
that there are historical structures in global politics and these have 
been changing according to general findable patterns and recent 
developments. Lastly, a being in a becoming ontological assumption 
combines well with creative critical theory. An effort to see changes 
over the general patterns provides a creative and productive 
interpretation ability. Belief of general patterns in global politics 
provides the ability to depict rather than predict, because there is no 
law-like repetitive events in the social area. Thus, events cannot be 
predicted. In addition to a becoming ontology, acceptance of a being 
(passive) ontology can help us to see specific moments with a 
timeless perception, like problem-solving theories. Thus, while a 
becoming ontology provides us with a diachronic perspective, a being 
ontology provides a synchronic perspective as Cox identifies (Cox and 
Schechter 2002). Problem-solving theories` power is derived from 
their being ontology which considers a time-specific moment and 
place, but they lack explanatory power when compared to a diachronic 
perspective. 
 
4.2.     Design Considerations  
A research design was required that met the thesis objectives (see 
Chapter 1), encompassing both data collection and data analysis. 
These objectives were addressed through use of a historicist design 
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using an embedded single case study of US oil diversification 
motivations. 
4.2.1. Historicism 
In this research, historicism (or otherwise the Historical Method) was 
used. When we say historicism, we specifically mean a critical 
reflexivist historicism which is inspired by the historical-dialectic; 
which is a common characteristic of the work of Hegel and Marx. We 
use historicism, because it is not only suitable for addressing the 
research objectives it is also necessary. Critical reflexivity and its 
roots, which is critical theory, see people as historical agents (Budd 
2008: 176). Reflexivity’s arguments are therefore predicated on a 
historical base. 
Historicism can be understood through its causality understanding 
originally provided by Hume. There are four main Humean 
conceptions of causation which are “regular patterns of occurrences”, 
“patterns of observable [italics from original]”, “regulatory-
deterministic” understandings and “efficient (moving) causes” (Kurki 
2008: 6). This explanation of nature belongs to the natural world. 
Whereas nature is observed, empirical generalisations are fabricated 
under general law. However, in social phenomena, the conditions of 
life are always changing. These changes happen under a conflict 
model (Cox 1976). Thus, social phenomena continue with antinomies. 
Reflexive causation explains social phenomena with; “dialectical 
interplay between social conditions and explicit efforts to delineate 
them” (Jackson 2011: 199), because “for reflexivists, knowledge itself 
causes and is caused by the operation of broader social forces” (ibid.). 
While we consider the changing of social forces, we can see 
unresolved tensions in the historical-dialectical approach. 
Consequently, critical reflextivists are not against everything that 
foundationalists argue, as Mearsheimer (1994) believes. Rather they 
criticise natural explanations of the social sciences and embrace the 
critique of existence in social life. Thus, this critique is not only 
conducted in a pejorative sense, there is also a positive meaning 
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(Guess 1981). This critique does not only analyse, it also directs us to 
current conditions. 
According to Kurki (2008: 7), Hume’s model does not present 
historical, qualitative and interpretive approaches in the social 
sciences methodologically, leading to the need to set objectivists’ 
aims for social knowledge epistemologically. It also poses difficulties 
in seeing unobservable causes such as ideas and reasons 
ontologically. Because of these reasons, reflextivists reject the 
Humean causation concept and as historians, they “should not even 
think about causality in the natural science sense of the term. For the 
historian …. the causal chain of events would emerge naturally [italics 
added]” (Moses and Knutsen 2012: 125). As critical theorists, 
reflexivists follow historical analysis, because they see “people as 
historical agents who are participants in action as well as being 
subject to action” (Budd 2008: 176). They try to uncover unfolding 
patterns that culminate in and clarify the present in history (Jackson 
2011). Reflexivity`s history interpretation is the same as Cox`s (1976: 
175) understanding of history as cyclical rather than circular. Thus, 
history is an ongoing process and is characterised by change rather 
than continuity, not progress or repeating realities such as 
foundationalists believe (Keohane 1988). Further to this point, 
historicism protects from the ahistorical explanations of 
foundationalism. If we are insulated from ahistorical explanation, what 
are we gaining? Foundationalism relies on naturalist explanation, 
which is law-like explanation of social and international life. Thus, in 
this view what has happened until now, will happen in the future. 
There is predictability in social life for them. However, logic tells us 
there are no such repeatable patterns, i.e. history is manifestly not 
replicable. We can only find general patterns of replication amongst 
social processes which are separated by time periods. 
Whereas foundationalism uses law like patterns and deterministic 
explanation, they also protect the status quo, because according to 
them, whatever exists now, existed in the past and will therefore exist 
in the future (Nicholson 1996). For example, current explanations and 
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theories depend on nation-state realities; however, in history there 
has not always been a nation-state structure. To avoid this problem, 
historicism can help us to move away from foundationalism`s 
determinism. Reflexivist historicism does not totally disagree with 
determinism or discount unchanging patterns; however, it believes 
that they exist in a non-linear way and more importantly that 
determinants are not purely predetermined (Germain and Kenny 
1998). Society is always changing and conflicts which affect history 
constantly emerge. Patterns exist but they are always evolving 
because of their socialisation roots (Kellner 1989). 
Reflexivist historicism is also different from Historical Materialism and 
in need of further explanation. Historical Materialism also depends on 
a deterministic approach. One deterministic dimension is that the 
“economic base determined the superstructure” and the other is that 
“laws of history, rooted in the economy, determined the trajectory of 
all social life” (Kellner 1989). However, historicism should also rely on 
subjectivity, culture and action, because besides material factors, 
there are also ideational factors. Thus, there is also conflict between 
ideas and materials. This reciprocity relationship insulates us from 
“one-way determinism” (Cox 1981: 136). Moreover, we do not struggle 
with structural explanations like foundationalists and Marxists do. 
“Structure” exists, but it “is transformed by agency” (Gill 1993: 23). 
Thus, determinations are influenced by social phenomena. This leads 
to a move away from a cumulative or progressive knowledge process 
(Neufeld 1993). At this point, it should be understood why reflexivist 
historicism is closer to the paradigms of Kuhn (2012 [1962]) rather 
than scientific research programmes (Lakatos 1970b). Whereas, 
Kuhn (2012 [1962]) emphasises revolutionary change, Lakatos 
(1970b) does not discount Popper`s notion that learning occurs from 
errors. Thus, progress of ideas is seen in the arguments of Lakatos 
(1970b); however, there is an incommensurability emphasis in the 
work of Kuhn (2012 [1962]). 
In the positivist sense, it is argued that there is a separation of events 
from ideas. However, reflexivist historicism tries to look at events from 
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a more holistic perspective, thus we see the link with ideas. This 
historicism approach can be seen in events at three different points, 
image of society, material conditions and structural changes (Leysens 
2008: 32). While these parts have contradictions in themselves, there 
is also a reciprocity relationship between them. On that point, we 
should look at Carr (1987[1961]). Although Carr is a political realist, 
he does not use problem-solving theory like Morgenthau (1993 
[1948]) or Waltz (1979). His approach is rooted in a “historical mode 
of thought” (Cox 1981: 131). In history, Carr (1987: Chapter 1 and 
Chapter 2) sees the dialectic between the historian and his/her facts, 
and dialectic between society and the individual. These ideas are not 
different from reflexivist historicism, as is mentioned in the reflexivity 
title. The question is how does Carr do it? Here, it is suggested that 
“Causes and effect are not generalizable and ̀ isolable`; so he saw the 
world consisting of `reciprocal causalities`: various structures, agents, 
events as well as process exerting influence on each other” (Kurki 
2008: 93). Further to this point, reflexivity’s close relationship with 
political classical-realism arises. Rather than accepting a structural 
based neo-realist approach, it accepts a “structural-critical” one 
(Leysens 2008: 68). Structural actors (e.g. institutions) are not 
accepted as a given, rather as made. For example, “The word “data” 
derives from the verb “to give” (dare, datum); and the word “fact” 
derives from the verb “to make” (facere, factum): a given is just there; 
a fact presupposes a maker and the maker’s purpose” (Cox 2008: 89). 
Value and facts are not separated. 
Reflexivist historicism and its definition of history are therefore 
explained. However, a new question then arises; how do we read 
history, or current history? Or, how can problem-solving theory’s 
successful explanation be explained? There are two concepts of 
relevance here: synchronic and diachronic (see Chapter 3). The 
synchronic concept “describe[s] certain conceptual division[s] within a 
given domain of social reality at a specific point in time”, whereas the 
diachronic concept “trace[s] historical stages of development from one 
era to the next” (Kellner 1989: 8). Thus, like a traditional theory, it is a 
136 
snapshot of structure of society in a specific moment of time, much 
like a photograph. But it is followed by a historical perspective of 
process. There are so many realms such as politics, economy, 
culture, society and the relationship and contradictions between these 
areas which are mediations. A synchronic perspective can capture 
this `mediated totality` through depicting them through time. 
In short, there are four points characterizing a reflexivist historicism 
approach, which are forwarded by Leysens (2008: 21) and inspired by 
Cox (1976). Firstly, subject and object are accepted in unity, because 
the subjective ideal and objective conditions of existence are not 
separated. Secondly, “events (action and thought)” are “locating them 
within the larger totality [italics added]” (ibid.). Thirdly, ideal types (e.g. 
capitalism) are generalised along with specific historical phases. 
Lastly, the importance of contradictions in the change process is 
accepted. In other words (Cox 2008: 88), there is a becoming ontology 
rather than being, complexity overweighs causality, complexity does 
not include a single force determining it; rather, it includes interactions 
in complexity, there are exploratory hypotheses rather than universal 
laws and the observer and observed are equally involved in change 
in the current paradigm. However, although we agree with Cox on 
these arguments, we believe that becoming and being ontologies 
cannot be separated. Being exists in becoming. Choosing becoming 
rather than being leads to uncertainties in Coxian theory (see in 
Chapter 3). 
In summary, reflexivist historicism provides several advantages. 
Firstly, it protects us from Hume`s ahistorical and anti-qualitative 
causations, because knowledge is derived from social conditions. 
Social conditions are made in historical processes. To understand 
conditions (i.e. synchronic), the historical process should be 
considered (i.e. diachronic). To understand these social and historical 
processes, reciprocal causality is used to give a more extended 
dimensional perception. Secondly, as mentioned in the reflexivity 
section, the main critique forwarded concerns contradictions in the 
social conditions. This critique tries to see and explain these 
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contradictions. Each contradiction creates new events in the global 
context. Thirdly, reflexivist historicism contrasts with positivism’s 
status quo protective structure. Thus, we will not follow a uni-linear 
deterministic perspective, but to understand global oil diversification 
conditions we will find general patterns of oil diversification 
motivations. Lastly, reflexivist historicism also protects from historical 
materialism’s two main faults which are the economic base approach 
and laws of history. If there is an assumption which believes in the 
existence of dialectic, we cannot use any area based approach (i.e. 
economic).  Dialectic should also consider the ideas-material 
interaction. Events arise from that point and we can see the larger 
picture from these special events. Under the US-based unipolar 
system, US oil diversification motivations will be our specific topic.  
4.2.2. A Comparative Historical Research Design  
A comparative historical research design was considered for meeting 
my objectives for several reasons, but comparative historical analysis’ 
basic points should be explained to show its suitability. Thus, this 
section will answer the question `why use comparative historical 
analysis?` as a first step while the following section (see Duration) will 
answer the `how will it be used?` question. 
Comparative historical designs embrace multiple case studies of 
social processes to research and compare specific phenomena in-
depth. The importance of these cases relies on the complexity of their 
contexts (Yin 2009). Cases which have complex contexts can only be 
understood with the help of comparison (the comparative part) but 
also with the help of a holistic view (the historical part). A comparative 
historical design’s first importance relies on the difference between 
quantitative and qualitative comparisons. While quantitative 
comparisons are based on statistics, qualitative comparisons require 
holistic perceptions. This perception distinguishes the qualitative-
comparative from a quantitative-comparative design (Ragin 1987). 
While quantitative studies are strongly analytic and produce 
probabilistic predictions, qualitative studies research events in their 
contexts and accept them as wholes (Hopkin 2010). As mentioned 
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above, depiction is prioritized rather than prediction in this research 
because data-centred and prediction-directed studies are mainly 
positivist and not associated with a reflexivist epistemology. The 
second defining feature relates to how they view data. Quantitative 
analysis asserts that numbers provide a more objective explanation 
and description of events, but actually “much data used in quantitative 
political science is qualitative data, coded into numerical form” 
(Hopkin 2010: 298). Thus, quantitative findings are decided by 
qualitative analysis. The last significant point relates to the selection 
of cases. While statistical analysis identifies confounding cases, 
qualitative research focuses on confounding factors and gives greater 
attention to the selection of relevant cases (Peters 1998). This 
difference between qualitative (small-N cases) and quantitative (large-
N cases) comparisons can result in large differences in case numbers 
between designs.  
The comparison between quantitative and qualitative comparisons 
should not mislead us to accept all the current comparative historical 
literature as relevant (Goldstone 2003; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 
2003; Mahoney 2004). Not using statistical analysis prevents 
generalizing causal effects and thus explaining specific outcomes 
(Mahoney and Villegas 2009). However, it does not mean that 
comparative historical studies must aim at causal inferences - as 
Rueschemeyer (1984) and Mahoney (2004) assert. Moreover, 
historical analysis should not include causal analysis in order to 
respond to the `why` question and generalize from case studies; 
rather, it should look at the process in order to respond to the `how` 
question and be didactical (Moses and Knutsen 2012). Thus, specific 
cases can be compared with the help of reflexivist epistemology rather 
than seeking cause-effect relations belonging to a positivist 
epistemology.  
The comparative historical design`s key importance relates to its 
definition and how it works. It deliberately involves choosing specific 
cases and then considers historical process (Tilly 1984; Mahoney and 
Rueschemeyer 2003). A key point arises from here. In order to work 
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with cases from a historical perspective, comparative historical design 
must use systematic and contextualized comparison (Mahoney and 
Rueschemeyer 2003; Osinsky and Eloranta 2014). In the thesis, this 
design allows the examination of the rationales used by individual 
actors to justify patterns of US oil diversification motivations.  
The target for comparative historical research is to find general 
patterns of social life from large-scale processes such as policy 
making. In order to analyse such large-scale processes, a holistic view 
is required, yet this not only requires a temporal dimension but also a 
spatial dimension. In terms of spatiality, both the macroscopic level 
and level of groups and individuals must be considered in a 
comparative historical design (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003: 7). 
Thus, we come to the basic problem of global politics, the structure-
agency issue. Although the comparative historical approach is 
interpreted as a structuralist design in the main social science 
literature (Mahoney 2003), it is not compatible with this research’s 
main assumptions, which are structure-agency and ideas-materials 
balances in the social context. If the cases are analyzed with a 
historical perspective all dimensions must be considered. Thus, 
comparative historical analyses do not have a structuralist feature 
(Møller 2016). 
Use of such a design for this thesis therefore has several advantages 
over other approaches. Firstly, it allows non-statistical based evidence 
to be collected on US oil diversification motivations. It has value and 
history considerations that can see the change and different 
dimensions in a complex process. Secondly, it allows a systematic 
and contextualized approach in order to justify US oil diversification 
motivations. Thirdly, it is highly compatible with this study’s theory 
(see Chapter 3) and its suitability for data analysis. Fourthly, it allows 
a broad based empirical analysis, through comparing cases within an 
overall design, thereby strengthening research findings. Fifthly, there 
is no comparative historical analyses study in terms of US oil 
diversification in the literature (see Chapter 1), adding methodological 
novelty to the study. The use of this research design therefore makes 
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a considerable contribution to the literature. Sixthly, it is useful in 
countering the agency-structure issue discussed above. Lastly, the 
use of mixed data types and sources is compatible with a reflexivity 
epistemology. 
4.2.2.1. Case Study Choice  
In view of the advantages offered by comparative historical research, 
this thesis selects three cases of US oil diversification motivations for 
further investigation within an embedded case design. This 
commonly-used design ‘embeds’ similar cases within an overarching 
case (see Yin (2009), giving a multi-level feature to the analysis.  
This research investigates US oil diversification motivations by using 
a different approach to the common “case-oriented” and “variable-
oriented” design (Osinsky and Oleranta 2014: 11). The reason for this 
can be understood by understanding what a reflexivist epistemology 
necessitates. It does not compare many randomly chosen cases in 
order to generalize the research findings. However, because only a 
few cases can necessarily be being targeted if the overall case is US 
oil diversification, constituent case numbers and their types are still 
important. In order to provide relations between cases and theory, it 
is argued that “more cases” means “better” (Peters 1998: 58). 
However, selection of cases must be made according to some criteria 
or targets. One of the most important points is that selected cases 
must be compatible with the research design and objectives 
(Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Moses and Knutsen 2012), i.e. 
the cases should be deliberately chosen (or ‘situated’ according to 
Peters 1998) in respect of the design. The other important point 
relates to theory. Cases are chosen in order to test, elaborate and 
develop theory (Peters 1998). This research has a theory-oriented 
approach. In order to provide this coherency, this research will use 
three cases in terms of US oil diversification motivations, chosen 
specifically to support the research aims. 
In reality, in historical-comparative designs “The `cases` chosen for 
comparision vary a great deal” (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003: 
141 
14). Cases can be chosen according to different priorities such as 
territorial boundaries, temporal dimensions and policy differentiations. 
However, these priorities must be defined by a target. The most 
important factor in terms of case choice is finding maximum 
heterogeneity of conditions and outcomes in order to explain the 
widest array of data (Gross 2010, in Jordan et al. 2011: 1163). In 
respect of this heterogeneity, research must be targeted to find certain 
characteristics of the research topic rather than probabilities (Jordan 
et al. 2011). Thus, cases are chosen in order to reflect as much of the 
wider study area as possible. Cases chosen at random without 
consideration of contexts or conditions cannot be compared. The 
number of cases should have a connection with the number of 
conditions (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009). Comparative 
historical analysis aims to find specific conditions or patterns of social 
life.  
The numbers of cases are another issue. The USA imported crude oil 
from 79 countries in 2016 (EIA 2017). The cases and the numbers of 
cases must then reflect the general pattern of US oil diversification 
motivations on the one hand and must also reflect the empirical depth 
of US oil diversification motivations on the other hand. In order to get 
the most compatible cases, they must have coherency with theory. 
However, within the confines of PhD research, with attendant 
limitations on time and resources, a compromise must be reached in 
case choice and case numbers. Three discrete cases studies were 
therefore selected to show the underlying patterns of US oil 
diversification motivations. This choice helps to test theory vis-à-vis 
the necessary empirical depth. It also reflects the case study design 
requirements discussed above. 
Thus, a single-case (embedded) design rather than singe-case 
(holistic) designs, multiple-case (holistic) designs, and multiple-case 
(embedded) designs (see Figure 4.3) was considered suitable for 
capturing the US oil diversification motivations. A multiple-case design 
clearly was not appropriate for the research objectives, since the 
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research focus on US oil diversification motivations. Embedded 
single-case designs with multiple units of analysis will be used. 
 
Figure 4.3: Basic types of designs for case studies (Cosmos Corporation, 
cited in Yin 2009: 46) 
4.2.2.2. The Heroic Role of Diverse Cases  
Comparative quantitative data can be analysed with statistical 
methods but qualitative data is “typically rich and complex” making 
management problematic (Burnham et al. 2008: 88). To overcome 
this situation, particularly when faced with historical analysis 
employing qualitative or mixed methods, comparison of suitable cases 
is required to test theoretical assumptions. However, the suitability of 
cases varies according to the theory used and ontological-
epistemological foundations of the research. One problem is so-called 
case selection bias ‘commonly understood as occurring when some 
form of selection process in either design of the study or the real-world 
phenomena under investigation results in inferences that suffer from 
systematic error’ (Collier and Mahoney, 1996: 60). For positivists, 
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selection of comparative cases should then ideally be undertaken on 
the basis of variance in the independent variables, as determined by 
the theory employed (Peters 1998). Here, ‘most different’ case studies 
can be used to increase variability on such variables (Przeworski and 
Teune 1970; Peters 1998: 144; Burnham et al. 2008; see also Patton 
2002: 234). However, with post-positivist research, different 
considerations are important, most notably the need to carefully 
‘situate’ the cases used in terms of the theoretical assumptions so that 
they provide a suitable venue for explaining the object of study, i.e. oil 
diversification motivations. 
The academic literature provides some guidance on comparative 
historical research design and attendant case choice (e.g. Mahoney 
and Rueschmayer 2003; Mahoney and Thelen 2015). Typically, these 
studies tend to frame comparative case selection in terms of positivist, 
theory-testing rationales that do not fit easily with a post-positivist 
perspective, which infers three main selection criteria. Another way of 
viewing case selection therefore is, rather than choosing at random, 
is to employ cases on the basis of whether they perform a ‘heroic’ role 
that represents a picture ‘much larger than the case itself’ (Seawright 
and Gerring 2008: 294). In other words, cases should not only be 
selected according to the theory employed but also where they 
provide comment (rather than aim at generalisability) on the wider 
process being studied, which in this thesis is oil diversification policy 
in the USA. It is worth emphasising that while cases should have 
heterogeneous points on which they coincide, they should also have 
internally homogenous processes that do not contradict each other, 
i.e. be similar in the processes studied but otherwise discrete (ibid.). 
Then, in this way, the social processes of interest can be isolated for 
analysis. Finally, the historical ‘diachronic-synchronic’ emphasis of the 
theory (Chapter 3) necessitates cases that take a long temporal 
perspective while also allowing examination of social processes at 
specific points in time. Case studies in this thesis have therefore been 
chosen to meet these criteria, to broaden the extent of theoretical 
testing. 
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With these criteria in mind, three case studies were selected to 
uncover US oil diversification motivations patterns via structural 
causes, ideas, material capabilities and institutions. These cases are 
the KXL (see Chapter 5), the Iraq War (see Chapter 6) and Arctic 
Drilling in the context of Energy Revolution (see Chapter 7). The 
patterns of oil diversification motivations will be uncovered through 
application of the theory to each case study, when they are analysed 
together (see Chapter 8).  
The KXL case (see Chapter 5) fits the three selection criteria. Firstly, 
if Cox is correct, state-society complexity and people as historical 
agents (see Chapter 3) should fit the evolution of oil diversification 
policy in this selected case. The case should also fit the explanation 
of Cox on changing global politics from hegemony to empire and 
changing foreign policy due to declining hegemonic power of the 
dominant state (see Chapter 3). Here, the KXL case could be 
considered a ‘heroic’ case for US oil diversification policy since, as 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 8, it provides a classic example of how 
ideas, material capabilities and institutions interact through time in the 
accumulation of policy in this area. As this thesis shows, this 
accumulation was not only constructed via the interactions of these 
different dimensions as there is also an important role for societal 
participation. Secondly, KXL is both internally and externally 
consistent. As Chapter 5 shows, it features the homogeneous process 
of US oil diversification policymaking, set within the broader context 
of federal energy policy that intersects but does not overlap with the 
Iraq War and Arctic Drilling/Energy Revolution cases. Finally, it allows 
a long temporal perspective to be adopted on the accumulation of 
policy, as dictated by the theory. The case study charts interactions 
that have occurred over a period of two decades, with political 
arguments still raging. 
The Iraq War case provides a complementary but discrete example 
for theoretical analysis. Again, it highlights the importance of structural 
dimensions to understanding the evolution of policy – as discussed in 
Chapters 6 and 8. To a lesser extent, domestic US social dynamics 
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played a role in the accumulation of oil diversification policy but were 
overshadowed by ideas, material capabilities and institutions, which 
as in the KXL, became operationalised to varying degrees at different 
points in time. That said, the Iraqi people’s reaction to privatisation of 
Iraqi oil shows a state-society complexity and also encompasses a 
social dynamics debate. As identified in Chapter 6, these reactions 
reflexively influenced US oil diversification motivations via the 
pressure it created on the domestic administration and the US federal 
government. Changing global politics from hegemony to empire and 
changing foreign policy due to the declining power of the dominant US 
state were also critically in evidence in this case, far more than in the 
KXL example. As identified above, there is complementarity with KXL 
in terms of a parallel but essentially different set of motivations for oil 
diversification, yet the case allows a wider, global perspective 
particularly on the relationship between US foreign and energy policy. 
Finally, the Iraq War is overtly an ongoing historical process, rather 
than a single event, and current US oil diversification can only be 
understood through a temporal perspective. 
Finally, the Arctic Drilling/Energy Revolution case is similarly optimal 
for the thesis research due to its ‘heroic’, complementary and temporal 
nature. This case too reflects an operationalised version of structural 
causes. Ideas as nation- and state-level priorities and as political party 
differences, material (in)capabilities and institutions are reflected at 
different time periods in the accumulation of policy. On the other hand, 
this case also reflects Cox`s explanation of global politics. From 
finding global solutions to energy security to a more US based energy 
approach is reflected in US oil diversification motivations in this case. 
While KXL (see chapter 5) will show how much domestic politics, 
foreign policy in the case of Canada, unstable oil suppliers and oil 
markets influence US oil diversification motivations, Arctic Drilling in 
the context of Energy Revolution (see Chapter 7) will demonstrate the 
importance of private interests that arise out of policy controls on 
these dynamics. Obviously, foreign policy dynamics will not be related 
to a specific country, but relate more to US perceptions of itself. As in 
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the Iraq War case, Arctic Drilling provides a different but largely non-
intersecting perspective on US oil diversification to KXL but also 
constitutes one element of a broader evolving historical process of 
policy accumulation that can only be understood through a long-run 
temporal perspective. 
Having identified these cases, the thesis then collected data on oil 
diversification rationales – a process outlined in greater detail below. 
Data collection itself was determined by both the theoretical 
framework and the needs of the specific data analysis technique 
chosen to aid theoretical testing. 
4.2.3. Duration 
While this work uses a comparative-historical research, it accepts 
history in terms of three essential features. Firstly, history is a process, 
i.e. a series of interlinked events. These events ‘can be modelled as 
a function of salient features of the institutional, ideological or social 
context in which the actor is situated’ (Hall 2014: 10). Secondly, any 
definition of a historical process should, however, recognise that both 
agency and structure are intertwined. While rational theory explains 
how individual agency within historical processes is determined 
according to specific material structures, a more critical theoretical 
perspective accepts that the two are mutually interlinked. Critical 
theory is based on historical-dialectic. Both agency and structure and 
both materials and ideas always affect and are affected by each other. 
Thus, this process reflects an agency-structure balance. Finally, we 
must also consider how this balance changes through time, 
particularly in terms of duration. Three different temporal dimensions 
are generally understood: duration; tempo (pace); and trajectories 
(paths) (Aminzade 1992). While pace refers to repetitive events, 
trajectories implies a sequential order of events (ibid.). However, in 
the duration perception, time passes, changes occur and they never 
repeat (Bergson 1998: 46). Thus, although the sequence of events is 
used, they are not the mere line of history. The sequence of events-
based perception requires cause-effect relations, but duration looks 
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at them from both diachronic and synchronic perspectives in order to 
see `how` structure changes. 
In addition, after collecting data on oil diversification motivations in 
each of three case studies, the thesis then needed to theoretically 
analyse them. In other words, a means of linking the empirical 
evidence to the theoretical framework (Chapter 3) was required. 
Firstly, this section shows how a duration technique was used to 
establish the non-causal process analysis. Secondly, it shows the 
definition of duration and how duration can be interpreted and 
understood. Thirdly, it shows how these decisions helped the analysis 
of theory in each case using a `congruence` technique (George and 
Bennett 2005: 181). 
4.2.3.1. Non-Causal Causal analysis 
In the `Reflexivity` section, a causation perception is already 
mentioned, but needs to be emphasised in more detail here. For Kurki 
(2008: 10), in order to avoid `metaphysical questions`, a causation 
problem is accepted in an epistemological (e.g. can we know 
causes?) or methodological sense (e.g. what methods should we use 
for causal analysis?) rather than ontological. However, causes do 
exist in ontological entities and they are not found in patterns of 
events. Thus, a Humean sense of causation is not rejected entirely, 
rather causation is limited to constitutive language in social contexts. 
Historicist explanations cannot only be derived from causal 
explanations. Moreover, Kurki (2008: 131) has already mentioned that 
a Coxian `historicist` framework is not applicable to causal 
explanation or vice versa. Then, questions arise that if causality is not 
rejected totally, how can it be used, when can it be used and how can 
the process be explained without causal explanation? 
Elton (2002[1967]: 9) thinks that historical analysis differs from other 
studies in terms of its concern with the `events`, `change` and the 
`particular`. Although it is a good explanation, there is one more step 
which must be emphasised that history takes these three concerns in 
the whole. Although in the whole, there are causal effects and 
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sequential events, they do not repeat and cannot be discovered 
directly. The facts which resemble each other can be found from 
patterns of history, because their interactions with each other create 
the patterns. Historians select facts in the process which are managed 
by a “multiplicity of sequences of causes”, then fit them into his/her 
“pattern of rational explanation” (Carr 1987: 138-140). At this point, 
we have to review Cox`s approach to `causes`. He avoids using the 
term ‘cause’ to distinguish his arguments from positivists’ cause-effect 
analysis, although causation is a matter of ontology rather than 
epistemology (Kurki 2008). Thus, we agree with Kurki (ibid. 138) that 
preferring `structural causes` than structural forces that mean only 
pressures and constraints. They are only the first causes of the 
process that is shaped inside of structure-agents-shocks and 
determine the rationally knowable principles; in other words patterns. 
The first key point is finding patterns of the process. In other words, 
uncovering “inner hidden laws” (Rigby 1997: 890). Patterns can be 
covered, because they are reflected in different time and space 
contexts. If the historical laws are not like natural laws, they must 
reflect differently in different contexts. We call these reflections 
‘events’. While those reflections do not have causal explanation, a 
historian can only describe them (Spalding and Parker 2007). 
Reflections can be named as `what happened` and they can only be 
`conceptualized` or `described` (Dray 1997: 768). In terms of the 
description issue, questions arise regarding how can they be 
described and why is it described in this way? These questions are 
based on three classifications from historical works that are 
‘description, analysis and narrative’ (Elton 2002[1967]: 9).  While the 
first two are separated, they can be involved in the third. Whereas 
analysis is static and attempts to find causal connections, description 
tries to `display a manifestation of the past` (ibid. 109). In terms of 
patterns` reflections, causal priorities are not our preferences. 
Description is seen as much closer to our process of interpretation, 
but the best way to undertake it is using less narrative in a descriptive 
method which is `a setting down of event one after the other` (ibid. 
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111). The most important contribution of narrative to description 
happens in terms of questions. While `what`, `who` and `when` 
questions are basic underlying tenets of historical research, narrative 
contributes a `how` question in order to describe processes.  
In this research, patterns of US oil diversification motivations are 
uncovered with the help of Coxian IR interpretation. Structural 
`causes` which are material capabilities, ideas and institutions are the 
causes of the structure rather than `pressures and constraints` (Kurki 
2008: 138), and the spheres of structure which are social forces, world 
orders, forms of state and social dynamics are shaped by them, see 
Figure 4.4. The patterns of US oil diversification are shaped by the 
interaction of structural causes that can be derived from different 
cases/events, in a paradigm of structural spheres already given in the 
Reflection of Cox (Chapter 3). Thus, patterns can only be uncovered 
when the question we pose is ̀ how do events change?`. Patterns exist 
in the process and they can only be derived from a perspective on 
how the events occur and changes through time, which requires 





Figure 4.4: Conceptualisation 
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4.2.3.2. Developing Duration 
Duration is “the amount of time elapsed for a given event or sequence 
of event” (Aminzade 1992: 459). It is taken or derived from an event 
in a time gap, but the real consideration is the length of a time gap. In 
this research, it is accepted that there are two different time 
perceptions which are diachronic and synchronic (see Chapter 3). 
While diachronic reflects a long duration process, synchronic 
encompasses short durations or even single events (Mhyre 2013: 
396). In diachrony, in order to see long term cyclical or inter-cyclical 
shifts, a cause-effect relationship needs to be found. However, 
synchrony is a specific moment within a long duration. Thus, a 
synchronic perspective can only see `how the structure changes` 
rather than seeing `why it happened`. Time gap and causality 
perceptions leads to the basic separation between synchronic and 
diachronic, and they also affect perceptions of comparison. If history 
is accepted as changes within cyclical processes, transitions in this 
gap have causes and effects. Thus, although every long duration is 
different to another sequence, predecessors lead to subsequent 
conditions. In other words, long durations accumulate from a series of 
events. If there is an accumulation relationship between them, they 
cannot be compared. On the other hand, events in long durations can 
be compared because they must have similarities (because of 
structural effects) and differences (because of time, space and 
context dependency in each case) (Werner and Zimmermann 2006). 
Thus, synchrony (i.e. events or cases) is required in comparative-
historical analysis.  
 Diachronic Synchronic 
Focus Process, how matters 
develop 
Structures, how matters 
stand 
Analysis Features of change 
over time,  
historical dynamics 
State of the systems at 
a given point of time 
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Logic of order Cause and effect 
chains 
Systemic associations 








Comparison Solitaries, unique 




Table 4.1: Logics of Order (Hämäläinen 2013: 9) 
The main characteristics of events are reflected in long durations. It 
means that “internal patterns of occurrences” in the events are shaped 
by the long duration (Abbott 2001: 291). Although, important events 
can lead to transformation of the long duration, how events change is 
the main consideration of this research. Events are explained in a 
diachronic perspective by force of “limiting” and “imprisoning” them in 
the short term (Braudel 2009: 174). Thus, duration is not limited to 
cause-effect relations and thereby predictable regularities, rather it is 
accepted that individual events exist in the larger totality, and they can 
be described and compared. The definition and contents of a 
synchronic perspective have been discussed, but it must also be 
made clear regarding how `the how` question can be answered. If 
synchronic is described as focusing on structures, how does it see 
structure? In order to understand synchronic interpretation of 
structure, we must reflect back on the `duration` issue. It is worth 
remembering that the duration conception “implies a unity defined by 
a beginning and an end, or a constancy of the event, or sequence of 
events, over a defined length of time” (Aminzade 1992: 460).  
Notwithstanding which type of duration is chosen, there can be three 
main triggers for constituting duration which are selected, exogenous 
shock and structural determined (Mickey and Pierson 2004: 26-31). 
Rational selection is about an individual`s position in the duration of a 
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process or event (ibid.). Whereas this selection happens in a 
conscious way, it can also happen without the subject being aware of 
how it occurs. In this research, it is accepted that people do not 
behave in behaviour, rather through behaviour. Rationality is not a 
pure defined and context-free concept. It is determined by institutional 
practices (i.e. mutual expectations), shared cognitive frameworks (i.e. 
shared narratives) and network relations (i.e. regular contact or 
communication) (Hall 2014: 7-8). In exogenous shock, actors` 
preferences are determined by external events (Mickey and Pierson 
2004: 26-31). Structural determination means the process under 
examination is largely pre-determined (ibid.). In order to explain 
various diachronic or synchronic considerations, these three triggers 
must be considered. Triggers are not only shaped by 
common/universal factors, there are also country-specific factors. The 
difference between universal and national dimensions should be clear 
in terms of US oil diversification motivations.  
This research will therefore analyse the three cases with the help of a 
revised Coxian IR interpretation. Events and their process (i.e. from 
their beginning until now) are accepted as a synchronic dimension. 
Structural dimensions, similarities and contrasts between each other, 
systemic understanding will be prioritized. However, a synchronic 
understanding cannot make sense of events without a diachronic 
perception. In the `Reflection of Cox` section, a diachronic perception 
which shows historical dynamics and cause-effect relations, is already 
given. Current global contradictions, situations, and the US’s position 
in the world was reflected upon. Thus, we do not need to research all 
diachronic and synchronic perceptions. However, we can set two 
main targets. One of them is finding triggers of social dynamics and 
its effect on oil diversification motivations patterns in a diachronic 
perspective. In order to do this, events must be analysed and 
compared in a synchronic perspective: our second target. All case 
studies require a synchronic perception that can be compared and 
used to find general patterns of US oil diversification motivations 
(diachronic), but all these case studies are also a long term process 
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(diachronic) that is composed by synchronic variations. This feature 
guides how we operationalise our contribution to Cox, which is being 
in becoming. How the research is conceptualised is shown in Figure 
4.4. 
4.2.3.3. Theory-Testing: Congruence 
The theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3 was then used to 
analyse these rationales using a `congruence method` (Goldstone 
2003: 50; George and Bennett 2005: 181; Blatter and Blum 2008: 
315). This method begins with “a theory and then attempts to assess 
its ability to explain or predict the outcome in a particular case” 
(George and Bennett 2005: 181). In critical theory using a historicist 
method, prediction is not a prior objective. Theory must help explain 
and describe the case, with an emphasis on uncovering patterns of oil 
diversification motivations (see Chapter 3). A congruence method 
provides an approach to examine the ability of a theory for this 
purpose.  
Before starting a congruence method, theory-testing is analysed. In 
order to build a theory, ̀ conceptualizing`, ̀ categorizing` and ̀ ordering` 
are the key targets of a researcher (Andersen and Kragh 2010: 50). 
These targets need to be checked by cases. Thus, cases are in a 
central position for theory building, whereas they are only instrumental 
for theory-testing (Løkke and Sørensen 2014: 69). Theory-testing 
does not limit itself with research questions, rather it tries to see all 
elements. The cases are part of these elements. However, seeing all 
elements and establishing universal generalizations are different 
aspects. Congruence testing aims to examine “how particular 
interests are related or different” (Goldstone 2003: 50). In order to 
arrive at this target, a congruence method does not have to follow the 
causal process. It follows that the congruence method is compatible 
with historical analysis, because it opens up complex 
conceptualizations which are beyond finding a specific causal 
relationship (Blatter and Blume 2008). 
Congruence testing is therefore a “theory-centred method” rather than 
specifically case-centered (i.e. Process Tracing approach) and 
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variable-centred (i.e. Co-Variational approach) (Blatter and Blume 
2008: 331). In order for testing analysis with a theory-based 
perspective, it needs to look from a broader context. The broader 
context requires `plurality` and `diversity` of observations (ibid. 319). 
Multi-dimensional considerations increase to help explain or 
understand the cases. Moreover, a theory-centred perspective leads 
to the use of both deductive and inductive methods. Here, 
“[d]eductively, the researcher generates ex-ante predictions”, 
whereas “inductively, the researcher reflects on which theory makes 
(more) sense for a specific observation” (ibid. 325). Thus, research 
moves between concepts and observations. A concept-based 
perception can deduce easily and the deductive part provides 
prediction ability for theory. Thus, testing is not the only target. 
Congruence can develop, refine and test theoretical assumptions 
(George and Bennett 2005: 200). In terms of being a theory-centred 
method, there is one more phenomena of note. Although, the 
congruence method is `theory-based`, it does not start with theory 
(Blatter and Blume 2008). Researchers have predictions before 
conducting the empirical work. Thus, there is an interaction “between 
theoretical implications and empirical indications” (Blatter and Blume 
2008: 327). Case selection arises from this process according to their 
`likeliness` for supporting the dominant theory (ibid. 336).  
Use of congruence is therefore entirely consistent with other aspects 
of the thesis methodology. Firstly, it does not require finding causal 
relations, because it tries to look from the broader context in order to 
see complex conceptualizations. It leads secondly to consistency 
which is the suitability with historical analysis. Thirdly, theory-centered 
perceptions lead to the use of both deductive and inductive methods, 
while it also sets up a balance between theoretical and empirical 
aspects. In this thesis, congruence involved comparing the cases of 
US oil diversification motivations with the theoretical framework (see 
Chapter 3; Figure 4.4). This comparison is discussed in chapter 8.  
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4.2.4. Data Collection 
Interviewees were selected according to the Coxian triangle’s 
operationalised version for US oil diversification motivations (see 
Figure 3.8). Actors that could potentially fill the positions in the figure 
were contacted. Obviously, the balance between opposite and 
different sides had to be considered in this selection process. For 
example, think-tanks close to opposite political parties and oil industry 
representatives from different areas (i.e. upstream, midstream) 
needed to be included in the sampling. In this way, opposite views and 
different priorities were collected and interpreted.  
On reflection, the research findings suggest this interview selection 
could be modified in future investigations, because they show that US 
oil diversification motivations cannot be limited to state-oriented 
interests. There are different actor interests from different levels 
(federal and national, private and public); however, it is not a stable 
picture. Even the interests change because of change in the context 
composed of ideational and material factors.  
Thus, the questions to interviewees initially targeted their views in 
terms of change in the time process for all cases. What the researcher 
experienced was that every interviewees’ opinions and arguments 
contributed the next ones’ questions, thereby who should be 
contacted for interviewees to be able to give correct impressions 
differed between cases, since every case is unique. For example, both 
the KXL and Arctic Drilling cases are environmentally controversial, 
but KXL has been chosen by environmentalists as a front-page issue. 
It led the researcher to focus more about environmentalist opinion 
when investigating the KXL. However, on the other hand, the findings 
have showed that lobbies have had more power on Arctic Drilling and 
energy policies (e.g. EPAct, EISA), so lobbies were the focus in this 
case study. 
Data collection via online resources and archive studies was 
conducted to collect all the relevant information related to the case 
studies. However, only the documents that can help to tell the story 
according to Coxian triangle were selected, since not all documents 
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could have been used. The relevant documents that can provide an 
impression of both structural reality-agent’s interests and both 
material reality-ideational factors were filtered. At this point, it is seen 
a great debate on balance and priority between the use of 
documentation and the use of interview data. While the relevant 
documents can create a story of the cases, they might not always be 
enough to give an agent’s interpretation of the context. On the other 
hand, the entire process cannot be given only via interviews because 
of the following reasons. Firstly, interviewees can only provide their 
subjective opinions, often without detailed supporting data (e.g. 
statistics, numbers). Secondly, the interviewees’ opinions cannot 
always be corrected or can easily be disproved by documents, as in 
the Iraq War case discussed in Chapter 8. Thus, there is a balance 
between the documents and interviews, and it is obvious that one 
cannot help without the other. Stories should be told with documents, 
but they should be enriched with interviews. The motivations behind 
the documents can only be learned via the interviews, while the 
veracity of interviewee information should be cross-checked with the 
documents. Indeed, social scientists refer to the use of such multiple 
data sources through the term ‘triangulation’ (Denzin 1970), to 
describe this process. 
 
4.3.     Reflexive Analysis  
Before data collection of case studies 
As indicated above, the researcher`s position is constructed in social 
and historical contexts in terms of mind-world monism. However, in 
this view knowledge which is a product of a researcher`s interaction 
with the context is not created by cultural values, but by the 
researcher`s position in a politico-normative dimension of a paradigm 
which is a decline of US hegemony and liberalism in this research. 
Thus, this research is not value-free and thereby does not separate 
value and facts as positivists do. As reflected in the researcher`s 
position, facts are also situated in social and historical context. The 
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researcher is aware that the same research topic would be analyzed 
differently before or after the research is conducted, even by the same 
researcher. Awareness of this relationship between values and facts 
allows a departure from hypotheses testing and empirical law-type 
generalizations. The case studies` stories will therefore be told 
according to a duration perception and discussed with a theory-based 
view. In this way, rationally knowable principles can be found. 
Moreover, while the researcher will look at how the research topic is 
situated in a context, s/he will also try to be aware of how knowledge 
is situated during the research process, but within the paradigm that 
s/he researches in.  
After data collection of case studies 
Reflexivity in the research started even with the case studies. The KXL 
and the Iraq War had been chosen in terms of encompassing foreign 
policy, domestic policy, changing power and oil market dimensions. In 
order to provide more domestic politics and internal oil market 
dimensions, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 
(EISA) was selected in the beginning. However, on reflection of 
interview and archival data, it was apparent that EISA cannot be 
separated from the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) and even 
problems of the oil market in the early millennium, which was not 
initially realized by the researcher. This awareness led to the 
researcher focusing more on the Energy Revolution in the US. 
However, Arctic Drilling showed itself as the key debate in the US oil 
market/production in relation to these events. As a result, case 
selection in Chapter 7 was not changed, but the focus and the scope 
considered were expanded during the course of the research.  
The main research question never changed throughout the thesis 
programme, but the sub-questions changed slightly in response to the 
research process. The number of questions were reduced during the 
process to allow more focused data collection and analysis. During 
the data collection, it was realized that some questions were inter-
connected, so they could be combined. The two questions that are 
159 
`What are the main obstacles and challenges the US has encountered 
on its way to ensuring energy security in the three cases?` and `What 
have been the definitions of energy security in US policy circles?` 
were combined as ̀ What have been the definitions of oil diversification 
in US policy cycles and how have they been changing over time?`.  
As part of the reflexivity approach adopted, the researcher diarised 
his field trip over 5 months in Washington D.C., USA. The diary shows 
that while the primary data shaped the researcher`s focus on the case 
studies, collected evidence has proved the capacity of the theory to 
explain US oil diversification motivations in terms of both the 
operationalised version of structural causes and Cox`s explanation of 
global politics (see Chapter 3; Figure 4.3). In terms of the focus on 
case studies, KXL has been showed as a symbol of the economy-
environment debate in the US, more generally as one of the important 
symbols of a fracturing US domestic politics by interviewees – an 
unanticipated outcome of the research. The information helped the 
researcher to compare with the Artic Drilling controversy. The `Why 
does Arctic Drilling have not the same power in US media as KXL?` 
question was asked and answered (see Chapter 5; 7; 8). On the other 
hand, the necessity of critical discourse was not considered in the 
beginning. However, data collection on KXL identified a controversy 
that was determined by the definition of `national interest`. It led the 
researcher to compare with the other case studies, finding that 
`national security` coverage in the Iraq War case (see Chapter 6) and 
the contested definition of ̀ national energy needs` in the Arctic Drilling 
issue (see Chapter 7) were also discursively significant to how oil 
diversification was understood by actors.  
In terms of proven availability of structural causes, new findings 
always have to fit the operationalisation. For example, the importance 
of different types of crude oil (light, medium and heavy) and of different 
types of oil sectors (upstream, midstream, and downstream) have 
helped the researcher become aware of different dynamics in material 
capabilities, nation- and state-level differences and institutional 
interferences. On the other hand, increasing domestic political 
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polarization and its reciprocal relationship with oil-environment debate 
was another key point that fits structural causes in terms of changing 
political party stances (i.e. ideas) and thereby institutional reflections. 
There was also an evident neo-Coxian aspect to the cases which adds 
social dynamics as a new structural sphere. Data on both KXL and 
the Iraq War showed that social dynamics exist, but that neo-Coxian 
arguments should be revised to reflect these evolving global dynamic 
(see Chapter 8). Data collection (i.e. interviews, archive documents 
and online sources) was conducted according to structural causes. 
We were able to identify different dynamics in all structural causes and 
new evidences related to the triangle. Thus, it did not only help us to 
uncover US oil diversification motivations, but also how the data 
collection was conducted.  
Finally, the connection between global politics and US oil 
diversification motivations was also proved and in turn shaped the 
research. For example, US oil diversification could be seen as 
reflecting US allies’ oil diversification. However, it also changed 
through time. The process of the Iraq War has in this respect helped 
the researcher to see changes in US oil and foreign politics. More 
generally, Cox` discussion on changing hegemonic power could be 
observed via US oil diversification motivations (see Chapter 8). Thus, 
US oil diversification motivations have been observed in the paradigm 
that also changed the direction of the research topic and shaped the 
researcher`s context. 
In summary, the research findings are not based on the assumptions 
that were already decided before the research process, rather they 
are determined by the process of the research which itself was shaped 
by the events related to the topic, new data, interactions with the 
participants/observers of the processes and the investigation of 
researcher`s approach to topic during the research process. Only the 
main principles of Critical Theory (e.g. people as historical agents, 
state-society complexity) were held and the findings prove the 
necessity of those principles: features discussed further in the case 
study chapters and the discussion of this thesis.  
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5. Keystone XL Pipeline: a project stuck 
between the tensions of economy vs. biosphere 
and national vs. state interests 
 
5.1.     Introduction  
Keystone XL Pipeline (KXL), which has been owned by TransCanada 
since 2009 (TransCanada 2010a), is the main oil pipeline system 
between Canada and the United States. It runs from Alberta, in 
Western Canada, to refineries in Illinois and Texas, and to oil tank 
farms and an oil pipeline distribution centre in Oklahoma. The pipeline 
has been controversial since the announcement of its expansion 
which routes over nationally protected Sandhills in Nebraska (ibid.) 
and also its intended transfer of oil tar sands – which have significant 
environmental implications. The main political discussions have 
involved environmental considerations but the pipeline also included 
trade relations that support economic benefits. Thus, there is a 
contradiction between environmental considerations and economic 
benefits. However, in relation to this contradiction, national vs. state 
interests are significant in the process too. While the local areas are 
environmentally affected, nation-level environmentalist organisations 
have overseen of the challenge. While there are job benefits from the 
project locally, there are national benefits for US oil market. However, 
there are also Midwest midstream and downstream oil industries that 
are sceptic about the KXL. When the two tensions combine, there is 
not unique opposition from one side, rather complex scopes and 
interests.  
All debates include consideration of the national interest, because 
according to Executive Order 13337 (DOS 2004), all US energy 
exports and imports must serve this objective. All participants in the 
project have defined national interest from their own perspective and 
this has led to multiple societal actors participating in the debate. 
While different actors have asserted their own perceptions, there is no 
clear determination of what the national interest entails. The discourse 
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on national interest has remained uncertain because of the 
contradictions and the context which are determined by oil prices, 
political party polarization in the US and US foreign policy perceptions 
that have been interpreted variously by different administrations. It is 
these interests that we can investigate regarding oil diversification 
motivations. 
KXL is potentially an ideal example for investigating US oil 
diversification motivations in this study. In the USA, there have been 
huge societal discussions and political debate concerning this case 
(Price of Oil 2017). KXL is then an example of a hugely controversial 
issue involving environmental considerations and national interest 
definition. It also has a clear foreign policy dimension because it 
involves oil imports from Canada. Thus, the issue moves our analysis 
beyond the scope of domestic oil policies (DOS 2011c). In addition, 
there are evident structural dimensions to the case that should, in 
theory, be amenable to a critical theoretical explanation.  
This research claims that the KXL debate has centred on a national 
interest definition. When the structural causes are used to uncover 
dynamics that are shaped by structural determination, agents’ 
interests and external shocks, it is seen that all these dynamics cannot 
be isolated from each other and their weight in the process is 
differentiated. As a conclusion, specific variables are not prioritized as 
mainstream IR approaches would do, but the reciprocal interaction 
between domestic politics, oil politics and foreign policy dimensions of 
US should be considered. KXL shows that oil import policy from 
Canada cannot be limited to the environmental debate or foreign 
policy perceptions. The interaction between these three helps create 
the policy process. This process been triggered by two contradictions 
that are economy-biosphere and national-state interests. Social 
dynamics as a contribution of neo-Coxian theory is identified in the 
research as a process shaper, but with the necessity of institutional 
organization. 
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In examining the potential of a Coxian analysis for analysing these 
aspects of the KXL case, this chapter starts with a literature review on 
existing KXL studies (Fair 2014; Gravelle and Lachapelle 2015; 
Bradshaw 2015; Kojola 2015) to provide a critique. Secondly, 
historical events and the background of US-Canada oil relations are 
given. It is followed by empirical evidence on the KXL project process, 
which is then explored using the theoretical framework outlined in 
Chapter 3. These data are used to establish the critical decision points 
as the policy-making unfolded. These points are used to understand 
the rationales for oil diversification motivations that developed over 
time, which are then analysed across three semi-distinct phases that 
map on to specific Presidential tenures. The last section will discuss 
the value of the theory in terms of explaining structural causes and the 
role of social dynamics as part of a neo-Coxian approach.  
The data were collected from online resources and interviews. 
Although the research focuses on US oil diversification motivations, 
the Canadian side has also been considered. In total, 310 
documentary resources were identified, of which 185 were used. In 
order to collect data, open-source governmental websites (e.g. White 
House; NDEQ; NEB), oil company`s website (e.g. TransCanada), 
politicians` websites (e.g. George Bush; Bernie Sanders) and the 
websites of institutions for energy, oil and trade (API; CAPP; ECH) 
have been used as primary data sources. Environmental groups’ 
websites (e.g. Greenpeace, Natural Resources Defense Council 
[NRDC]) and news websites (e.g. New York Times) were also used to 
collect secondary data. In addition, 17 ‘elite’ interviewees were asked 
questions about the KXL to corroborate documentary sources (see 
‘triangulation’ in Chapter 4). Interviews were held with retired and 
current policymakers (including from Canada), people from think-
tanks, lobbies, environmental organizations (including Canada), local 
people and the oil industry (including the US and the Canadian side). 
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5.2.     Literature Review 
As the KXL pipeline application is still an on-going process, there is 
only limited theoretical analysis of the case, which is surprising given 
its controversy and the salience of other oil pipeline projects in North 
American politics (e.g. BBC 2019). That said, studies to date have 
focused on specific aspects of the KXL process including the 
implications for jobs and the environment, political support, opposition 
and media constructions. After critical review of this literature, this 
study argues that significant gaps exist in our understanding that could 
be addressed through a Coxian analysis. In this respect, more holistic 
theoretically-driven analyses of the KXL process over time are 
required.  
For example, Fair (2014) researches the KXL process in terms of the 
‘jobs vs. the environment’ debate, i.e. labour-environmental relations, 
setting the analysis within the context of a green transition. The jobs 
vs. environment debate is examined through the position of two labour 
unions: The Laborers International Union of North America (LIUNA) 
and Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada 
(CEP). The study shows that labour unions are far from unified in their 
position towards the pipeline. While LIUNA supports the construction 
of KXL, CEP is in opposition. The characteristics of both unions are 
classified under five titles: economic position; social unionism; cultural 
divide; coalition organization; and framing (Fair 2014).  
To an extent, Gravelle and Lachapelle’s (2015: 99) study does provide 
a broader perspective through examining the economic benefits, 
energy security implications and environmental impacts of KXL. 
Decision-making processes are analysed through mass public 
opinion, political parties and the ideologies which they embrace. 
Gravelle and Lachapelle (2015: 101-102) pose four main hypotheses 
which revolve around political party differences in the US. According 
to their hypotheses, conservative members of society (e.g. 
Republicans) tend to support KXL, with left-leaning Democrats 
typically opposed. Moreover, ideological polarization around KXL in 
local areas increases in direct proportion to proximity to the pipeline.  
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Bradshaw meanwhile (2015: 433) explores the KXL process through 
opponents’ (i.e. indigenous people, landowners, environmental 
activists) perceptions and how oppositions are formed. The KXL 
debate is framed in terms of climate change and state-corporate 
crimes. The latter includes policies and institutions, shaped by 
different opponents’ goals. Although the conflict of interests of 
opponents and proponents is explored, a historical perspective is 
lacking. While KXL is accepted as a case of state-corporate crimes 
and climate change, it is shown that it has a symbolic value in terms 
of civil movements (Bradshaw 2015: 445).  
Similar themes are reflected in Kojola’s (2015) study of KXL media 
discourse, composed of ideology and power. Drawing upon 
theoretical notions of power, ideology and hegemony, the analysis is 
heavily inspired by Gramsci’s (1971) study. These terms are the main 
sources of legitimacy in KXL which is “maintained through ideology 
and perceptions of jobs versus environment trade-offs” (Kojola 2015: 
5). Thus, in theoretical terms, media power is used to direct society 
according to powerful actors’ interests. In KXL, these arguments are 
applied to conflicts between labour unions and environmentalists.  
A critique of these studies shows significant gaps in our knowledge of 
KXL. Firstly, the lack of a temporal dimension to analysis of the case 
is evident. For example, in Gravelle and Lachapelle’s (2015) study 
adopts a ‘snapshot’ of events, meaning policy evolution is overlooked. 
Indeed, all these studies ignore the temporal aspect of the case when 
KXL should be understood as a historical process. Kojola’s (2015) 
study meanwhile limits its analysis to the narrow timeframe of 2011-
2012. In Bradshaw’s (2015) analysis, the importance of discourse or 
the power of ideas is emphasised, but again a long term historical 
perspective is required to fully understand how they have shaped the 
process. Secondly, these studies tend to focus on specific actors, 
thereby only providing a partial view of events: namely the position of 
unions (Fair 2014); political parties (Gravelle and Lachapelle 2015); 
opposition groups (Bradshaw 2015); and the media Kojola (2015). 
Thirdly, the current literature fails to acknowledge the supply side 
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characteristics of KXL, since studies focus exclusively on events in 
the USA: a Canadian perspective should also be considered. 
Fourthly, KXL is a symbol not only of economics vs. the environment 
but also polarization in American politics. Gravelle and Lachapelle’s 
study does start to address this issue but ideology and partisanship 
are manifestly not the only shapers of the process. There is increasing 
polarization in national politics around ‘culture wars’ issues such as 
the environment (see Hunter 1991; Benkler et al. 2018). Finally, in this 
respect, we argue that the influence of ideas can only be understood 
in relation to other motivations, such as material capabilities and also 
key institutions: factors that require a more holistic, temporal 
perspective. Research is therefore required that helps interpret 
interactions between these dimensions over time to understand the 
motivations behind the accumulation of oil diversification policy in the 
KXL case. 
  
5.3.     A Timeline of KXL and Historical background of US-
Canada Oil Relations 
In this section, a timeline of significant events showing the process of 
diversification motivations is constructed from empirical evidence from 
the KXL project process. The process details will be given according 
to a chronological sequence starting in the early 2000s and ending 
with the current situation, thereby illustrating the synchronic and 
diachronic nature of the case.  
5.3.1. A Timeline of Significant Events 
February 2005 – TransCanada and ConocoPhillips announce plans 
to spend $1.7 billion to build a 3,000 km pipeline to move oil from 
Alberta to Illinois. They were expected to be operating the pipeline as 
early as 2008. 
March 2008 – U.S. State Department (DOS) gives the green light for 
the expansion plan of the pipeline. 
April 2010 –The Deepwater Horizon explosion.  
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May 2010 – DOS holds public meetings in Nebraska as part of the 
Environmental Impact Assessment process for KXL. 
July 2010 – US Department of Energy (DOE) criticizes the State 
Department`s Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS).  
June 2011 – EPA rates the Supplemental Draft EIS (SDEIS) as 
having “Insufficient Information” and recommends additional analysis. 
August 2011 – Protests erupt in Washington calling on the Obama 
administration to reject the KXL. DOS releases the Final 
Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS), which warns that no “major 
environmental risks” have been found. 
November 2011 – The State Department says TransCanada must 
reroute the pipeline to avoid the ecologically sensitive Nebraska 
Sandhills. TransCanada and Dave Heineman, Nebraska governor, 
agree to re-reoute the pipeline in order to avoid the Sandhills and the 
Ogallala aquifer. 
December 2011 – A group of Republican senators introduced 
legislation aimed at forcing the Obama administration to make a 
decision within 60 days.   
January 2012 – The State Department announces it will not approve 
the construction of the KXL in its current form but will allow 
TransCanada to re-apply once it has devised a new route avoiding 
sensible ecosystems. 
May 2012 – TransCanada submitted a second request for a permit to 
construct the pipeline to the DOS. 
September 2012 – TransCanada submits a Supplemental 
Environmental Report to Nebraska DEQ with a preferred route 
alternative. 
January 2013 – Nebraska Governor Dave Heineman approves 
TransCanada`s proposed new route for KXL. 
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April 2013 – The EPA criticizes the State Department`s latest the 
Draft Supplemental EIS (DSEIS) as insufficient, and recommends 
routing the pipeline to avoid the Ogallala aquifer. By this date, the 
State Department has received a million public comments on the EIS, 
most of them against the pipeline. 
January 2014 – After a five-year review process, the State 
Department releases its FEIS, stating: “Approval of a single project is 
unlikely to significantly affect the rate of extraction of the oil from the 
oil sands or the refining of heavy crude on the U.S. Gulf Coast.” 
February 2014 – A district court judge in Nebraska declared the law 
that allowed for the pipeline`s route through the state unconstitutional. 
April 2014 – The Cowboy Indian Alliance and others gather in 
Washington, D.C. for Reject and Protect, five days of protest.  
November 2014 – The House of Representative held by a Republican 
majority votes in favour of KXL. The Senate votes against the northern 
portion of KXL.  
January and February 2015 –The Keystone XL Pipeline Act passed 
the House (H.R. 3) and the Senate (S. 1) but President Obama vetoed 
the bill. Later on, the Senate failed to override President Barack 
Obama`s veto by a vote of 62-37. 
November 2015 – The Obama administration rejects TransCanada`s 
application to build the KXL. 
January 2016 – TransCanada filed a claim under the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) against the U.S. government`s 
rejection of KXL. TransCanada file in a Houston federal court accused 
Obama of “exceeded his authority in November when he blocked the 
pipeline`s construction”.   
January 2017 – Trump signs an executive order approving KXL, but 
suggests the U.S. will renegotiate the terms of the project.  
March 2017 – President Trump issues a presidential permit for 
Keystone XL.  
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November 2018 – The District Court of Montana blocked 
construction. 
Figure 5.1: KXL Timeline 
5.3.2. The Historical Context to US-Canada Oil Relations 
Even before KXL was planned, USA and Canada had an extensive, 
long-established oil trade. While the US imported 591,489 thousand 
barrels of oil (Mbbl) from Canada, it exported 8,972 Mbbl to Canada 
in 2004 (EIA 2018a; EIA 2018b). Although exports to Canada had 
fluctuations, imports from Canada had been increasing since the early 
1990s until 2004, except in 1999. While imports from Canada 
represented 13% of all US oil imports in 1993, they constituted 16% 
in 2004. In 2004, two Canadian companies (i.e. Kinder Morgan 
Canada and Enbridge) were responsible for oil exports from Canada 
to the USA (Oil Sands Magazine 2018).  
 
Although TransCanada was part of the US-Canada energy resources 
trade during this period, it was primarily exporting natural gas not oil. 
The company then proposed expanding its existing pipeline system to 
export oil to the US in the KXL development (TransCanada 2005). The 
development of Alberta tar sands for oil production during this period 
then provided an opportunity for this export trade. Albertan oil is 
largely comprised of bitumen which is ‘a thick, sticky form of crude oil’ 
(NEB 2019) and requires a specific but environmentally destructive 
extraction process which also generates significant climate emissions 
due to the high energy inputs required for oil extraction.  
 
5.4.     The Bush Era: 2001-2009 
To understand the motivations for the KXL pipeline, we must go back 
to events in the early 2000s. Here, it is important to note the influence 
of political authority in shaping US oil diversification. By this point, the 
incumbent Bush Presidential administration started to favour reliance 
on the exploitation of domestic oil supplies and ‘secure’ sources from 
countries including Canada, as opposed to unreliable supplies from 
the Middle East. The Iraq War (Chapter 6) had exposed US 
dependence on these sources, which led the administration to pursue 
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a supply side policy of oil diversification. Moreover, Bush withdrew the 
US from the Kyoto agreement in March 2001, after just two months in 
office (The Heritage Foundation 2001). Thus, his limited 
environmental considerations supported new oil pipeline construction 
and hydrocarbon imports. His administration and energy transition 
team were also dominated by industry representatives such as Dick 
Cheney (Vice President), the former CEO of oil services company 
Haliburton, who supported oil development (Cushman 2014). A key 
component of this policy was to source further oil supplies from 
Canada by building a new pipeline linking US oil processors to 
Canadian producers, primarily in Alberta. 
In this respect, the earliest attempts to develop a pipeline date from 
DOS and Presidential actions in 2004. These attempts began with 
Executive Order 13337 which sought to establish “energy-related 
facilities and land transportation crossings on the international 
boundaries of the United States” (DOS 2004). According to the Order, 
Presidential authority was used to determine US energy exports and 
imports in order to maintain safety, public health and environmental 
protection. In this respect, a pipeline to transport tar sand oil from 
Alberta to the US was identified as best serving ‘the national interest’ 
(ibid.). In the project process, it was announced, the Secretary of State 
would consult with State, tribal, local, and federal government officials 
on the KXL project. Different actors were going to mean different 
considerations would be in play. Then later in the process, 
environmentalists signalled their opposition to the pipeline and 
business friendly national level institutions supported KXL, whereas 
some local residents were happy to have income from KXL 
construction and construction jobs (Interviewee-2, Interviewee-19). 
Obviously, there was also going to be some local level opposition 
(Interviewee-17). 
Prior to the Executive Order, initial discussions on the project had 
commenced in late 2003 with certain Canadian petroleum producers, 
which then continued during 2004 (NEB 2006) and into 2005, primarily 
between the TransCanada Corporation and ConocoPhillips 
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(TransCanada 2005; NEB 2005: 1).  The project, which included new 
pipeline construction (3,000 km in length) and conversion of the 
current natural gas pipeline systems (1,240 km), was expected to 
begin operations in 2008/2009 and start to service suppliers in 2012 
(see Figure 5.2). Preliminary discussions had by this point already 
begun with stakeholders, including communities, government 
representatives and landowners in the USA (ibid.). In November 2005, 
TransCanada and ConocoPhillips Company signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) defining the responsibilities of both 
companies in constructing the pipeline (TransCanada 2006a: 14). In 
Canada, Keystone was described by its industry proponents as an 
innovative and cost-competitive project (TransCanada 2006a: 5). 
Attempts were made by industry to include all stakeholders in the 
planning process, as obliged by Canadian federal and state 
legislation. TransCanada was careful to include the views of 
Aboriginal groups (ibid. 17), considering their concerns in field studies, 
environmental and socio-economic assessments, engineering 
designs and other activities necessary to support the application 
(TransCanada 2006b).  
These concerns were addressed in the requirements of the National 
Energy Board Canada (NEB) and Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act (CEAA). Such concerns were discussed via 
consultation activities with stakeholders, including elected officials, 
community leaders and directly affected landowners, plus other public 
engagement, including mail-outs and open house events (NEB 2006: 
26). Public hearings were completed in mid-November 2006 in 
Canada and official approval was received from the NEB in February 
2007 (TransCanada 2007: 30). A decision on a second application, 
which focused on constructing and operating new pipelines was given 
on 20th September 2007 (NEB 2007b). Responsible institutions and 
their roles were being defined under the CEAA (NEB 2007a). Although 
the NEB argued that the project would have some negative impacts 
on domestic industries, employment, security of supply and aboriginal 
peoples, it still approved the project. In justifying its decision, the NEB 
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(2007b; 2007c) stated that on the basis of safety, security, 
environmental protection, enhanced efficiency in energy markets, the 
project was in the Canadian public interest. However, according to 
environmentalists (Interviewee-1; Interviewee-7; Interviewee-17) from 
both countries, neither Aboriginal nor environmental groups views 
were, despite the consultations, integrated into decision-making. At 
this point, an implicit hierarchy in state-society complexity should be 
considered. Legal requirements by political society did not correspond 
with the expectations of civil society. 
 
Figure 5.2: The proposed KXL route (TransCanada 2005: 20) 
A similarly positive view on the project was reflected by US federal 
policymakers. The KXL was accepted by the US and the DOS as 
serving the national interest because of the proximity of the Canadian 
source (and its security), the newly available supply of crude oil with 
minimum transportation requirements and the status of Canada as a 
reliable and long established US trading partner: factors contained in 
its Record of Decision (ROD) and National Interest Determination 
(NID) documents (2008a: 2). These positive reasons were compatible 
with the FEIS, which necessitated an environmental review of the 
project by the DOS, published on January 11, 2008 (DOS 2008b). 
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Under obligations contained in the federal National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) (1969) 4 , the DOS considered the project’s 
environmental, social and economic impacts, including geology, soils, 
water resources, wetlands, terrestrial vegetation, wildlife, fisheries, 
threatened and endangered species, land use, socioeconomics, 
cultural resources, air, noise, reliability and safety (DOS 2008a: 9-12) 
which were also evaluated by TransCanada (2008e). The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) then published the Notice of 
Availability and the DOS (2008b: 19) accepted its comments on the 
FEIS. On the other hand, NEB scheduled an oral hearing to review 
the proposal that commenced in April 2008 (TransCanada 2008a: 23). 
On the 14th March 2008, the DOS (2008a) issued a Presidential 
Permit to construct, operate and maintain KXL, since it was accepted 
as in the national interest because it involved oil imports from a stable 
and reliable trading partner and Canada’s close proximity to the US. 
In addition, a report by TransCanada (2008b) shows how the 
company had sought to address public and employee safety and its 
respect for the environment and native cultures, for example, in trying 
to develop opportunities in terms of economic, educational and social 
advancement for Aboriginal people (TransCanada 2008d). During this 
time, oil prices had already been increasing since 2001 globally and 
peaked at $91.17 per barrel in 2008. The US saw the highest import 
quantity of oil in 2005 at 12,549 thousand barrels per day (Mbbl/d), 
whereas production was 5,000 Mbbl/d which was the lowest quantity 
since 1947 (EIA 2019b). Thus, in addition to Canada`s attractive 
position as a supplier, systemic pressure was also effective in 
providing a rationale for the project.  
However, this consensus of support for the project started to break 
down after the announcement of the expansion of KXL to the US Gulf 
Coast on 16 July 2008 (TransCanada 2008c) (see Figure 5.3). 
Expansion was supposed to result in a 3,200 km long pipeline, much 
 
4
 NEPA establishes the right of all US citizens to a healthy environment, in addition 
to obliging federal officials to conduct a full analysis of the environmental effects of 
their programmes or actions (Section 102(1)(2)) and produce an environmental 
statement detailing such effects. 
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larger than originally anticipated, and the project would carry 1.1 
million barrels per day (MMbbl/d) in total, again exceeding original 
estimates. It was proposed to begin construction in mid-2010 for 
completion by 2012 (NEB 2009a). TransCanada`s application would 
be evaluated under section 52 of the NEB Act in Canada (NEB 2008: 
1), while they also needed a Presidential Permit in the US for the 
expanded project (TransCanada 2008f). In this application (ibid.: 1), 
US national interests were again emphasized by the company. Before 
2009, TransCanada agreed to increase its ownership interest from 
62% to 79.99 per cent of Keystone (TransCanada 2009b: 19) and then 
secured 100% ownership in August 2009 (TransCanada 2010a). 
Although the importance of oil imports from Canada in terms of 
availability can be inferred as indicative of diversification in US federal 
policy, a clear diversification emphasis is seen in the Application to 
the South Dakota state government for a Permit for the KXL 
(TransCanada 2009a: 23). Thus, KXL required both federal and state 
level permits/approvals. Canadian oil imports were argued by the 
applicants to be compatible with decreasing US domestic production 
and increasing domestic demand in the US. However, on the 
Canadian State side, an oral hearing was scheduled to start 
September 15, 2009 (NEB 2009a). A list of parties  included the 
applicant (TransCanada), first nations, companies, governments and 
government participants, while issues proposed included production 
facilities, economic feasibility, potential commercial impacts, potential 
environmental and socio-economic effects, appropriateness of the 
general route, toll and tariff regulation, and potential impacts on 
Aboriginal interests (NEB 2009b). The CEP requested the 
consideration of three goals, which were ensuring Canadian energy 
security, promoting sustainable economic development of Canada 
and reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). Expansion of 
pipeline network was identified in TransCanada’s Annual Report 
(2010a) and the NEB Reasons for Decision (2010a). 
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Figure 5.3: KXL with the Expansion Plan (TransCanada 2010a: Summary) 
Duration: Theoretical Analysis 
KXL starts with material pressures and influences of the US and global 
oil market. However, it was joined by ideas later in the process. We 
do not see significant institutional participation in the interaction of 
structural causes in this period. 
For the DOS (2004), the main considerations in considering the 
project were safety, public health and environment. These factors can 
be interpreted as being of material importance because of their 
productive and destructive capabilities. In order to be compatible with 
this order (ibid.), TransCanada (2006a) highlighted the importance of 
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material considerations such as environmental issues and 
engineering designs. Moreover, socio-economic assessments and 
highlighting of Aboriginal groups showed other ideas were considered 
by TransCanada. TransCanada`s consultation activities, which 
included stakeholders, elected officials, community leaders, directly 
affected landowners and open-house events (NEB 2006: 26), show 
that TransCanada considered societal participation. Canadian public 
interest was also being emphasized (NEB 2007b). Although neither 
Aboriginals nor environmentalists were listened to, according to 
environmentalists (Interviewee-1; Interviewee-7; Interviewee-17), we 
do not think that the lack of societal participation of the process was 
the cause of KXL being a national issue. It was a project that could 
benefit different identities. It could be a negative symbol for 
environmentalists since it was carrying tar sand oil as much as it could 
provide economic benefits both publicly and privately. It was therefore 
a material issue, but the conflicts of interests were also bringing an 
ideational split into the process, i.e. ideas started to supplant material 
capabilities as significant in determining oil diversification motivations. 
Increasing oil prices and oil market pressure were supporting the US 
import policy from Canada on the one hand, while the contribution of 
oil exports to the economy was supporting the Canadians’ ambition to 
sell oil on the other hand. Increasing oil market problems and climate 
change considerations started shaping the priorities. It is at this point 
that the influence of ideas was most evident in the process. In 2008, 
the US government (DOS 2008a) was examining both these priorities, 
but there was not a strong political reaction. Oil imports from stable 
and reliable trading partners was still being defined as being in the 
national interest (DOS 2008a). The US had already been importing 
from Canada and the rest of the world and Canada at this point was 
being prioritized as a key trading partner.  
However, the first breaking point in the system happened in 2008, 
when TransCanada announced the expansion of KXL to the US Gulf 
Coast (TransCanada 2008c). TransCanada as an economic actor 
was trying to increase its benefits, but this attempt expanded the 
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discussion on KXL to include this more ambitious project, 
necessitating wider support for their actions. When the DOS (2008a) 
agreed to this expansion, it could be blamed for being too close to the 
oil industry.  
During this period, the main discussion on the KXL was about whether 
it was suitable for the national interest. However, national interest is 
not defined clearly in any state document (DOS 2008a; DOS 2012b). 
The main problem here is that some justifications can be contradicted, 
such as environmental considerations and economic benefits. All the 
KXL process was subsequently determined by the discussion around 
national interest which was defined differently by actors and 
institutions. Thus, the priorities of different actors led to contradictions. 
Institutions eventually started to shape the process, but not during the 
Bush era. For example, we do not yet have clashes between 
institutionalist priorities during the Bush era, as seen between 
TransCanada (2009a) that believed oil imports from Canada 
strengthened the diversification power of US oil policies, and The 
Pembina Institute (2011) that thought that KXL increases US 
dependency on Canadian oil. 
In short, during this period the project emerged from a material 
structure while ideational factors then became significant in terms of 
debates over the economy vs environment. The material structure 
was composed of both US and global dynamics in terms of the 
international oil market. Ideational motivations, however, were related 
to reducing ties with the Middle East and looking for more friendly and 
much safer suppliers. The government’s approach to the oil industry 
and environmental issues also eased the project’s approval in terms 
of it being judged in the national interest. Up until the expansion 
project was announced there was not a state-federal split and few 
clear political party clashes. Moreover, up until the 2010s, although 
there were some tendencies to favour fossil fuel interests in the Bush 
administration, US political parties themselves could not be defined 




5.5.     The Obama Era: 2009-2017 
Despite the environmental concerns over the project, in the 111th US 
Congress (H.R. 2454), under the American Clean Energy and 
Security Act of 2009 an energy bill was approved by the House of 
Representatives on June 26, 2009 by a vote of 219-212 (211 
Supporters were Democrat). However, it was never brought to the 
floor of the Senate for discussion or a vote (Congress 2009). The Act 
was not, however, about KXL; it was a cap-and-trade bill5 under which 
the government would set a limit on the total amount of GHG that 
would be emitted nationally. Thus, again environmental 
considerations were being pitted against oil development, 
demonstrating the growing importance of ideas in the process. The 
unsuccessful attempt at adopting the bill was a breaking point in US 
environmental politics (Interviewee-28) but was also symptomatic of 
the wider polarization of US politics. While Democrats were the 
supporters of the cap-and-trade bill, the right-wing Republican Tea 
Party Movement, whose members called for lower taxes and for a 
reduction in the national debt, were implacably opposed. This 
ideological ‘culture wars’ polarization of the issue was also reflected 
in an increasingly acrimonious bi-partisan national debate over guns, 
abortion, immigration and social issues (Interviewee-14).  
In March 2010, the NEB (2010b) approved KXL according to: the 
considerations of maintenance of safety; protection of the 
environment; and ensuring landowner rights. Environmental issues 
were becoming more significant to both Canadian and US 
policymakers. While they were becoming a subject of much wider 
debate in the US case, they were mainly an oil production (i.e. 
upstream) issue in Canada.  The Deepwater Horizon explosion, which 
 
5
 ‘It’s a system designed to reduce pollution in the atmosphere. The cap on greenhouse gas 
emissions that drive global warming is a firm limit on pollution. The cap gets stricter over 
time. The trade part is a market for companies to buy and sell allowances that let them emit 
only a certain amount, as supply and demand set the price. Trading gives companies a 
strong incentive to save money by cutting emissions in the most cost-effective ways’ (EDF 
2019). 
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involved an accident on a US oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico and resultant 
three months of oil leaking, had triggered a widespread debate over 
the environmental consequences of the pipeline. For example, 
images of dead ducks in an oil sands tailings pond were plastered on 
billboards in Denver, Portland, Seattle and Minneapolis by opponents 
(Inside Climate News 2010). Next to them, there was a picture of an 
oil-drenched brown pelican at the site of the Deepwater Horizon spill. 
The billboards were entitled “Alberta: The Other Oil Disaster”. 
Moreover, 2010 was recorded as the warmest year ever, prompting 
further debate over climate change (National Geographic 2010). In 
mid-June, 50 members of Congress led by three Democrats (Jay 
Inslee, Peter Welch, and Dennis Kucinich) sent a letter which 
emphasized the unnecessary risks of tar sands oil importation into the 
United States to Secretary Clinton (Congress 2010). On July 2, 2010, 
DOE (2010) criticized the KXL DEIS. Both the letter and the DOE’s 
response were welcomed by environmental groups (Inside Climate 
News 2010). In contrast to these events, TransCanada (2010b) then 
announced a construction, mitigation and reclamation plan for KXL. It 
explained how the work would be compliant with federal, state, and 
local permits.  
Two significant institutional reports were then published in 2010. 
According to the Perryman Group, an economic and financial analysis 
firm (2010), KXL would provide an economic stimulus and stable 
supply of oil to the USA. The stable supply arguments forwarded were 
based on estimates of reliable oil reserves, plus more stable and 
predictable sources in Canada compared to volatile regions such as 
the Middle East. These arguments powerfully promoted the pipeline 
to policymakers. The EnSys group, an independent consulting firm 
specializing in the petroleum industry, produced a study (2010) 
prepared at the request of the DOE. It mainly focused on different 
scenarios but the important issue for this study (ibid. 13) was that 
Canadian producers, shippers and government agencies were 
promoting the flexibility, security and diversification of domestic 
markets which would occur from the pipeline. Later on, The Pembina 
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Institute (Droitsch 2011) published a study in opposition to the EnSys 
(2010) study. The report argued that the EnSys conclusion that KXL 
would not affect production was flawed, as Canada’s new link with 
Asia would drive increases in upstream production (ibid. 2-4). 
Institutions with different priorities were showing their positions on the 
economy vs. environment contradiction. 
The accumulation of events in 2010 and the reaction to it saw 2011 
as the year that combines all structural causes interactions, since 
public participation and environmental considerations became 
prominent in the debate. Hence, in a NRDC study (2011), threats from 
the pipeline to agriculture, increased climate emissions and risks to 
communities on the Gulf Coast from oil spills were highlighted. The 
study asserts that KXL would not serve the national interest, because 
tar sands is an expensive and dirty form of oil to produce. National 
interest was one of the most controversial topics surrounding the 
debate on KXL and two opposite groups were created. A 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) report (Parfomak et al. 
2011a) evaluated opponents and proponents’ arguments under the 
national interest discussion. Opponents were against KXL, the study 
suggests, because Canadian oil is environmentally dirty and promotes 
US dependency on fossil fuels. However, there is an uncertainty 
between environmentalists. While some were against tar sands 
(Interviewee-1), others eschewed promoting all kinds of fossil fuels 
(Interviewee-5). At the time, opponents (Interviewee-1; Interviewee-5) 
recommended transferring energy sources from fossil fuels to 
clean/renewable energy, whereas for proponents of KXL, this demand 
was not achievable in the short-term because of current car 
production and people’s preferences for maintaining existing lifestyles 
rather than climate change considerations (Interviewee-2; 
Interviewee-26). 
On the other hand, KXL proponents (e.g. Canadian agencies, 
petroleum industry, stakeholders) thought that it was good for energy 
security in terms of diversifying US petroleum supply and economic 
benefits such as job creation (Parfomak et al. 2011a: 6-7). Moreover, 
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KXL could lead the US to be less dependent on foreign sources. Also, 
if the oil exports from Canada did not go to US, they would go to Asia, 
thereby enhancing the energy security of rival states. Although crude 
oil has a global price market, it was also argued, imports from Canada 
could lead to lower transport and refining costs (ibid. 10). The 
Canadian oil industry and government (Interviewee-16), on the other 
hand, thought that this situation would bring competition for Midwest 
US midstream and downstream industries, so they supported the 
opponents.  
The Canadian Energy Pipeline Association (CEPA) (2011) sent a 
letter which emphasized the economic and social benefits of KXL and 
the importance of a trade-friendly and politically stable neighbour, to 
Secretary Clinton. They argued that KXL would enhance US quality 
of life and allow the economy to grow, while considering the 
environment. The letter was sent to Clinton on the same day (June 6) 
that the EPA (2011) emphasized oil spill concerns and the necessity 
of a FEIS. The same day was also the end of the public comment 
period for the SDEIS, which was released in April 2011 (DOS 2011a). 
Additional public meetings were undertaken in order to discuss energy 
security, environment and safety issues (ibid.). In the same year, the 
CRS (Parfomak and Ratner 2011) announced a second study. It 
emphasized mutually beneficial energy trade relations between two 
countries and the link between physical, economic and environmental 
places. Canada’s importance in terms of trade with US, its political 
stability, and also its huge petroleum reserves were identified as 
positive factors in favour of KXL (ibid. 5). 
In the FEIS (DOS 2011c), which interprets the national interest under 
energy security, environmental, cultural, economic, foreign policy 
dimension and federal regulations titles, was heavily criticized by the 
NRDC, Sierra Club and National Wildlife Federation (2011). In the 
North American-Made Energy Security Act (H.R. 1938) (Congress 
2011a), it was stated that oil imports from Canada rather than 
politically and economically unstable places, Canadian oil`s effect on 
domestic refineries’ activities, and the strengthening the world’s 
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largest two-way trading relationship and employment opportunities 
necessitated the pipeline. The same view was also held by 
TransCanada (2012a). By this point, 19th of August, DOS (2011b) had 
already held 21 public meetings and received public comments in 
order to decide whether a KXL permit was suitable for the national 
interest. Just three days after the FEIS, CRS (Parfomak et al. 2011b) 
published its third report on KXL. In addition to previous reports, it 
(2011b: 10) emphasized that Venezuela, another key source of US 
imports, had been trying to diversify business away from the US. It 
showed that the current trade relations with Canada must be secured 
and also that the US’ energy and trade relationships with other 
countries did not only depend on the US side. 
KXL`s potential effects on jobs in US were emphasized in other 
sources but the Cornell University study (2011) focused on job 
creation and industry benefits as a whole. Its perception of KXL was 
pessimistic. Reasons included a higher project budget was necessary 
than actually stated by the company and that the predicted job 
creation was questionable (ibid.). This study`s (ibid.) main discussions 
challenged the Perryman Study (2010). On the other hand, Oil 
Change International (2011) found that KXL was primarily an export 
project, so it could not decrease US oil dependency. US domestic 
production had been increasing for 30 years, thus KXL could not serve 
the national interest itself. On 23th of September, TransCanada 
(2011a) announced that KXL supporters would speak with the media 
about the project`s claims on supporting energy security and job 
growth in the US and how much Canada is more preferable than the 
Middle East and Venezuela as a trade partner. When the discussions 
then became more politically charged, two important speeches were 
made by Joe Oliver, Minister of Natural Resources of Canada. While 
the first (National Post 2011) was about KXL`s importance to the US, 
emphasizing low levels of GHG and the energy partnership between 
Canada and US, the second (Natural Resources Canada 2011) 
concerned KXL`s importance for Canada in creating jobs and low-tax 
benefits for society, since oil sand was accepted as a key engine of 
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the Canadian economy. Parallel claims can be found in TransCanada 
reports that asserted KXL`s importance for the US economy, 
Canadian economy and the national interest of the US (2011b). They 
stated that the “Route will be changed and Nebraskans will play an 
important role in determining the final route” (TransCanada 2011c). 
State and Federal level approvals then became as significant as 
political party clashes. Two subsections of ideas (see Chapter 3) 
became influential in the process. 
On November 10, 2011, President Obama (White House 2011a) 
declared his support for the DOS`s announcement, which asserted 
requirements for additional information because of the importance of 
an open and transparent process. The necessity of additional 
information was also emphasized by Obama when he had a dialogue 
with Prime Minister Stephen Harper of Canada during the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation meetings (White House 2011b). These events 
happened just before the 2012 elections, making them more political 
salient. While environmentalists (Interviewee-5; Interviewee-7) 
complained about the fossil fuel industry’s power over the election 
process through lobbying via the media and elites from both countries, 
environmentalists’ power to influence through lobbying via the same 
tools should not be ignored (Interviewee-14; Interviewee 20). 
President Obama sided with the environmentalist positions, primarily 
because it coincided with his election pledges to reduce GHG 
emissions but also his support for restoring US international 
leadership on this issue, which had been damaged at the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) climate 
conference in Copenhagen in 2009 (Russel and Benson 2014). He 
declared his personal interest in KXL (Interviewee-21), helping the 
issue to become a symbol of the Presidency’s environmental 
credentials. Moreover, grassroots activism’s effect on Democrats is 
worth emphasising (Interviewee-17).  
In terms of the KXL permit, both the Senate (2011) (S. 1932) and 
Congress (2011a) (H.R. 3548) discussed the application in House 
committees. The topics focused upon by senators and 
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representatives were US overdependence on oil imports from hostile 
and unstable regions and its effect on national security, US 
vulnerability to geopolitical tumult, threats to supplies under higher oil 
prices, secure and reliable trade, oil’s importance for the Department 
of Defense (DOD), bi-lateral trading, possible environmental social 
and economic impacts and long term jobs impacts (Senate 2011). 
There was only one Democrat co-sponsor (Joe Manchin III from West 
Virginia) in 40 co-sponsors for the permit. On November 23, a group 
of Republican Congress members introduced an Act aimed at forcing 
the Obama administration to make a decision within 60 days 
(Congress 2011c). Again, Obama approached the permit decision 
slowly because of the Presidential election in 2012 (New York Times 
2011). 
On January 18, 2012, the DOS (2012a) announced that it would not 
approve the KXL construction. The main reason for this decision was 
stated as a lack of necessary information but the importance of 
maintaining positive bilateral relations with Canada was also 
emphasized. On the same day, Obama (White House 2012a) said his 
government prioritised benefits for American workers and business 
without risking the health and safety of the American people. The 
administration (Zichal 2012) announced how the government was 
seeking to boost domestic energy production and increase efficiency 
but through cleaner energy sources rather than fossil fuels. Although 
US domestic production is generally light sweet oil as opposed to 
heavy crude, it is still fossil fuel. It does actually seem difficult to 
distinguish what environmentalists or President Obama opposed, 
whether it was tar sands, fossil fuels, production of fossil fuel or 
distribution of fossil fuel. In terms of fossil fuel production and 
distribution, proponents argued that new technologies are far better 
than old ones (Interviewee 11). Moreover, the climate change issue is 
not a production, rather a consumption issue (Interviewee-16). 
However, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA) can be given as an example, which made available significant 
federal subsidies for clean energy. These priorities were also seen as 
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compatible with national `energy independence` and ̀ all of the above` 
policies/targets/rhetoric. In order to support this argument, two 
examples were given which were US crude oil production had reached 
its highest level since 2003 and oil imports had been falling since 2008 
(ibid.).  
While Democrat Senator Bernie Sanders from Vermont (2012) 
supported this decision (DOS 2012a), CEPA (2012) announced their 
disappointment at the decision. Their announcement (2012) included 
an argument that KXL represented a reliable and safe source of oil for 
Americans and provided significant opportunities for American and 
Canadian business and citizens. TransCanada`s president and 
executive officer Russ Girling (TransCanada 2012a) said that the US 
would, as a result, continue to import oil from conflictual areas like 
Middle East, Venezuela and other countries who did not share the 
same democratic values as Canadians and Americans. It was then 
announced that TransCanada would re-apply for a permit (ibid.). This 
project, it was argued, was an export pipeline for Canada which would 
help send oil from Canada to Europe and Latin America by the NRDC 
and Oil Change International common study (2012). Thus, its benefits 
for the US were outweighed by benefits for Canada. Moreover, the 
pipeline would increase the price of oil in the American Midwest and 
it would affect US consumers. 
In February 2012, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) (2012) 
announced a review of KXL in terms of serving the national interest 
after a request from Congress (2011b). Neither the DOS or 
TransCanada violated the law since they had followed the necessary 
permit process. In March 2012, the President`s remarks (White House 
2012b) on American-Made energy shows how his administration 
interpreted the energy issue. For Obama (ibid.), America was 
producing more oil than at any time in the last eight years with the help 
of the shale revolution, but the real issue was dependency on oil 
market prices and imports from the Middle East. The target for him 
was reducing dependency on every source of fossil fuel energy. Here 
is the question: if the US did not have the shale revolution during the 
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time (see Chapter 7), would President Obama still have had the same 
view?  
While on 17 April 2012, the Governor of Nebraska signed into law a 
statute authorizing the Nebraska Department of Environmental 
Quality (NDEQ) to review an alternative pipeline routing in the state. 
An initial alternative routing report was then submitted on 18 April 
(DOS 2012b). Then, as referenced in the SDEIS, the national interest 
was described in terms of environmental impacts, diversity of supply 
to meet US crude oil demand, security of transport pathways, cross-
border facilities, relations between the US and various foreign 
suppliers of crude oil, foreign policy objectives, economic benefits and 
reducing reliance on fossil fuels (ibid. 10-11). On 24 May, a MOU was 
signed between the DOS and NDEQ in order to define roles and 
responsibilities (DOS 2012c). In June, the NDEQ (2012) published a 
KXL feedback report which summarized Nebraskans’ concerns, 
outlined NDEQ’s concerns and provided Nebraskans with an interim 
status report on NDEQ`s decision-making. On 5th of September, 
TransCanada (2012b) submitted a Supplemental Environmental 
Report to the NDEQ for the preferred alternative. Republican Senator 
Greg Brophy from Colorado (2012), supported a revised route in order 
to meet federal environmental, social and economic standards. In 
October 2012, the NDEQ published its Draft Evaluation Report (DER) 
which set out potential impacts and reflected back comments from 
Nebraskan citizens. On November 1, the US House of 
Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 
(2012) evaluated Obama`s actions regarding KXL in terms of 
domestic energy production. Although domestic production would 
increase, it was concluded, it would not happen on federal lands. 
Thus, increasing domestic production did not benefit American society 
economically. From the evaluation it can be discerned that there was 
by this point no strong argument for importing oil from Canada: a 
marked change from the Bush administration era. 
That said, according to polls conducted by Anderson Insight and 
CAPP (2012), American society supported oil imports from Canada 
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rather than Mexico, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. Polling suggested 
that 78% of the public consequently approved of Keystone in both 
2011 and 2012. On the other hand, people from 25 tribes met at the 
Protect the Sacred Gathering (2013) to protest against the tar sands 
projects in South Dakota in January 2013.  
The Pembina Institute (2013) then published another study. It 
emphasised two main points which related to how an accumulated 
surplus of oil in the US Midwest could affect domestic oil prices, and 
the pipelines’ potential effect on diversification in the producers’ 
market. In January, the NDEQ (2013) announced its Final Evaluation 
Report which considered potential environmental, social, economic 
and social impacts proposed mitigation measures for pipeline safety 
ıand potential spills. On this basis, the Governor of Nebraska 
approved KXL. On 22 January, the Energy and Commerce Committee 
leaders (2013) announced their support for Governor Dave 
Heineman’s approval. Making this announcement (ibid.), they argued 
that KXL would help create thousands of American jobs and 
strengthen American energy independence. The DOS (2013) then 
released the DSEIS in March. On 15th March, the House of 
Republicans (2013) evaluated Obama`s green energy efforts and 
showed how these policies had largely failed, with some energy green 
producers going bankrupt such as solar energy, electric car battery 
technologies manufacturers. The Institute for 21st Century Energy 
(2013) then sent a letter to Secretary of State Kerry arguing that KXL 
was in America’s national interest, because Canada is an important 
and reliable trading partner, oil imports from Canada would not be 
from a geopolitically unstable region, and KXL could support North 
American energy self-sufficiency, jobs and economy. However, the 
EPA (2013) criticized the DSEIS as insufficient.  
On 22 May 2013, the House (2013) passed H.R. 228 bill, entitled as 
“…to approve the construction, operation, and maintenance of the 
KXL…”. While 219 Republicans supported the measure, 185 
Democrats were against. In terms of the oil trade, the US is not only 
the country who cared about diversification as a buyer: Canada also 
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considered diversification of its imports. Here, the NEB (2013) 
released a Market Diversification report for Canadian oil and gas. In 
order to increase the benefits of resources for Canadians and ensure 
public health, safety and environmental protection, diversification was 
accepted as a key target. At this point, environmentalists’ arguments 
(Interviewee-8) that KXL was an export rather than an import project 
can be supported. However, here the same point is valid. What is the 
interest or benefit for the US of KXL? The Canadian side’s perspective 
can be seen through comparing both sides’ governments. While 
Democrat and Republican administrations had different positions in 
terms of KXL in the US, both Conservative and Liberal governments 
supported it in Canada. Economic priorities proved too attractive even 
for an environmentally friendly Liberal government (Interviewee-2). 
During the time, there were two important factors on the US side that 
shaped the process. Firstly, the US was becoming more self-sufficient 
in oil, and secondly, North American oil prices were by then lower than 
global prices. 
A CEP submission (2013) to the NEB also emphasizes Canadian 
energy security, employment and GHG as important reasons why the 
project should be supported. In terms of employment, similar support 
came from the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) which is 
based in the US (2013). In terms of the benefits of KXL on 
employment, they (ibid.) disagreed with the President. On the other 
side, environmentalists (NRDC 2013; Public Citizen 2013) did not find 
KXL in the national interest because of its environmental impacts and 
potential chances of oil spills. This split of ideas is reflected in the 
polls. According to the Pew Research Center (2013), 65% American 
continued to favor building Keystone. But while 82% of Republicans 
favored construction, only 51% Democrats supported the project. On 
the other hand, in the first half of the 2014, NGO protests increased 
and new organizations were set up such as Reject and Protect (2014) 
and the Cowboy Indian Alliance (National Geographic Blog 2014). 
In January 2014, the DOS (2014) released its Final Supplemental 
Environmental Impact Statement (FSEIS). This report (DOS 2014: 
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1.9-1-1.9-9) shows clearly that different levels (i.e. federal and state) 
and areas (i.e. Montana, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas) were 
being considered. On the Canadian side, Gaétan Caron (NEB 2014), 
Chair and CEO of NEB, said Canadians’ energy interests were 
evolving to balance economic, environmental and social 
considerations. In terms of environmental considerations, OIG (2014) 
released a KXL Compliance Follow-up review in February. In order to 
decide a project suitable for the national interest, it was evaluated 
under economic, energy security, foreign policy, environment and 
cultural criteria. In the same month, a district court judge in Nebraska 
(2014) declared the law that allowed for the pipeline’s route through 
the state unconstitutional. The decision was adopted pursuant to the 
Major Oil Pipeline Siting Act. Plaintiffs were Randy Thompson, Susan 
Luebbe and Susan Dunavan, three Nebraskan Landowners. These 
landowners were supported by environmental groups such as Bold 
Nebraska (Kleeb 2014) and Resilience (Genoways 2014). 
However, support for KXL by this point was growing, particularly 
amongst right wing politicians. Republican Senator Chuck Grassley 
from Iowa (2014) argued that KXL was important for economic growth 
and energy stability in the US, because it would create jobs and 
provide energy independence. Using similar arguments (creating jobs 
and boosting economy), Republican Congressman Peter Roskam 
from Illinois (2014) also announced his support. The highly influential 
UCC (2014) was also supportive, announcing six different reasons 
why KXL should be accepted by the federal government. These were 
that the pipeline would not harm the environment (this argument was 
referenced to a DOS report (2008b: 5-1), it would give the US more 
oil supply flexibility, allow oil imports from a friendly supplier (as 
opposed to unfriendly countries), strengthen the North American 
economy, help address GHG, and would produce jobs, higher wages 
and a growing economy. Similar support came from House 
Republicans (2014). For them (2014), 61% of Republican 
congressmen supported KXL, since it was argued to provide direct 
and indirect jobs, reduce American dependency on foreign oil and 
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strengthen the economy. These examples represent the critiques of 
politicians and lobbies of Obama during this period (Lance 2014; 
Brooks 2014). 
Indeed, the President could be seen as contradicting public and 
political opinion. In November, the House of Representatives, that 
was under Republicans control (2014) (H.R. 5682), voted in favour of 
KXL, while the Senate (2014) (S. 2280) voted against the northern 
portion of KXL. In the House of Representatives, while 221 
Republicans supported the project, only 31 Democrats voted in 
favour. In the Senate, while 59 Senators (45 Republicans and 14 
Democrats) supported it, 41 Senators (39 Democrats and 2 
Independent) were against. In 2014, according to the Pew Research 
Center (2014), a majority of Americans (59%) favoured building KXL 
which was down from 2013. Whereas 83% of Republicans favoured 
building the pipeline, only 43% of Democrats supported the project 
(ibid.). The percentage of Democrat supporters had fallen 11% since 
2013. Support or opposition to KXL clearly reflected Democrat or 
Republican affiliation (Interviewee-14). 
In January 2015, the House of Representatives (Congress 2015a) 
(H.R. 3) and Senate (2015a) (S. 1.) both passed the Keystone XL 
Pipeline Approval Act, directly challenging Obama’s authority.  As 
Obama then decided on whether to grant approval, many influential 
institutions and politicians announced their opinions on KXL in an 
attempt to sway his views. For example, President and CEO of the 
American Petroleum Institute (API) Jack Gerard (API 2015a) said that 
a majority of Americans wanted the project to be built and the 
President could not hide behind the Nebraska court case. 
Congresswoman Terri Sewell (Dem.) from Alabama (2015) supported 
KXL since it provided energy independence, job creation and 
strengthened the economy. Similar arguments were given by Senator 
Rob Portman (Rep.) (2015) and the Energy Commerce House (ECH) 
(2015). The Congressional Budget Office (BDO) (2015) then 
announced that KXL would have no significant effect on federal 
spending. On 16 January, a memorandum requesting views on the 
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proposed KXL in accordance with Executive Order 13337 was sent to 
state departments. This letter was replied to by several departments 
(DOC 2015; DHS 2015; DOD 2015; DOE 2015; DOI 2015c; DOT 
2015; EPA 2015). They either did not make serious comment (DOC 
2015) or emphasised their support (DOE 2015). Some institutions6 
sent a letter of support for KXL to John Boehner (Rep.) speaker of the 
House of Representatives, and Nancy Pelosi, Minority Leader. These 
groups are mainly known as having a close relationship with 
Republicans. Their lobbying helped influence the debate. On the other 
hand, scientists and economists sent a letter criticising KXL to 
President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry (NRDC 2015). 
Lobbies, more generally institutions, were therefore being shaped by 
the polarization of ideas around KXL. 
However, despite intense lobbying by energy and business interests, 
on February 24, the KXL approval act was vetoed by the President 
(Senate 2015a). Security, safety and the environment were defined 
as key factors for national interest in support of the decision (White 
House 2015a). From another perspective (Interviewee-20), Obama 
became a political target when he announced publicly he was going 
to consider KXL from an environmental perspective during the 2012 
election rally. Lobby groups were quick to react. The API (2015c) 
criticized the decision on the same day. This process then closed 
because of the failed passage of the approval in the Senate by 62-37 
votes (Senate 2015b), which required a majority of 2/3. While 8 
Democrats voted `yes`, none of Republican Senators voted `no`. In 
July, TransCanada (2015b) announced its estimates of KXL`s 
contributions to US energy security and local benefits (i.e. tax and 
economic input) as around $200 million, plus more than 14,000 
construction jobs for the 11 states involved. Pipeline safety, 
consideration of GHG, increasing oil supply and moving away from 
 
6
 Including the API (2015b), Americans for Prosperity (2015), Consumer Energy Alliance 
(2015), Frontiers of Freedom (2015), International Brotherhood of Teamsters (2015), 
International Union of Operating Engineers (2015), NAM (2015a), North America`s Building 
Trades Unions (2015), The 60 Plus Association (2015), TransCanada (2015) and UCC 
(2015). 
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Venezuela and Middle East suppliers were other points which were 
made. On July 22, State of Nebraska Governor Peter Ricketts (Rep.) 
(2015) sent a letter which emphasised a revision of the pipeline route 
as a result of the legislative and public process in Nebraska, to 
Obama. Increased safety conditions for health and environmental 
issues were made. While on 3 November the DOS (2015a) 
announced the ROD NID report, Obama (White House 2015b) denied 
another KXL application on 6 November. By this point, it had taken 
more than six years to review the project. For him (ibid.), KXL did not 
serve the national interest, because there was no meaningful 
economic contribution in job creation, lower gas prices for Americans 
and the dirtier crude oil it supported. However, Obama also 
considered his own political legacy on climate change pledges and 
these factors may have proved more significant in his decision-
making. 
Indeed, US backing helped paved the way for the signing of the 
UNFCCC 2015 Paris agreement (Interviewee-6). However, Obama 
(White House 2015b) admits that there were also material factors that 
helped him in denying the project: oil and gasoline prices were 
relatively low and US domestic production had been increasing. 
Moreover, KXL had become a campaign issue between parties rather 
than an objective policy – an example of so-called bi-partisan ‘culture 
wars’ issues. Some institutions such as the UCH (2015), NAM (2015b) 
and politicians such as George W. Bush (2015), Justin Trudeau 
(Prime Minister of Canada 2015) the new Prime Minister of Canada, 
Senator Joe Donnelly (2015) and Nebraska Governor Peter Ricketts 
(2015) stood against the decision. In his press statement, Secretary 
Kerry (DOS 2015b) explained Obama`s announcement by stating that 
he “evaluated information provided by TransCanada, SEIS, the views 
of other federal agencies, and nearly five million public comments”. 
According to a West Virginia University paper on KXL (2015a), 57% 
American favoured KXL, representing a significant decline from 
previous polling. According to the poll which was completed in 
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December by CNN and ORC (2014), 80% of Republicans supported 
it compared to just 39% of Democrats. 
On January 6, TransCanada filed a legal action (2016a) in a Houston 
federal court accusing Obama of `exceeding his authority` and filed 
(2016b: 1) a claim which asserted that the “Administration`s actions 
violated U.S. obligations under NAFTA”. Peter Watson (NEB 2016), 
Chair and CEO of NEB, expressed some uncertainties over Canada’s 
energy future. These were deployment of advanced technologies for 
renewable and fossil fuel energy production, decisions by OPEC, 
lifting of sanctions against Iran, the historic climate agreement in 
Paris, denial of the KXL and the recent lifting of US oil exports. Thus, 
in this view, there was no one dimension dictating the national interest, 
rather multi-interacting dimensions. On 10 June, the House Oversight 
and Government Reform Committee (2016a) sent a second subpoena 
to the State Department for KXL documents after letters on February 
24, 2016 (Oversight 2016b) and May 31, 2016 (Oversight 2016c) 
requesting additional documents for further clarification. The first 
subpoena was made on July 8, 2015 (Oversight 2015a), after the DOS 
failed to respond to letters sent on 24 February 2015 (Oversight 
2015b) and 15 June 2015 (Oversight 2015c) requesting letters. At the 
end of the year, a CRS (Yacobucci 2016) report asserted that energy 
policy is complicated by the diversity of energy consumption and 
supply in the US. The debate was shaping an institutionally 
informative approach. 
While the Obama presidency was finishing, there was a new 
presidential election campaign. In terms of KXL, all four Republican 
candidates (i.e. Rubio, Carson, Bush and Trump) supported the 
project (Rubio 2012, McCormick 2014, Bush 2015, Schleifer 2015), 
whereas both Democratic candidates (Clinton and Sanders) (New 
York Times 2012a, Sanders 2012) were against it. Election of Trump 
as President then led to a new phase in the KXL story. When Clinton 
was a member of the Obama administration in 2010, she said she was 
inclined to approve it but changed this view in the election 
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campaigning. Trump, meanwhile, had consistently expressed support 
for the project during the campaigning. 
Duration: Theoretical Analysis 
The process by this point had become a reflection of reciprocal 
interaction between ideas, institutions and material capabilities, rather 
than being a pure material issue as in the beginning. However, there 
is no static picture in terms of weigh of structural causes. While 
institutions only reflected the different ideas at the beginning, they also 
shaped the ideas in the process as it progressed. We also saw the 
division in ideas (between political parties and national-state interests) 
through time. However, these changes happened in parallel to 
material capabilities improvements. Thus, material capability, which 
was significant at the starting point of the process, was overtaken by 
the two other structural causes in driving the KXL process. 
In this respect, the period began with TransCanada (2009a) 
emphasizes that KXL was important for US oil diversification policy, 
because of decreasing domestic oil production and increasing 
demand in the US (i.e. material capabilities). Although it is not possible 
to establish whether the Canadian government supported this 
expansion plan, the Canadian reaction (NEB 2009b) expanded KXL`s 
main dimensions to the institutional area. In addition to discussions on 
the benefits to Canadian public interest, the implications for 
government, government participants, and Canadian sustainable 
economic development were also prioritised (ibid.). Thus, at the 
beginning of the process KXL was discussed as an economic-energy 
trade issue involving Canadian oil between a Canadian oil company 
and the USA (i.e. a material capabilities dimension). But it became 
increasingly characterized by a relationship between the US state 
(and its departments) and US public interest on one side, and the 
Canadian state (and its departments), Canadian public and oil 
company on the other side (i.e. an institutional dimension).  
By the start of the next decade, this interplay between material 
capabilities and institutions was overtaken by the increasing 
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importance of ideas in the KXL process. In mid-2010, the Deepwater 
Horizon explosion, which is an external shock, was a key trigger for 
climate change considerations, leading to environmental issues 
becoming more significant as the debate developed. This ideational 
feature received more prominence in the discussion on whether 2010 
was the warmest year ever, triggering a strong reaction by 
environmental groups to KXL. To illustrate this point, the letter of 
Members of Congress to Secretary Clinton on environmental 
concerns around the project shows the importance of ideas (i.e. 
collective images by one of different groups).  A battle over ideas was 
also gaining momentum during the cap-and-trade bill, as the climate-
sceptic Tea Party movement became more politically important. The 
political divergence in the process can be deduced from the Perryman 
Group (2010) and EnSys` (2010) conclusions since institutions also 
reflect the process (see Chapter 3). By 2011, material capabilities 
issues, in terms of problems for the US and global oil market, still 
existed but the debate was becoming framed more in party ideological 
terms. Thereby, institutions started to reflect these different priorities.   
Indeed, the remaining part of the Obama era could be characterised 
by a conflict over ideas, which in turn were promoted by, and 
influenced through, institutions such as the Presidency, political 
parties and departments of state. Opponents and proponents of the 
project were more visible in this period (Perfomak et al. 2011a). 
Considerations for the environment, dependency on fossil fuels and 
Midwest midstream and downstream actors constituted one side of 
the ideological debate, while the benefits of diversity of US petroleum 
supply and economic benefits (e.g. job creation) and the possibility of 
Canadian oil supplying Asia, instead of the USA, represented the 
other side. Different perspectives, priorities and interpretations of the 
terms led to increased involvement by different institutions in the 
process in parallel to ongoing ideational separation (CEPA 2011; EPA 
2011). Institutions started to shape the ideas and the direction of the 
process rather than only reflecting the ideas.  
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In addition, material benefits became only part of arguments for KXL 
rather than being the main focus, as in the Bush era. Obviously 
material improvement (i.e. decreasing oil prices, increasing global and 
US oil production) was helping generating support for the project. The 
DOS tried to solve an accumulated problem with additional public 
meetings. To inform society, environmental and safety issues (i.e. 
material capabilities) and energy security (i.e. ideas) were chosen. 
However, an ideational split between institutions could not be 
stopped. Environmentalists already saw KXL as a front page issue 
and focused on it between many other issues (Interviewee-3). KXL 
had become a symbol of wider splits in US politics. The dynamics of 
oil politics and domestic politics were also becoming increasingly 
intertwined.  
KXL then became prominent before the election rally, showing how 
institutionally-driven ideas were gradually supplanting material 
capabilities. Political party clashes had already started and the 
benefits for the US Midwest had become an important issue in 
addition to national interests in terms of Midwest midstream and 
downstream oil industries, oil prices and the environment. Ideational 
splits heavily influenced President Obama, who was being pressured 
by the increasing power of grassroots activism, that also had an effect 
on Democrats. As a result, other institutions (i.e. state departments, 
oil and environmental lobbies, think-tanks that prioritise energy-
economy and environment, Canadians’ participation) started showing 
oppositional positions against each other as coalitions formed in 
support of or in protest to KXL. 
At this point, the national interest was being defined as including 
environmental impacts, diversification of supply of crude oil, safety 
issues, compatibility with foreign policies and economic benefits (DOS 
2012b). 2013 started with similar discussions which were mainly 
about ideas and institutional issues surrounding KXL (NDEQ 2013; 
ECC 2013), while it was also considered a material issue. Moreover, 
there were also clashes between state departments (institutions) 
(EPA 2013 vs. DOS 2013). Changing the US and global oil markets 
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generated a contradiction between biosphere and economy as a 
trigger of these debates. 
Institutional divisions became increasingly evident. Pew Research 
Center polls (2013; 2014) are important in terms of showing the huge 
difference between Republicans’ and Democrats’ support for KXL. 
Collective images were held by different groups at different times (see 
Chapter 3). Moreover, the percentage of Democrat supporters had 
fallen 11% in one year. This shows that people’s 
reactions/perceptions change in time through the process because of 
an accumulation of events and discussions and their intensity. The 
split between political parties was reflected in their supporters’ views, 
which then became prominent in the election. Thus, voters’ 
expectations from the parties were also changing. The parties’ 
reaction against this `reflection back` wave was not only related to 
KXL and also other controversial issues. It was not surprising that a 
candidate like Donald J. Trump, who promoted controversial 
arguments, would be selected in this increasingly polarized context. 
On February 24, 2015, President Obama (White House 2015a) 
vetoed the KXL bill during the KXL debate (API 2015; Sewell 2015; 
ECH 2015; BDO 2015; NRDC 2015). Specific reasons for the decision 
cannot be determined but we can at least choose a dimension and 
focus on it. In democratic systems, societal reaction showed itself to 
be more influential year by year. Thus, in addition to current 
discussions and Obama’s personal opinions, societal pressure also 
exerted an evident influence on him. It was seen both before the 2012 
election and the 2016 election. Moreover, besides his personal and 
party legitimation requirements inherent in the process, there was also 
an American global leadership of climate change emphasis to 
consider (White House 2015b). The dynamics of foreign policy 
became influential in the process in addition to oil politics and 
domestic politics. Both administrations and politicians (i.e. 
Republicans and Democrats) have to consider their legitimacy. Thus, 
legitimacy became the main decider of the process at this point (see 
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Chapter 3). Moreover, the US administration also had to consider the 
US’ position and image in the world specifically after the Iraq War.   
In short, the project to carry oil from Canada to the US had become a 
very controversial issue in US politics. It started with material needs 
for both countries (i.e. material capabilities) linked to foreign policy, 
but environmentalist considerations (i.e. ideas), that were connected 
with US oil and domestic politics, changed the direction of the process. 
Ideas and their different reactions from political parties brought 
institutions into the process. While institutions only represented the 
ideas in the beginning, they started being the determiners of the ideas 
in parallel to increasing material capability (i.e. a changing US and 
global oil market). State-Nation interests also became prominent as 
part of ideas and as part of domestic politics. This clash also 
represents a contradiction. Specifically the Midwest was the key point 
of the debate in terms of oil industry in the region, oil prices of the 
Midwest and environmental impacts. This contradiction was not 
effective as an economy vs. biosphere argument; however, both sides 
(economy and environment) could use the Midwest as part of their 
arguments.  
Thus, both institutional representatives of ideas (political parties and 
nation-state interests) split over time. The effects on institutions and 
institutional reflections show how different actors and interests were 
interacting under the system and their behaviours had been shaping 
the ̀ others`. During the process, we also see how oil politics, domestic 
politics and foreign policy dynamics were pulled into the process. 
Now, a polarized domestic politics that could carry grassroots activism 
and populism was supporting the election of a new president. 
 
5.6.     The Trump Era: 2017- 
On 24 January, newly-elected US President Trump (White House 
2017a) signed a Presidential Memorandum inviting TransCanada to 
refile an application for the Presidential Permit. Trump had made a 
point of expressing support for fossil fuel sectors in his controversial 
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`America First` Presidential election campaign, so this move was 
unsurprising. Here, Trump emphasized the role of KXL in creating 
jobs, enhancing energy security, providing affordable and reliable 
energy for Americans and tax revenues for state and local levels. 
Moreover, a new term ‘energy dominance’ for US foreign policy was 
adopted by Trump over ‘energy independence’ (Interviewee-17). A 
more regionally integrated market (e.g. the United States–Mexico–
Canada Agreement [USMCA]), including Canada, it was argued, 
could help achieve it. Environmental impacts of KXL were not 
mentioned. This decision was supported by industry lobbies (CAPP 
2017a; API 2017a; NAM 2017) and leading politicians (Nebraska 
Governor Pete Ricketts 2017). In addition to the President`s points, 
they (CAPP 2017; Ricketts 2017) also added their own environmental 
reviews that stated minimal impacts from the project.  
Encouraged by this changed political context, on January 26 
TransCanada (2017) filed another Presidential Permit application. 
However, this time the approval was challenged by Greenpeace 
(2017). It sent a letter to the US Office of Government Ethics citing a 
conflict of interest in the Presidential administration. The letter wanted 
recusal of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson from the decision process 
because his recent employer ExxonMobil was investing heavily in 
producing crude oil from Canada’s tar sands and would directly benefit 
from the approval by Presidential Permit. On 23 March, however, a 
Presidential Permit (DOS 2017) was announced. In contrast to this 
decision, Democrat Senator Brian Schatz from Hawaii (2017) 
asserted that KXL was not in the US national interest, because 
countries like Germany and China continued to make progress in the 
transition away from dirty energy, thereby gaining significant efficiency 
advantages. In contrast, the UCC (2017) and House Representative 
Mike Bost (2017) supported the permit because of KXL`s effects on 
energy security, creating jobs and economic growth. The US embassy 
in Canada (2017) announced that the permit supported foreign policy, 
environmental, social and economic impacts and compliance with 
applicable law and policy. Adding further supporting evidence, the API 
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(2017b) estimated that 42,000 jobs would be created during 
construction along with the generation of $55 million from property tax 
revenues. Some opposition was voiced by residents close to the line 
of the proposed pipeline. The Price of Oil (2017) announced that they 
received more than 460,000 comments against KXL from native 
tribes, farmers, ranchers, Nebraskans and activists. Their `No KXL 
Promise` letter (2017) announced that re-routing the project would not 
work. 
Canada was also supportive of the Permit decision. The CAPP 
(2017b) announced that Canada’s energy future relied on overcoming 
five challenges: low commodity prices; pipeline capacity; industry 
competitiveness; regulatory uncertainty; and access to new markets. 
In terms of oil, challenges include low oil prices, Canadian and US 
regulators` responses on climate change, potential US protectionist 
policies to block Canadian oil’s access to its traditional export markets, 
technological developments that reduce costs and GHG (CAPP 
2017b: 2). Jim Carr (Government of Canada 2017), Canadian Minister 
of Natural Resources, emphasized the benefits of an integrated 
energy market between Canada and the US. Here, KXL was seen as 
significant in creating thousands of good jobs for Canadians. By the 
end of 2017, Canada had also become the US’ largest energy trade 
partner (EIA 2017b), meaning the project took on a strategic trade 
dimension. In 2016, 41% of total US crude oil imports were from 
Canada.  
On December 19, The Nebraska Public Service Commission (2017) 
issued an order for a KXL application docket. According to the docket 
(ibid.), “there will be no comment from the Commission”. Trump`s 
permit has since been faced with both legal challenges and protests. 
Environmental and landowner groups are still trying to block the 
project via state courts. They assert that this approval is a rubber-
stamp (NRDC 2018). In November 2018, a Judge of the United States 
District Court for Montana (2018) blocked construction, why the court 
arguing that the administration failed to follow established rules and 
procedures for decisions. Trump approved the project on the same 
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document that was provided by Obama`s DOS. Although, further legal 
challenges to this decision are likely (Biological Diversity 2018), in an 
attempt to break the Montana court stalemate, Trump (White House 
2019b) cancelled his 2017 permit and issued a new permit not 
contingent on State Department review. The project is planned to be 
completed in 2022 (TC Energy 2020), although further legal action is 
likely. 
Duration: Theoretical Analysis 
Although governmental decision-making during this period was 
completely opposite to the Obama era, Trump actually came into 
power under the conditions that Obama left the administration in terms 
of interaction of structural causes. That interaction continued in this 
period. However, changing oil politics, domestic politics and foreign 
policy perceptions that altered via the interaction of structural causes 
led to a new direction in the KXL process.  
Again, institutions and their interaction with ideas were highly evident 
during this era, particularly the ‘America First’ rhetoric of the Trump 
Presidency. Trump’s prioritization of ‘energy dominance’ over energy 
‘independence’ marked a significant ideational change in the process, 
demonstrating the importance of foreign policy ideas. Here, Trump 
used this reframing of oil diversification to invite TransCanada to refile 
an application (White House 2017a). The main reasons behind this 
decision, according to the President, were jobs, energy security, 
affordable and reliable energy and tax revenues (i.e. State and local 
levels). It is interesting to note that the same issue was accepted in a 
totally opposite way by two different presidents from two different 
parties. However, Trump’s priorities were also determined by his 
party, supporters and US global power. Improving US-Canada ties 
was also connected with a changing US opinion about the rest of the 
world. While the public wanted to hear `America First`, it became 
interpreted by Trump as isolationism in response to wider perceived 
threats from globalization. American national interests then became 
more important than global interests, as reflected in oil diversification.  
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The important point is that, although Trump announced his approval, 
58.7% of Nebraskans voted for him. Until that time, there were 
challenges by the people of Nebraska and increasing opposition to 
KXL in polls, but it did not affect the election outcome. This perception 
can be connected with lack of support for grassroots activism. 
Certainly, the general election process and arguments must be 
evaluated. Generally, the parties’ backgrounds (i.e. ideas) affected 
both presidents’ behaviours rigidly as KXL became increasingly a 
‘culture wars’ issue. Thus, legitimacy can have a different meaning to 
people and to political parties even in the same time and place. 
Moreover, there is a process of accumulation. Obama`s (White House 
2015b) argument that KXL had become a campaign battle between 
parties rather than a pure policy decision, shows how different 
backgrounds affected the process differently. Discussions which 
occurred before approval have consequently continued after approval 
(UCC 2017; Boost 2017). The accumulation of interaction between 
structural causes led the same president (Obama) to have different 
stances at different time points, while the same process has witnessed 
opposite administrational decisions (Obama and Trump). 
 
5.7.     Discussion: the Value of a Coxian Perspective  
5.7.1. Structural Causes: Material Capabilities, Ideas and 
Institutions 
In contrast to a more rational perspective that would prioritise single 
causal factors and the synchronic nature of events, a Coxian 
perspective reveals far more about the motivations for US oil 
diversfication over time. Here, it is obvious that the KXL process has 
never had one dimension and can be understood in terms of structural 
causes such as the material capabilities, ideas and institutions of Cox.  
This observation can be derived from comparision between the 
beginning and end of the process. The oil company`s changing plans 
in order to get more benefit was actually following its rational interest. 
It was a deliberate selection made by an agent (see Chapter 4). 
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However, pre-determined rules and expectations also existed in the 
process (ibid.) After TransCanada`s expansion plan to the Gulf Coast, 
the selections of actors and structurally determined existences started 
to clash and KXL presented a more complex picture. However, it 
developed according to patterns which are determined by actors’ and 
structures’ preferences, considerations and limitations. But 
exogenous shocks can also direct and shape these patterns (ibid.). In 
the case of KXL, in 2010 two important shocks became evident which 
were the Deepwater Horizon explosion and scientific evidence that it 
was the hottest year on record.  They affected societal perceptions on 
environmental issues, because, while an idea manifested itself in a 
short-term perception of that topic, materiality considerations exist 
over a long-term. It does not mean any superiority over each other, 
since long-term events are shaped by short-term perceptions in the 
beginning.    
All KXL discussions have been mediated through the national interest. 
While different actors asserted their own perceptions, lack of clarity 
over the national interest term led to an accumulation of these 
perceptions. An unclear picture of contradictions between the 
economy-biosphere and the national interest-state interest led to 
societal interference much more than in the ordinary policy process. 
Societal reaction caused a legitimacy issue for government. As a 
Democrat leader, Obama was certainly affected. In terms of 
environmental considerations, Democrats were more receptive than 
Republicans. Obama acted in response to these contradictions. 
Trump, on the other hand, as a new president, asserted arguments in 
a directly oppositional and more definite way. If the process had not 
been controversial, Trump`s assertive line of argumentation might not 
have worked. The process was not controversial in the beginning, but 
evolution of the process led to conflict.  
Although this study is about US oil diversification motivations, the US` 
energy partners specifically Canada in this case cannot be ignored. 
From the both sides perspectives (DOS 2008a; TransCanada 2008f), 
the necessity of protecting trade relations between Canada and US 
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were emphasized. There are some reasons for this. Firstly, Canada 
was interpreted as a better trade option than politically unstable 
regions (e.g. Middle East). Thus, the main emphasis for diversification 
was secure and reliable supply. Secondly, Canada shares democratic 
values with the US and both countries have more historical 
connections than with any other country. Thirdly, Canada-US trade is 
the world’s largest two-way state economic relationship. Moreover, 
Venezuela, another oil exporter country, had been trying to reduce its 
trade relations with the US for political reasons linked to its left-wing 
government (Perfomak et al. 2011b). However, Canada worked to 
protect its own interests. Canada also looked to diversify its oil market 
as much as the US, because northern America oil was cheaper and 
US protectionist arguments could not be relied upon (CAPP 2017). 
Finally, the Canadian public’s interest evolved to support a balance 
between economic, environmental and social considerations (NEB 
2014). Government and its oil policies are shaped and supported 
much more than before.   
The accumulation of the process had combined oil politics and 
domestic politics in the beginning. However, they were joined by 
foreign policy dynamics in terms of US power in the world, in addition 
to US-Canada ties. This event prompts a discussion as to whether 
Cox’s (1992: 179-180) scenario of “a non-hegemonic order lacking 
effective universal principles of order and functioning as an interplay 
of rival powerful states, each with their client states, most probably 
based on an organization of rival world regions happen” was now 
emerging.  By this point, the international order was experiencing 
inter-regional splitting, while there was a fundamental change in 
international institutions. Thus, President Trump’s decisions were 
largely determined by a process which started long before his 
appointment, with the decline of US hegemony and a fracturing 
international liberal order (Maull 2019). This declining order and its 
supporting institutions have been connected with increasing social 
causes. Although economic and technological advancements have 
contributed, a lack of belief in institutions increasingly led society to 
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participate more actively in policy processes. Social forces, including 
populism and grassroots activism, have had an evident influence but 
also has become an outcome.  
5.7.2. Additional Structural Sphere: The Role of Social 
Dynamics? 
In view of the intervention of society actors in the KXL process, we 
might ask the question: what is the role of social dynamics? As 
identified in Chapter 3, Cox’s theoretical arguments lack clarity in 
terms of the transition between agency-structure and civil society-
political society. 
Social dynamics were certainly significant in the case. In the early 
process, the case was defined by oil trading from supplier companies 
(i.e. TransCanada and ConocoPhillips) to a demander (i.e. the US). 
However, during the KXL process, different ideational arguments and 
different state agencies (institutions) intervened to expand the scope 
of the debate. Moreover, the Canadian state, at the supplier side, 
engaged in the process in the institutional form of the Prime Minister 
(Prime Minister of 2015) and Minister of Natural Resources (Natural 
Resources Canada (2011). Different US state departments 
participated as well, providing another institutional dimension. 
However, global politics is not based purely on state/government 
behaviors. In terms of the oil trade, petroleum and business 
institutions (CAPP 2017; API 2017a; NAM 2017), environmental 
institutions (NRDC 2011), universities, polls showing societal 
perceptions (Pew Research Center 2013) and protests as societal 
reactions (Reject and Protect 2014) cannot be ignored. Thus, as with 
any other issue in global politics, US oil diversification motivations are 
based on, and should be studied through, the lens of state-society 
complexity. In this respect, social dynamics shows itself as another 
structural sphere in the Coxian analysis. 
These dynamics are particularly evident in the environmental debates 
on the pipeline project. Increasing environmentalist opposition against 
KXL occurred after 2010. This social reaction was shaped by 
institutions. Moreover, with the help of the lobby system in American 
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politics, they became a powerful rival to oil industry interests. They 
pushed the oil industry to support the Republican side, while 
environmentalists sided with Democrats, who have been more 
receptive to environmental considerations. Moreover, the 
environmentalist opposition, shaped by these institutions, has in turn 
become a shaper of Democrat interests, thereby partly shaping 
domestic politics. While hardly evident before 2010, these social 
dynamics therefore became more pronounced in the period 
thereafter; suggesting that a neo-Coxian analysis has become more 
feasible in the KXL case. In short, while social dynamics fill the gaps 
in Coxian theory, they also show the nature of changing contemporary 
world dynamics. 
 
5.8.     Conclusions   
US oil diversification patterns can be uncovered by the help of ideas, 
material capabilities and institutions derived from Cox (Chapter 3). All 
these elements affect each other during the process, with some 
becoming more prominent at specific points, e.g. material capabilities 
in the early Bush phase, and ideas and institutions under Obama. The 
three main causes can therefore be shown and processes described. 
The KXL pipeline, in this respect, is a useful case for uncovering 
patterns of US oil diversification. While oil is a material substance, its 
effect and importance are related to ideas. That material issue has 
brought ideas dynamics into the process. And these two interests 
were reflected and shaped by institutions.  
This process also links US oil politics, which is connected with the 
global oil market, into wider areas that encompass domestic politics 
and foreign policy. Thus, US oil diversification motivations cannot be 
attributed solely to isolated economic benefits or environmental 
considerations. They were also connected with the splits of both 
political parties and national-state interest under domestic politics 
dynamics. Moreover, the changing scope of US foreign policy which 
included drawing away from the Middle East oil and going back to the 
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American continent also intervened in the reciprocal interaction 
between oil politics and domestic politics. Thus, oil diversification 
cannot be reduced to administrational process or government 
participants but must be understood in this wider structural context.  
On the other hand, there are also non-governmental institutions and 
societal reactions, i.e. social dynamics. Although non-governmental 
institutions and societal reactions affected the process, it finished 
according to what the administration wanted in the end. Demands and 
abilities of administrations cannot be understood without considering 
their political parties and leader’s preferences, thereby determinants 
of administrations’ legitimacy which is composed of domestic politics 
and foreign policy in US case. Thus, the picture seen in US oil 
diversification motivations supports a state-society complexity 
characteristic (see Chapter 3). However, a Coxian emphasis on state-
society complexity needs to be explained in more detail. Social 
dynamics shows itself as a new social sphere in the 2000s millennium 
– a feature particularly evident in the KXL case, although it requires 
institutional organization to effect the process.  
The process has proved our methodological stance that the rationality 
of people is not decided by some definite limitations, rather in time 
processes and according to events. KXL shows that people behave in 
behavior, rather than through behavior (see Chapter 4). For example, 
Trump’s approval decision in 2017 cannot be evaluated without 
understanding the discussions on the project which started in 2008. 
This research, finds that the accumulation of the process has occurred 
around disputes over the national interest definition. Mainstream IR 
approaches could have chosen a selected topic, dynamic or 
independent variable to explain KXL, for example state self-interest 
(Realism) or economic cooperation (Liberalism), but can at best only 
provide a partial explanation of oil diversification. However, we have 
shown how different dynamics are influencing the duration process 
and shaping each other in a non-linear feedback loop that moves 
beyond these rational explanations. This analysis therefore adds 
significantly to the KXL literature. It also provides a basis for 
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uncovering oil diversification in other cases, which we can examine in 























6. The Iraq War: transnational and national 
benefits - from cohesion to contestation  
 
6.1.     Introduction 
The Iraq War (2003-2011), also commonly referred to as the invasion 
of Iraq, was the war that targeted the overthrow of the Saddam 
Hussein (1979-2003) government by a US-led coalition that included 
the UK. While the relationship between Iraq and the US had already 
been deteriorating since the 1990-1991 Gulf War, the accusation by 
the US that Iraq possessed ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (WMDs) 
kept tensions alive. Before start of the new millennium US officials 
began discussing the ending of the Hussein government and regime 
change (Senate 1998: S1178; Congress 1998). However, 9/11 which 
involved coordinated terrorist attacks against the US led to a more 
aggressive intervention by the US in the Middle East. It has always 
been questioned as to whether the Iraq War was connected to control 
of Iraqi oil (Jhaveri 2004; Duffield 2005). Oil was certainly not the only 
reason for the conflict, but Iraqi oil was important for the US and its 
allies because of its potential reserves and production capacity. 
Diversification of US energy supplies geographically was strategically 
important and Iraq was the one of the potential candidates along with 
Iran and Libya in terms of their oil contribution to the market. Thus, 
there was not only the US national interest to consider, but also a 
transnational requirement for oil that was compatible with the national 
interest. However, having military intervention abroad (national 
interest), specifically in the Middle East, has undermined US 
hegemony, thereby reducing national and transnational benefits (i.e. 
as a unipolar power) for the US. 
The national security discourse will be investigated through this 
research. The main theme of this discourse was convincing the 
American people on the justice of war with Iraq, but it also reflects how 
US policymakers and institutions interpreted US national security 
differently i.e. through the view of US and its global position. Thus, it 
helps us to find contradictions in the process in terms of national-
transnational benefits. The US military interventions abroad and its 
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global oil market requirements have become contradictory. However, 
of interest is whether this diversification motive can be proven using 
pre-war US departments reports and studies. Certainly, Iraq’s 
participation in the global oil market after the war shows that this US 
strategic target has been achieved.  
The Iraq War is therefore an important case study in terms of 
discussing a US-led global system and US responsibilities 
theoretically and analysing US oil interests empirically. While the 
theoretical view shows us foreign policy dynamics in the War, they are 
connected with oil politics, which is provided by an empirical view. 
However, there is also a transition in domestic politics which is related 
to other dimensions. The USA was involved in Iraqi oil at different 
levels, and through different actors, including government, policy 
makers, state departments, oil lobby-industry and think-tanks. On the 
other side, this involvement led Iraqi civil society to react against the 
US, while Iraqi policymakers had a positive relationship with the US. 
This complex process is therefore evaluated from two aspects which 
are firstly the motivations of the US government within a national 
security discourse and secondly how the Iraqi governments 
considered/resisted civil society around the discursive issue of the 
meaning of Iraqi people`s ownership of Iraqi oil. These two aspects 
have a sequential order. 
The research claims that the War started with the national security 
discourse that could unite political and civil societies after the 9/11 
shock. However, this unified domestic politics was integrated with a 
structural change in terms of the global political system which is 
related to US foreign policy and the global oil market, leading to a new 
picture. Collapse of united American ideas around national security 
reveals the attempts of IOCs, policymakers and elites for the 
internationalisation of Iraqi oil. It has also led political parties to 
became divided resulting in a transition in domestic politics. 
Obviously, it was not a one sided process. The effect by the US on an 
Iraqi political-civil society split and its results have underpinned the 
process since attempts to introduce oil regulation in Iraq. US 
legitimacy has been more strongly questioned in terms of US foreign 
policy. Thus, transnational-national benefits have become 
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contradictory. However, the process has not accumulated just through 
structural dynamics. There were agents` interests and interpretations 
of oil and non-oil (e.g. Israel lobby, neoconservative ideas) groups that 
interfered, shaped and triggered this structural change. However, we 
will consider an oil perspective. The Iraq War is an important case 
study to show how US oil diversification perceptions changed from a 
position of `freeing the Middle East oil` to `drawing away from the 
Middle East oil`. 
In this chapter, empirical evidence on the Iraq War is explored using 
the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 3. This data is used to 
establish the critical decision points as the policy-making unfolded. 
These are used to understand the rationales for oil diversification 
motivations that developed over time, which are then analysed across 
three semi-distinct phases that map on to important key points for the 
Iraqi oil case. The first of them covers the pre- and early war period to 
provide context. Next, the early war period is accepted as finishing 
with the adoption of a new Iraqi constitution which is the beginning of 
second period. Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) marked the 
end of second period and led to a new stage of Iraqi oil development. 
The current situation is dated from the Iraqi oil bids.  
The data were collected from archive studies, online resources and 
interviews. Online resources were selected under two headings (i.e. 
US and Iraq perspectives). Although the research focuses on US oil 
diversification motivations, the Iraqi side has also been considered to 
provide balance. In total, 220 primary resources were identified, of 
which 69 of them were used. In order to collect data, open-source 
governmental websites (e.g. White House 2000; KRG 2007a), NGOs 
websites (e.g. Platform 2007a; 2007b) and the websites of institutions 
on energy, oil and trade (e.g. Bearden 2001; Deutsche Bank 2010) 
have been used as primary data sources. In addition, 6 interviewees 
were asked questions about the Iraq War to corroborate documentary 
sources. Interviews were held with retired diplomats, retired 
policymakers and people from think thanks and lobbies in Washington 
DC, USA over a period of five months in 2018-2019.  
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6.2.     Literature Review 
There is a wide literature about the motivations behind the Iraq War. 
While some (e.g. Hepburn 2003) focuses specifically on the oil 
motivation behind the war, others (Schmidt and William 2008) identify 
ideological, social and political factors. Moreover, there are also some 
(e.g. Mearsheimer and Walt 2007) who discuss the motivations of 
other countries. A review of this literature suggests that an oil 
diversification motive is a credible explanation - but one which 
requires further analysis. 
For example, Hepburn`s (2003) work asserts that the war was not 
fought for oil. He (ibid.) believes that there is no direct US motivation 
for oil, because the short-term results of the war led to dramatically 
increasing oil prices, but it did lead to a slow rise in Iraqi oil production. 
Rising oil prices was not the target policy makers would have 
preferred. And in order to get back what was paid for the war from 
American taxpayers, Hepburn argues that oil production would have 
to rise in the short-term to account for this discrepancy. Moreover, the 
argument about weakening OPEC with a strong US ally does not 
make sense, because of Saudi Arabia`s power within the 
organization.  
Schmidt and William (2008) take a different standpoint by looking at 
neoconservative effects on the US foreign policy. According to them, 
neoconservatives were already interpreting the US position in the 
world as a sole (unipolar) power. However, this world view was 
changed with the Bush Doctrine which targeted preserving the US’ 
hegemonic position. In accordance with the neoconservatives` 
bandwagoning logic, which believed in US hegemony rather than a 
multipolar balance of power, the Bush doctrine included pre-emptive 
use of military force. Of course, the effect of 9/11 on this transition 
cannot be ignored. Again, according to a neoconservative worldview, 
the Bush doctrine believed unipolar power should not act 
multilaterally. Lastly, in parallel with Wilsonianism, democracy 
promotion holds an important place in US foreign policy objectives. 
For neoconservatives, public interests also inform the national 
interest. All these elements, according to the authors, created the 
main motivation for the Iraq War. 
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Taking a very different view, Whyte (2007) looks at neo-liberal 
institutionalised corporate corruption. The main political focus for neo-
liberalism is de-regulation; however, this unregulated space creates a 
suitable environment for a corrupt market. Economic shock-therapy in 
a country helps to create such an environment. In the case of Iraq, 
since it is the biggest source for Iraqi revenue, oil is the main object of 
bribery, over-charging, embezzlement, product substitution, bid 
rigging and false claims (ibid. 177). The Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA) and its mission was the main facilitator. The CPA restructured 
the economy and disbursed Iraqi oil revenue to US corporations. In 
practice, “The high profitability of reconstruction contracts was 
guaranteed via a system of `cost-plus` contracts” (ibid. 188). Western 
– mainly US – corporations then benefited from Iraq’s reconstruction 
in many areas. Kaufmann`s work (2004) also focused on misused 
civic institutions and the marketplaces of ideas. This thesis is applied 
to analyse how the Iraq War was sold to the American people. The 
research (ibid.) shows how threat inflation was successful. Five main 
factors were found as key for the legitimatising of the war: political 
manipulation in democracies; control of information; the 
administration`s authority in foreign policy; the weakness of 
countervailing forces; and the effect of 9/11 (ibid. 32-46). 
In examining an oil motivation behind the Iraq War, Stokes (2007) and 
Stokes and Raphael (2010) argue the case for a dual logic. They 
suggest that there is a transnational state rather than a nation-state 
logic and the US is mainly responsible for the current system. While 
global oil demand increases, the global oil market should provide oil 
to all demanders whether they are Western or non-Western powers. 
However, this economic logic combines with American military targets 
aimed at unilateral military superiority. While the US tries to diversify 
oil suppliers for transnational markets from the Middle East, the 
Caspian Basin, West Africa and Latin America, counterinsurgency 
programmes are also created in these regions. With this programme, 
the US has rolled back social forces to challenge the prevailing order.  
Colgan (2013) categorizes the conflicts that are caused by oil, but the 
term “resource wars” is exaggerated. In the categories, causal 
pathways are classified under three mechanisms: ownership and 
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market structure; producer politics; and consumer access concerns. 
The Iraq War is accepted as connected to oil indirectly. The U.S. 
presence in the Middle East creates a historical motivation: 
“Motivations for war included US desire to remove Saddam Hussein, 
who had a history of petro-aggression, and U.S. fears that Hussein 
would destabilise region, threatening consumer access to oil” (ibid. 
171). Thus, the US did not aim to profit and control Iraqi oil, but the 
Carter Doctrine and United States Central Command (CENTCOM) 
increased US interest in the region. Decreasing Iraqi oil production 
during the 1990s and Hussein`s aggressive behaviours are 
interpreted as two motivations behind the war.  
In contrast, Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) investigate the power of the 
Israeli lobby in US politics. The Israeli lobby is one of the most 
powerful interest groups in the US and they are close to 
neoconservatives. 9/11 contributed enormous power to this alliance 
and the Bush administration`s unilateralist foreign policy to invade 
Iraq. Removing Saddam was strategically important for both the US 
and Israel: “The war was motivated … by a desire to make Israel more 
secure” (ibid. 231). In terms of the Iraq War, the Israel lobby but also 
the Israeli state helped neoconservatives sell the war to the American 
people. The authors (ibid.) do not believe oil was the real motivation 
behind the war, because oil companies did not lobby for the 2003 war. 
However, they do ignore the US’s most important interest, which was 
maintaining access to oil and gas in the Persian Gulf. They argue that 
“This objective does not require the US to control the region itself; it 
merely needs to ensure that no other country is in a position to keep 
Middle East oil from reaching the world market” (ibid. 337). 
Lastly, Butt (2019: 251) asserts the term a “performative war”. This 
thesis is grounded on the belief that challenging hegemony leads the 
hegemon to show its power to a global audience. 9/11 is accepted as 
a trigger for performative war. Thus, American hegemony and its 
status with material capabilities are differentiated before and after the 
incident. However, this hegemonic focus is combined with a 
neoconservative desire and Wilsonian ideas in reference to Schmidt 
and William`s (2008) work. These motivations are found to be superior 
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to arguments about WMD, oil and Israel lobbies or spreading 
democracies in the Middle East.  
We believe oil was one of the main motivations behind the war, so we 
disagree with the argument (Hepburn 2003) that asserts war was not 
related to oil. Since we do not focus on the motivations behind the war 
generally, we do not focus on Wilsonian ideas or the neoconservative 
unilateral world view (Schmidt and William 2008) versions of the story. 
However, the US led unipolar world system and its implications related 
to them are important, since US foreign policy is also considered as a 
motivation behind oil diversification. The argument (Whyte 2007) 
related to the collapse of neoliberalism or misused marketplaces of 
ideas/institutions are important and supported in this study, since it 
should consider world structure`s theoretical point of analysis and 
empirical application in the Iraq War. However, we do not see it as the 
only motivation behind the war.  
The importance of providing oil to the transnational market is also one 
of the arguments (Stokes 2007; Stokes and Raphael 2010) that is 
asserted in this work. When we look at the process, the market 
argument does provide a structural explanation, so we partly agree 
that there is a dual logic. However, as it will be seen, the process 
includes lobbies, individual actors or societal reactions in both 
countries. The motivation does not stay stable and national-
transnational benefits become contradictory in parallel to changing US 
power. The US’ historical motivation in the region argument (Colgan 
2013) is right, but it is not the only reason. Meetings and reports on 
Iraqi oil before, during and after the war clearly show this in the study 
below. The study on the effects of the Israel lobby and Israeli state 
interest (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007), again similar to Wilsonian 
ideas or Neoconservatives, is not the focus of this work, but it should 
also be mentioned to create a general picture of the war. Lastly, we 
could consider the “performative war” thesis (Butt 2019). A challenge 
to US hegemony might be effective when explaining the war; however, 
the process cannot be reduced to just this one point.  
We assert as Duffield (2012) does that oil is not the only reason for 
the war, but it is one of the main reasons. However, while he (ibid.) 
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looks at the motivation behind the war through the historical context 
of US interests in the region and US government approaches, we also 
analyse the changing motivations during and after the war. This 
chapter tries to show oil motivations behind the war, how Iraqi oil was 
interpreted by different actors, how the process of motivations on Iraqi 
oil evolved, and the war’s place in changing US oil diversification 
motivations. Although there is a huge literature on the Iraq War and 
more specifically oil motivations behind the Iraq War, none of the work 
covers actor-actor and actor-structure reciprocal relationships in the 
process. On the one hand, ideational and material sides of the 
structure should be kept in balance during the analysis, while actor 
participation from both sides (Iraq and US) is not ignored. On the other 
hand, work on the Iraq War cannot be reduced to either an empirical 
or theoretical view. Since both views analyse the motivations behind 
war, the literature is large but lacks engagement with this aspect.   
 
6.3.     A Timeline of and Historical background of the Iraq 
War 
In this section, a timeline of significant events is presented showing 
the process of Iraq War which starts with the Gulf War as a historical 
background. The process details will be given according to a 
chronological sequence starting in the early 1990s and ending with 
the current situation, thereby illustrating the synchronic and diachronic 
nature of the case.  
6.3.1. A Timeline of Significant Events 
January 1991 – The Persian Gulf War began when Operation Desert 
Storm was launched by a U.S.-led coalition and ended on 28th 
February. 
April 1995 – the United Nations allowed partial resumption of Iraq's 
oil exports to buy food and medicine in an oil-for-food programme. 
October 1998 – Iraq ended cooperation with the UN Special 
Commission (UNSCOM) to Oversee the Destruction of Iraq's WMDs. 
October 1998 – President Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act which 
targeted removal of the Saddam Hussein government. 
217 
December 1998 – The US and British Operation Desert Fox bombing 
campaign to destroy Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons 
programmes. 
September 2001 – September 11 attacks in the USA. 
October 2002 – Congress (H.J.Res.114) authorizes an attack on Iraq. 
March 2003 – President Bush announced U.S. forces had begun a 
military operation into Iraq. 
July 2003 – The Iraqi Governing Council (provisional) was 
established under the US led-CPA. 
June 2004 – The US handed sovereignty to an Interim Government 
headed by Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. 
May 2005 – The Iraqi Transitional Government replaced the Iraqi 
Interim Government. 
October 2005 – The Constitution of Iraq was adopted. 
May 2007 – President George W. Bush defies the Democratic-
controlled Congress by vetoing a war-spending bill that set a timetable 
for withdrawal of US troops from Iraq. 
May 2007 – The Iraq Oil Law (The Iraq Hydrocarbon Law) process 
started.  
August 2007 – Oil and Gas Law of the Kurdistan Region was 
approved. 
February 2008 – 70 firms register for Iraqi Oil Contracts. 
September 2008 – Iraq's oil minister, Hussain al-Shahristani, 
announces that plans to award Exxon Mobil, Shell, Total, BP, and 
Chevron no-bid contracts to service Iraq's oil fields have been 
withdrawn. 
April 2009 – The Model Producing Oil Field Technical Service 
Contract was prepared for the Iraqi Government and International Oil 
Companies.  
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August 2010 – Over seven years after the war in Iraq began, 
President Obama announced the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom with 
a withdrawal of combat troops. 
August 2011 – A completed version of the Federal Oil & Gas Draft 
Law was presented.  
December 2011 – The last U.S. soldiers leave Iraq, ending a nine-
year military mission. 
April 2012 – Oil exports from Iraqi Kurdistan halted amid a row with 
central government over contracts with foreign firms. 
Figure 6.1: The timeline of the War 
6.3.2. Historical Context to the War 
The historical origin of the Iraq War can be found in the first Gulf War 
in 1991 which brought US attention specifically on Iraq and Saddam 
Hussein. It was the war between coalition forces led by the United 
States and Iraq. Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait, which had 
arisen from oil pricing and production disputes, was the main reason. 
For ensuring demilitarisation of Iraq, economic sanctions against Iraq 
started in 1990. Since sanctions caused huge civilian sufferings, the 
United Nations (UN) (1995) established the oil-for-food programme 
that led Iraq to sell oil in exchange for food, medicine and other 
humanitarian needs in the era of president Bill Clinton (1993-2001). 
However, the relationship between the USA and the Saddam Hussein 
government became increasingly conflictual.  
Since the Hussein government used chemical and biological weapons 
during and after the Iran-Iraq war, it had been accused by US-led 
coalitions and institutions of possessing WMDs. Although Iraq had 
declared information to international observers about its WMDs in 
1992, 1995, 1996 and 1997, this disclosure did not reduce 
international pressure (UNSCOM 1999). Moreover, there were 
tensions between the Iraqi government and WMD inspection teams, 
because UNSCOM (ibid.) did not find Iraq`s declarations `verifiable`. 
In the meantime, Iraq could not increase oil production, since 
developing its infrastructure was limited by sanctions. In 1998, Iraq`s 
oil production was 2,15 Mbbl/d, while total world production was 75,68 
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Mbbl/d (EIA 2019a). Whereas Iraqi proven crude oil reserves were the 
second largest after Saudi Arabia at 112,500 Mbbl, total world proven 
reserves was 1,034,623.7 Mbbl. Iraq therefore had a huge potential in 
terms of oil flow to the global oil market, but the political economic 
structure was restraining it. Before the war, Iraq`s situation was 
evaluated by US officials and oil debates occurred in the US in relation 
to oil sanctions on Iran and Libya (Morse and Jaffe 2001a; Ebel 2002). 
 
6.4.     Pre- and Early War: 1998-2004  
The following period witnessed increasing tension between the US 
and Iraq. Two cruise missile attacks on Iraq occurred in 1993 which 
were related to the attempted assassination by alleged Iraqi agents 
on former U.S. President George H. W. Bush. In 1998, in response to 
an Iraqi offensive in the Kurdish Civil War, and Iraq’s failure to comply 
with UNSCOM inspectors in terms of WMDs, Operation Desert Fox 
was launched by the US and UK. It was a four day bombing campaign 
on Iraqi targets, reflecting the tension between Iraq and the US. In 
early 1998, the neoconservative Project for New American Century 
(PNAC) (1998) sent a letter to President Bill Clinton which 
emphasised the danger of the Hussein government, its destabilization 
of the Middle East and the lack of success of the containment policy. 
It framed Iraq as the most fundamental national security threat of the 
country. Some of the signatories were Zalmay Khalilzad who later 
became US ambassador to Iraq (2005-2007) and played a significant 
role in the first post-Saddam government, Donald Rumsfeld who later 
became the Secretary of Defense (2001-2006), Paul Wolfowitz who 
later became the Deputy Secretary of Defense (2001-2005) and 
Robert B. Zoellick who later became the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
(2005-2006). 
In the same year, the danger of the Iraqi government and the solution 
of “military action” was first debated in the US Senate (1998: S1178). 
Moreover, oil’s economic importance for liberated areas (Northern 
Iraq where the US-backed Kurds dominated) in terms of resistance to 
Hussein was also emphasised. Later in the year, a National Security 
Strategy for a New Century was announced (White House 1998). 
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Three core objectives were enhancing energy security, bolstering 
America’s economic prosperity and promoting democracy abroad. 
According to the report (ibid.), although the US did not rely on Persian 
Gulf exports, allies of the US such as Europe and Japan were 
importing 85% of Persian Gulf exports and were heavily reliant on the 
region’s oil. However, since US domestic production was depleted, 
national dependence on foreign oil was expected to increase. Thus, 
ensuring access to the region’s oil resources and the free flow of these 
resources were the main targets (ibid. 33). The flow of oil from this 
region to the rest of the world was also related to the geo-political 
constraints provided by the Strait of Hormuz and the national security 
perception of US. The oil market and US national security was 
connected with that spatial area (Interviewee-28). Thus, the issue was 
not just related to Iraq but also to stability in the supplier countries in 
the global oil market (Interviewee-14; Interviewee-26). On the other 
hand, in parallel with the US’s broader `promoting democracy` target, 
Iraq`s “transition to democracy” was emphasised in the Iraq Liberation 
Act of 1998 (Congress 1998). It was supported in Congress by 360 
(202 Republicans and 157 Democrats) votes to 38. The US position 
therefore enjoyed bipartisan support. 
In 1999, the post-Saddam era started to be evaluated by US 
policymakers (CENTCOM 1999). US action seemed to be required 
and a US role for a transitional government also discussed in 
government circles. Later in the year, UN Security Council Resolution 
(1999) referred to Iraq’s oil production capacity and `the options for 
involving foreign oil companies in Iraq’s oil sector`. In 2000, the PNAC 
(2000) published a paper on Rebuilding America’s Defenses. The 
basic ideology behind the report was a foreign policy that promoted 
American principles abroad and national leadership with US global 
responsibilities. One of America’s global leadership responsibilities 
was shown as “the preservation of favourable balance of power in … 
the Middle East and surrounding energy-producing region…” (ibid. 5). 
That same year, Bill Clinton’s Government (White House 2000: 8) 
announced a National Security Strategy for a Global Age report which 
emphasised the need to “deter threats to the free flow of Middle East 
oil”. On the Iraqi side, Hussein devised an approach involving selling 
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oil in euros rather than dollars, although the decision was providing 
less income because of conversion fees. It was a huge challenge 
attempting to circumvent a petrodollar system led by the US but 
nonetheless raised concerns amongst federal policy actors.  
In the first month of the George W. Bush administration, an 
information memorandum (DOS 2001a) was prepared by Near 
Eastern Affairs for Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Advisor 
(2001-2005) who then became the Secretary of State (2005-2009). In 
the memorandum letter (ibid.) “regime change” in Iraq was specifically 
emphasised. However, important warnings to the new government 
were made by think tanks in terms of increasing energy demand and 
decreasing supply in the US and in the world (Muttitt 2012). In the 
Strategic Energy Policy Report and its updated version (Morse and 
Jaffe 2001a; Morse and Jaffe 2001b) was co-sponsored by the James 
A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University and Council 
on Foreign Relations, all close to Republicans, there were two key 
issues mentioned, energy delivery challenges and volatile prices. In 
order to solve these issues, three policy paths were established: a 
SPR, diversification of energy supply resources and adjusting 
economic interdependence in energy (Morse and Jaffe 2001a: 33). 
The tension in the Middle East and free access to oil in the region is 
one of the main themes in the report, since the “Gulf” was going to 
“remain the world’s base-load supplier and the least expensive source 
of oil to meet growing demand” (ibid. 30). The Bush administration 
was actually not unfamiliar with the oil market because of the 
background of the members. Vice President Dick Cheney (2001-
2009) was the former chief executive of the Halliburton oil field service 
company, whereas Condoleezza Rice was a previous director of 
Chevron. Also, the president himself came from an oil industry 
background as did his father. The administration was consequently 
called the “oil and gas administration” (Kay 2001).  
The administration was aware of the warnings of the oil market, so the 
North American Energy Working Group was announced by Spencer 
Abraham the Secretary of Energy (2001-2005) at the 5th Hemispheric 
Meeting of Energy Ministers Hemispheric Energy Initiative (DOE 
2001). The Secretary then emphasised increasing demand, 
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decreasing supply and energy infrastructure at the National Energy 
Summit of UCC (Bearden 2001). However, there were two main 
issues to such a policy: “diversifying America's energy supply” which 
meant security of supply, and “protecting consumers against price 
spikes” which could only succeed with the increasing of supply (ibid.). 
During this time, the National Energy Policy report (NEP) (2001) had 
been prepared under Cheney. It included the main issues of the time 
(e.g. imbalance between supply and demand, environmental 
considerations), but did also emphasise the importance of promoting 
“geographic diversification of energy supplies” (ibid. 8-19). However, 
according to some (AEI 2002: 98), the plan followed a proposed draft 
written by oil lobbyists. 
However, a lawsuit concerning the activities of the Task Force found 
the documents contained a map of Iraqi oilfields, pipelines, refineries 
and terminals, as well as two charts detailing Iraqi oil and gas projects 
and “Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield Contracts” (Judicial Watch 2002). 
When the year ended, 9/11 triggered a widespread xenophobic 
attitude in the US (Interviewee-21). Before 9/11, the aggressive 
behaviour of Saddam and the potential nuclear danger of Iraq were 
emphasised in a memorandum which was provided by Rumsfeld to 
Rice (DOD 2001c). As a summary of the previous debates, a DOD 
(2001a: 4) Quadrennial Defense Review Report mentioned that “the 
US and its allies and friends will continue to depend on the energy 
resources of the Middle East, a region in which several states pose 
conventional military challenges”. However, the US government had 
already started evaluating war with Iraq and the main post-conflict 
issues that should be considered such as “How to Start?”, “Provisional 
Government”, “Reactions to Bombing Iraq” (DOD 2001b; DOS 
2001b). 
The danger of Hussein and his secret WMDs programme were 
discussed by both US and UK allies (White House 2002a; DSD 2002) 
and included an operational timeline plan and maps (CENTCOM 
2002a). Subsequent high level meetings between governments were 
overwhelmingly about the future of Iraq after regime change. For 
example, the UK’s Washington ambassador Christopher Meyer (DSD 
2002) met with Wolfowitz to discuss these issues. There were also 
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some meetings/reports that include an `Oil and Energy` title such as 
the Future of Iraq Working Project which involved three total meetings 
held primarily in Washington from July 2002 through to early April 
2003 (DOS 2002a; DOS 2002b; DOS 2003). Restoring, developing 
and transparency provision were the main focus on the Iraqi oil and 
gas sector. Iraqi oil was not only of interest to the US oil industry, 
rather for all importer nations, but the US was one of the main 
interested parties. At this point, Ahmet Chalabi, who was the founder 
of the Iraqi National Congress, an opposition group to Hussein 
supported by the US, said “American companies will have a big shot 
at Iraqi oil” (Beaumont and Islam 2002).  
Towards the end of 2002, Iraqi oil policies started to be decided. A 
CENTCOM (2002b) Energy Infrastructure Planning for the Deputies 
presentation concerned Iraqi oil fields, infrastructure plans and the 
future ownership structure of oil industry. Increasing Iraqi oil 
production was interpreted as “diversifying/increasing global oil 
supply” (ibid. 15). The same focus can be seen in the US-UK Energy 
Dialogue meeting of 2002 (DOE 2003). In parallel with this meeting, 
the National Security Strategy (White House 2002b: 20) was 
emphasising “working with … energy producers to expand the 
sources” for enhancing energy security. During this time, UK oil 
companies such as BP and Shell were expressing their concerns to 
the Government about “securing future oil contracts in Iraq” (Iraq 
Inquiry 2016: 256). In this emerging context, “H.J.Res.114 
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 
2002” was agreed in the House of Representatives by 296 votes (215 
Republican and 81 Democrat) against 133 votes (6 Republican and 
126 Democrat) and in Senate by 77 votes (48 Republican and 29 
Democrat) against 23 votes (21 Democrat and 1 Republican) 
(Congress 2002 and Senate 2002). Democratic Party stalwarts such 
as John Kerry, Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden and John Edwards also 
voted to support the resolution.  
On March 19th, 2003 President Bush started planning military 
operations in Iraq with the emphasis on “no ambition in Iraq, except to 
remove a threat” (The White House 2003). On the other hand, US 
think tanks were evaluating the Iraqi oil industry. In order to repair and 
224 
restructure this industry, the participation of international players was 
argued to be necessary, while the other principle that “Iraqis maintain 
control of their own oil sector” was also supported by the CFR and 
Baker Institute (2003: 10). However, in order to achieve a sustainable 
and more productive Iraqi oil industry, foreign investment was 
considered necessary. Oil rich areas, are located in Northern Iraq in 
and around Kirkuk and the southern field of Rumalia, were also 
mentioned. Participation of international actors and the flow of Iraqi oil 
to global market were the main themes evident in thinking during this 
period (CFR 2003). In terms of repairing and restructuring of Iraqi oil, 
Halliburton and Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR) had already been 
awarded a no-bid contract under the name of Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO) 
by the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group, which was  tasked “to 
restore and operate Iraq`s oil infrastructure” (House 2006) within DOD 
(RIO 2003; Mobbs 2004; Congress 2005a). Meetings between US-UK 
energy groups emphasised the risks of increasing global reliance on 
Middle East oil and the region’s necessity for investment (DOE 2003). 
The need for foreign investment was also emphasised by a 
BearingPoint report (2003) which was prepared for the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID). In addition to previous 
arguments, the necessity for good governance in the form of an Iraqi 
foreign investment law was also emphasised to protect commercial 
interests (ibid.). 
The UK government also commissioned studies on Iraqi oil including 
the UK Energy Strategy for Iraq in 2004 (Muttitt 2012). It was believed 
that with the help of foreign direct investment (FDI), the Iraqi oil sector 
could be improved. The improvement of the Iraqi oil sector was 
prioritised, “since Iraq is extremely important to the UK’s objectives on 
energy security” (UKESI 2004). During this time, when Iraqi people 
were asked whether they wanted coalition forces to leave Iraq, 76 of 
866 respondents who agreed stated the main reason was “They want 
Iraqi oil and resources” (Brookings 2004: 40). It must be emphasised 
that the majority (418) did not support a specific reason, since they 
saw others as “occupiers and must leave immediately” (ibid.). 
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Duration: Theoretical Analysis 
The first period of the war helps us to see how the US oil diversification 
policy in the war process was established. Structurally all the 
dimensions (i.e. structural causes) were interacting to develop the 
motivations for diversification.  
As mentioned, Hussein and his relationship with the US and US-led 
institutions had already produced a negative momentum since the 
Gulf War. However, in the meantime, US institutions started 
mentioning the security issue of the Middle East and specifically Iraq 
(PNAC 1998). The pressure for war with Iraq cannot be isolated just 
through institutions and ideational structures, since many signatories 
of the PNAC had significant roles in the Bush Administrations. Thus, 
they did not only pressure institutionally, they also had an active role 
in the Republican Party as policymakers. Structures were creating the 
actors that would lead to Iraq a more complex situation. It is also worth 
emphasising that Democrat leader Clinton’s administration and 
Democrats generally cannot be seen as having a pure anti-war 
approach (Congress 1998). There was unified ideas in the US in terms 
of the war with Iraq with Republicans and Democrats largely united. 
The reason why 1998 is accepted as the beginning point of the Iraq 
War is not only related to the operation, but also the emphasis of Iraqi 
oil in the US Senate (1998: S1178) which shows institutional attention 
in US. However, the National Security Strategy for a New Century 
(White House 1998) clearly showed that one of the three core issues 
were energy security and related to that, accessing oil from the 
Persian Gulf was one of the main objectives. Institutional attention and 
ideational unification were combined with material issues of the US 
and global and US national security. This situation supports the points 
made by Colgan (2013).  
The US was not only thinking about national interests concerning oil 
diversification but also its allies’ (i.e. Europe and Japan) oil imports. 
Moreover, they also considered the rest of the oil market participants. 
Middle East oil was heavily in demand by US market participants, 
because the oil market`s supply-demand balance was tightening (see 
Chapter 1). The interests of these states were also the interests of the 
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US because of US power which provides a unilateral world, so 
diversification of global oil supply was also considered (CENTCOM 
2002b: 15) in parallel to global leadership responsibilities (PNAC 
2000). Thereby, US led international institutions (UN Security Council 
1999) considered foreign oil companies` involvement in Iraqi oil 
sector. Institutions were therefore keeping the status quo, but also 
shaping oil diversification as parallel with our institutions definition. 
Maintaining the Middle East as an energy producing region was one 
of the main material objectives for this US leadership. However, 
material incapability (tightening US and global oil market, lack of 
infrastructure of global oil market) and ideas (neoconservative US 
leadership interpretation that was combined with a ̀ negative` Saddam 
image in both parties) were pushing the US to take an action as these 
structures became more important to the story. 
When the new administration started working, there were two material 
capability issues in the energy sector concerning oil diversification that 
were delivery challenges and volatile prices. Freeing oil from the 
region was one of the solutions identified in the CFR (2001) report, so 
geographical diversification was necessary (NEP 2001). Moreover, 
increasing gasoline prices would put the new administration in danger 
from public anger (Bearden 2001). But, the administration’s 
background which was very close to the oil sector, also opens up a 
debate on the importance of institutional determinants of oil 
diversification. Of course, the power of the oil lobby cannot be 
accepted as the same over time. US interest in the region is also 
highly related to its relationship with Israel (Interviewee-26). The 
security of Israel in addition to US national security were by this point 
beginning to influence the process. This study does not assert the Iraq 
War was only related to oil, but oil diversification was certainly one of 
the main themes behind the war. However, other interests/factors (oil 
industry, Israel) helped shape US oil diversification in the long term as 
will be discussed. 
Studies (Judicial Watch 2002) by the new government on Iraqi oil 
which included oilfields, pipelines, refineries and terminals before the 
war were not that surprising given this material capabilities context. 
Thereby, the US and its allies’ dependence on Middle East energy 
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could easily be emphasised by the DOD (2001a: 4). In the meetings 
of operation on Iraq, Iraqi oil was still considered important for 
diversifying and increasing the global oil supply (CENTCOM 2002b: 
15). This was the perception of the government. However, from the 
industry point of view, Iraqi oil was attractive for both the upstream 
and downstream industry (Interviewee-11; Interviewee-19). This 
public-private interest collaboration found a reflection in US 
institutions. Foreign investment was seen as a key factor for US think 
tanks (CFR and Baker Institute 2003; CFR 2003) and the US 
government (BearingPoint 2003). Moreover, the necessity of the 
foreign investment law was mentioned (ibid.).  
During war preparations and the early war period there was a 
materially problematic situation for the US and global oil markets, in 
turn influencing the motivations for diversification. By this point, 
intersubjective US ideas, shared by political parties, were becoming 
united against the Saddam regime. And, US institutions were 
reflecting and shaping the war with Iraq and Iraqi oil. This structural 
explanation also includes agents` interests or backgrounds in ideas 
and institutions, with examples given above. These ambitions had in 
turn been shaped by US power in the world, but also US societal 
support. The “danger” of Saddam was combined with the 9/11 
incident, which was an exogenous shock to the structure-agency 
interaction which occurs in a state-society complexity. It triggered the 
public fear of national security (Interviewee-21) and legitimised the 
government`s action on Iraq. Democrats who were already not 
opposing the war with Iraq also became more pro-war because of the 
national security fear of the public. Although the US does not have 
territory in Persian Gulf or the Strait of Hormuz, the region was framed 
as a threat for national security. The interpretation of national security 
was different for civil society and political society, which included elites 
in institutions and the media. However, the war with Iraq could not be 
escaped after 9/11 as these interpretations merged. 
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6.5.     The Era of Oil Law: 2005-2008  
In 2005, Democrat politicians questioned the RIO 1 and RIO 2 
contracts that were held in 2003 and 2004 (DOD 2005; House 2006). 
Congress questioned the excessive costs that were being generated 
by holder companies which were Halliburton and KBR. On the other 
hand, the CRS (Kumins 2005) and National Strategy for Victory in Iraq 
report (NSC 2005) emphasised the importance of increasing Iraqi oil 
production. Both the International Monetary Fund (IMF)-Iraq Article IV 
Consultation Report (2005a) and IMF-Iraq Stand-By Arrangement 
(2005b) strongly recommended increasing oil production, with the 
solution shown as “US technical assistance” and “draft[ing] a new 
petroleum law” (ibid. 14). It is worth remembering that the global oil 
price had been increasing steadily since 2002, with the 2005 level 
almost around its early 1980s level. The oil price was therefore 
attracting the attention of policymakers. US officials started focusing 
more on supply from unstable regions like the Middle East and Africa 
(Oil Shockwave 2005; IEA 2005).  
In late 2005, the Constitution of Iraq (2005) was approved. Two points 
should be mentioned since they reflect the main issues faced by the 
Iraqis regarding their oil industry: “Article 111: Oil and gas are owned 
by all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates.”; and 
“Article 112: Second The federal government, with the producing 
regional and governorate governments, shall together formulate the 
necessary strategic policies to develop the oil and gas wealth…”. In 
the meantime, the negative aspects of the global oil market and an 
increasing price had been triggered by the war. Arguments 
concerning increasing biofuels and focusing on renewables then got 
enormous attention in the US (Interviewee-4; Interviewee-14) (see 
Chapter 7). 
In the Constitution, Iraqi oil is designated as belonging to the Iraqi 
people. However, the agreement introduced to manage Iraqi oil was 
a PSA supported by the US-UK. Under the PSA, the Iraqi state had 
ultimate control over the oil, but, since private companies provided 
capital investment for exploration, drilling and the construction of 
infrastructure, the state was constrained by the contracts (Platform et 
al. 2005: 12). While Iraqi oil was a controversial issue federally, the 
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Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) started signing exploration 
and development deals and MOUs with foreign companies (ibid. 19). 
The KRG had already started agreeing contracts in 2002 and signed 
five new agreements in 2004. 
An imbalance between global supply and demand and heavily import 
dependence countries were still important factors in the National 
Security Strategy 2006 (White House 2006a). In the case of Iraqi oil, 
the necessity for more infrastructure and FDI were also repeated 
(DOD 2006a). However, it should also be mentioned that “through 
April 2006, the United States has invested more than $265 million” in 
Iraq’s oil, gas and electricity infrastructure (SIGIR 2006: 4). On the 
other hand, Iraq still experienced other issues that were general and 
oil specific which were increasing arguments over religious and ethnic 
identities (e.g. Shi`a, Sunni, Kurd) in Iraqi politics, decentralised 
control of petroleum resources by federal and regional governments 
and terrorist threats to energy production and transportation (DOD 
2006a; DOD 2006b; Revenue Watch 2006). 
As mentioned, the KRG had already started signing contracts with 
foreign companies, but they had also passed a draft law inside the 
territory (KRG 2007a). Before the law, they prepared a draft model for 
production sharing contracts for discussion (KRG 2006a). According 
to supporting memorandums, it was designed to “reflect and 
implement the extent of Kurdistan’s constitutional right to control 
petroleum development in its territory” (Jaffe 2006: 16). The 
inconsistency between Federal and Kurdish government policy was 
evaluated by KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani (KRG 2006b) 
through reference to the constitution which says “all powers not 
stipulated in the exclusive powers of the federal government” in Article 
115 were enumerated to constituent states. Moreover, he found that 
the federal governments’ behaviour was sabotaging foreign 
investment in Kurdistan’s oil sector. The debate on oil revenues was 
not unexpected, since oil production was providing 95% of 
government income. Apart from the governance level issues, there 
were also reactions against the new constitution. Labor and 
Professional Oil Unions identified complex problems in terms of 
administrative and technical implementation issues (Global Policy 
230 
Forum 2006). They were clearly against the privatization of the oil 
industry being promoted by government policy.  
In 2007, President Bush was under pressure by a Democrat Congress 
to withdraw from Iraq with the introduction of the “U.S. Troop 
Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability 
Appropriations Act” bill to Congress (Congress 2007a). On the other 
hand, US policymakers and government were trying to support a new 
oil law in Iraq in order to sell Iraqi oil on global markets. Moreover, US 
advisors who worked with the Ministry of Iraq since 2003 on a contract 
basis were being funded by USAID. They worked with the US 
embassy and were affiliated with the DOC and DOE between mid-
2006 and April 2007, according to the CRS (Blanchard 2007). The US 
Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman (2005-2009) emphasised the 
importance of “new legislation to govern Iraq’s oil industry and to 
facilitate international investment” in July 2006 and “later that month, 
Iraqi Minister of Oil Shahristani (2006-2010) visited Washington, DC, 
and met with executives from major IOCs” at the DOE (ibid. 20).  
The draft hydrocarbon framework (Parajon 2007) which was 
submitted by the Iraqi cabinet in February 2007 had been prepared 
since mid-2006 under the DOS (Blanchard 2007). However, 
according to Platform (2007a) the draft was seen and discussed by 
nine IOCs within two weeks after being written in mid-2006. In the 
meantime, there was also support from think tanks, State 
Departments (RAND 2007), lobbyists, and the International Tax & 
Investment Centre (ITIC) which was supported by six oil companies, 
BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil, Shell, Total and Eni. They pushed for Iraq 
to offer long-term oil production contracts known as PSAs (Platform 
2007b). Their demands were included in a report entitled “Petroleum 
and Iraq's Future: Fiscal Options and Challenges” (Muttitt 2012: 121). 
They also held meetings in Beirut, Amman and Istanbul (ibid. 289). 
The Iraqi hydrocarbon law had four main titles which were managing 
hydrocarbon investment, revenue sharing, restructuring the Ministry 
of Oil and establishing the Iraqi National Oil Company (SIGIR 2007). 
There was some opposition to the law (Blanchard 2007). Sunni Arabs 
were suspicious of the proposed revenue sharing arrangements. The 
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Iraq Federation of Oil Unions disrupted oil production with strikes due 
to concern over IOCs and PSAs. Some Shiite Arab and Sunni 
Insurgent groups also opposed the PSAs. It is worth emphasising that 
the opponents of the law were faced with aggressive reactions. For 
example, eight members of the Federation of Workers’ Council were 
kidnapped on their way to a press conference for the oil law (Muttitt 
2012: 218-219). Oil experts were also opposed after announcing their 
positions on the new law in a series of meetings (ibid. 220-223). An 
oil workers’ strike demanding their participation in the oil law process 
gained victory (ibid.). After the strikes, they were offered a role in the 
oil law debates. Of course, military intervention against the oil unions 
by the government did result in international reaction and pressure 
from American and British trade union confederations (ibid.). Another 
factor limited government decision-making. The counter reactions 
against the oil law were slowing down the process since opposition to 
the oil law became associated with rising nationalism. Nationalist 
feelings against the US were reflected in and reflected upon the oil 
issue.  
Although not related to the draft law, but related to Iraqi oil, IOCs also 
held suspicions about how Iraqi oil would be governed. The legal and 
regulatory environment was not healthy and there were major security 
issues (Jaffe 2007). The Iraq oil sector was experiencing problems 
such as a deteriorating security environment due to ongoing Sunni 
and Shiite backed insurgencies, corruption and smuggling and lastly 
the lack of funds for investments – factors identified in a testimony to 
the US Government Accountability Office (Christoff 2007: 11). 
However, there were still commercial benefits from Iraqi oil: “Once 
companies have recouped their costs from developing the oil field, 
they are allowed to keep 20 per cent of the profits, with the rest going 
to the government” (Congress 2007b: H397). 
In the second half of 2007, the Petroleum Law of Kurdistan (KRG 
2007a) was approved by Article 112 and 115 of the constitution. While 
Article 112 allowed federal and producer regional governments to 
formulate strategic policies together, in Article 115 “priority” is “given 
to the law of the regions and governorates not organized in a region 
in case of dispute” (Constitution of Iraq 2005: 33-34). This 
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compatibility was confirmed by independent expert legal opinion 
(Crawford 2008). In regard to the Petroleum Law of Kurdistan (KRG 
2007a), a Production Sharing Contract (KRG 2007b) model was 
adopted. Using the same law, the KRG (2007c) signed a contract with 
US-based Hunt-Oil. During this time, some US policymakers started 
commenting about the oil focus of the war. While Alan Greenspan, 
former chair of the Federal Reserve, declared that “…the Iraq war is 
largely about oil” (Beaumont and Walters 2007), Republican Senator 
for Nebraska Chuck Hagel said “People say we’re not fighting for oil. 
Of course we are” (Shamoo and Bricker 2007). General John Abizaid, 
former commander of CENTCOM with responsibility for Iraq 
supported this view, saying that "Of course it's about oil, it's very much 
about oil” (YouTube 2008). In the meantime, the American public’s 
opinion on the war with Iraq was becoming softer and regret-related 
(AEI 2007). 
Competition for Iraqi oil extraction and service contracts intensified in 
2008. More than 70 companies including BP (Britain), ConocoPhillips 
(China), ONGC (India) and Royal Dutch Shell (Anglo Dutch) 
registered for oil contract bidding (Reuters 2008). However, no-bid 
contracts were negotiated with Shell, Chevron, Total, BP, Exxon Mobil 
and others were signed. US congressional leaders (Democrats) then 
pressed the “Bush administration to block deals to be signed between 
the Iraqi federal government and the world’s largest oil companies and 
to cancel deals between the Iraqi Kurdish region and smaller U.S. oil 
firms” (Lando 2008). Chairman Henry A. Waxman requested 
information about the US government’s role in the contracts 
processes in his letter to Condoleezza Rice (ibid). This challenge 
affected the oil contract process. The Iraqi government cancelled six 
no-bid oil contracts with Shell, BP, ExxonMobil, Chevron and Total 
and four smaller companies (Kramer and Robertson 2008). While 
2008 ended with the Withdrawal of US Forces from Iraq the Strategic 
Framework Agreement was then signed between the USA and Iraq 
(DOS 2008c; DOS 2008d). 
Duration: Theoretical Analysis 
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Institutional influences on the direction of US oil diversification policy 
already existed during the war, but this period witnessed their 
expansion. On one hand, material incapability in terms of oil had been 
increasing with the effect of the War being felt on global markets. On 
the other, the unified ideas picture evident before the War was 
overtaken by increasing division in terms of how political parties were 
interpreting these ideas alongside decreasing support for the War 
from US society. This section shows how the `national security` and 
`oil as belonging to Iraqi people` ideas became controversial 
discursive issues that, driven by institutions, can lead to tensions in 
the process. 
This period was subsequently characterised by the increasing 
importance of institutions and their interpretation of ideas in 
determining oil diversification. 2005 is chosen as the beginning date 
of the new era because of two institutional turning points. One of them 
is the new Iraq Constitution (2005). It includes an `oil and gas` 
emphasis, but general responsibilities for Iraqi oil and gas were not 
spelled out. At this point, the importance of interpretation by 
institutions or individuals as an agent became important. The absence 
of an agreed interpretation, which is was what happened in the 
constitution, meant that new problems could be triggered. For 
example, Iraqi oil and gas were specified as belonging to the Iraqi 
people (Constitution of Iraq 2005); however, private companies were 
given rights to exploit Iraqi oil and gas with PSAs. This contradiction 
triggered nationalist feelings in the Iraqi people who were not 
specifically from the oil industry. The whole hydrocarbon law process 
was shaped by this struggle. It resembles what happened in the KXL 
process in terms of conflicts of ideas and institutions in defining the 
US national interest.  
This year is also significant because of the agreement which was 
signed with the IMF. US-led international institutions were also 
pressuring Iraq to accept “US technical assistance” and “draft a new 
petroleum law” (IMF-Iraq Stand-By Agreement 2005b: 14). As we see 
later, this rhetoric was also used at the agent level. These institutional 
attempts were actually being influenced by increasing material 
incapability of the global oil market, which was a trigger of and 
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triggered by the War. There were also terrorist activities aimed at 
energy supply sources and transportation routes, while smuggling and 
corruption were becoming other shapers of material (in)capability. 
Because of a high insecurity level, central government was coming 
under pressure in terms of the hydrocarbon law to attract Iraqi oil for 
IOCs. 
During the preparation of the draft law, we see different types of 
institutional interferences and participation from the US side such as 
American advisors who were supported by USAID, the US Secretary 
of Energy, DOS, IOCs, and industry lobbies (Blanchard 2007; 
Platform 2007a; RAND 2007). During the time of the announcement 
of the law, ethnic separation had spread in Iraq in parallel to increasing 
nationalism stemming from opposition to the law. The Americans’ 
(Senate 1998: S1178) support for the Kurds even before the War was 
making them powerful and leading others to unite against this law. On 
the other hand, the Kurds started agreeing their own contracts with 
foreign companies. These contracts had already started in 2002 and 
were still continuing by 2007 (KRG 2009). Moreover, the Kurdish 
government (KRG 2007a) was adopting their own Oil and Gas Law in 
defiance of the national government.   
Because of this uncertain picture of combining structural causes 
reflections, we start seeing strikes and societal reactions against the 
new law and PSAs from civil society under the organisation of 
institutions (e.g. Labor and Professional Oil Unions, Federation of 
Workers` Council). Political society’s tough responses to civil societal 
unrest could not end the reactions. As shown above (see Chapter 3), 
the state is composed of political society and civil society (Gramsci 
1971: 263).  While these two elements conflict against each other, it 
is easy to have an issue (i.e. new oil law) as a national symbol. As 
KXL became a symbol of US oil and environmental policies, the new 
oil law became a symbol in Iraq of civil unrest.  
What we have seen until now is that there was an emergent nationalist 
feeling in Iraq (collective images of social order of ideas), but also a 
regional-federal dispute (intersubjective meanings of ideas) which 
was connected with the first one. Material incapability existed in Iraqi 
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internal dynamics, but also in the global oil structure. There was 
institutional interference by US and US-led global institutions in Iraqi 
decision-making, but also private ones. This uncertainty found its 
reflection with institutional clashes in Iraq that resulted in tough 
responses by the Iraqi government. While the war had already been 
criticized by international society, the critiques were further supported 
by this clash in Iraq and the comments of American policymakers 
(Beaumont and Walters 2007; Shamoo and Bricker 2007; YouTube 
2008) about the War`s connection with oil. What we argue here is that 
there were evident material and ideational, but also structure- and 
agents-based pressures and influences on Iraqi political society. 
There was a huge US-based influence on this picture, with attendant 
feedback effects. Structural causes help us to uncover the transition 
within the US on the issue of oil diversification during this period. 
The new era of the Iraq war started in 2008 with oil extraction and 
service contracts that were agreed with IOCs. There was also US 
government interference in the process that became challenged by 
Democrats. The war was originally supported by both parties, 
however, democrats were increasingly opposed to the war as it 
progressed. Of course, oil exploitation was becoming a key criticism 
of the administration. The reason why Democrats were becoming 
opposed is related to American societies’ perception of the war, which 
was characterised by decreasing support (AEI 2007). Although there 
had always been Democrats support, the war was staged under a 
Republican government. Political pressure from the Democrats 
worked in terms of government interference in the no-bid contracts 
(Goodman 2008). Along with the change in the Iraqi oil situation, 
American domestic politics faced a transition. National security fears 
as a trigger for war did not exist anymore. Now, the war was primarily 
perceived in terms of the oil law and the `interpretation of belonging 
to Iraqi people` which became a new discourse debate. 
The US was interfering in the internationalisation of Iraqi oil process 
not only at a governmental level, but also with other institutional level 
pressures that were joined by private interests. In addition to these 
pressures, there were significant challenges for the US led world 
system internationally. US hegemony had been declining. While US 
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legitimacy was decreasing, material incapability was also increasing 
due to increasing oil prices that placed another pressure on US 
policymakers. This period shows how the US institutions responsible 
for decreasing hegemony reacted and there is a connection with US 
domestic politics related to ideas. The material capabilities side of the 
war was also significant in shifting the debate on US oil diversification. 
Internationalisation of Iraqi oil could help the global oil market in the 
long term as it does now, but in the short term it just led to increasing 
prices that put the US and its institutions under further pressure, which 
is ironic given the original rationales for the conflict.  
 
6.6.     Iraqi Oil Contracts with IOCs: 2009-  
2009 started with the pressure of peaking global oil prices of $91.17 
per barrel. The new President Obama declared that the US was 
ending the war (White House 2009), but he was also supportive of the 
government of Iraq’s comprehensive legislation (Blanchard 2010). 
However, the Iraq central government (2009) had already prepared 
the model of Technical Service Contracts which would be signed with 
IOCs. On April 23, 2009 Iraq’s First Petroleum Licencing Round was 
declared which included contract areas and participating companies 
by means of 20-year technical service contracts. (MOO 2009). Thus, 
oil contracts started being signing without a hydrocarbon law agreed. 
The second bid process was also held in the same year. Big oil 
companies like BP, CNPC, Exxon Mobil, Lukoil (Russia) and Conoco 
Phillips were some of beneficiaries of the bids (Chalabi 2009). 
Although central government started this bidding process, the tension 
between central government and the KRG over oil production was still 
ongoing (Blanchard 2010). Under these uncertainties, a delegation of 
British, Dutch, Italian and Japanese diplomats arrived in Iraq to help 
the government develop its oil industry (Bennett 2010). They were 
either Ambassador or Charge D' Affaires level officials, thereby 
demonstrating that Iraqi oil was still considered important for global 
supply-demand imbalance (Deutsche Bank 2010). Iraqi proven oil 
reserves were also increasing. Iraqi Oil Minister Shahristani 
announced that proven oil reserves had been increased by 25 per 
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cent from 115 billion to 143.1 billion barrels (Elass and Jaffe 2011). 
Increased oil reserves opened a new era for the Iraqi oil industry. The 
third licencing bid round was held in 2010. 
While Iraq was the 13th biggest oil producer in 2002, it only attained 
the same level again in 2010 due to the conflict. There were shortages 
because the war caused significant damage to oil infrastructure and 
threats to production then emerged in the subsequent insurgency. 
Since this time Iraq has increased its production significantly (EIA 
2019a). At the moment, it is the 6th biggest oil producer. Iraq’s oil 
export capacity increased by 500 per cent over seven years.  The 
country now almost has the same influence as Saudi Arabia in OPEC 
(Elass and Jaffe 2011). Of course, increasing oil production has been 
accompanied with proposed legal changes. A revised version of the 
Federal Oil & Gas Draft Law (IEI 2011) was presented to cabinet by 
the Federal Ministry of Oil in 2011. This law, known as the Refining 
Law (Strong 2017) has not yet been passed due to the opposition 
described above. 
Iraqi oil has been attractive for IOCs because its production costs are 
lower compared with Saudi Arabia (USCS 2012). More than 70% of 
Iraq’s oil production come from fields that are being operated by IOCs 
under technical service contracts and nineteen of these contracts 
have been awarded by the rounds since 2009 (IEA 2012: 23). The 
fourth bid round was held in 2012. This time results were disappointing 
for Iraq, since the participants’ profit expectations were low because 
of the continued lack of infrastructure (Wing 2012). In 2015, Iraq was 
the second-leading contributor to the growth in global oil supply 2015 
(behind the US) (EIA 2016). By this point, production was almost 700 
Mbbl/d above the 2014 level. On the other hand, US oil imports from 
Iraq were almost at the same level in 2000 and 2017 (EIA 2019a).  
Duration: Theoretical Analysis 
The trend of the separation of ideas on oil diversification between 
political parties continued in this period. Moreover, the peak oil price 
in 2008 was the reflection of the highest point of material incapability. 
It affected how oil diversification was viewed in this period, specifically 
in the beginning. However, changing oil market dynamics in the 2010s 
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reduced this pressure. Institutional interferences worked at some 
points (private attempts), but they did not work at governmental level 
which reflects the US position in the world. Institutions` role are 
defined as maintaining particular order in theory, but this section 
shows how much institutions interfere with the declining of that order.   
Political division of ideas was a significant factor in how US oil 
diversification played out in Iraq. A new era started with the US forces’ 
withdrawal from Iraq (DOS 2008c; DOS 2008d) and the agreement on 
Iraq’s oil and gas facilities with IOCs (Reuters 2008). During this time, 
the US was changing its administration. Democrat leader Obama 
secured the Presidency by promising to end the war, so he was also 
supportive of the comprehensive oil legislation in Iraq (Blanchard 
2010). Thus, political party debates on the War were not of the type 
where one party opposes the war and the other supports it. Rather it 
was that the coming wave was more suitable Republicans to declare 
war but Democrats were also participants of the process. When the 
War started creating its negative image on American and international 
society, one party (i.e. Democrats) that was not responsible for the 
war directly could distance themselves against the war in order to gain 
public support. A war with Iraq existed in the Clinton era, while 
pressures for internationalisation of Iraqi oil existed in the Obama era. 
This reflects political party splits in terms of ideas as a structural cause 
for oil diversification.  
Although the Iraqi government was not able to adopt an oil law 
because of civil unrest, PSAs had been established through contracts 
with IOCs. They were not only from traditional oil-importer countries 
(i.e. US, Europe and Japan); rather importers from all over the world 
specifically India and China. A new dimension of energy security 
created an image that encompasses non-Western buyers on 
importers. The participation of IOCs from different countries was a 
parallel situation with the delegation interference from multiple 
countries (Bennett 2010). Global oil politics had been changing, while 
US hegemony had largely been diminished. Of course, a supply-
demand imbalance did still exist, but there were also high oil prices. 
Not only for providing supply-demand balance, but also for decreasing 
abnormal oil prices to the acceptable level, Iraqi oil should have 
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participated in the market. While Iraq`s proven reserves were growing, 
the contract bids for Iraqi oil were also signed.  
However, a legal-constitutional status for Iraqi oil was still seen as 
necessary to establish property rights. The Federal Oil & Gas Draft 
Law can be interpreted as fulfilling that necessity. But also, the first 
bids were about resolving technical and service issues. Bids during 
this period were about refining (Strong 2017). Iraqi oil`s participation 
in the market was growing in both spatial and sectoral areas. 
However, institutional pressures from the US and US-led international 
organisations backfired during the process. Thus, the target of oil 
diversification had been achieved but US hegemony had been 
overwhelmingly damaged as a result. 
In summary, the War started with united ideas on the need for the 
conflict amongst US public and policymakers, but the end of the 
process reflected a schism in political-civil society and political party 
stances. The war did not provide a strong material contribution in 
terms of oil to the US directly, although it did initially reflect the Carter 
Doctrine based oil diversification perception. However, the War 
changed this view as time progressed. Military interventions abroad, 
specifically in the Middle East, have become one of the most 
controversial topics in US foreign policy, raising questions over their 
need to diversify US oil supply. Lastly, interference by US institutions 
in terms of the internationalisation of Iraqi oil has undermined US 
power/legitimacy/hegemony. 
 
6.7.     Discussion: the Value of a Coxian Perspective 
6.7.1. Structural Causes: Material Capabilities, Ideas and 
Institutions  
In this study, oil is not accepted as the main reason for the Iraq War, 
but Iraqi oil was obviously considered by the US and UK policymakers 
and it has its own dimension that changed through time during and 
after the war. Motivations behind the war are various. It can be 
interpreted as resulting from WMDs, the Israeli lobby effect, regional 
insecurity, neoconservative ideology, the roots of Carter doctrine etc. 
(UNSCOM 1999; Duffield 2005; Schmidt and William 2008; Colgan; 
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2013; Ahmed and Liton 2018). All these motivations including oil had 
shaped the war, but also shaped the US oil diversification motivations 
through the war. On the other hand, Iraqi oil was and has actually still 
been important for the global oil market because of the relatively high 
reserves and its type. The discussion section therefore focuses on 
Iraqi oil, but not in an isolated way from rest of Iraq war or Iraq’s 
economy-politics (i.e. material) and socio-cultural (i.e. ideas) 
structure, as the chronology and duration sections. 
The historical origin of the Iraq War can be found in the Gulf War which 
showed that the oil market is not trustable (Interviewee-18). This is 
what can be seen from an empirical view, but there was also a 
motivation that can be seen via a theoretical point of view. US allies 
(i.e. Japan and Europe) were highly dependent on Persian Gulf 
exports, including Iraq (White House 1998). The oil flow from the 
region was important for the US, since its hegemonic leader position 
in the world depended on its allies’ energy security. Its allies’ interests 
can only be interpreted as its own interests. However, other 
participants become important with the changing global oil market 
(CFR 2003). The diversification and security of their energy supply 
was accepted as the energy supply of the US itself. America’s global 
leadership responsibility was combined with securing and providing 
the flow of Middle East oil to the market (PNAC 2000; White House 
2000). There was a compatibility between transnational and national 
interests (Stokes and Raphael 2010). The importance of 
diversification has been emphasized by policymakers (Bearden 
2001), institutions (Morse and Jaffe 2001a; 2001b) or institutional 
reports of policymakers (NEP 2001). There were dynamics of the 
global oil market and US foreign policy. 
However, this structural picture which also includes agents’ interests-
backgrounds (US government) was triggered by 9/11 as an 
exogenous shock. Unified domestic politics were completing as the 
motivations behind the War that triggered problems in Iraq. Increasing 
identity separation in Iraq combined with uncertain definition of the 
ownership of Iraqi oil. The oil in the Kurdish-governed region was 
already important and controversial from the US perspective, but the 
debate on legalization of oil production increased the polarization in 
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Iraq. On the other hand, during this time, US involvement for the new 
constitution and the new hydrocarbon law started having more Iraqi 
societal attention. The US and its allies were already defined as 
“occupiers” (Brookings 2004: 40), but increasing resistance to them 
started in 2007 during the hydrocarbon draft law debates. Thus, the 
interaction and struggle between political and civil society started 
showing itself in Iraq. This reaction was not able to stop the entire 
internationalisation of the Iraqi oil process, but merely slow it down. 
Moreover, it was one of the main reasons for international pressures 
that undermined US legitimacy. The oil diversification of the US has 
therefore also been shaped by the internal context in Iraq. 
The story of RIO 1 and RIO 2 contracts were important in terms of two 
issues that are the oil industry’s power/effects on policymakers and 
increasing political party clashes on the War. Political parties were not 
in the same position as before the war (Congress 2007). The war’s 
connection with oil has always been discussed, but some 
policymakers also started mentioning the issue (Beaumont and 
Walters 2007; Shamoo and Bricker 2007; YouTube 2008). It was 
combined with American society’s suspicions about the necessity of 
the war (AEI 2007), so the new condition gave shape to the election 
rallies of 2009 in the US. There was an obvious transition in US 
domestic politics and foreign policy in addition to oil price hiking. 
However, this is only the structural picture. 
The institutions of the US government and US led international 
organizations could not change the oil law despite a changing 
administration  in the form of the Democratic Party that had been 
pressuring the Republican government in terms of not interfering in 
Iraqi oil contracts (Lando 2008). At this point, IOCs’ and KRG’s mutual 
interests put the Iraqi federal government under pressure and PSAs 
were agreed for Iraqi oil despite the lack of an oil law. The process 
pushed the Iraqi government to start oil-bid contracts with 
international participants. IOCs participation in Iraqi oil has widened 
as a result. US institutional participations have been damaged in 
consequence, thereby US hegemony too. The target of oil 
diversification has been achieved but mostly by IOCs employing their 
own efforts. This situation leads to a debate on the definition of 
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institutions in Coxian theory. Do they only maintain the particular 
context? When they intervene in combination with other dynamics, 
they can actually speed up declining hegemony. In a historical 
process, they have a more active role than Cox envisages.   
The target of increasing Iraqi oil production and reserves of 
governmental institutions, policymakers and oil industry has been 
achieved. Iraq’s oil production rate has increased, oil flows from the 
Middle East have become more reliable, a US friendly government is 
now established in Iraq (although events in early 2020 might challenge 
this view) which has now replaced Hussein’s threat to the region, while 
US power has been damaged globally. However, changing US power 
has altered the scope of US foreign policy and oil imports thereby its 
oil diversification attention. The policies aimed at freeing or securing 
Middle East oil have become transformed into ‘running away’ from 
Middle East oil. Diversifying the global oil supply has become 
diversifying the US oil supply which finds its reflection in the notion of 
`America First` (see Chapter 5). Hussein`s attempt to trade oil with 
Euro has ended, but ironically the US has damaged the petrodollar 
system more than Saddam ever did. Now, regional challenges against 
US are undermining the dollar based oil trade (Frisani, 2017). 
9/11 as an exogenous shock has changed American society`s 
perception thereby government decisions dramatically, because it 
gave a fillip to the national security fear. What government`s, elites, 
institutions, Israel lobby and neoconservative ideology understand 
from national security was highly related to being global leader 
perception, but not like society`s fear after attack on US land. 
However, there was a collapse of national-transnational compatibility. 
They worked together, but the war has speeded up decreasing US 
power and has created a contradiction between the definitions of 
national security thereby, national and transnational benefits. National 
interests of the US had become ambiguous and a trigger of a process 
that evolved around domestic politics, oil politics and US foreign 
policy. Can the decisions of American governments that rely on IOCs 
that lobby during the election process be counted as aiming of public 
or private benefits? Can be America-based IOCs` interests be related 
to rational or transnational interests? Can the interests of different 
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groups (e.g. Israel lobby, neoconservative ideology) still count as 
national benefits, although they are able to shape national decisions 
that can damage the US’ position in transnational market? Who 
benefits?  
During the time period, there is only one part that cannot be easily 
studied academically but included in our theory (see Chapter 3). 
Intelligence services or the meetings/plans that were not held by 
political society count as a `covert world` (DOD 2001b; CENTCOM 
2002b). The war process cannot be studied without their influence, 
but their participation can only be studied as much as they permit 
outsiders to see which leads a limitation for research methods (see 
Chapter 8). The Iraq War clearly shows that political and civil societies 
of the US were joined by a covert world that we cannot expose how 
much they were shaping the institutions of the US, but we know, at 
least, the existence of intelligence services of US before and during 
the war, and terrorist organizations in Iraq after the war have 
influenced the process. 
6.7.2. Additional Structural Sphere: The Role of Social 
Dynamics? 
We believed that operationalising Coxian theory within a specific topic 
could help us check whether our neo-Coxian assumptions actually 
work. Emphasis on the balances of structure-agency and civil society-
political society exist in Cox’s arguments, but we could see how this 
transition can happen, as  was evident in Chapter 5, within this case. 
Moreover, updating Coxian theory for the contemporary world is also 
clearly possible. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, social dynamics can exert a significant 
influence over oil diversification motivations as an additional structural 
sphere. Although structural pressures and agency participations are 
the main definers of the process, state-society complexity arose out 
of events in the case. State-society complexity is one of the main 
suppositions of Coxian theory (see Chapter 3) which is a Gramscian-
inspired formulation, i.e. state = political society + civil society 
(Gramsci 1971: 263). The (dis)connection between political and civil 
societies can find a reflection as triggering social dynamics that 
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differentiate depending on the context. During the hydrocarbon law 
process, the key legislative attempt for determining the flow of Iraqi oil 
to the market, civil society’s interference in the process cannot be 
ignored. This reactionary movement could be explained with the role 
of social dynamics. Although this dynamic was not able to change the 
direction of Iraqi oil production entirely, it had a major impact on the 
process. The role of social dynamics should then be considered as a 
structural sphere of the new millennium in this case, mirroring 
observations on the KXL case (Chapter 5).  
Increasing social dynamics during the millennium obviously derived 
significant impetus from the War but they existed anyway. For 
example, Kurdish people were repressed by Saddam. Moreover, the 
Iraq War is one of the important factors that has damaged US 
legitimacy in the world. The societal reaction of Iraqis was organized 
by unions to bring civil society together against Iraq`s political society, 
which was perceived as elitist and foreign influenced. The aggressive 
reaction by the Iraqi government to the protests received more 
international attention and pressure that were ready to have a 
complain about US behaviours in related to the war. During the time, 
the US used institutions and individual actors to pressure the Iraqi 
government to adopt new oil legislation. Social dynamics in Iraq has 
definitely exerted some power on a changing global structure, but it is 
not clear whether social reactions could still have had the same power 
without union backing. It reminds us of Cox`s (2008) argument about 
decentralized civil society structure.  
 
6.8.     Conclusions 
As the War shows, US oil diversification processes cannot be 
attributed to just one dimension. While oil is evidently a material 
substance, its effect and importance in relation to diversification is 
related to ideas and their utilization by institutions. US oil 
diversification vis-à-vis the Iraq War therefore cannot only be 
attributed to economic or political benefits, because there is also a US 
hegemonic position which exists beyond these benefits. It is more 
reflective of the responsibility of the leadership. This role is shaped 
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and reflected by institutions. However, institutions cannot be limited to 
the governmental level. As the Iraq War shows, there are also non-
governmental institutions, oil industry, oil market effects and 
furthermore, a covert world of interaction to consider. Demands and 
abilities of administrations cannot be thought of without their political 
parties and leader’s image, thereby determinants of administrations’ 
legitimacy. However, it is worth emphasizing that even political party 
effects are differentiated at different time points. Thus, the picture 
seen in the US oil diversification motivations covers a historical 
process which is shaped by the interactions of structure-agency and 
materials-ideas rather than one determiner variable such as 
mainstream IR approaches would prioritize, i.e. state self-interest or 
economic cooperation.  
The changing picture of structural causes of US oil diversification 
motivations evolved through structure, agents’ interests and shocks. 
When uncovered, it is found that there are actually reciprocal relations 
between global oil politics, US foreign policy and US domestic politics. 
We show how they transition in a duration. When their interactions are 
followed through the process, contradictions in the system emerges. 
The transnational and national benefits were compatible in the 
beginning of the process in relation to compatibility between these 
three spheres. However, their interaction has brought dual logics as 
separated and contradictory. Oil diversification motivations can be 
uncovered, when change of this triangle are compared across cases. 
However, it is worth remembering that showing structural change 
requires the consideration of a structure-agents-shocks relationship, 
because people behave through behavior, rather than in behavior 
(see Chapter 4). For example, PSAs with IOCs cannot be understood 
without considering world oil reserves in 1998, the draft hydrocarbon 
law process and KRGs’ PSAs with IOCs which started in 2002.  
In short, US oil diversification motivations can be explained by the 
Coxian triangle, which is material capabilities, ideas and institutions. 
Their operationalization on the Iraq War case has demonstrated the 
importance of Cox’s theory and also the limitations of positivist 
approaches. This chapter does not challenge the existing literature on 
motivations behind the war entirely. Moreover, those arguments can 
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be shown as supportive of ours. What we do argue is that, there is not 
one static motivation behind the War in terms of oil, as Realists or 
Liberals may contend. Oil diversification motivations can be shaped 
at structural and agent levels but require both theoretical and empirical 
observation. It brings a much wider argument in relation to the 
literature on oil motivations behind the war. Both material and 
ideational sides of the story are uncovered via actor-actor and actor-
structure reciprocal relationships in a structural accumulation. The 
Iraq War is a consequently an important case for demonstrating how 
US oil diversification motivations have evolved from `securing and 
freeing oil flow from the Middle East` to `running away from the Middle 
East`. As can be deduced from the above analysis, it is not obviously 
a perception of events in one region of the world, rather it is related to 
a change in wider foreign policy perception of the US.  
Finally, it should be emphasized that a Coxian analysis of state-
society complexity needs to be explained in more detail, as Iraqi civil 
society`s participation in the process shows. Social dynamics shows 
itself as a new social sphere in the 2000s millennium – a feature 
particularly evident in the Iraq War case. When social dynamics need 
to be considered, in addition to forms of state, world order and social 
forces, both the state-society complexity and agency-structure issue 
can be explained. It leads us to a clearer application of Coxian 
analysis. Thus, neo-Coxian theory works in terms of the significance 
of social participation, but it does not tell us whether it would still work 
without institutional interference. With these conclusions in mind, we 
can now test Cox’s theory again in the final case of Arctic Drilling to 








7. Arctic Drilling in the Context of Energy 
Revolution: a process pushed by the 
contradictions of economy vs. biosphere and 
national vs. state interests  
 
7.1.     Introduction 
Arctic Drilling is heavily linked to concerns over the security of external 
oil supply, primarily from the Middle East, which have precipitated the 
Energy Revolution in the USA. The first time drilling in this region 
became a significant political issue was after the 1973 oil crisis. The 
second time that it rose up the political agenda was in the new 
millennium when the global and US oil markets faced another major 
oil supply issue. By this point, reducing reliance on foreign sources, 
specifically the Middle East, increasing domestic production and 
energy independence had become the common rhetoric of the federal 
government, echoing events of the 1973 crisis. Not only did this 
rhetoric restart debates over the merits of drilling in the Arctic but it 
also pushed policymakers to create new legislation for promoting 
alternative energy sources. However, different governments and 
political parties can have opposite views on exactly what constitutes 
energy needs and how to resolve them. These views in turn, including 
private interests, have shaped the political context of the so-called 
Energy Revolution, whereby the US has sought to develop alternative 
sources of energy such as Arctic oil along with shale oil and biofuels 
to reduce reliance on imported oil, and hence often unreliable, sources 
particularly from the Middle East later on (see Chapter 6). This is the 
story that this chapter seeks to illuminate. 
Arctic Drilling in the context of the national Energy Revolution in the 
US is another good example for investigating US oil diversification 
motivations in this thesis. Arctic Drilling has increasingly received 
media attention while having a polarising effect on political discourse. 
Now, it is one of the biggest oil issues for the US under the ‘America 
First’ agenda of Donald Trump, although the country has conversely 
become a leading oil producer rather than importer. In the thesis 
literature review (see Chapter 2), oil diversification was defined 
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according to import policies but as this case concerns increasing 
production in the US it can be understood as a significant component 
of national oil diversification policy since it is aimed at reducing imports 
and therefore increasing security of domestic supply. The process 
accumulation will be followed through approaches to `best meet the 
national energy needs` as required for the legislation. Approaches to 
`best national energy needs` has created contradictions, along with 
environment-energy and national-state interests as triggers of the 
process. Energy usage is one the requirements of modern life 
standards, but it can involve negative environmental effects. On the 
other hand, some federal legislative measures do not fit local/state 
level expectations/demands. For example, shale oil is seen by same 
as what the US economy needs in parallel to private interests, but 
some states (e.g. New York) challenge it because of environmental 
considerations despite benefitting from it economically. A similar 
debate can be found in Arctic Drilling too due to the state level costs 
and benefits. 
This chapter claims that a Coxian IR interpretation can uncover the 
dynamics of the case over time. The beginning of the process was 
highly shaped by global oil politics and its material effects, but its 
pressures on government, which already had an oil interest via oil 
prices, started the interactions and trajectory of the process. There 
has been a structural accumulation, but the actors (public and private) 
tried to survive and benefit from the crisis that was going to lead new 
`conditions`. In parallel to the Iraq War and KXL, the case topic has 
seen increasing domestic polarization and changing foreign policy 
perceptions in addition to changing US oil politics. However, external 
shocks (Hurricanes and the Deepwater Horizon accident) have clearly 
led to environment-economy contradictions in addition to this non-
linear relationship between structure-agents. These contradictions 
have led to another contradiction which relates to national-state 
interests. Changing pictures of interaction between oil politics, US 
domestic politics and US foreign policy show how oil diversification 
motivations have to led from US `energy independence` rhetoric to 
`energy dominance` without actor dominancy. Lastly, the chapter also 
finds that neo-Coxian theory does not work here as entirely as in the 
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other two case studies. Reasons why will be discussed later in the 
thesis (see Chapter 8). 
The data are used to establish the critical decision points regarding oil 
diversification policy as the political process unfolded. These decision 
points are then used to understand the rationales for oil diversification 
motivations that developed, which are then analysed across three 
semi-distinct phases that map on to important key points at which 
Arctic Drilling was developed. They are researched across three 
federal administrations, those of George W. Bush, Barack Obama and 
Donald Trump. As the Trump administration is still developing policy, 
only events up to middle of 2019 are encompassed in the study. Later 
on empirical findings are discussed through neo-Coxian theory. 
In this chapter, empirical evidence on Arctic Drilling in the context of 
the Energy Revolution policy is explored using the theoretical 
framework outlined in Chapter 3. Data from original documentary 
sources are combined with secondary and tertiary sources, plus in-
depth interviews, to develop an understanding of evolving policy in 
this area. In total, 332 primary resources were identified, of which 76 
of them were used. In order to collect data, open-source governmental 
websites (e.g. White House 2007; P.L. 113-67 2013), lobby works 
(e.g. Open Secrets 2008; Senate 2017) and the websites of 
institutions on energy and oil (e.g. Yergin 2014) have been used as 
primary data sources. In addition, 12 interviewees were asked 
questions about Arctic Drilling plus the shale boom and the alternative 
fuel program to corroborate documentary sources. Interviews were 
held with retired diplomats, retired policymakers and people from think 
thanks and lobbies in Washington DC, USA over a period of five 
months in 2018-2019. 
 
7.2.     Literature Review 
Very few studies have engaged with the issue of Arctic drilling. 
Therefore, this Chapter makes an important contribution, both 
empirically and theoretically, to our understanding of oil diversification 
policy in this area. Studies that do exist have been conducted on 
economic implications, environmental effects and geopolitical 
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concerns, without providing in depth analysis of the socio-political 
context to this form of oil exploitation. As such, they do not consider 
either structure-agency or materials-ideas interactions. Rather they 
provide a discussion on a topic that is isolated in dimensions and 
mainly out of context. Context- and history-free arguments can seem 
true, but they do not give insight on the accumulation of process. On 
the other hand, existing literature mainly focuses on the Arctic 
National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), which is the most controversial area 
of the US Arctic drilling, but the process has involved drilling in the 
entire Arctic, so this work will look at this wider context.  
From an economic perspective, studies have examined the 
implications for global oil prices. Here, Ikeda (2011) looks at the 
economic effects of ANWR drilling on global oil markets, but the study 
tries to provide cost-benefits assessments in comparison to 
environmental effects. A quantitative method is used for the analysis 
and as a conclusion, Ikeda (2011) asserts that environmental effects 
would actually be reduced by this form of oil production. The ANWR`s 
effect on global oil prices is also investigated by Coats et al (2008). 
The commonly held view that ANWR drilling does not have any effect 
on prices is questioned. ANWR drilling is seen as only being able to 
affect the global market in the long-run, however, an economic model 
(ibid.) holds that this common view is wrong. Interaction between 
expected prices and current prices lead them to conclude that 
“Increases in future output capabilities because of current discoveries 
will lead to lower prices in the future and so, a lower opportunity cost 
of using those resources in the present” (ibid. 10). ANWR production 
is interpreted as relatively small compared to world production, so 
there is doubt that it would reduce current prices. 
Aside from economic effects, studies have also examined the 
environmental impacts. For example, Tanus (2012) examines 
potential oil production and its implications for the ANWR coastal area 
(1002 Area). The author then considers the Fish and Wildlife Services 
statutory mandate and rules on ANWR drilling and oil reserves to 
determine the risks of exploration. Finally, normative arguments are 
forwarded for policy in order to conform to the goals of ANWR 
management, the conservation purpose of the system and to protect 
251 
human health and the environment (ibid. 371). Waterman`s study 
(2003), in contrast, analyses the environmental decision-making of 
the George W. Bush administration. Withdrawal from the Kyoto 
Protocol is the main subject of the investigation. The work includes 
both climate change and international law dimensions. While the US’ 
pro-growth ideology is criticised, a leadership role for combatting 
climate change is suggested for the US as a normative view. Thus, 
the study (ibid.) focuses more on US international environmental 
obligations rather than ANWR.  
Some limited study has also been conducted into the wider 
geopolitical implications of Arctic drilling. Yang (2008) looks at how 
the ANWR explorations effect OPEC behaviour. The research 
question is based on whether reducing dependence on foreign oil and 
easing energy shortages can help protect the US from OPEC’s market 
power. A quantitative model is used for the investigation in order to 
understand the ANWR’s potential effect on the OPEC cartel. As a 
result of the study, it is predicted that increasing domestic production 
with ANWR does not seem to be helpful for countering OPEC’s power 
since, given the actual volumes, it has a negligible influence on foreign 
petroleum suppliers’ strategic behaviour.  
This literature therefore exhibits a number of gaps in understanding. 
Firstly, it mainly involves quantitative analyses of the economic and/or 
environmental effects of ANWR drilling in order to provide normative 
prescription for policy, e.g. Ikeda 2011. However, depicting the 
process rather than providing normative prescription is an important 
target of studies since the former tells us little about how oil 
diversification evolved. Secondly, little examination of the political 
rationales for the drilling is provided, with normative arguments based 
more on positivist assessments of economic efficiency or 
effectiveness of the policy rather than the ‘realpolitik’ of its context. 
Thirdly, these rationales can only realistically be placed in historical 
context, which is not readily achievable from the ‘snapshot’ nature of 
these studies. A historical-dialectical view, taking a synchronic-
diachronic perspective, could be used to provide insight into these 
aspects of the case as it unfolded, thereby moving beyond existing 
research to reveal its evolving dynamics. Therefore, this study will also 
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provide context for understanding the Arctic drilling issue. Finally, little 
discussion is engaged with surrounding the politically contested 
nature of drilling and the shifting nature of political support for the 
policy through time: a major oversight in the literature. As in the KXL 
case, (see Chapter 5) this support for Arctic drilling has varied 
according to specific domestic and external circumstances in the 
USA.  
 
7.3.     A Timeline and Historical background of Arctic 
Drilling 
In this section, a timeline of significant events is presented to show 
the historical process of Arctic Drilling. The process details will be 
given according to a chronological sequence starting in the early 
2000s and ending with the current situation, thereby illustrating the 
synchronic and diachronic nature of the case.  
7.3.1. A Timeline of Significant Events 
2 August 2001 – Bush’s Energy Plan (H.R.4 - Energy Policy Act of 
2002), which includes a provision allowing ANWR drilling, is passed 
in the House.  
21 April 2005 – The Republican-controlled House of Representatives 
approved Arctic Refuge drilling as part of the 2005 Energy Bill 
(EPAct), but the House–Senate conference committee later removed 
the Arctic Refuge provision from the Act. 
15 December 2005 – Republican Senator for Alaska Ted 
Stevens attached an Arctic Refuge drilling amendment to the annual 
Defense Appropriations Bill. A group of Democratic Senators led a 
filibuster of the bill on December 22, and the amendment was 
subsequently removed. 
25 May 2006 – The House of Representatives passed H.R.5429 - 
American-Made Energy and Good Jobs Act to open ANWR 
development.  
5 January 2007 – Democrat Representative Edward J. Markey from 
Massachusetts introduces the H.R. 39 Udall-Eisenhower Arctic 
253 
Wilderness Act legislation to declare 1002 Area “wilderness” and thus 
permanently off limits to exploration. Shelved in Committee.  
25 September 2007 – the ANWR amendment was killed in the House 
Resources Committee. Republican Rob Bishop from Utah moves to 
amend H.R. 3058 to include pro-ANWR language. Rejected. 
13 March 2008 – Introduction of S. 2758 of The American Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2008 by Republican Senator 
Murkowski from Alaska Authorizes the opening of 1002 Area if the 
price of oil reaches $125 per barrel. 
1 May 2008 – Introduction of S.2958 The American Energy Production 
Act by Republican Senator Pete Domenici from New Mexico as an 
amendment to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) to 
permit states including Alaska to explore and production oil. 
21 May 2008 – Introduction of H.R. 6107 American Energy 
Independence and Price Reduction Act by Alaskan Republican Don 
Young opening the 1002 Area of ANWR and the Outer Continental 
Shelf (OCS). Co-sponsored by Democrat Rep Bartlett for Maryland. 
Summer 2008 – ANWR bills stack up following the skyrocketing price 
of oil on global markets. 
31 March 2010 – Obama announces that the administration will 
expand oil and gas development and exploration on OCS. The Cook 
Inlet Recovery Act (HB 280) was passed by the Alaska Legislature. 
12 May 2011 – H.R.1231 - Reversing President Obama's Offshore 
Moratorium Act was passed in the House. 
4 August 2011 – The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) 
approved Shell’s drilling plan. It was the first approval since the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill of 20th April 2010. The Final Programme 
was announced in July 2012. 
11 October 2012 – The Department Secretary of the Department of 
the Interior (DOI) David Hayes stated that support for the permitting 
process for Arctic offshore petroleum drilling will continue if President 
Obama stays in office. 
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22 January 2014 – the United States District Court for the District of 
Alaska announced that the BOEM prepared incomplete or unavailable 
information in terms of environmental effects of the proposed leases.   
21 January 2015 – President Barack Obama proposed to designate 
12.28 million acres of the refuge, including the coastal plain, as 
wilderness, prohibiting drilling (Executive Order 13689). 
16 October 2015 – The US government announces that it has 
cancelled oil leases for 2016 and 2017, and that it will not extend 
current leases.  
1 April 2016 – For the first time in more than a decade, oil production 
in Alaska increased year-over-year during the 12 months, ending 
March 2016. 
9 December 2016 – President Obama approves another Arctic drilling 
withdrawal (Executive Order 13754) 
28 April 2017 – President Trump Executive Order 13795 which 
supports the Implementing and American-First Offshore Energy 
Strategy to reverse the previous administration’s Arctic leasing ban. 
3 July 2017 – The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation 
and Enforcement (BOEMRE) announced the 2019-2024 National 
Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Leasing Programme to replace 
the 2017-2022 Programme which was approved on January 17 2017. 
22 December 2017 – Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (Tax Act) which 
establishes an oil and gas leasing programme for the ANWR in Alaska 
was passed through a Republican controlled House of 
Representatives and Senate. 
29 March 2019 – The District Court of Alaska cancelled Trump’s 
proposition which was for opening all offshore Alaska for drilling. The 
reason was President Obama’s 2015 and 2016 Executive orders 
which indicated that bans could only be recoverable by an act of 
Congress, so Trump did not have authority. 
12 September 2019 – The Trump administration announced a plan 
would allow oil leasing on 1.56 million acres of the 19-million-acre 
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refuge, in accordance with Section 20001 of the Tax Act. It would open 
the entire coastal plain to the energy industry. 
Figure 7.1: The Timeline of Arctic Drilling 
7.3.2. Historical Context to Arctic Drilling 
US oil exploitation in the Arctic dates back several decades. On 
August 7, 1953, OCSLA (P.L. 113-67 2013), which makes the US 
Secretary of the Interior responsible for the administration of mineral 
exploration and development of the OCS, was created. The Act, as 
amended, provided guidelines for implementing an OCS oil and gas 
exploration and development programme. Alaska is one of the four 
OCS regions in the US, while the Alaska OCS region had been 
classified into four sub-regions: the Beaufort Sea, Chukchi Sea/Hope 
Basin, Norton Basin and Cook Inlet. The others are the Gulf of Mexico 
Region, Atlantic Region and Pacific Region. In 1976, the federal Naval 
Petroleum Reserves Production Act (NPRPA), then renamed the 
National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska (1976), was approved to 
authorize the Secretary of the Interior to establish on certain public 
lands of the United States national petroleum reserves for the 
development of the total energy needs of the country. It was also the 
time (1974-1977) that the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) was 
constructed, which was initiated just after the 1973 Oil Crisis caused 
a sharp increase in oil prices. TAPS, which is 800 miles (1,287 km) 
long, conveys oil from production wells in Prudhoe Bay to tankering 
facilities in Valdez, Alaska (see Figure 7.2). 
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Figure 7.2: Alaska Map (Alaska Centers 2019) 
On November 12, 1980, the Alaska National Interest Lands 
Conservation Act (ANILCA) (1980) which provides varying degrees of 
special protection to over 157,000,000 acres of land was signed by 
President Jimmy Carter. The ANWR, including the “1002 area”, was 
then given federal legal protection. ANWR comprises 19 million acres, 
while the “1002 area” covers 1.5 million acres. It was the largest 
unexplored and potentially productive geological onshore area in the 
US for oil reserves (EIA 2000). Nine years later, in 1989, the Exxon 
Valdez oil spill occurred. The second largest oil spill in history, it 
caused significant damage to the Alaskan marine environment. It led 
to accident avoidance procedures for the TAPS to be strengthened in 
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-380). At this point, both 
energy needs and environmental considerations started becoming 
important and the main controversy in the Arctic was the potential 
impacts on the ANWR.   
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Before President Bush came to power, US oil imports were 60% of 
the US oil supply and was sourced from 30 countries (NPC 2000). 
While the US was producing 5,822 Mbbl/d, Alaska was producing 970 
Mbbl/d of it in 2000 (EIA 2018c). Alaska was the second biggest oil 
producer state after Texas. However, in 2018, while the US produced 
10,990 Mbbl/d, Alaska was the fifth biggest oil producer (EIA 2019b).  
 
7.4.     The Bush Era: 2001-2009 
The Bush administration had a close relationship with the oil industry, 
as mentioned above (see Chapter 6). When George W. Bush came 
to power, he already had an interest in drilling in the ANWR. On July 
27, 2001, the H.R.4 - Energy Policy Act of 2002 (Congress 2001) was 
introduced to the House by Republican Billy Tauzin for Louisiana and 
passed by 240-189. While the ‘ayes’ side was 203 Republicans and 
36 Democrats, the ‘noes’ side was 16 Republicans and 172 
Democrats. Title V of Division F of the Act contained the 1002 area 
development provisions. President Bush`s (DOI 2002) attention on 
ANWR drilling was reflected in the 2002-2007 OCS plan (see Figure 
7.3). The Mineral Management Service used to be responsible for 
implementing the requirements of the OCSLA in the DOI until 2010. It 
was reorganized as BOEM and Bureau of Safety and Environmental 
Enforcement in 2010. Five yearly lease sales were planned to “best 
meet the Nation`s energy needs” as specified in the section 18 of 
OCSLA (P.L. 113-67 2013). It was a controversial point of ANWR 
drilling, since every government could interpret `best meet the 
national energy needs’ from their perspective, although the eight 
evaluate factors provided in Section 18(a)(2) are: (A) Geographic, 
Geological, and Ecological Characteristics; (B) Equitable Sharing of 
Developmental Benefits and Environmental Risks; (C) Location with 
Respect to Regional and National Energy Markets and Needs; (D) 
Location with Respect to Other Uses of the Sea and Seabed; (E) 
Interest of Potential Oil and Gas Producers; (F) Laws, Goals, and 
Policies of Affected States; (G) Relative Environmental Sensitivity and 
Marine Productivity and (H) Environmental and Predictive Information 
(ibid. 32).  
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Figure 7.3: Proposed Final Programme 2002-2007 OCS Planning Areas 
(DOI 2002: 4) 
During this time, the share of US petroleum demand met by net 
imports went up to 64% (DOI 2002). It was expected to be 70% by 
2025 (Hirsh et al. 2005). While domestic production was decreasing, 
import and global oil prices were rising. Price volatility peaked in 1998, 
whereas gasoline price volatility peaked much later in early 2002. 
President Bush was aware of the situation, so emphasised energy 
issues as one of his government’s core goals in the State of the Union 
Address 2003 (Washington Post 2003). One of the goals was 
promoting “energy independence” for the country, while “dramatically 
improving the environment”. In referring to the NEP (2001), these 
targets were provided by energy efficiency and conservation, 
developing cleaner technology and producing more energy at home. 
Thus, the administration was considering different aspects of energy 
security, so drilling in Arctic would not be the only solution to achieving 
the government’s goal. Early in 2005, there were some unwanted 
problems for the US government and oil consumers. Price volatility 
had just happened and prices had been increasing rapidly. Venezuela 
had experienced a strike, which affected oil imports, and global oil 
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demand, specifically from China and India, had been increasing. Apart 
from the economic developments, political events and labour strikes, 
weather, infrastructure problems and terrorism would also lead to 
further volatile oil prices.  
All the targets of the administration given above were only achievable 
through new energy legislation, which already started to be discussed 
in the Senate. The EPAct progressed through the House and Senate 
in this context. It was the first energy act since the Energy Policy Act 
of 1992, which was agreed just after the Gulf War. Both Congress and 
the Administration were held by the Republicans but it was bipartisan 
legislation (Congress 2005b). The main target of the Act was reducing 
dependence on foreign sources achieved via new technology for 
conservation, producing and refining more crude oil and developing 
alternative fuels (White House 2005a). The transportation sector was 
responsible for 60% of total oil consumption in the US and alternative 
fuel produced would decrease the amount consumed and thereby 
imports. Moreover, renewable fuel is, despite some impacts for 
biodiversity and land use, a more environmentally friendly alternative. 
Ethanol produced by corn and biodiesel from soybeans were the main 
alternative fuel programmes supported by the federal government. 
While US was producing 3,904 million U.S. gallons (MMgal) in 2005, 
a target of 7.5 billion gallons of ethanol in gasoline by 2012 was 
specified in the Act. However, this target was achieved in just a few 
years as farmers witched from arable products to more lucrative 
ethanol production (Interviewee-30). The bill introduced tax credits for 
biofuels producers and established a federal fund of $550 million to 
improve technology. The importance of supporting new technology 
was emphasised in the legislation. It could help four different areas for 
increasing domestic production from existing energy resources, 
creating new sources like ethanol, conserving energy and being used 
by other nations to reduce their own demand (DOE 2005). In four 
years of being in power, the administration spent nearly $10 billion on 
new energy technologies for renewables (White House 2006b). 
The result of the EPAct was a great success, because apart from the 
oil market pressure and government targets, there was also significant 
support from the farm lobby and entrepreneurs in the biofuels 
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business (Interviewee-2; Sen. Cantwell 2005). Specifically, Mid-
continent farmers have a major effect on decisions taken in the 
Congress (Interviewee-2; Interviewee-22). Republican farmer states 
(e.g. Iowa, Indiana, Illinois, Minnesota, Nebraska, Wisconsin, South 
Dakota) were also supportive of EISA. It is also worth emphasising 
that Iowa carries great importance for the re-election of presidents 
because of the caucus process, in which it is the first state in 
determining party nominations (Interviewee-26). Making Iowans 
happy was going to be important in 2008 election rally. The EPAct 
also included amendments on efficiency and conservation. However, 
in terms of oil production, there was only one paragraph about oil 
shale and adoption of tax incentives for decreasing oil production 
costs. However, it led to significant diversification of US oil producer 
states. An oil shale R&D programme was created as a result, while an 
estimated 2 trillion barrels of oil were locked in oil shale primarily in 
Colorado, Utah and Wyoming (Sen. Cornyn 2005; DOE 2007b). In 
terms of oil diversification, the amendments on ANWR drilling in the 
original text were removed in the signed version in December.  ANWR 
drilling would potentially increase US oil production to around 1 
MMbbl/d (USGC 2005).  
President Bush argued that production was targeting `affordable` and 
`reliable` sources in four ways when he was signing the EPAct: energy 
conservation and efficiency; more clean productive energy; diversified 
energy supply; and investment in electricity (White House 2005b). 
However, in the second half of the year two extreme weather 
conditions occurred: hurricanes Katrina and Rita. They to led 
enormous energy shortages and oil price increases due to their 
impacts on US Gulf of Mexico production, thereby placing major 
pressures on the government. The global oil price was heading to $60 
a barrel, while domestic retail gasoline prices increased to $3.06 a 
gallon. On the other hand, in terms of tax incentives for oil production, 
five oil companies (i.e. Exxon-Mobil, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, BP 
America and Shell Oil USA) were under pressure from some 
Democrats (Sen. Wyden 2005) who wanted to announce that Big Oil 
did not need the tax breaks provided by the EPAct. According to 
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agreements they had with President Bush, when the price of oil 
exceeded $55, they would not need tax breaks. 
While the US tried to increase domestic oil and biofuel production, 
decreasing imports from the Middle East started to be promoted by 
the Presidency. Reducing dependence on foreign oil was linked 
directly to the ongoing conflict in the Middle East (see Chapter 6). In 
early 2006, President Bush announced that their target was to replace 
more than 75% of oil imports from the Middle East by 2025 (White 
House 2006b). During this time, North Africa and the Middle East were 
holding 62% of the world oil reserves but were considered unstable 
parts of the world (Warnecke 2007). US oil imports from Canada and 
Mexico were heading to more than 30% of total oil imports (DOE 
2006). On the other hand, ANWR drilling was approved by the House 
in the H.R. 5429-American Made Energy and Good Jobs Act 
(Congress 2006). Bush justified this policy in terms of three main 
motivations: having a reliable domestic supply of energy; keeping the 
economy growing by creating jobs; and ensuring business can 
expand (White House 2006c). 
The EISA can be seen as a continuation of the EPAct, but there are 
some differences. While the oil industry (because of the MTBE and 
tax breaks), farm lobbies and renewable associations were behind the 
EPAct, environmental groups were not supportive, but this time they 
joined the lobbying in order to counteract the oil industry. When the oil 
price exceeded $70 a barrel in 2007, environmental lobbies knew that 
the Act was going to be passed (Interviewee-26, Interviewee-30). It 
passed the Senate by record voting - 86 votes for and 8 against 
(Senate 2007). Both parties had the same number of members in the 
Senate, while the House of Representatives was under the 
Democrats’ control. While oil and retail gasoline prices were creating 
pressures on the administration, they were not the only motivations 
behind the act. Democrats wanted to make environmental groups 
happy while Republicans wanted to support farm states (Interviewee-
22). Disengaging from the Middle East was an argument common to 
the rhetoric of both sides (Interviewee-14). 
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As noted above, EISA can be seen as a continuation of the EPAct. It 
targets improving vehicle fuel economy through the CAFE (clean air) 
standards that were first enacted after the 1973 crisis, increasing 
biofuels production to 36 billion gallons in 2022 and increasing the 
efficiency of lighting. Apart from the Act, the importance of oil shale 
started to be announced in governmental speeches and reports. US 
officials knew that the US had three-quarters of the world`s estimated 
2.6 trillion barrels of oil shale resources (DOE 2007a). It was not a 
new industry but an evolving one in need of financial support driven 
by government policy. By this point, public and private investments 
had been coming together again to develop the industry (Interviewee-
14). 
Besides biofuels and oil shale, ANWR drilling was also discussed in 
Congress. At the beginning of 2007, President Bush modified the 
1998 withdrawal leasing in the North Aleutian Basin Planning Area 
(White House 2007). However, the 2007-2012 final programme (see 
Figure 7.4) to best meet national energy needs did not include this 
area because of the comments of the Governor of Alaska, a large 
majority of local governments and tribal organizations (DOI 2007: 3-
4). Party differences also started to emerge on the topic. While 
Democrats asserted the necessity of accepting ANWR as wilderness, 
as in H.R. 39 (Congress 2007c), the Republican side used pro-ANWR 
drilling language as in H.R. 3058 (Congress 2007d). 
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Figure 7.4: Proposed Final Programme 2007-2012 OCS Planning Areas 
(DOI 2007: 8) 
The oil price was still increasing in 2008 and it eventually reached 
$147 per barrel in July, compared with $18 in January 2002. The price 
of a gallon of gasoline reached $4.11 for US consumers. As an 
election was coming, oil prices shaped the discussions. On the other 
hand, one of the main topics discussed in the Congress was tax 
incentives for Big Oil. Although prices had already exceeded $55 a 
barrel, tax incentives for Big Oil had not been removed and the 
industry was making record profits (Representatives 2008). Exxon-
Mobil reported earning $40.6 billion in 2007, which caught Democrats’ 
attention (Representatives 2008). On the other hand, the Republican 
government (White House 2008) was trying to convince Democratic 
Congressional leaders to take steps on four issues: increasing access 
to the OCS; using the potential of oil shale despite the Democrats 
omnibus spending bill to block oil shale leasing on Federal Lands; 
permitting exploration in the ANWR; and expanding refinery capacity. 
At this point, party collaboration gave way to party polarization. 
Estimates suggested that 10.4 billion barrels of oil could be produced 
in ANWR, equivalent to roughly two decades of imported crude oil 
from Saudi Arabia (ibid.). 
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Because of the controversies in 2008 there were many Congressional 
attempts for ANWR drilling and debates in the congress. Alaskan 
Republican Senator Lisa Murkowski (Congress 2008a) introduced 
S.2758, that would authorize the exploration, leasing, development, 
production, and transportation of oil and gas. Republican Senator 
Pete Domenici then introduced S. 2958 which included an oil and gas 
development programme within the Coastal Plain of the ANWR. 
Those attempts were not surprising, because opening ANWR would 
provide the largest oil price reduction impacts (EIA 2008). However, 
although ANWR’s oil reserves were attractive for oil companies, 
drilling costs in the region were high compared to domestic onshore 
oil because of the geographic location, which also led to uncertainty 
for investments. The difference between the drilling costs of onshore 
and ANWR had been growing significantly.  
However, Republicans were arriving at more pro-drilling positions. 
Just before the election, one of the Republican presidential 
candidates, Senator John McCain, who originally held an 
environmentalist position until a 2008 election rally but had received 
the largest oil and gas industry financial contribution for the election 
(Open Secrets 2008), called for lifting the Federal moratorium on 
offshore drilling for oil and gas (Congress 2008b). The suggestion 
gained support from the future president. Democrat presidential 
candidate Senator Barack Obama, as the second biggest oil and gas 
industry recipient (Open Secrets 2008) had been trying to put limits 
on oil shale and stood against OCS drilling. However, in summer 2008 
he met with a delegation of oil company chief executives and as a 
result announced a major policy shift (PBS 2008; New York Times 
2012b). He was still emphasising his belief in renewables, but he 
showed support for Arctic drilling. Republicans argued in the 
Congress that getting oil from US lands was the priority rather than 
paying countries such as Saudi Arabia or Venezuela that saw the US 
as an enemy (Congress 2008c). The public agreed with them in terms 
of supporting domestic production because of gasoline prices. The 
polls showed more than 70% of the public supported OCS and ANWR 
drilling (Congress 2008d). In the second half of the year, two main 
acts were passed by Democrats in the House. H.R.6515 - Drill 
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Responsibly in Leased Lands Act of 2008 (Congress 2008e) that 
amends the NPRPA of 1976 directed the Secretary of the Interior to 
conduct an oil and gas competitive leasing programme in the National 
Petroleum Reserves-Alaska (NPR-A), that included at least one lease 
sale each year during the period 2009 through to 2013 but failed in 
the House, while H.R.6899 (Congress 2008f) that limited offshore 
drilling and amended the oil shale part of EPAct was passed by the 
House.  
Duration: Theoretical Analysis 
Material incapability was the main determiner of oil diversification 
motivations in this period, although it interacted with ideas and 
institutions as time progressed. However, none of them held the same 
influence over the process across the entire period. Oil market 
pressures increased during the Bush administration despite their 
attempts at finding solutions to rising prices and hence declining 
material capabilities. Even the ideas influencing oil diversification 
motivations differed over time. The early administration process 
reflected the 9/11 effect which unified the political parties, while later 
on there was an increasingly visible split between them which found 
its reflection in the ANWR. Another dimensional aspect of ideas 
involved national-state interests, which resulted from and shaped the 
process too. Institutions were influenced by relative material 
incapability but also the divergence in ideas on Arctic drilling (political 
parties and national-state interests).   
The process of the Bush administration energy policies and Arctic 
drilling perspective was initially heavily shaped by the material 
structure of global and US oil markets and the administration’s 
approach to the oil industry. In terms of the oil market, we see 
increasing oil and gasoline prices, increasing oil demand and 
decreasing supply. Being dependent on imports made the US more 
vulnerable to insecure foreign supply, particularly from the Middle 
East. As mentioned, around 60% of domestic oil consumption was 
provided by imports (EIA 200a; DOI 2002). Thus, the material 
capabilities of the US oil market were highly limiting and were 
predicted to become more constraining year by year. This material 
266 
limitation put the government under pressure to open new domestic 
sources of production such as the Arctic.  
The Bush administration’s relations with the oil industry and gasoline 
price effects on voters then influenced the institutional and ideational 
side of the process. In terms of ideas, material incapabilities were 
pushing both Republicans and Democrats to support new energy 
programmes. This period also included the time after 9/11 and the Iraq 
War, so nationalist rhetoric was used against importing oil from the 
Middle East, which has the biggest global oil reserves. Moreover, 
some Democrat politicians were responsible for their states or donors 
in terms of a pro-drilling agenda. However, as the process evolved 
party politics became heavily engaged with the economy-environment 
issue, as in the KXL case. The idea of Energy Independence, which 
was used first after 1973 crises, was therefore re-emphasised by the 
government as being in the national interests. Material incapabilities 
were reflected in institutional arguments given as being important for 
countering this incapability (Interviewee-32).  
At this point, Republican supporting farmers, renewable energy 
entrepreneurs and associations, the oil industry (although not as 
much the others) and both political parties were coming together to 
promote their interests but also to improve US material capabilities in 
the EPAct. Thus, both private and public actors were standing 
together on this issue. New technology and innovation were the main 
targets of both the EPAct and EISA for increasing material capability 
(White House 2005a; Interviewee-14). Increasing alternative fuels, 
energy efficiency and expanding domestic production would 
strengthen not just the government`s hand but would also benefit 
other groups (e.g. Renewable Fuel Associations). Institutions were 
shaping the process as much as ideas and material capabilities. Most 
importantly, steps taken would make consumers happy by reducing 
the price of domestic fuel. However, technology was also important 
for environmental considerations then promoted by the government 
(Washington Post 2003). The environmentalists’ campaigning had 
been increasingly influential on EISA. As the entire process shows, 
concerns over climate change and an oil production friendly 
perspective merged as a result. A contradiction between 
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environmentalist considerations and energy necessity did however 
increase the tension between Republicans and Democrats, although 
there was also a general polarization in US politics occurring at this 
time (see also Chapter 5). This ideas problem was caused by material 
incapability which was evident in environmentalist considerations (i.e. 
ideas) which had become more powerful in parallel to their lobbying 
power (i.e. institutions). However, there was also a general trend in 
terms of polarization within US politics (i.e. ideas and institutions 
interacting). 
In the last year of the Bush presidency, while prices were still going 
up, oil politics became even more polarized. Republicans were more 
pro-oil, while Democrats became more environment friendly thereby 
leading to open conflicts. After the EPAct and EISA, President Bush 
still tried to get Democrat support, but ultimately was unsuccessful in 
winning them over (White House 2008). In response to the rhetoric, 
presidential candidate Democrat Obama opposed Arctic Drilling; 
however, in reality he was more supportive, reflecting the influence of 
the fossil fuel lobby on his decision-making. Republican McCain, on 
the other hand, changed his stance from pro-environmentalist to pro-
oil to better align with partisan prerogatives. Ideational polarization in 
both parties then started to shape actors, thereby institutions. These 
same institutions would go onto support further polarization in the 
following era. 
To summarise, this era shows that material incapabilities were 
combined with unified political ideas which also reflected institutions 
in terms of the energy issue. This structural evolution also accelerated 
after the two Hurricanes, but also reflected agents` (individuals and 
lobbies) interests. When material incapability combined with the 
election process, the picture started to change in parallel with the 
result of the Iraq War in terms of the energy issue. This ideational split 
(between political parties) was reflected in the Arctic Drilling issue. 
Republicans started becoming more-pro oil, while Democrats more 
pro-environmental. However, even before the election process, Arctic 
Drilling was becoming less of a concern for Democrats since its 
electoral salience was low. Removing the ANWR emphasis in the 
EPAct, which was a bipartisan policy, is a clear example of this 
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declining concern. Thus, Arctic Drilling was not entirely connected 
with the energy revolution process. 
 
7.5.     The Obama Era: 2009-2017 
No specific events related to Arctic Drilling occurred in 2009, but in 
terms of oil production the ARRA was signed by President Obama 
(Public Law 111-5 2009). It was actually a stimulus package triggered 
by the economic crisis (Russel and Benson 2014). More than $40 
billion was made available to the energy sector for energy efficiency, 
renewable programmes, fossil fuel research and development, and 
cleaning up nuclear weapons production sites. That amount was more 
than the EPAct and EISA provided in total. A Treasury Grant Program 
was created to provide roughly $25 billion for renewables between 
2009 and 2016. However, it was adopted at the time when American 
politics started becoming polarized, with the rise of the ultra-
conservative Tea Party, affiliated to the Republicans (Chapter 5). Only 
three Republican senators voted for ARRA, while all non-Republican 
members of the House were in favour of it. As discussed in Chapter 
5, the Administration was also attempting to pass a cap-and-trade 
system that additionally increased polarization in US politics.  
2010 was the year that the new administration made a stand against 
Arctic drilling. However, the situation was more complex. On March 
31, 2010, President Obama announced the expansion of oil 
exploration in the region, reflecting the shifting position in his 
presidential campaign. The Deepwater Horizon explosion in the Gulf 
of Mexico, which is the biggest oil drilling disaster in US history, 
subsequently led the President to reverse his decision (Goldenberg 
2010) and resulted in the DOI issuing a 6 month drilling moratorium in 
the US, including Alaska (Hagerty 2010). The explosion had a great 
effect on environmentalist reactions. Leading environmental groups 
called for a pause to plans by Royal Dutch Shell to begin drilling 
exploratory wells in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas in late May. 
Moreover, the administration revised the 2007-2012 leasing 
programme because of the potential environmental damage (DOI 
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2010). It removed the upcoming Beaufort Sea and North Aleutian 
Basin leases and some Chukchi Sea leases (see Figure 7.5). 
 
Figure 7.5: Revised Programme 2007-2012 OCS Planning Areas (DOI 
2010: 20) 
In 2011, Republicans in the House passed H.R.1231 - Reversing 
President Obama's Offshore Moratorium Act which made the OCS 
available for leasing (Congress 2011d). In August of the same year, 
BOEMRE approved Shell’s drilling plan. It was the first approval since 
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. During this time, although the US 
started producing oil and biofuels, oil prices were still high and a gallon 
of gasoline was still over $4. However, tax breaks for Big Oil were still 
a discussion topic in the House (Congress 2011e). ExxonMobil had 
made almost $1 trillion profit in the previous 10 years and Big Oil was 
still receiving tax breaks. This issue too was increasing the pro-oil (a 
more Republican focus) vs. environmentalism (a more Democrat 
focus) polarization.  
In 2012, the US oil import rate fell to 45% of total consumption thanks 
to the development of oil shale, biofuel production and efficiency 
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programmes. The Obama administration then announced the 2012-
2017 OCS final programme (see Figure 7.6). While president Obama 
was still protective of Atlantic and Pacific drilling, Alaskan drilling was 
not viewed the same way. Leaving open the doors for Arctic drilling by 
a Democrat president was surprising for environmentalists while he 
had very strict opposition against KXL (New York Times 2012b) (see 
Chapter 5). However, Shell’s election support for Obama in 2008 
created a significant impact (Open Secrets 2008). As mentioned 
above, presidential candidate Obama changed his position on Arctic 
drilling in summer 2008. Despite his negative speeches on Arctic 
drilling, his government’s decisions were supportive. But of course, 
Shell was not the only actor drilling in the Arctic. Producing 1 MMbbl/d 
of crude in the region did mean more than 10% of domestic 
production. The signal for diversification of domestic oil supply existed 
because of oil politics. It could create a significant impact on US 
domestic production and thereby decrease gasoline prices. At this 
point it is worth emphasising that while Shell was getting permission 
to drill, environmental groups were not reacting strongly. 
Environmentalists tried to find a front page issue and after finding KXL, 
they mainly focused their attention on it (Interviewee-3). Shell 
received the final permit in 2012 to sink the wells in the Chukchi and 
Beaufort seas, but the company reversed its plan because of 
“regulatory challenges and stubborn ices” (Eaton 2012). In 2013, 
President Obama started his second term. He was the third biggest 
oil and gas industry donation recipient after two Republican 




Figure 7.6: 2012-2017 Proposed Final Programme of OCS Planning Areas 
in Yellow Are under Consideration for Inclusion (DOI 2012: 1-3) 
Hydraulic fracturing (fracking) then started to transform the US oil and 
gas sector. In fracking, large volumes of water mixed with specialized 
chemicals are pumped under pressure into the ground. The pressure 
forces oil and gas to flow out of the rocks and into a production well. 
The EPAct revised the Safe Drinking Water Act term `underground 
injection` to exclude the injection of fluids and fracking agents (except 
diesel fuel). As a result, the EPA lacked authority to regulate fracking 
(Tiemann and Vann 2013). This became an issue as the oil and gas 
industry were starting to combine fracking with horizontal drilling 
(Interviewee-31). Both methods were well established but the 
combined method was costly. Technological improvement and 
innovative efforts by independent energy companies that were not 
members of Big Oil triggered a race for shale (light) oil and gas 
production (Interviewee-31). With the pressure of high oil and gasoline 
prices, public and private interests had combined.  
Some states including Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Wyoming 
supported and benefitted from shale oil, while other states banned it 
because of voters’ opinions. However, states like New York, Maryland 
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and Vermont benefited economically from shale oil because of the 
boom’s great effect on US oil and gas production (Interviewee-34). 
North Dakota had not even produced oil before, but it rapidly became 
one of the biggest oil producers in the US. As a result, there has been 
a diversification of supply states in the US. From the beginning of 2008 
through to the end of 2012, US oil imports declined by more than 1.3 
MMbbl/d, while domestic production rose around 1.5 MMbbl/d (Greco 
2013). 
However, the Arctic OCS was still a focus of the oil industry and the 
administration were not totally against Arctic drilling.  The approach of 
Obama (White House 2014) was an ‘all-of-the-above’ approach that 
targeted developing every source of American-made energy and did 
not exclude continuing to explore and produce Arctic oil and gas. The 
goal of policy was determined as supporting economic growth and job 
creation, enhancing energy security and a clean energy future (ibid.). 
It could be made compatible with energy independence rhetoric and 
would suit `best meet energy needs` this time. On the other hand, 
Republican support for Arctic drilling was also reflected in federal 
policies. Although the oil industry had interests in Arctic drilling, it was 
not as attractive as shale oil, because of geographical limitations 
under federal legislation. For example, ConocoPhillips announced 
suspension of its drilling. Alaska started losing its domestic production 
share since some states (e.g. North Dakota, Texas, Alabama, 
Oklahoma, New Mexico) were increasing shale production rapidly 
(Pawlowski 2013), while Alaska`s oil production had been in decline 
since 1998. Alaska had moved from the second to fourth biggest US 
oil producer state (RDC 2014).  
In 2014, US oil production had increased three times compared to 
2008, a rise of 60% (Yergin 2014). Domestic production and imports 
from Canada (see Chapter 5) and Mexico were supplying 75% of US 
oil consumption (NPC 2014). The tendency to supply from the North 
American continent had been increasing in tandem with the rhetoric 
on reducing reliance on Middle East oil. On the other hand, 
controversies in the Arctic area were still ongoing. The US District 
Court for the District of Alaska (2014) announced that BOEM’s reports 
were incomplete or lacking information on Shell’s Chukchi Sea 
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planned drilling. Shell was already scaling-back production from the 
Beaufort Sea on October 31st, 2013, but then also announced 
cancellation of drilling in the Arctic in January 31st, 2014 after the court 
decision (Greenpeace 2015). In the same year, Noble Drilling LLC 
admitted keeping false and incomplete records and willingly failing to 
notify the U.S. Coast Guard of hazardous conditions aboard the drill 
ship Noble Discoverer. It was fined $12.2 million (ibid.). Around the 
same time, Chevron scaled back attempts at drilling in the Beaufort 
Sea area which had been planned since 2009 and prospected in the 
2020s, because of “economic uncertainty” (Reuters 2014). Chevron 
had already spent more than $100 million in production investments, 
however, decreasing oil prices triggered ̀ economic uncertainty`. From 
June 2014 ($113.48 per barrel) to January 2015 ($53.02 per barrel), 
oil prices dropped 60%. During this time, apart from the shale boom 
in the US, OPEC members consistently exceeded their production 
and China experienced a slowdown in economic growth thus 
decreasing global demand. The global oil market was not stable 
anymore.  
2015 was also the year that the Obama administration sought to lead 
the Paris Climate Agreement. The emphasis on being a ‘global leader’ 
in terms of reducing GHG could be seen in the White House’s (2015c) 
rhetoric. The Arctic area was going to be severely affected by climate 
change, meaning that the US needed to become the global leader in 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions. As the controversy surrounding 
KXL increased in the same year, the polarization of US politics around 
this issue grew. Although over 7 million acres of the refuge was 
determined as wilderness in ANILCA, the government thought that 
60% of the refuge did not carry this designation (DOI 2015a), so the 
president called upon Congress to withdraw certain areas of the OCS 
Alaska from leasing disposition in January (White House 2015d). In 
accordance with this request, the government brought in new 
requirements for Arctic drilling in February. However, in the same 
year, while BOEM approved Shell`s exploration plan in the Arctic, the 
administration granted Shell a final permit to drill for oil in the Chukchi 
Sea. Mirroring Chevron’s actions in late 2014, Shell abandoned its 
project for the “foreseeable” future (Macalister 2015). However, US 
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policymakers could not ignore Arctic drilling entirely, because there 
are three type of oils required for the US market, sweet, medium and 
heavy, and shale oil did not provide all of them. 
While shale oil provides light-sweet crude, the main US refineries 
were refining medium-to-heavy sour crude oil. New refineries for light-
sweet crude were not built because of the low oil price and bigger 
investment risk. Despite the shale boom, the US needed to drill Arctic 
oil in order to diversify the oil types that it produced. Increasing 
domestic production does not then necessarily make the US 
independent or isolated from the global market. The US therefore 
needed to buy heavy crude from Canada, Mexico, Venezuela or some 
OPEC countries and increase medium-to-heavy crude domestic 
production via the main OCS to provide medium-to-heavy crude (DOI 
2015b), while finding new export markets for its light-sweet crude. 
After heavy pressure from oil producers, the government had to 
remove an export ban (Interviewee-14; Congress 2015b). The Obama 
administration took this decision in the year of controversial decisions 
on KXL and Arctic Drilling that were politically symbolic of the 
economy vs. environment debate. While onshore oil produces higher-
quality quick-turnaround, “long-term, traditional projects general 
produce medium-to-heavy sour crudes”. (DOI 2015b:  4-10). The CFR 
(2017) therefore also share the government`s perception that Arctic 
resources are a long-term proposition since the market can get oil 
over a 15-20 years period. It is worth emphasising that Alaska had an 
exceptional position in terms of banning crude export. In 1996, 
President Bill Clinton amended the policy to allow exports for Alaska 
(Muskal 2014).  
For the first time in more than a decade, oil production in Alaska 
increased year-over-year between April 2015 and March 2016 (RDC 
2016). Nevertheless, Alaska`s oil production share in the country had 
decreased. While the state was producing 25% of all US oil in 1988, 
it was down to 7% by this point. However, more than one-third of state 
jobs relied on the oil and gas industry and the oil and gas industry 
creates 92% of the state’s revenues (AOGA 2019). Thus, despite 
some local and tribal challenges, it is difficult to talk about people`s 
direct opposition to Arctic drilling in the state. If the administrations do 
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not prevent the state from relying on one sector, there will always be 
an open door for Arctic drilling (White House 2016). The Obama 
administration announced the 2017-2022 OCS oil and gas leasing 
proposed final programme (DOI 2016). Only the Cook Inlet area was 
included in the lease sales (see Figure 7.7). Executive Order 13754 
(Federal Register 2016) were going to be announced as a support for 
Executive Order 13689 (White House 2015c). These orders were 
going to cause a problem to the new president who supported Arctic 
Drilling. 
 
Figure 7.7: 2017-2022 Proposed Final Program of OCS Planning Areas 
(DOI 2016: S-11) 
Duration: Theoretical Analysis 
The Obama administration provided a similar picture of oil 
diversification motivations to that identified in the KXL case (Chapter 
5). Gradual increasing material capability as overtaken during this 
period by ideational clashes between political parties (institutions) and 
national-state interests. These ideas were shaping institutional 
positions that then affect how they tried to influence the process. Thus, 
they did not have a role which only maintains the particular order, as 
Cox suggests. 
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Obama`s presidency started with a severe economic crisis, which was 
harmful to the global economic market including the oil market. 
Material incapability therefore still existed in terms of unstable oil price 
vulnerabilities but increasing ethanol production and the results of 
federal energy efficiency programmes started showing their effects. 
However, thereafter declining material incapability through 
technological change was matched with increasing institutional 
interaction with ideas. 
The first few years of the Obama administration was characterised by 
polarized rhetoric and contradictions in the government. The Obama 
administration was trying an ‘all-of-the-above’ approach to make both 
environmentalists and the oil industry happy. While one side was one 
of the main supporters of his party, the other side was one of the 
biggest contributors and was responsible for gasoline prices, so 
bridging this divide was not easy. However, the biggest turning point 
that also reflects controversial stance of Obama in terms of Arctic 
Drilling, was the Deepwater Horizon shock. It created a deeply divisive 
environment vs. oil debate with BP in particular singled out for 
condemnation for its role in the disaster. It led to more institutional 
polarization along party lines, with the 2012 election campaign 
showing more clearly the environment-energy clash around Arctic 
Drilling.  
The wave of increasing ideational and institutional polarization had 
been occurred alongside increasing material capability through 
increasing global and US oil supply, in addition to increasing 
technological efficiency that resulted from investments since the Bush 
administration in terms of production and consumption of oil.  The US 
oil import share was down to 45% in 2012. While biofuel and efficiency 
programs were working, the shale boom expanded US oil production 
enormously. Moreover, it added diversifying producer states into the 
oil diversification definition. These improvements, that were supported 
by both ideational and institutional sides and both public and private 
interests, were decreasing US oil vulnerability. In addition to 
environmentalist concerns and low global oil prices there was another 
factor that slowed down Arctic Drilling. Even while the Obama 
administration was still approving the drilling, decreasing oil prices 
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and increasing global supply made investments in Arctic drilling 
riskier. Geologically the Arctic is one of the most difficult areas for oil 
production. As a result of increasing US oil capabilities, there was 
limited private attention to the Arctic as oil companies scaled back 
their investments in favour of other drilling areas where profit margins 
were higher. 
New environmentalist ideas were also influential on institutions in 
other ways. They combined with Obama`s desire to ensure US ‘global 
leadership` on the climate issue and ultimately led to the Paris Climate 
Agreement. Thus, there was a change in the integration of oil politics, 
US domestic politics and US foreign policy. The US had been losing 
its hegemonic position after the Iraq War, and had aimed to recover 
its position at some point. Climate change was the most attractive 
policy option to achieve this aim in Obama`s last two presidential 
years. Decreased oil prices helped Obama to act against fossil fuel 
programmes, including Arctic Drilling, since they strengthened the 
scope for government action.  
Obama’s oil diversification motivations should be discussed in detail 
here. It is important to note that he focused on energy diversification 
rather than just oil. When he came to power oil prices were high, and 
the solution did include both increasing domestic oil production and 
renewable programs. While oil prices were decreasing, ideational 
polarization was rising up. This context too was informing general 
energy production policy, because renewable programs were what 
environmentalists heavily supported. Oil diversification has never 
been the main target for the administration, and this has shaped both 
KXL and Arctic Drilling. The Administration’s decisions on these 
policies were never consistent inside of the processes. However, 
since the KXL was more a front-page issue, this inconsistency could 
be seen more in this case than in the Arctic Drilling one.  
In short, the oil diversification motivations picture was constantly 
changing through structural causes interacting within wider structural 
spheres. Material incapability around oil turned into a capability with 
the help of public-private collaboration. Ideas that were connected 
with the interests of individuals and institutions helped solving this 
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incapability, but solving this issue split ideas, and thereby institutions 
more dramatically. Ideationally, there was increasing polarization 
politically, while nation-state interests became contradictory. Some 
states (e.g. New York) did not support shale production because of 
environmentalist considerations, but the entire US was benefitting 
from it economically (and even politically). On the other hand, oil and 
gas drilling did have a huge meaning for Alaska`s revenues, but 
national politics had been preventing Alaska from deciding itself. 
However, one material issue that is often ignored still keeping the 
Arctic Drilling debate alive, which is different oil types and industries. 
There was a national refining necessity for medium-to-heavy sour 
crude oil for downstream industry that conflicted with lighter crude 
shale oil production. At the end, there was increased domestic 
polarization that was shaped by splits and contradictory ideas, thereby 
institutions would not discard the populist presidential candidate as 
much as they were shaped by grassroots activism.  
 
7.6.     The Trump Era: 2017- 
In 2015, Shell did not continue its Arctic operations because of high 
costs and regulatory uncertainty. However, with the new president, 
who was oil industry friendly, oil companies` interests increased again 
in parallel with oil price increases. The decreasing amount of oil 
production in Alaska was going to be reversed (see Figure 7.8). BP 
spent $1,720,000.00 lobbying for Arctic drilling (Senate 2017). The 
Administration’s ambition for energy policy was encapsulated in the 
“America-First Offshore Energy Strategy” (White House 2017b). In the 
Executive Order 13795 (ibid.), the president modified the offshore 
drilling withdrawals of January 2015 (White House 2015c) and 
December 2016 (Federal Register 2016). The President announced 
that they were going to open the Arctic for drilling again, so the 
government would announce a new 5-year plan (DOI 2017a). It was 
going to be called the 2019-2024 program (Federal Register 2017). 
As his predecessors did, Trump was seeking to “best meet national 
energy needs” (DOI 2017b). However, the government`s ambition for 
Arctic drilling has been shaped by the target of “achieving American 
energy dominance” (DOI 2017c). The `All-of-the-above` approach of 
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Obama to federal policy had been transformed into the `energy 
dominance` of Trump, reflecting his populist agenda. BP (2018a) then 
announced their appreciation to the administration in terms of the new 
5 year plan for OCS energy exploration and leasing.  
 
Figure 7.8: Oil production history, when president Trump came in power (A-
DOR 2017: 8) 
The key event of this presidential era happened in late 2017. A 
Republican Congress and administration passed the Tax Act which 
established an oil and gas exploitation program for the coastal plain 
of the ANWR while also amending ANILCA (Congress 2017: 183). 
The administration announced the first draft of the 2019-2024 leasing 
programme in early 2018 (see Figure 7.9). Both the Alaska Governor 
Bill Walker (2018) and BP (2018b) announced their support. Drilling 
in ANWR is key for Alaskan oil production and three different regions 
provide Arctic oil production. In federal areas there was 45 billion 
barrels of oil production composed of offshore (27 billion barrels), 
NPR-A (8.8 billion barrels) and non-wilderness areas in the ANWR 
(10 billion barrels) (RDC 2018). Congress focused on Arctic drilling. 
The “America-First” strategy was showing itself in the energy area 
(UBS 2018). Only 21% of US oil came from imports in 2017, while it 
was around 60% in 2005. Fuel import exposure risk was 12% in 2005, 
but it decreased to 2% in 2016 (ibid.). However, it seems that oil 
production was not only related to oil import levels (UCC 2018). The 
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majority of the decrease in oil import supplies were from OPEC 
countries, mainly in the Middle East. Imports had declined around 
25% from 2011 levels (UBS 2018); however, the US was still importing 
2.6 MMbbl/d crude from OPEC.  
 
Figure 7.9: 2019–2024 Draft Proposed Programme Alaska Region Program 
Areas (DOI 2018: 9)  
On March 29, the District Court of Alaska (2019) decided on Trump`s 
executive order 13795 (White House 2017b) which purported to 
revoke the 2015 and 2016 Obama withdrawals. According to the Court 
(2019: 13), Trump’s decision was unlawful, because “Obama’s … 
withdrawals indicated that he intended them to extend indefinitely, and 
therefore be revocable only by an act of Congress”. At this point, the 
Tax Act would help president Trump. This Act was passed through the 
Congress (2017), so the Arctic drilling decision made by the 
administration could then revoke Obama’s withdrawals. At this point 





Duration: Theoretical Analysis 
As in the KXL case (Chapter 5), this period was characterised by the 
dominance of ideas around the institutional interpretation of the best 
meet energy needs in oil diversification, stemming from declining 
material in-capabilities in the patterns of oil diversification.  
The clash between climate change considerations and oil friendly 
views had been increasing and were reflected in the different line 
taken by the new Republican president. Oil prices were almost at the 
same level experienced under the previous president; however, 
Trump was asserting an `America-First` policy which prioritised US 
interests everywhere and did not have global considerations, 
including the environment. Even the offshore energy strategy was 
labelled with “America-First” (White House 2017b). The new approach 
of the government was supported by both private and public interests. 
Investments by the energy industry had decreased oil prices and 
increased domestic production to a point where US reliance on the 
global market was becoming much lower than previous eras. Trump 
then acted in a totally opposite way to the direction President Obama 
had in his last two years on material capabilities. There was a similar 
institutional and ideational picture, but the decision was going to be 
pro-oil: President Obama`s ‘all-of-the-above’ was transformed into the 
“energy dominance” approach (DOI 2017c). It was compatible with 
new administration’s ideational (‘America First’) worldview and 
supported by improving material capabilities.  
Energy dominancy now targets more energy production in US. 
Moreover, while it can increase the material capability of the US, 
ideational and institutional clashes can also be triggered, as the recent 
project approval process shows. However, increasing domestic 
production cannot lead the US to be an energy leader or energy 
dominator of the world because oil has a global market. Trump’s policy 
rhetoric does not reflect the reality of global oil politics. Events in the 
world are still able to affect the US oil market. As in `Energy 
Independence`, energy dominancy; is also a rhetoric of government. 
However, the difference between them is created by the context in 
which they are asserted. The Energy Independence rhetoric that 
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emerged after the 1973 crisis, was supported by a position of 
vulnerability to oil supply. However, there is a difference between 
dependency and vulnerability. The US is much less vulnerable now, 
although it is still dependent on the global oil market. Less vulnerability 
leads actors to more freely assert their arguments in domestic politics. 
Arctic Drilling was seen as a solution for oil vulnerability of the US in 
the early millennium, but its specific parts were discussed (e.g. four 
OCS areas, ANWR). However, the entire Arctic has now become 
dominated by the issue of drilling despite reduced vulnerability, 
because while the material capability of the US has changed, it is not 
isolated from ideas and institutions and the interactions between 
these three structures. 
 
7.7.     Discussion: the Value of a Coxian Perspective 
7.7.1. Structural Causes: Material Capabilities, Ideas and 
Institutions 
The US Energy Revolution of the mid-2000s was determined by the 
material realities of US oil production and the global oil market and 
their ideational effects. Increasing global demand, decreasing supply, 
increasing oil prices became significant. Oil prices` direct connection 
with gasoline prices are the most important point leading policymakers 
to care more about oil. The other main reason is any economic or 
political event in the world changes oil prices directly. Oil is fungible. 
Thus, whenever the oil market is affected, investments and policy 
impacting upon oil arises such as the 73 crisis and the Gulf War.  In 
the early-2000s, the oil market was making oil prices more vulnerable 
but 9/11 and the Iraq War triggered oil price rises again. Moreover, 
this wave was helped by the fear of oil shortages after the two 
Hurricanes. With the help of the structure and close relationship with 
the oil industry, policymakers tried to interfere in the process. They 
were joined by industry associations and entrepreneurs. With little 
lead from the federal government apart from ARRA, public and private 
collaboration created the energy revolution in terms of the shale 
boom, renewable fuels, efficiency programmes and more generally 
technology investments in these areas. Thus, oil politics dynamics 
became intertwined with domestic politics. This combination included 
283 
a structural wave but also agents` interests, backgrounds and 
priorities. That said, the Arctic drilling issue does not follow exactly the 
same path with the energy revolution in the beginning.  
While the US started to produce more oil and reduce dependency on 
oil in the transportation sector with the help of alternative fuels, the 
Deepwater Horizon explosion in 2010. This material event triggered 
environmental arguments against oil production. Since that explosion 
was an offshore issue that included drilling in Alaska, president 
Obama took an action against Alaskan production which was already 
a debate that spanned the economy-environment. Political parties 
were collaborating in terms of the energy issue in EPAct and EISA, 
except Arctic Drilling. However, this event was the explosion of 
economy-environment debate that would integrate Arctic Drilling with 
the Energy Revolution. With the help of decreasing import and oil 
prices that are material realities, ideational (in terms of political 
parties) and institutional differences started showing themselves. The 
contradiction between environment and economics would start to be 
a main debate and trigger of the process. The definition of how ‘best 
to meet the nation`s energy needs` was not only changing according 
to different administrations/political parties, even for the different 
synchronic picture of structural causes in the same presidency. 
However, the economy-environment debate was not the only 
contradictory production of the process. 
Micro-regional interests, as another part of the ideational arguments 
forwarded for domestic oil production, have always been important in 
the energy revolution in the US. Both the shale boom and alternative 
fuel programmes have showed how the idea of energy independence 
fundamentally reshaped the US’ relationship with energy production. 
In terms of Arctic Drilling, we have to remember that Alaska’s 
dependency on oil and gas revenues is not replicated in any other 
state. However, in both the shale boom and alternative fuel 
programmes, many states are coming together and triggering the 
process. In terms of Arctic drilling, there is only one state`s 
representatives really considering the state interests. Other 
supporters are determined by their contributors, their party tendencies 
or their own personal views. Apart from the private lobby efforts, there 
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has never been a huge alliance supporting Arctic drilling. Even the oil 
companies, as shown above (e.g. BP, Shell, Chevron), have had 
suspicions about Arctic drilling. The region’s geography and climate 
are complicating features that lead to high production costs, and 
uncertainty surrounding federal regulations have led oil companies to 
become wary of investing too much in Arctic drilling. Private interests 
have not had the same ambition as in the shale boom and alternative 
fuels, where profits are more easily made. Nation and state-level 
priorities reflect the federal administrational process, but can have 
different perceptions. The shale revolution did lead to an 
environmental debate but not as much as in KXL and Arctic Drilling. 
Thus, its nationwide growth could not be stopped despite state level 
resistance. On the other hand, Arctic Drilling, despite the state-level 
economic necessity, could be stopped with federal level decisions. 
However, increasing domestic production with growing state 
producers changed the definition of oil diversification into the 
diversification of both countries and states rather than only countries, 
with the help of the shale revolution. A new definition could therefore 
be added to the oil diversification literature in a time of collapsing 
liberal ideas and a more nationalist-populist rhetoric system which 
added a foreign policy dimension into the process, in addition to oil 
politics and US domestic politics.  
The US was a global leader in early 2000s. Its global/regional focuses 
are also important. Since the Iraq War, US hegemonic position has 
been heavily degraded. As a result of contradictory transnational-
national benefits (see Chapter 6), the US is becoming more focused 
on itself or North America (macro-regional) in addition to micro-
regional interests, as Cox`s (1992) scenarios suggest. A changing 
foreign policy dimension is integrated into oil politics and US domestic 
politics. Obama`s decision on being a leader in the Paris Climate 
Agreement reflected the interaction of these dimensions, which was 
in response to collapsing US hegemony globally. 
Trump`s current views on climate change, America-first and energy 
dominance cannot be thought just thought of as his personal views, 
neither was Obama`s global leader ambitions in terms of 
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environmentalist policies in his last years of the presidency. 
Increasing US domestic production and Trump`s America-First  
`energy dominance` view have emerged in tandem. The withdrawal 
from the Paris Climate Agreement was started by the president who 
does not have a `global leader` ambition and climate change 
consideration. While in the early-to-mid 2000s the government was 
trying to solve vulnerability to energy needs, it now wants to dominate 
the global market, because structural causes have brought new 
dynamics. America`s game changer position with the energy 
revolution has helped and pushed the pro-drilling administration to 
adopt a new rhetoric. Arctic drilling has been affected by the new 
context, as in Obama`s last few years, but pushed oil diversification in 
the opposite direction.  
7.7.2. Additional Structural Sphere: The Role of Social 
Dynamics? 
As with the KXL and Iraq War cases (Chapters 5 and 6), social 
dynamics were also evident, although they differ in terms of their 
significance, the types of actors involved and their political demands. 
Two main social effects are seen in the process of Arctic Drilling in the 
Energy Revolution context.  
Firstly, voters’ expectations about gasoline prices was one of the main 
drivers of the Energy Revolution. However, this process is more about 
legitimacy issues for governments, rather than one that created an 
obvious dynamic in society. Under the democratic system, meeting 
voters` material expectations cannot be defined as a social dynamics 
issue. There are some realities that governments always have to meet 
in terms of the demands of people, for example their economic 
wellbeing. However, issues like human rights and climate change are 
more about medium-to-long term objectives that might lead society to 
react together.  
The second social effect is close to this point, although it also cannot 
be accepted as social dynamics. As indicated above, the climate 
change consideration is one of the biggest issues for the Arctic Drilling 
process. However, we do not see a huge collaboration between 
environmentalists, local residents and a political party in this specific 
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case – unlike the KXL. Strangely, given the high profile nature of the 
case and the sensitivities of Americans to preserving wilderness 
areas, Arctic Drilling has never become a national front page issue in 
this manner. It seems that environmental group’s efforts are the key 
approach for creating attention. Only during the Deepwater Horizon 
diasater did environmentalists seek to use the issue to campaign 
against offshore drilling but not in the Arctic, as might be expected. 
Thus, institutional interference in social dynamics cannot be ignored 
when organized and directed in a specific way, which did not occur to 
the same extent as in KXL. The findings on neo-Coxian theory can be 
compared with the other two case studies (see Chapter 8) but it 
appears that social dynamics operated in different ways. 
 
7.8.     Conclusions 
Arctic Drilling in the Energy Revolution context has changed the 
definition of oil diversification in the USA.  A policy of sourcing oil from 
many supplier countries has changed to supplying domestic demand 
from states in the US, thereby increasing domestic production. 
However, the motivations behind these efforts cannot only be 
interpreted through a policy-centred analysis, because there has been 
a reciprocal interaction between oil politics-US domestics politics-US 
foreign policy that cannot analysed in isolation.  
Both Arctic Drilling and the Energy Revolution are shaped by material 
in/capabilities, ideas and institutions. While the interactions between 
these three dynamics accumulate and lead to new decisions, all these 
decisions cannot be considered only through public or governmental 
perceptions. Private interests also influence the motivational process. 
In terms of the governmental side, political parties’ approaches to the 
issue were differentiated at different time points. State-society 
complexity shows itself here. However, the carriers of the process that 
are structural determination, agent`s decisions and shocks are 
showed too. These complex relations have created the contradictions 
that triggered the Arctic Drilling process. Contradictions between 
economy-energy and national-state level interests have emerged as 
a result of structural causes, in a reflection of the interaction between 
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oil politics-US domestics politics-US foreign policy. How to `best meet 
the national energy needs` has continually been re-defined in different 
contexts by different governments along with the contradictions of the 
process. 
While structure has been determined by three structural causes, they 
have structure-agents-shocks interactions. Patterns emerge under oil 
politics-US domestic politics-US foreign policy. Thus, what we have 
seen is that it is not a policy-centred process. Apart from the 
governmental structure and agents, private interests always appear 
significant, since oil has political economic importance. There is not 
only one determiner of the process despite the different priorities of 
governments. Oil price as part of material interests has the biggest 
motivational role behind the process, but after the interactions of 
material capabilities, ideas and institutions, even the oil price is shown 
as less influential. It is not an independent variable as a positivist view 
would suggest. Other factors (e.g. political party influence, a changing 
US position in international politics) start having more key point as a 
motivation behind the diversification policies. Thus, this complex 
picture cannot be interpreted with theoretical suggestions which focus 
on specific priorities, as the Arctic Drilling literature does. However, 
this study has identified interactions between agents-structure 
occurring within a temporal process, thereby showing how changing 
dynamics can help us depict the process and allow us to identify 
possible alternative scenarios. As a method of inquiry for depicting the 
process, a Coxian approach helps to create much wider areas of 
debate for future research. 
Lastly, a Neo-Coxian revision of Coxian theory that adds social 
dynamics to the structural spheres of Cox, does not have the same 
degree of resonance as in other two case studies. We do not see a 
huge environmentalist reaction as in KXL, since the environmental 
groups (i.e. institutions) did not embrace the issue to the same extent 
as in KXL. Thus, it poses the question as to whether social dynamics 
as a new sphere of the new millennium requires more institutional 
effort than ideational and material facts. Adding social dynamics as a 
new sphere should then be clearer in terms of how institutions’ 
influence over/around the two other causes. How much social 
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dynamics can be part of the new millennium without huge institutional 






















8. Discussion: Assessing Coxian IR Theory for 
Uncovering General Patterns of US Oil 
Diversification Motivations  
 
8.1.     Introduction 
The preceding chapters (see Chapter 5; 6; 7) focused on the data 
collection and analysis of empirical material. This chapter aims to 
discuss the empirical and theoretical findings through returning to the 
research question posed in the introduction, most notably: How can 
the Iraq War, Keystone XL Pipeline and Arctic Drilling in the context 
of Energy Revolution be theoretically interpreted to uncover general 
patterns of oil diversification? It was argued in the introduction that 
Robert Cox’s ‘material capabilities-ideas-institutions’ view of structural 
dynamics could potentially help explain these patterns by providing a 
holistic, temporal view of these interacting dimensions over long time 
spans that, theoretically, move us beyond rational and temporally 
static interpretations of national oil diversification evident in the extant 
literature, thereby adding significantly to these studies. But to what 
extent is this argument valid? 
This chapter therefore seeks to discuss the research findings in order 
to inform a balanced consideration of this question, using the three 
sub-questions forwarded in Chapter 1. Firstly, it synthesises the 
scopes of US oil diversification over time from the three case studies 
to show how Cox’s structural dynamics help interpret the 
accumulation of policy over time. Secondly, it discusses the added 
value of a Coxian analysis for helping understand oil diversification 
motivations vis-à-vis established and more widely used rational 
theoretical perspectives. This section focuses on the potential positive 
contribution of a Coxian analysis to broadening our knowledge of oil 
diversification through filling gaps in the literature but also blind spots 
and challenges to the theorising. On this basis, the chapter then 
discusses the potential for developing a neo-Coxian approach that 
updates the theory to account for the increasing influence of social 
dynamics on motivations in the new millennium, relating it back to 
recent advances in Critical theory. Thirdly, the chapter then discusses 
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limitations to the research before finally forwarding recommendations 
on how to take studies forward through further empirical, theoretical 
and policy-relevant research as a prelude to our conclusions. 
Along with help of the sub-questions, this chapter claims that US oil 
diversification motivation patterns can be classified under the triangle 
of oil politics, domestic politics and foreign policy. Oil politics is 
composed of the global oil market, US oil market and US and global 
oil industry. Domestic politics is composed of legitimacy of 
administration and politicians, political parties and non-oil lobbies. 
Lastly, foreign policy is composed of the US position, power and 
legitimacy in the world and the relationship with the suppliers of US oil 
imports. These patterns can find their reflections in different time 
periods as they accumulate. There are also the contradictions that are 
additional patterns and triggers of the change in the system. 
Economy-Biosphere is the issue of the oil politics. The clashes 
between national and state interests are the part of domestic politics. 
National-transnational benefits can create a contradiction for US 
foreign policy. While above patterns provide a general picture and 
their reflections are accumulated, the contradictions as additional 
patterns are the product of those reflections (see Figure 8.1). Thus, 
contradictions represent the researched time period which is between 
early 2000s and now. In addition to the patterns uncovered by Coxian 
theory, social dynamics was also discussed as a neo-Coxian 
suggestion. Although the theory should be revised and social 
dynamics` participation to the structural spheres requires observation 
in the future, social dynamics are becoming a shaper of patterns. 
While social dynamics show systemic determinations and agents` 
rational participation, they are also shaped by the shocks (political-
economic and shortages) from outside.  
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Figure 8.1: The Patterns of US Oil Diversification Motivations 
 
These patterns cannot be isolated from each other. They change and 
are shaped according to the interactions between each other. This 
formulation might seem like material- or structural-based explanation, 
but it is not, because all these patterns have agents that follow their 
interest, although it is determined by the context. Thus, we offer a 
formulation that state-centric mainstream IR approaches cannot 
readily explain during the processes, or in the new millennium period. 
 
8.2.     US Oil Diversification Scopes 
The first sub-question (Chapter 1) asked: What have been the 
motivations for oil diversification in US policy cycles and how have 
they changed over time? These motivations were traced through time 
in each of the three cases (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) to show that they 
were not a static phenomenon but shifted both within and between the 
different temporal phases, often during the same federal 
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administration. However, in order to view the new millennium`s US 
policy cycle, how the process evolved should be understood and then 
analysed in terms of changes.  
8.2.1. A Brief Historical Background of US Oil Diversifications 
In order to uncover the patterns of US oil diversification motivations 
through the historical-comparative analysis, contextual background of 
the researched period was given in addition to the historical 
background of each cases. The patterns found make more sense 
when they are considered with this brief background. The change and 
effects of the oil market, the transition of US foreign policy perception 
of the rest of the world and the role of domestic politics (specifically 
when the gasoline prices are high) are not only the dynamics of the 
millennium. 
The main US oil diversification motivation in recent decades was 
triggered by the 1973 crisis (see Chapter 1). Oil was used as a 
weapon in which OPEC used supply as a means of pursuing wider 
political aims. It was the first time in the US oil history that the US had 
faced two issues: accessibility to oil sources and buying it at 
reasonable prices. The policy of Energy Independence was 
announced in response (Nixon 1973). Oil diversification through 
diversifying sources is one of the part of the policy along with reducing 
reliance on foreign oil. Thus, changing supplier countries became 
important to strategic thinking. After the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan, President Carter (1980) interpreted the invasion as a 
“threat to the free movement of Middle East oil”. The conclusion was 
that the US needed to have a military presence in the Middle East to 
protect global oil market suppliers. Reliance on foreign oil and military 
intervention was eventually combined in the Gulf War of 1991. 
However, using troops would eventually undermine US power. 
Reducing reliance on foreign oil then became converted to removing 
“reliance on the Middle East”, an aim heavily mentioned during the 
George W. Bush administration (White House 2006a). The 
decreasing power of the US was putting pressure on governments 
and an `energy independence` rhetoric re-emerged. In the early 
millennium, the oil market experienced lack of supply due to an 
availability issue. Thus, accessibility and affordability combined with 
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the availability issue. In the mid-1990s, the US started looking at 
importing from Central Asia, West Africa and Eurasia, while trying to 
limit reliance on the Persian Gulf. During the time, US oil 
diversification did mean oil diversification for the US allies (Japan and 
Europe) (Interviewee-6) and even for global market too. Moreover, it 
was going to be one of the motivation for the Iraq War (CENTCOM 
2002b). US attention on its allies had found it roots in the Cold War, 
but this focus has changed in the early-millennium. 
8.2.2. The Millennium through the Cases 
In the KXL process (Chapter 5), oil diversification was framed primarily 
in terms of the national interest – but this ‘interest’ changed through 
time. Oil companies initially characterised the pipeline in commercial 
terms but as the project became politicised the importance of US oil 
vulnerabilities, driven by global oil markets, became more evident. 
During the first stage the Bush administration presented KXL as 
important to national energy security through its diversifying of oil 
supply away from ‘unreliable’ sources of foreign oil, i.e. from the 
Middle East, which became particularly acute during the Gulf War. 
Proximity of supply and established, stable trading relations with 
Canada served to endorse this framing. As the political consensus for 
the project began to break down in the late 2000s, the national 
interests were then argued to involve diversifying oil supply from 
Canadian producers due to declining US domestic production, 
increasing domestic demand but also the tightening global oil market 
which cause oil price increases. The need for oil diversification was 
then reinterpreted under the Obama administration. KXL was argued 
as not in the national interests, primarily because of the environmental 
and social impacts, sparking a bitter ideological bi-partisan debate. 
Counter arguments focused on the benefits for the national interest of 
job creation, economic competitiveness and reducing reliance on 
foreign supply. However, the shale revolution and increasing domestic 
oil production during the Obama administrations reduced the rationale 
for diversifying oil supply from Canada. As Trump assumed office, 
how oil diversification was presented in terms of the national interests 
changed again. The Trump administration argued that KXL was in the 
national interest due to its potential for job creation, enhancing energy 
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security, energy provision for US citizens and the increased tax 
revenues for governments. This view of oil diversification fitted 
Trump’s wider ‘America first’ doctrine, encapsulated by ‘energy 
dominance’ based on national self-interest. The important point is how 
declining US power and legitimacy globally in parallel to polarization 
of US domestic politics has brought national self-interest argument 
more acceptable for American people and oil policies. 
Patterns of oil diversification motivations differed in the Iraq War case 
(Chapter 6). After 9/11 as an exogenous shock to Americans, has 
triggered national security fear in both civil and political society. 
Although they had different definitions of national security view 
(political society including elites and think-tanks was thinking US 
security was comprehending the rest of the world), the shock was 
enough to bring them together for declaring the War with Iraq. 
However, the changing view on national security would divide the 
society and political actors, after negative outcomes of the war. 
Unified political parties will have this separation too. Democrats` 
opinion on Iraq were generally the same as Republicans even before 
the War, but Republicans were responsible from the negative 
outcomes of the war since they led the administration. The situation 
has changed Democrats’ rhetoric easily. Unified ideas did not exist 
anymore. On the other hand, during the time, US perceptions of the 
Middle East oil and oil diversification has been changing too. The  
Middle East oil policy rhetoric had been become one of  running away 
from Middle East oil. US attention on the Iraqi oil did exist even before 
the War, but not only for US national interests. US, as hegemon and 
responsible actor for the transnational system, needed to have Iraqi 
oil in the market, primarily for the US allies but also for the tightening 
global oil market. Nationally, it justified having a US military presence 
in the region. However, the War did not go well for the US that did not 
decide the War multilaterally. Decreasing of US 
hegemony/power/legitimacy has sped up, thereby national and 
transnational benefits have become contradictory. On the other hand, 
the global oil market has tightened more.  Unstable regions were seen 
as unsuitable oil suppliers for the US and US interests needed to be 
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prioritized anymore. Energy Independence and self-sufficiency had 
become the rhetoric of Obama administration.  
Arctic Drilling has been discussed in terms of how to `best to meet 
national energy needs`, but without an agreed definition. Energy 
needs can conflict with environmental considerations of this idea or 
be pressured by global and US oil markets. Obviously, agents would 
define it under the context, but according to their interests, 
background and group. Arctic Drilling was discussed as a way of 
increasing US oil production in the early Bush administration because 
of the tight oil market. The government was trying to increase oil and 
other sources of energy production, not only in Arctic, however, there 
was also the rhetoric of reducing oil imports from the Middle East. Oil 
consumption was increasing and oil prices were at peak point in 2008. 
It was not unexpected, but created a shock effect. It was the year that 
Arctic Drilling had the most intense debate, because Democrats could 
easily use it for challenging the government`s position in terms of 
gasoline prices and environment considerations. A new president 
(Obama) did not stop the Arctic Drilling debate because the context 
did not evolve dramatically and the political party differences did not 
make huge difference at the time. However, changing US and global 
oil market dynamics in a positive meaning have changed energy 
needs definitions. He was talking more environmentalist position, 
while oil price decreases were helping. Environmentalist 
considerations have increased since Deepwater Horizon that also 
affected the KXL. National energy needs are defined only around 
energy issues. However, increasing strong hand in terms of oil (i.e. 
material) was being combined with the decrease of US power (i.e. 
ideational) during the time. Polarisation in US domestic politics and 
changing US foreign policy toward a more self-interested perception 
has brought the new president Trump who could carry this wave 
further. More strong US hand in oil would change the rhetoric from 
energy independence to energy dominance, which is parallel to 
changing domestic and foreign politics. The definition of US oil 
diversification has expanded to `supplying also from the states` and 
that definition was supporting the drilling scope on Arctic Drilling. The 
participation of production from different states has brought another 
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dimension, national-state interests, into the evolving definition of 
national energy needs definition. 
Every each cases have their own historical process, but they also 
have interactions that create the context where they are. After looking 
at the stories of the each case studies, we can now find what they 
have created together. It will help us to uncover the patterns which 
represent the second sub-question. 
8.2.3. Findings of the Case Studies 
The case shows the methodological stance of the research (see 
Chapter 4). US oil diversification motivations have been shaped by 
the rational choice of actors (i.e. individual`s position in the 
process/event), structural determination (i.e. pre-determined context) 
and exogenous shocks (i.e. external events).  
The main shocks are the 1973 crisis, the 1979 crisis, 9/11 and the Iraq 
War process (see Chapter 6), 2005 Hurricanes Catrina and Rita (see 
Chapter 7), the peak oil price in 2008 (see Chapter 7), and the 
Deepwater Horizon explosion (see Chapter 5; 7). The Middle East has 
been a problematic supplier for the US because of these shocks. Of 
course events in unstable parts of the world were also creating 
shocks, such as the Nigerian election process in 2002. However, the 
2005 Catrina hurricane show that not only the Persian Gulf or unstable 
countries but also the Gulf of Mexico can be unreliable. On the other 
hand, environmentalist considerations after Deepwater were able to 
change structures more sharply in terms of the environment-energy 
issue. Oil diversification means more energy, and typically involves 
environmental considerations. Policymakers have been pressured by 
the debate more intensely relative to before the crisis. Of course, 
structural determination is not only determined by shocks but also by 
structures’ themselves such as the oil availability issue of the early 
mid-2000s, increasing environmentalist considerations through time, 
decreasing US hegemony that has led to a turning back towards a 
continental focus, the increasing polarization of domestic politics, and 
changing actors in oil policies (oil industry, farm lobby, renewable 
industry, car industry, private entrepreneurs, small and medium power 
oil producers). Rational selection is mainly through the political lenses 
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of policymakers. The process influenced Obama’s switch to an 
environmentalist position, Trump`s as an oil friendly Republican with 
a non-environmentalist view or the Bush administration’s attempt to 
secure Iraqi oil for the market are all rational decisions. In short, US 
oil diversification motivations are not only shaped by oil-related 
sectors and oil-related political-economic picture. The motivations can 
belong to different groups and be shaped through the process. 
US oil diversification meant reducing reliance on foreign oil for the US 
and its allies between the 1973 crisis and the early-millennium. 
However, it was combined with prioritising the security of Middle East 
oil production and transportation in the 1979 event, Iranian 
Revolution. A market-based diversification approach (i.e. Liberal) 
started giving way to a military-based view (i.e. Realist). The Gulf War 
was the key point for leaving the market-based oil market. However, 
Around the end of Gulf War diversification meant importing from ex-
Soviet countries and also Africa. A unipolar world was targeting new 
members for the global political economy market, global oil market. 
On the other hand, the US had been losing its power. The Iraq War 
was the result of this process and helped speed it up. Oil 
diversification had now become predicated upon reducing national 
reliance on the Middle East in the early millennium. By the Mid-2000s 
the energy revolution changed the meaning of oil diversification again 
towards diversifying oil import countries and oil producer states. The 
energy revolution was joined by Arctic Drilling, now driven by the 
rhetoric of energy dominance. A changing US role in the world has 
also changed the import suppliers to the US as a new oil diversification 
focus emerges.  
What we have now is a positive trend in terms of oil imports from 
Canada (see Chapter 5). While US power has been decreasing and 
the US’ reducing dependency on the Middle East, Canada has been 
prioritised by US oil policy actors and institutions (see Chapter 7). 
Isolation from the rest of the world has led the US to focus on regional 
suppliers. While a macro-regional stance against the US has been 
increasing (Cox 1993c), it leads the US to follow its own macro-
regional policies in a reactionary way. Re-arrangement of NAFTA 
through the USMCA in 2018 can be seen as a key example of this 
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trend. While 70% of US petroleum imports were from OPEC in 1977, 
50% petroleum imports are now from Canada (43%) and Mexico (7%) 
(EIA 2019c). Petroleum imports from the Persian Gulf have decreased 
to 16%. In addition, the Canadian democratic governance system is 
similar to the US and their historical trade connections make Canadian 
imports more attractive. This changing context has shaped 
successive presidents’ (Bush, Obama and Trump) decisions and they 
in turn have been shaped by them. As indicated above, actors decide 
through behaviour relative to other actors and structure. The structure 
is not only composed of material (in)capability, but also the 
institutional and political context. 
Since the US presence in other countries required military operations 
or stationed forces, they have a cost. While military intervention can 
be related to national interest and can bring transnational benefits 
(Stokes and Raphael 2010), it also brings costs, internal oppositions, 
and can also undermine US hegemony. On the other hand, in terms 
of oil issue, freeing the US from foreign oil rhetoric had been used 
since Nixon till Obama but the rhetoric changed with Trump. Not only 
because of his personality, but also because of the new oil structure 
when he came in power. Here, `Energy Dominance’, which reflects 
how US power and focus has been changing, is the new rhetoric (DOI 
2017c). Three states (Canada, Mexico and Colombia) out of five US 
oil import countries are from the Americas now. If there were no 
political problems with Venezuela, it would also be an oil import 
supplier. Thus, US oil diversification has turned towards the continent 
and itself.  
In summary, the story of US oil diversification motivations are 
composed of the interaction between structural determination, agents` 
selections and external influences (see Figure 8.2). This transition 
between structure-agency create the patterns that can be uncovered 
by the structural causes (ideas, material capabilities and institutions) 
in more detailed scope and a wider temporal perspective (see Figure 
8.3.), rather than a narrow temporal perspective that can provide 
explanations that are not sustainable in the long-term as mainstream 
IR theories do.  
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Figure 8.2: The creation process for the patterns 
 
Figure 8.3: Uncovering the patterns 
 
8.3.     Explaining Patterns of Oil Diversification Using Cox 
The second sub-question (Chapter 1) asked: How can these 
motivations be explained by the ‘material capabilities-ideas-
institutions’ arguments of Cox? Given the changing nature of these 
motivations within and between cases over time, it would be 
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problematic to interpret them using conventional rational IR theorising 
that aim at generalizable theoretical explanation: a feature identified 
in Chapters 1 and 2.  
For example, Realism explains international security in terms of 
competition to secure state power under conditions of international 
anarchy (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001), while Liberalism focuses 
on ‘interdependence’ between states (Keohane and Nye 1977). As 
Chapter 2 shows, when applied to energy security, Realism focuses 
on the role of corporations, markets and conflicts in securing state 
self-interests, Liberalism takes a more economic view when 
considering markets and capitalism, interdependency and activity of 
non-state factors. A raft of criticisms are made of these positions in 
the literature (Chapter 2) that become more evident when applied to 
the case studies. Although Realist notions of state self-interest, to an 
extent, characterise oil diversification motivations in all the case 
studies, its exercise through corporations, markets and conflicts was 
hardly predictable and did not conform to any ‘rational’ pattern. 
Moreover, this explanation fails to account for the role of other actors. 
A Liberal focus on state economic interdependency through markets 
is equally problematic since, again, the case studies show that oil 
diversification motivations changed repeatedly through time, making 
prediction difficult. In fact, as Devetak (2005: 150) argues, these 
theories tend to take for granted the “social and historical production 
of both… agents and structures” making their application problematic 
and therefore potentially providing an important role for Critical theory 
to fill these gaps.  
Since this research considers how the social-historical production is 
made, as in the first sub-question, it  was found that the findings of the 
mainstream IR approaches reflect `what researchers are already 
looking for`. This research too can be limited by the researcher`s 
approach, but he is not stuck with these presumptions (see Reflexive 
Analysis in Chapter 4). The research itself too has a process as the 
researched topic. The researched area should not be limited to 
theoretical pre-selections, because they would become the 
determiners of findings. Thus, when offered Critical theory for 
uncovering the patterns of US oil diversification motivations, we do not 
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only challenge mainstream IR approaches theoretically, but also 
methodologically.   
An alternative theoretical approach was therefore forwarded 
(Chapters 1 and 2) based in Critical theory. According to Devetak 
(2005: 150), Critical theory “is more interested in explaining how both 
individual actors and social structures emerge in, and are conditioned 
by, history”. Here, it was postulated that Cox’s (1981) ‘material 
capabilities-ideas-institutions’ view of structural causes could 
potentially better explain oil diversification motivation patterns due to 
its capacity to encompass a holistic and temporal view that does not 
rely on ‘rational’ or, to use Cox’s (1981) term ‘problem-solving’, 
positivist interpretations of complex social processes that seek to 
legitimise rather than expose current political structures. These 
features were – to varying degrees - evident in all three cases, 
suggesting that oil diversification motivations can be interpreted from 
this theoretical perspective in ways that move interpretations beyond 
pre-existing studies. After setting out the patterns of each case 
studies, they can be interpreted together. 
8.3.1. Uncovering the Case Studies 
Chapter 5 showed how interpretation of the ‘national interest’ in oil 
diversification motivations changed through time in the KXL process. 
It initially developed in response to US material interests under the 
Bush administration. Here, material considerations such as the 
vulnerabilities of the global oil market in the early millennium were a 
significant factor in explaining the need to diversify domestic US 
supply away from ‘unreliable sources’ (i.e. the Middle East) through 
the KXL project. The Gulf War (Chapter 6) only served to intensify this 
need for reducing domestic reliance on foreign imports, highlighting 
the importance of this dimension. Evolving material conditions in the 
USA and globally in relation to changing ideas in the US regarding its 
hegemonic power in the world increased state-society complexity 
around the KXL process. By the time Obama came to power, the role 
of intersubjective ideas particularly regarding environmental 
protection vis-à-vis jobs and competitiveness became the defining 
feature of an American state-society complexity, with state institutions 
and public interests on one side, with other institutions, including the 
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Canadian state, oil companies and the Republican Party, on the other. 
External shocks to global oil markets (from the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster) and increasing polarization in US domestic politics as a 
result then shaped institutions’ positions. The re-shaped national 
interest became environmental protection as the rationale for oil 
diversification via KXL was reduced. The second term of the Obama 
administration witnessed further polarization of domestic and oil 
politics. However, decreasing US power globally interacted with these 
political spheres, specifically after the Iraq War (Chapter 6). So while 
material capabilities were strongly evident in oil diversification 
motivations at the start of the KXL process, by this point they 
increasingly reflected a clash of ideas and institutions (between 
political parties and state-national levels). Material capabilities` role 
declined as a factor during Obama’s second term because of 
increasing domestic and global oil production, reducing the need to 
secure domestic supply (see also Chapter 7). Ideas about oil 
diversification – particularly the America First ‘energy dominance’ 
rhetoric – then became important in the Trump era, alongside material 
capabilities, or rather technical practicalities, related to importation of 
heavy crude oil from via KXL Canada to serve the US domestic 
market, as domestic supply was increasingly geared towards lighter 
crude production and processing. These dimensions now appear 
influential in the oil diversification motivations of the Trump 
administration, which is redefining this concept again in terms of 
diversifying supply from Canada while reducing reliance on Middle 
East states, which in turn reflects a withdrawal of US hegemony from 
the region in foreign policy. 
Coxian structural dynamics are also evident in oil diversification 
motivations in the Iraq War case (Chapter 6) but, as in the above 
analysis, they varied in their interaction at different points in time. 
Despite the denial of institutional actors (see below), it could be 
argued that material capabilities in terms of the US need for Middle 
East oil supplies, combined with ideational fixations concerning 
national security were significant in the early phase. After 9/11, the 
perspective of American society was almost exclusively on national 
security concerns. There was a united political-civil society. The oil 
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supply-demand balance of the US and the global oil market, oil prices, 
technology to produce oil at a lesser cost and more efficiently, security 
(politics) and safety considerations of where the oil was produced and 
transported from, and global politics were key determinants of the 
structure of oil diversification. However, as the Iraq War case 
progressed, oil diversification motivations in the US began to reflect 
more the interaction between ideas and institutions. As the post-War 
conflict continued, the domestic consensus on ideas around the War 
collapsed in two ways: increasing opposition from Democrats and 
decreasing public support for the war. On the other hand, US 
institutions` interference in Iraqi oil caused Iraqi society to pay 
attention on Iraqi oil. Civil unrest in Iraq, which met a tough response 
from the political establishment supported by US institutions, was 
increasing international opposition to the war. Social dynamics played 
a key role here. Also, decreasing US power combined with more 
hurtful oil market. Thus, in addition to the collapse of united ideas, the 
US was more vulnerable materially than before the war. Institutional 
positions were also more obvious in the process, because an 
increasing oil market pressure was leading institutions to increase 
their pressure on the process. However, US and US-led international 
institutions could not solve the `pulling out Iraqi oil to the market` 
issue. Decreasing US institutional power was reflecting and 
supporting decreasing US hegemony/power/legitimacy. When 
Obama came into power nothing changed, because the Democrat 
leader`s rhetoric (i.e. Democrats) and actions (i.e. Republicans) were 
close to different parties. Institutional attempts continued in parallel to 
‘running away’ from Middle East oil. Trump’s disengagement from Iraq 
and hence Iraqi oil reflects a more isolationalist US stance. However, 
changing ideas, material capabilities and institutions show that this 
change in oil diversification motivation is reflected in the other two 
cases. 
In the final case (Chapter 7), oil diversification through Arctic Drilling 
and the Energy Revolution of the US was heavily shaped by the 
material structure of the global oil market and US vulnerability to it. As 
in the KXL case, the motivations to diversify domestic oil production 
through Arctic Drilling were initially driven by concern over these 
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material capabilities, combined with the Bush administration’s oil 
interests. State level interests were a factor but they were not as 
important in oil diversification decisions as US material incapabilities 
and Presidential institutional influence. Ideas were less prominent 
under this administration but, as in the KXL case, this changed under 
Obama. Growing US oil vulnerability due to unstable global markets 
and polarization in US domestic politics shifted the nature of structural 
dynamics so that ideas and institutions became more prominent. 
While Republicans supported a pro-oil stance and Arctic drilling to 
address energy insecurity, Democrats were concerned about the 
environmental impacts. However, increases in US material 
capabilities due to the Energy Revolution (i.e. shale gas, increased 
domestic production, renewables) altered the debate again on 
domestic oil diversification, allowing Obama to pursue a more 
environmental stance in his second term. This position was reflected 
in the US’ leadership role in the Paris Climate Agreement, as Obama 
tried to reassert US global hegemonic influence during a period of its 
declining power in global politics. Trump’s desire to diversify domestic 
oil supplies through supporting Arctic drilling again, as with KXL, 
arguably reflect the role of America First ideas, articulated through 
‘energy dominance’ rhetoric rather than overt concern over US 
material capabilities since domestic oil supply has actually increased 
meaning that the US is not entirely reliant on diversifying imports. 
In short, our analysis shows that, in contrast to the perceptions of 
rational IR theories, US oil diversification motivations are the product 
of ideas (intersubjective meanings and collective images), institutions 
and material (in)capabilities (technological; organisational; natural 
resources and wealth) of US and global oil markets but also the nature 
of the relationship between these dimensions as they changed 
through time in transition between structure and agency. The KXL 
case demonstrates the importance of material capabilities shaped by 
global markets to oil diversification motivations but also shows how 
they can be mediated through institutions such as the Presidency, 
corporations and political parties and the role of powerful ideas such 
as environmentalism or America First in determining outcomes. Oil 
diversification motivations in the Iraq War case, despite the denial of 
305 
policymakers, were overtly predicated on US energy security 
concerns and global hegemony, demonstrating how policy was 
related to the global oil market and hence national material 
capabilities. Arctic drilling follows a similar pattern to the KXL case: 
while oil diversification motivations have also reflected national 
material capabilities conditioned by oil markets, ideas around 
environmentalism and their utilisation by institutions have also shaped 
policy. This thesis therefore argues that Coxian theory has significant 
utility, especially when compared to rational theories, in helping 
uncover patterns of oil diversification motivations over time. In fact, it 
would be impractical to uncover these patterns using rational theories, 
demonstrating the added value of the thesis. 
8.3.2. The General Patterns of US Oil Diversification Motivations 
As discussed in the Introduction section, the research findings 
indicate that the general patterns of US oil diversification motivations 
are composed of the triangle of oil politics, domestic politics and 
foreign policy. The findings can also be applied to the pre-millennium 
era. However, every period also has their contradictions that are the 
products of the reflections of patterns in that period. The economy-
biosphere contradiction was already predicted by Cox (1999: 17), but 
this research has put placed it within the context of oil politics. 
Moreover, the research also evaluated the argument national-
transnational benefits argument (Stokes and Raphael 2010) and 
found that these elements can become contradictory during the 
process as part of US foreign policy. Lastly, the dynamics between 
state-nation interests become more problematic in terms of domestic 
politics in the current millennium. These three contradictions, each 
products of the Coxian ‘triangle’ are also patterns, but limited to the 
researched area. They are the triggers of the process, but not 
persistent (see Figure 8.1).  
The Core Value of the Research 
After finding the patterns of US oil diversification motivations, we can 
discuss the core value the research now. Literature on US oil 
diversification motivations suggests available patterns, but not as the 
structure that have continual interactions that lead change in history. 
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Rational theories are able to identify key point in the process, but do 
not encompass the changing picture over time. However, the process 
changes through the interaction between structural causes and the 
contradictions they produce and are triggered by.  
The first point in the literature regards the importance of energy 
independence policy for oil. However, this study paints a different 
picture. Such policy had been used by politicians until Trump but not 
in Trump era, because the accumulation of the process has brought 
new dynamics. Moreover, as the background and findings of the case 
studies show above, even the definition of energy independence was 
not static during the different administrations. Initially this concept was 
more about policy rhetoric that did not refer to any specific region 
(Nixon, 1974), but it became about securing Middle East oil (Carter, 
1980) was further reinterpreted to mean ‘running away’ from the 
Middle East (Bush, 2006). Now, the US has an `energy dominance` 
rhetoric, but we do not suggest energy independent and dominant 
policies are compatible. Moreover, we believe that there might 
sometimes be a tension between policy and politics. Good policy does 
not always mean good politics, because the policymakers’ interests 
(politically) are not always compatible with countries’ benefits (in a 
policy context) . Furthermore, they might be contradictory. For 
example, President Obama was also caught in the controversy 
between policy and politics. Announcing his stance against fossil fuels 
in a 2012 election rally led to huge problems and placed pressure on 
him politically in his second presidency to be part of the energy-
environment debate (see Chapter 5; 7). 
Other parts of the literature argue that foreign policy can be revealed 
through liberal or realist world views, but this thesis argues against 
this suggestion. A Liberal perspective (CNA Report 2009) emphasises 
interdependency of trade relations between states. Diversification 
policies are interpreted from this view since they require both suppliers 
and demanders. It is partly right, because diversification prioritises the 
importance of the supplier country. However, it is evident from the 
case studies that it is not the only dimension of US oil diversification 
motivations. For example, the US` increasing oil imports from Canada 
cannot only be explained by these dynamics. On the other hand, 
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Realists (Klare 2012; Klare 2014b) offer an alternative explanation 
that diversification can be used as a foreign policy tool, in order to 
assert state power under anarchy. The expansion of US military power 
supported by diversification policies such as the Carter Doctrine 
suggest that Realists are partly correct. However, the scope of 
American society and the state has changed since the 1970s. US 
military interventions in the rest of the world have been decreasing, 
despite the Gulf War. The current trend in oil diversification shows that 
the scope of tension is within the American region, but it has fallen 
short of direct intervention towards hostile regimes such as 
Venezuela. Thus, US foreign policy is shaped by its position in the 
world, its administration and also the material context global political 
economically. Lastly, both rational views have state centric 
explanations, even though Liberals also consider non-state actors. 
However, as the cases show, the formulation of ‘State = political 
society + civil society’ that also includes covert world interference are 
shaping and shaped by the structural causes. 
Thirdly, keeping shortages effects at a less damaging level was 
another explanation in the literature (Chow and Elkind 2005), but the 
case studies show that the picture is not the same since the energy 
revolution. Increased domestic oil production made the US less 
vulnerable to oil shortages and disruptions. In September 2019, 
attacks on Saudi Arabia`s oil tankers did not harm the US and did not 
affect oil prices as in the past, because the US and Iraq had been 
increasing their supplies rapidly, so enabling them to keep relatively 
balanced supply-demand in the market. Moreover, there are also high 
levels of biofuel production in the US that can keep gasoline prices at 
a relatively stable level. Since oil has a global market and its price is 
defined globally, there is always dependency on oil prices. However, 
the US has, to an extent solved its oil vulnerability. US oil petroleum 
imports constituted 11% of total consumption in 2018 (EIA 2019c). 
While the US is less vulnerable to oil supply, it has reduced its 
concerns for oil-dependent allies. 
Lastly, the argument (Stokes and Raphael 2010) on two logics of 
national-transnational benefits had been right, but analysis from the 
case studies shows that it is increasingly less defensible. According 
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to this argument, when the US state intervenes or acts in any country, 
it is not directly for the protection of American capital per se, but for 
transnational capital. For example, opening Iraqi oil to the global 
capitalist system can be given as an example of this feature. However, 
whether the US still wants to expand its military interventions is now 
controversial, given its relative retreat from several conflict areas, e.g. 
Iraq. An isolationist and America First rhetoric were visible in the 
Trump election process, and has arguably filtered into US foreign 
policy. Moreover, decreasing US power has created a contradiction 
between national-transnational benefits.  
What this study then offers is a new perspective on oil diversification 
motivations by showing that its patterns cannot be isolated from each 
other. They are created by dynamics that are composed 
simultaneously of oil politics, domestic politics and foreign policy, so 
they change and are shaped according to the interactions of these 
three spheres. This formulation might appear to be a material- or 
structural-based explanation, but it is not, because all these areas 
have agents that follow their interest and ideational factors that shape 
actors’ behaviour according to contexts. 
 
8.4.     Limitations of the Theory and Theoretical Innovation 
The third sub-question (Chapter 1) asked: What are the limitations of 
this theory for explaining motivations for US oil diversification? As with 
all theories, there are potential blind spots and challenges in empirical 
application.  
The three evident areas relate to normative theorising, ontological 
concerns and challenges to Cox’s theory.  Firstly, critics of Critical 
theory have in the past generally focused upon its lack of normative 
political prescription for social change. However, this question was not 
explicitly considered in the thesis even though an understanding of 
how oil diversification motivations have emerged that could provide 
the basis for future reflexive change in energy security policy (see 
below). Secondly, there is a tendency, as with other theoretical 
perspectives, to see the cases as artefacts of the theory, i.e. through 
only considering evidence that fits its assumptions, in this instance 
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about structural dynamics, and discarding other, more established 
theoretical explanations. However, this observation is more 
ontological than epistemological. As discussed above traditional 
‘problem-solving’ theories do not readily capture the complexity of 
state-society dynamics in the cases since they focus on narrow 
conceptions of state self-interest or economic determinism, so Cox’s 
approach can provide new insight not available through such theories 
through its Critical perspective. Thirdly, and more significantly, this 
study has shown that, in the new millennium, social dynamics are a 
growing phenomenon in political decision-making, in this case around 
oil diversification. That is not to say that social dynamics are 
historically novel but they do appear to be more prevalent in the new 
millennium, primarily due to globalisation and advances in information 
technology. For example, in the KXL case (Chapter 5) environmental 
NGOs and civil society groups were increasingly influential through 
time. Evidence from other sectors, for example, climate politics and 
the trans-nationalisation of environmental justice (see for example, 
Schlosberg and Collins 2014) or the growing influence of transnational 
advocacy groups (Keck and Sikkink 1998) shows the increasing 
importance of social dynamics as a force in global processes. 
Although the case studies show that institutional organization is 
required for effective social dynamics (see Chapter 5 and 6), how 
institutions become important and how they evolve in response to the 
policy process was outside the scope of this thesis. Transnational civil 
society is not centralised but there is a possibility that non-
governmental institutions can change the structure, thereby leading 
social dynamics to be an important sphere of the structure. One 
response to this deficiency in theorising could therefore be to integrate 
Sinclair’s (2016) notion of social dynamics with the material 
capabilities-ideas-institutions model to provide more holistic 
explanations of structural forces. 
Such an approach would add to the work of Cox. For this author (Cox 
1993b: 135) ‘History generates theory’ and ‘this theory is not absolute 
knowledge, not a final revelation or a completeness of rational 
knowledge about laws of history’. Thus, while Cox established his 
theoretical view in the 1980s-1990s, he based his view on the 
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contemporary paradigm of the time. However, he (ibid.) left an open 
door for this theory to be reviewed in the future in relation to an 
evolving historical context. As identified above, such a review would 
be opportune. When viewing his theory in the ‘history’ of the new 
millennium, there is a great wave of social dynamics occurring in many 
states worldwide, a feature not evident when Cox was formulating his 
theory. Society’s reaction to identity rights, human rights, gender 
equality, democratic rights, environmentalism and climate change has 
created novel transnational social dynamics that interact with material 
capabilities, ideas and institutions. Adopting social dynamics as a new 
structural sphere, as Cox (1981) predicts, helps to explain these 
emergent structural contexts: as was evident in the case studies. In 
addition to explaining this new reality, social dynamics should be 
considered for two other reasons. Here, it helps to show the transition 
between agency and structure with the help of operationalising Cox`s 
structure interpretation within the specific issue. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, although Cox is clear about the balance between agency 
and structure, he does not provide a clear picture of how it happens. 
Also in considering social dynamics, we are able to operationalise the 
“State = political society + civil society” formulation of structural 
spheres identified by Gramsci (1971: 263). While political society can 
be equated with forms of state, civil society can be a reflection of 
social dynamics. Again, operationalising this insight within a specific 
topic helped to reveal the reflections of these concepts. In this sense, 
we have already started the process of developing a preliminary neo-
Coxian approach in this thesis through the initial discussions made in 
all the case studies (see Chapter 5, 6, 7). 
In addition to the limitations of the theory`s empirical application and 
theoretical innovation, the study indicates that Cox`s institutions 
definition does not comprehend their role entirely. They were 
interpreted as `maintaining particular order` (Cox 1981: 136), 
however, a durational view on specific events has shown that 
institutions do not only reflect power relations but also contribute to 
the change of the process in parallel to Cox`s understanding of 
history. Thus, institutions can also be the agents and participants of a 
particular declining order. The reason behind why institutions lack 
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definition is that other varieties of institutions are being ignored. 
Institutions have different ideas and agendas, thereby they focus on 
various topics from various standpoints. Moreover, there is now a 
declining of hegemony which changes the role of institutions that 
should be further studied in parallel to those changes. 
 
8.5.     Limitations of the Research Methods 
The reliability of study data was impacted by the limitations of 
obtaining some primary data: a conspicuous problem with historical 
and political studies in general. In all the case studies it was not 
possible to interview oil companies that were involved with the 
processes directly, although interviews were conducted with other oil 
industry representatives, including ones from small/independent oil 
companies. Although big oil companies are the focus of 
energy/environmental issues, their representatives did not volunteer 
to talk for reasons of commercial confidentiality. They were offered 
this chance as part of the balanced investigative approach adopted. If 
a direct view could have been elicited from TransCanada on KXL (see 
Chapter 5), Halliburton on the Iraq War (see Chapter 6) or from BP, 
Shell, ConocoPhillips on Arctic Drilling (see Chapter 7), we could 
assess how oil companies see these cases and potentially obtain 
information that cannot be found in online sources and archive 
studies.  
The other limitation on collecting primary data concerned sensitivities 
related to the Iraq War. Some policymakers who were involved in 
policy-making declined interview, while some of the archive 
documents were not obtainable, even under freedom of information 
requests, due to their classified status. It led to incomplete information 
about the role of oil diversification in the war. Even US policymakers 
who were in senior administration positions during this period said that 
oil diversification was not a factor in the war. That information ran 
counter to the findings in the archive documents. The reliability of 
interviewees then became an issue. Apart from policymakers, there is 
also an evident `covert world` effect that was proved in the Iraq War 
case. Findings regarding the influences of the covert world are hard 
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to state exactly because documents relating to it were often not 
accessible.  
However, this limitation did not significantly restrict the study. 
Policymakers, diplomats, environmental groups, other oil industry 
representatives, think-tanks and lobbies were open to speaking in 
both the US and Canada. Primary documentary data from state 
departments and other governmental sections were easy to identify, 
locate and access in the US. While a majority are from online sources, 
the archive documents can also be easily accessed: a feature of US 
federal government that supports such types of research. Primary 
data collected was enough to provide answers to the research 
questions. 
In addition, the reflexivity that underpinned the research approach 
(Chapter 4) helped the researcher remain open to new avenues of 
enquiry that supported the data collection. Although the problems 
encountered in securing interviews, the reliability of witnesses and the 
embargoing of official documents could be considered constraints on 
the research, they often led to alternative research strategies to 
secure data, for example ‘triangulating’ interviews with multiple data 
sources such as media articles and company reports to cross-check 
the veracity of statements. These strategies in turn then led to new 
thinking through reappraisal of prior assumptions. While the 
researcher now reflects back on the research process (how the 
knowledge was produced), he realizes that the interpretations of 
interviewees from all sectors, and the multiple documents consulted, 
have shaped and helped him to identify new directions for research.  
 
8.6.     Recommendations 
This study both offers a new perspective on oil diversification 
motivations also also informs new areas of theoretical, empirical and 
– to a lesser extent – normative research. While the study has helped 
further develop Cox’s original arguments and applied them to ‘real 
world’ examples, thereby providing innovation, the case for neo-
Coxian theoretical development is also established. Neo-Coxian 
theory identifies ‘social dynamics’ as a new sphere of the developing 
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world order in ways not originally anticipated by Cox. As this ‘new 
wave’ increases, it will require both interpreting and observing, 
providing a key role for Critical theory in which a neo-Coxian 
perspective could add significant value. There is an important role, 
therefore, for not only future theory building, based on the findings of 
the thesis, to take forward these arguments in the new millennium but 
also further empirical testing in different state contexts to ground such 
novel theoretical approaches. 
The above discussions on social dynamics are not covered in the IR 
literature, although societal participation into the policymaking 
process have already been discussed in other political science areas 
(e.g. Snow at al. 2019), suggesting greater integration between these 
traditions is necessary. Social movements and their collaboration with 
NGOs have been analysed via a political science perspective 
(Saunders and Roth 2019). In contrast, the meaning of social 
dynamics throughout the global economic political context has not 
been discussed in IR theories. Thus, this research only contributes an 
IR perspective in term of the role of social dynamics, which is not new 
debate topic in wider political science areas. Consequently, this thesis 
argues that the role of social dynamics should be further studied in IR 
literature in an attempt to making stronger a bridge between IR and 
the rest of the political science literature. What the social dynamics 
are and how they work should be further contextualised through their 
role in foreign policy and global economic politics dynamics. As this 
research shows, although they are not able to shape process entirely, 
social dynamics can create a wave that is considered by politicians in 
their political choices. This leads to change in foreign policy 
expectations and creates new foreign policy dynamics that are not 
isolated from social dynamics, as understood in wider political science 
studies. 
Problematically, the US oil diversification motivations uncovered in 
this thesis provide a unique case, so cannot be applied easily to 
another country. All countries have their own internal dynamics and 
their own position in global politics. However, by drawing upon a 
(neo)Coxian analysis, US oil diversification motivations can be 
compared with other countries, such as China, the second biggest oil 
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consumer and rising power of the world. Japan or the European Union 
can also be added to this comparison because of their oil consumption 
rate and their relationships with the US. Developing countries such as 
Brazil, with its long established policies for domestic biofuel 
production and oil import substitution, would make interesting 
alternative comparators. Comparison would allow differences in oil 
diversification motivations and the reasons behind those differences 
to be identified in terms of structural dynamics over time in order to 
further develop the theoretical arguments. In this sense, while not 
attempting to develop a ‘universal’ theory for oil diversification 
motivations, as positivists would prioritise, operationalisation of 
Coxian structural causes can be productively applied to all countries 
to help better uncover their unique circumstances.  
In this respect, such theory would not aim for predictive capacity in 
normatively informing or determining oil diversification policy but 
would allow a better understanding of ‘where we are now?’ on the 
basis of ‘where did we come from?’ to inform reflexive policy change, 
made through historical analysis. To an extent, this approach would 
reflect the role of Critical theory in allowing us to engage in ‘social 
criticism’ as a prelude to ‘societal transformation’ (Devetak 2009: 167; 
see also Hoffman 1987; Neufeld 1995). Indeed, when determining the 
ultimate ‘value’ of such a theoretical perspective, a question posed in 
the opening chapter, we could argue that a Coxian approach is 
potentially significant in shifting our perceptions on the motivations 
behind oil diversification globally as a prelude to a more constructive 
dialogue on policy solutions - which moves us away from simplistic 
‘problem-solving’ explanations based on rational notions of state self-
interest or economic determinism.  
 
8.7.     Summary 
This chapter has discussed the research questions outlined in the 
introduction chapter. Firstly, the accumulation of oil diversification is 
synthesised to provide an overview of the empirical findings from the 
case studies. Secondly, Coxian theory was assessed through its 
ability to explain US oil diversification motivations patterns thereby to 
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see the value of the theory compared to more traditional rational 
theories.  Challenges to applying the theory are also discussed. 
Lastly, in the self-reflexive view on the research, implications of the 
research are discussed relative to existing literature, but limitations of 
the research are also explained. The final part also includes 





















9. Conclusions  
 
This chapter aims to conclude the thesis by summarising how it meets 
the research question, placing the findings in the current literature to 
show its added value and identifying new avenues for future research: 
a process started in Chapter 8. Firstly, in this respect, the aims, 
objectives and research questions posed in Chapter 1 are returned to. 
Secondly, the thesis’ contribution to the literature is stated. This 
contribution is categorised into three principal areas, empirical, 
theoretical and methodological: (i) the contribution to understanding 
of US oil diversification motivations; (ii) revision of Coxian theory, by 
providing a neo-Coxian view; (iii) the operationalization of Coxian 
theory; and (iv) methodological innovation that combines a synchronic 
and diachronic analysis of oil diversification motivations through time 
(methodological and theoretical contribution). In the third section, 
future directions of the research are outlined, with a focus on 
theoretical development and new empirical testing. Lastly, the themes 
of the chapter are summarized.  
 
9.1.     Aims, Objectives, Research Questions 
This thesis sought to (address a specific aim and) answer one main 
research question, plus three sub-questions (see Chapter 1). As 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the fundamental premise forwarded 
by the thesis is that the existing literature on oil diversification 
motivations is dominated by the ‘causal’ explanations of mainstream 
IR approaches, namely Liberalism and Realism. Due to the limited 
interpretative capacity of these theories, it was argued that oil 
diversification could be better examined and interpreted by using 
critical theory, namely the arguments of Cox, to help expose the 
underlying motivations for policy in terms of structural forces created 
through the interacting dynamics of ideas, institutions and material 
capabilities (see Chapter 4): thereby filling a significant gap in 
knowledge. The existing literature does not entirely discount using 
critical theory for this purpose but it does largely ignore historical 
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evolution and policy cycles in analysing oil diversification policy, again 
presenting a deficit in understanding. As discussed in Chapter 2, both 
the diachronic and synchronic nature of oil diversification motivations 
should be considered to give a more holistic explanation, thereby 
providing a role for the historicism inherent in critical theory. In 
addition, a state-centric view also lacks significant perception of wider 
structural forces, which can be countered by adopting a critical view. 
By using critical theory, state-society complexity can be considered 
allowing it to be matched with structural causes. These gaps then 
informed the main aim of the thesis to uncover US oil diversification 
motivations. 
Meeting this aim was achieved through four key objectives of the 
research: 
1. To critically review published studies on US oil diversification 
motivations in order to identify gaps in their explanations; 
In order to meet this objective, the existing literature was critiqued to 
show the limitations of traditional ‘problem-solving’ accounts 
compared to critical theory’s assumptions (e.g. people as historical 
agents, state-society complexity), in order to identify specific gaps in 
knowledge. From this review, a Coxian IR interpretation was identified 
as potentially significant for uncovering oil diversification motivations 
- but further testing was required. 
 
From this initial review, the key theoretical arguments were 
developed. A Coxian IR interpretation was used for uncovering US oil 
diversification motivations since it specifies arguments on how 
structural forces operate through time, providing significant 
advancement on static, snapshot interpretations evident in other 
theories (see Chapter 3). Cox’s perspective on the global capitalist 
system and core theoretical assumptions are predicated upon the 
interaction of a ‘triangle’ of structural causes: ideas, material 
capabilities and institutions. This research is therefore premised on 
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operationalising these elements. However, as identified in Chapter 3, 
Coxian theory could also be considered according to new millennium 
dynamics such as social forces; a feature developed in the thesis. 
These observations led us to our second objective: 
2. To develop a novel critical IR theory perspective in order to 
uncover US oil diversification motivations, thereby adding to 
the existing literature; 
A Coxian IR interpretation was reviewed according to the new 
millennium`s realities. Social dynamics was found as a new structural 
sphere of Cox`s (1981: 138) triangle. The new millennium’s structural 
spheres were therefore conceptualised using a diamond (Chapter 3) 
to further inform the analysis. Moreover, although it was not in the 
study scope to revise the theory, Cox’s definition of institutions was 
found to lack clarity after its operationalisation. Institutions do not only 
maintain the global order, but also are the active participants and 
agents of declining order: a feature not identified by Cox. 
 
Cox’s structural forces are accepted in this research because of our 
ontological position. Moreover, this position also led us to 
operationalize it using the contemporary paradigm debate, which is 
reflexivity vs. positivism (Kurki 2008: 89). His theory not only 
challenges positivist epistemological positions (using problem-solving 
theories) (see Chapter 3), his theory and its emphasis on historical 
interpretation integrate reflexivity as an approach to research. Given 
this ontological and epistemological position, the third objective is: 
3. To construct a reflexivist epistemological and duration-based 
historicist methodological stance in order to apply this theory to 
US case studies on oil diversification; 
To meet this objective, Coxian IR theory was operationalized by 
combining basic assumptions and arguments of critical theory along 
with a reflexivist epistemology. This operationalisation involved 
development of a theoretical approach based upon Cox’s structural 
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forces for uncovering the motivations for oil diversification. Theory was 
then matched to data through the development of a dedicated 
research design based upon a multiple historical case design of US 
oil diversification that employed qualitative data sources to interpret 
the diachronic and synchronic aspects of policy accumulation. 
 
The final objective involved testing of the revised Coxian theory 
through its operationalization via a reflexivist epistemology: 
4. To examine the value of such a revised critical IR theory 
perspective for explaining US oil diversification. 
The theory was then tested using a qualitative case study design 
employing primary data collected official archives, and semi-
structured elite interviews conducted with key actors in the 
accumulation of oil diversification motivations. Cox`s theory was able 
to clarify the actors and dynamics in the process of US oil 
diversification motivations via structural causes. Adaptation of a 
complexity paradigm rather than causal explanations did fit the 
research topic; however, it was also found that basic structural 
dimensions were significant at different time periods through structural 
causes` reflections. By interpreting the accumulation of the process 
Cox helped show how these different time periods shaped the next 
ones. While the research was not conditioned by a causal view, as in 
mainstream IR approaches, it was able to identify the implications of 
structural obstacles and pressures and agencies’ interests and 
reactions. However, the revision of the theory to add social dynamics 
of the new millennium as a new structural sphere (Chapter 3) was not 
clearly reflected in US oil diversification motivations. Two cases (see 
Chapter 5; 6) proved that social dynamics are, however, an emergent 
sphere during contemporary times, although the last case (see 
Chapter 7) did not show the same pattern. This leads to the conclusion 
that there are three possibilities for revising the theory: firstly, by 
accounting for social dynamics, which are still emerging as a 
significant structural force; secondly, revision requires recognition of 
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the organizing significance of institutions (see Chapter 7); and lastly, 
both features require consideration together through theoretical 
revision. 
 
Results of the research were discussed in Chapter 8 in relation to the 
three sub questions that were established to structure the research in 
answering the main question posed in Chapter 1: How can the Iraq 
War, Keystone XL pipeline and Arctic Drilling in the context of Energy 
Revolution be interpreted to uncover general patterns of US oil 
diversification motivations? Sub-questions are:  
1. What have been the definitions of oil diversification in US policy 
cycles and how have they been changing over time? 
2. To what extent do these definitions fit the ‘material capabilities-
ideas-institutions’ arguments of Cox? 
3. What are the limitations of this theory for explaining patterns of 
US oil diversification? 
In order to uncover the motivations behind US oil diversification, three 
case studies were chosen. They broadly represent the same period 
of time between the early-millennium and now, thereby allowing 
comparison using the same structure. However, actors and the 
interaction between actors are differentiated in all the case studies. 
KXL provided a reflection of how material capabilities, driven by 
foreign policy and trade considerations, initially shaped oil 
diversification motivations and the decision to construct the pipeline in 
terms of the ‘national interest’. However, this is not the only important 
point about the KXL case. As the process unfolded through time, it is 
evident that oil diversification motivations shifted to reflect the 
importance of ideas, most notably environmentalism and later 
‘America First’ (‘energy dominance’), and their mediation through key 
institutions such as the Presidency and a conflictual bi-partisan 
Congress. During the Obama period, the policy process was 
characterised by dynamics such as environmental concerns, 
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environmental groups, and the polarization of domestic politics. Social 
dynamics was therefore an emergent factor although ultimately not 
decisive on the final policy. Material capabilities, influenced by global 
capitalism, including liberal dominancy, and US hegemony were 
significant in oil diversification motivations in the Iraq War case. 
Although the desire to diversify US oil supplies through access to Iraqi 
oil was never explicitly stated by actors, the motivations of the Bush 
administration are widely understood. In contrast to the KXL case, 
social dynamics were visible, but not in the USA, where popular 
support for military intervention continued, rather within Iraq in 
response to continued US involvement in oil production. To an extent, 
the patterns of oil diversification motivations in the Arctic Drilling case 
mirrored the KXL case. They also reflected the influence of the oil 
market and US foreign policy on material capabilities but also the role 
of ideas such as environmentalism and the Energy Revolution and 
their interaction with institutions. What is also visible is the changing 
nature of oil diversification definitions where they also became related 
to oil production (diversifying production) as well as imports 
(diversifying supply). Thus, the definition of diversification also 
transformed in relation to wider changes in global politics, US foreign 
policy and the US oil market. Diversifying supplier states joined the 
process in order to increase the oil supply at nation- and state-level. 
 
9.2.     The Added Value of the Study to the Literature 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the study contributes to the literature in 
four different areas: the contribution to understanding of US oil 
diversification motivations (empirical contribution); revision of Coxian 
theory, by providing a neo-Coxian view (theoretical contribution); the 
operationalization of Coxian theory (theoretical and empirical 
contribution); and lastly, methodological innovation that combines a 
synchronic and diachronic analysis of oil diversification motivations 
through time (methodological and theoretical contribution). 
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9.2.1. Contribution to US Oil Diversification Motivations 
This study found four major gaps in the US oil diversification 
motivations literature: the lack of a historical perspective; the lack of a 
supplier side view; limited consideration of state-society complexity; 
and a lack of studies that compares cases (see Chapter 2). This study 
helps fill these gaps in the literature, thereby representing a significant 
advance in knowledge. However, there is one last contribution that 
provide a debating point for the two cases, that are KXL and Arctic 
Drilling in the context of Energy Revolution.  
From a Critical theorist perspective, people are accepted as “historical 
agents” (Budd 2008: 176). Global politics, which is a product of 
‘historical agents’, goes through interactions and struggles under 
historical development. Our case studies show that this observation 
holds for US oil diversification motivations. While we considered 
interactions in the system, we show contradictions and controversies 
that pushed changes of structure through a historical-dialectical view 
(see Chapter 8). This method helps to reveal that there are no fixed 
and repeatable patterns in US oil diversification motivations; rather 
they evolve through time through the accumulation of events. 
Secondly, in both case studies (KXL and the Iraq War), supplier 
countries’ dynamics are evident. Both them (see Chapter 5; 6) showed 
that they are also part of US oil diversification motivation 
determinants. In terms of KXL, the Canadian side is economically 
reliant on oil export incomes and geographically relies on the US. It 
makes them more positive about the oil trade with the US. Despite the 
KXL issue, oil imports from Canada are still increasing. Although US 
political dynamics promote this trend (see Chapter 8), Canadian 
production policy is also important. On the other hand, the activated 
social dynamics of the Iraqi people delayed the process of 
internationalization of Iraqi oil. It kept pressure on US administrations 
to take action. Moreover, this reaction has led to ‘the war for oil’ 
accusations and damaged US power. 
In accordance with Critical theory’s state-society complexity 
considerations, the research shows that state-centric explanations are 
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not able to give the whole picture of events. Non state actors including 
environmental groups, lobbies, trade and oil groups and 
entrepreneurs were able to influence the process of US oil 
diversification motivations by shaping and triggering aspects of them. 
With the help of different case studies, it becomes clear that neither 
foreign policy nor domestic politics are the sole determinants. They 
are both integrated into the US oil market. The case studies also show 
that different actors are able to join the process. The actors 
determining US oil diversification motivations are not fixed in time or 
space. However, state-society complexity is visible in the case studies 
processes. In addition, this study also contributes to the further 
definition of oil diversification. The Energy Revolution in the US, which 
is combined with the US position in global capitalism, has also 
included diversifying oil producer states (see Chapter 7).  
Lastly, although all case studies are discussed through the literature, 
there was not sufficient literature for KXL and Arctic Drilling in the 
context of Energy Revolution. The controversial position of these 
cases leads to the view that there are different arguments for varied 
issues, but both them have limited debates. Moreover, the Arctic 
Drilling literature is mainly concerned with the ANWR, which is 
obviously related to the context. Just recently, it has become an issue 
across the entire Arctic. This work, however, provides sufficient 
debate grounds, for both these case studies consider structure- and 
agency-based, and material- and ideas-based dynamics. 
9.2.2. Contribution to Coxian Theory and a neo-Coxian view 
Initially, it was specified why a Coxian view was chosen rather than 
any other critical theory. We found four key points that made Coxian 
theory suitable for the aims of the study (see Chapter 3). Firstly, 
because the theory is against ‘immanent critique’ which is “without 
reference to an independently articulated method or to transcendent 
criteria” (Hutchings 1999: 99), a Coxian view is more appropriate than 
other Eurocentric Critical theories (for example, Linklater 1989; 
Hutchings 1999; Robinson 1999). Cox presents a reciprocal 
relationship between structure (social relations and physical 
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production) and superstructure (ideology and political organizations). 
Their reflexive relationship creates a historical evolution that cannot 
be predicted and should not be subject to normative assumptions 
made by theorists. Although “Theory is always for someone and for 
some purpose” (Cox 1981: 128), subjective perception of the world 
should be made by objective explanation. Emancipatory interests 
which involve “freeing people from those constraints that stop them 
carrying out what freely they would choose to do” (Booth 1991: 53) is 
another aim of Critical theorists (Booth 1991). However, this term is 
associated with a Eurocentric rationality view. In reality, there is no 
absolute freedom, neither for actors nor for states. Any action can 
affect the whole organization (Cox 2004). Thus, a Coxian view can be 
interpreted as one in which people’s actions are not predetermined: 
they do not act in behavior rather through behavior (see Chapter 4). 
Another reason why a Coxian view was used is because of his 
balanced system of structure-agency and materials-ideals. It protects 
from having a structuralist or reductionist and historical materialist 
view. Interactions of these dimensions always result in different 
patterns during historical processes. Considerations of diachronic and 
synchronic durations offered by Cox help to understand these 
patterns. In relation to this point, Cox is also important due to his 
history-theory connection. Theory is situated in history, so it cannot be 
absolute knowledge (Cox 1993b: 135). Cox leaves open the door for 
his theory to be reflexively renewed in the future as history evolves: a 
conspicuous problem with context specific rational theory. 
This study shows how Coxian theory is specified according to such 
principles (see Chapter 3). Moreover, a critique of Cox was also 
provided to show the positive and negative aspects of his analysis. 
This literature allows us to suggest a neo-Coxian theory which has 
social dynamics as the additional sphere of the new millennium. Social 
dynamics also help Coxian theory to show the transition between 
agency-structure and conceptualizing state-society complexity within 
structural spheres. However, while two cases (see Chapter 5; 6) 
showed the existence of powerful social dynamics, the other one (see 
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Chapter 7) did not show the same degree of influence. This leads us 
to a gap in neo-Coxian arguments allowing for their future revision, as 
indicated below. On the other hand, this study also shows that a 
Coxian institutions definition does not adequately comprehend their 
role. They not only maintain the particular order but also participate in 
a changing process. The definition of institutions should also include 
an active role in addition to a passive role.  
9.2.3. Operationalization of Coxian Theory on US Oil 
Diversification  
This thesis has significant value for both Coxian theory and the 
empirical topic. In the academic literature, there is no study which 
conceptualizes Coxian structural forces for energy security issues, 
such as US oil diversification motivations: therefore, this thesis fills 
this evident gap. Cox’s structural forces, ideas, material capabilities 
and institutions, are accepted as structural causes (see Chapter 4) 
and their reflections in US oil markets are conceptualized (see 
Chapter 3). Ideas that are intersubjective meanings (habits and 
expectations of behavior) and collective images (the common ground 
of social discourse and different views on legitimacy of power 
relations) are accepted as (ir)rational decisions in terms of national 
and state level and political party differences (different priorities). 
Material capabilities are composed of three aspects: productive and 
destructive potentials; technological and organisational capabilities; 
and accumulated forms such as natural resources, stocks of 
equipment and wealth. In this thesis, material capabilities are firstly 
the US oil market, oil production, oil reserves, import levels and oil 
prices and secondly technological sufficiency in the US oil market. 
Institutions that maintain a particular order and reflect power relations 
in this thesis are companies, state departments, institutions of trade 
and environment, environmental groups and lobbies.  
Our case studies prove that reflection of these structural causes are 
significant, as Cox asserts. Because every case has its unique 
context, the effect of causes are different. Moreover, even the sub-
parts of causes can also be differentiated. For example, two sub-parts 
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of ideas did not follow each other. While there was limited evidence of 
nation- and state- level power differentiation (i.e. intersubjective 
meaning) in the Iraq War (see Chapter 6), political party stances (i.e. 
collective images) were different between the beginnings and the 
ends of KXL and Arctic drilling case studies. Accumulation of the 
process with different interactions of the structural causes were 
evident in all case studies. Even some key determinants such as 
increasing oil prices did not always have the same effect. Different 
actors (public and private) reacted in different ways at different times. 
Again, these features would be difficult – if not impossible - to explain 
using rational ‘problem-solving’ theory within positivist studies. 
Operationalization of the theory has been examined through 
diachronic and synchronic time dimensions – adding significant 
innovation to the existing literature. To date, existing studies take time 
limited perspectives on oil diversification, failing to follow such 
processes over long periods. The study shows that there are no 
historically repeatable patterns, but rather, cyclical oil market and oil 
diversification motivations. In the oil market sense, and in the US oil 
market, the contemporary cycle started in the new millennium. It has 
triggered different dynamics in the US. There is manifestly no pre-
determined structural power, but interactions and their results that 
become causes. On the other hand, Cox’s view on US hegemony, 
which was already connected to the US oil market and its evolution, 
has been demonstrated. The study shows that US oil diversification 
motivations cannot be isolated from the global oil market, global 
capitalism, and US power in the world. However, there are also 
empirical truths that are triggering actors or expectations internally. 
Structural causes can help to see how these dynamics are working in 
a non-linear way. Although the case studies start with the early 
millennium, the historical background of the oil market is provided to 
show how history works in cycles and accumulates (see Chapter 1). 
Key shocks and determinants of previous cycles help to reveal how 
the current picture is situated in its historical context. 
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Lastly, the study showed that structural causes can be applied to 
energy security issues and can fill the gaps in the literature left by 
mainstream approaches.  Moreover, Cox`s structural explanation on 
the global political economic organization that includes hegemony, its 
allies and rivalries can be applied and reflected on within this energy 
security topic. Because of oil’s global market, the energy security 
issue also had an effect on the hegemon’s power reciprocally. 
Obviously, the US was the best case for observing such changing 
global politics. 
9.2.4. Methodological Innovation Using Coxian Theory 
The study also provided significant methodological innovation in terms 
of a conceptualization of Cox in the current paradigm with an 
ontological arrangement in terms of time perception. However, it also 
embraces Kurki`s (2008) critique of Cox in terms of structural forces 
for this conceptualization. 
Cox (2008: 89) refers to a complexity paradigm through emphasizing 
the necessity of “more holistic, more relativistic, and more historically 
oriented approaches”. His main stance is therefore against a positivist 
epistemology and can be categorised as a reflexivist view. However, 
Cox avoids using the term ‘cause’ to distinguish his arguments from 
positivists’ cause-effect analysis, although causation is a matter of 
ontology rather than epistemology (Kurki 2008). Thus, we agree with 
Kurki (ibid. 138) that preferring structural causes than structural forces 
that mean only pressures and constraints. However, in addition, we 
also think Coxian (2008: 88) ontology should be corrected as that 
becoming and being ontologies are intertwined rather than becoming 
in order to provide grounds for a diachronic and synchronic view. In 
this approach, we can find general patterns that are separated by time 
periods but not attempt to uncover repeatable and predictable 
patterns as positivist problem-solving theories do (see Chapter 3). 
In short, Cox’s view fits a reflexivist epistemology because of the 
compatibility of both sides’ principles in how they look at history, 
people in history, theory construction, state relations and the position 
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relative to positivism. The most innovative methodological contribution 
of the research is that it suggests becoming and being ontologies as 
intertwined. They are reflected as the diachronic and synchronic views 
used by Cox. The reason for following this assumption is that gaining 
an overall picture of the process is the target, while the process also 
becomes a smaller picture in a much longer process. For example, 
our case studies exist in the period between the early millennium and 
now, but this period is a picture of the global oil market which starts 
as far back as the Seven Sisters (see Chapter 1). Secondly, we agree 
with and use Kurki’s interpretation of structural “causes”. All case 
studies’ processes and more generally US oil diversification 
motivations have been shaped through structural causes which are 
not only pressures as forces would suggest, but also motivations and 
pushers depending on the context. Ontologically, it also provided a 
stricter stance in order to find determiners of rationales of the 
processes, while not imprisoned by positivist cause-effect 
assumption. While we use only “first causes” of the process that also 
comprehends the process, an historical-dialectical method has been 
used to see interactions in the duration as Cox suggests. It allows 
finding contradictions and controversies in the topic that have 
triggered and reflected motivations for US oil diversification (see 
Chapter 8). 
  
9.3.     Future Directions of the Research  
This research opens up the possibility of further research in two main 
areas: theoretical and empirical. By applying Coxian theory to a social 
process in the new millennium, it became obvious that neo-Coxian 
theory could offer an explanation for structural changes over time (see 
Chapter 3). However, the case studies show that without institutional 
interference, societal reactions are not able to be part of the structural 
spheres (see Chapter 8). The decentralized character of transnational 
civil society organization still exists. However, the study suggests that 
social dynamics is a new sphere that is still developing, so it will 
require further observation in the future. Here, events related to other 
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structural spheres can show how social dynamics can be effective by 
themselves or the importance of institutional interference behind them 
can be identified. In short, neo-Coxian arguments require better 
specifying theoretically but also developing through further theoretical 
application. 
An analysis of (neo)Coxian structural causes can also be applied to 
different case studies to comparatively assess the additional value of 
the theory. Such research could be undertaken via inter-state or intra-
state comparison. Further examples of oil diversification could be 
researched within countries such as the USA, to further test and 
develop the theory. But significant potential exists to expand the 
analysis to other national contexts. While this research focuses on US 
hegemony, which involves a globally significant oil producer, importer 
and consumer country, the oil diversification motivations of potential 
rival hegemons globally (i.e. China) and an ally of the US (i.e. Europe 
or Japan) could be compared. This research could productively 
analyze changing relationships between the US, its potential rivals 
and historical allies on the one hand, and changing perceptions of oil 
diversification through time on the other hand. Such analysis would 
also aid theoretical development of neo-Coxian perspectives 
discussed above. 
 
9.4.     Summary 
This research has achieved the aims that in Chapter 1. The main 
research question is answered through consideration of several sub-
questions (see Chapter 8). Three case studies have helped to reveal 
different reflections of US oil diversification motivations. In this way, 
we were able to see whether Cox’s theoretical operationalization on 
US oil diversification motivations work and the value of a neo-Coxian 
approach. The results show that Cox’s IR view can be operationalized 
on oil diversification motivations, but a neo-Coxian perspective still 
requires further theoretical and empirical development. Future studies 
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Appendix 1: Interview Questions  
        
General questions 
What factors affect US oil diversification motivations? 
Why do we see that two different parties (i.e. Republicans and 
Democrats) have two different priorities? Because of their voters, 
supporters? 
Can we say oil companies, oil lobbies or any foundations which are 
related to trade or oil trade are able to direct the governments? 




Is the Keystone XL pipeline damaging the environment? 
How does American society perceive the Keystone XL pipeline? Do 
these perceptions differ between people in Nebraska and the rest of 
America? 
As an environmentalist what were the the motivations for you to be 
interested in Keystone XL? Is it an environmental consideration or lack 
of information which is caused by administrations or anything else 
including ideologies? 
We see different decisions in different administrations Obama and 
Trump. And also, as I remember George W. Bush announced his 
support to Keystone XL in 2015 as I remember. Can we separate the 
republicans and the democrats? 
Do you think American government(s), Obama and Trump, do or do 
not reflect societal demands in terms of Keystone XL, environmentally 
or economically? 
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Do you think Keystone XL has become a symbol? 
Both Liberal and Conservative governments in Canada have 
supported this project unlike the US. Why? 
What do Canadian oil mean to US oil industry? 
 
The Iraq War 
How have US oil policies changed since the Iraq War? 
Do you see any connection between the Iraq War and US oil 
diversification targets?  
Do you think that US oil diversification motivations changed after the 
Iraq War? 
What did Iraqi oil mean to US governments or US oil industry before 
the War? 
Has the War changed the perception on Iraqi oil globally or nationally? 
What have been the perceptions of the Middle East oil for US oil 
industry in terms of oil type, security, global politics? 
 
Arctic Drilling in the context of Energy Revolution 
Why were the EPAct and EISA adopted? Do you think that its adoption 
occurred in response to a societal influence or international pressure 
or even both? 
Have the EPAct and EISA become successful? Should they be 
supported? 
Are EPAct and EISA related to reducing the oil imports from the 
Middle East? 
What kind of groups, lobbies, ideas or material factors did affect 
EPAct, EISA and the energy revolution? 
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How much have social dynamamics played a role during the policy 
process of Arctic Drilling? 
Why is drilling in Arctic still discussed despite of energy revolution and 
solved gasoline prices issues? 
How much has technology played a role in the millennium`s oil debate 
in terms of renewables, shale revolution, Arctic Drilling, offshore 
drilling? 


























Appendix 2: List of Interviews  

























Oil Industry-Think tanks 4 
Government-Policymakers 4 
Oil Industry-Think tanks 4 
Government-Policymakers 2 
Lobbies 4 





The Iraq War 
Arctic Drilling in the 




Appendix 3: Information sheet and consent form for 
research 
 
Title of Research Project 
US Oil Diversification Motivations in the case of the Iraq War, the 
Keystone XL pipeline and Energy Independence and Security Act 
2007.  
 
Details of Project 
 
I am a PhD student at the University of Exeter’s Environment and 
Sustainability Institute (ESI), based on Penryn Campus in Cornwall. 
My project is on examining the US oil diversification motivations. 
This research is funded by the Turkish Republic Ministry of National 
Education.   
The information, collected from the participants through interviews, 
will be used in my PhD thesis and it may be used for academic 
publication as well.  
 
Contact Details 
For further information about the research /interview data (amend as 
appropriate), please contact: 
 
Name:  Suleyman Orhun Altiparmak 
Postal address:  Environment and Sustainability Institute 
University of Exeter, Penryn Campus 
Penryn, Cornwall 
TR10 9FE 
Telephone: (+44)(0)7843 900553  
Email:  sa633@exeter.ac.uk 
 
If you have concerns/questions about the research you would like to 
discuss with someone else at the University, please contact: 
 
Dr David Benson 
Environment and Sustainability Institute 









Dr Owen Thomas 
Peter Lanyon Building (First Floor), A 159 









Interview tapes and transcripts will be held in confidence. They will 
not be used other than for the purposes described above and third 
parties will not be allowed access to them (except as may be 
required by the law). However, if you request it, you will be supplied 
with a copy of your interview transcript so that you can comment on 
and edit it as you see fit (please give your email below so that I am 
able to contact you at a later date). 




Data Protection Notice 
 
The information you provide will be used for research purposes and 
your personal data will be processed in accordance with current data 
protection legislation and the University's notification lodged at the 
Information Commissioner's Office. Your personal data will be 
treated in the strictest confidence and will not be disclosed to any 
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unauthorised third parties. The results of the research will be 
published in anonymised form." 
 
a. Interview recordings 
The digital recording of your interview will be deleted as soon as 
there is an authoritative written transcripts and contact details. 
b. Interview transcripts and contact details 
Your personal and contact details will be stored separately from your 
interview transcript that will be stored on U drive and may be 
retained for up to 5 years. 
If you request it, you will be supplied with a copy of your interview 
transcript so that you can comment on and edit it as you see fit 
(please provide your email below) 
 
Third parties will not be allowed access to interview tapes and 
transcripts except as required by law or in the event that something 
disclosed during the interview causes concerns about possible harm 





Interview data will be held and used on an anonymous basis, with no 
mention of your name, but we will refer to the group of which you are 
a member.  If this is not the case you need to adapt the text. 
 
Consent 
I have been fully informed about the aims and purposes of the 
project. 
I understand that: 
 
•there is no compulsion for me to participate in this research project 
and, if I do choose to participate, I may withdraw at any stage; 
•I have the right to refuse permission for the publication of any 
information about me; 
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•any information which I give will be used solely for the purposes of 
this research project, which may include publications or academic 
conference or seminar presentations; 
•If applicable, the information, which I give, may be shared between 
any of the other researcher(s) participating in this project in an 
anonymised form; 
•all information I give will be treated as confidential; 
•the researcher(s) will make every effort to preserve my anonymity. 
 
 
............................……           .............……………..……..  
(Signature of participant)    (Date) 
 
 
………………………………        ……………………………..…… 
(Printed name of participant)  (Email address of participant if 
they have requested to view a copy of the interview transcript.) 
 
 
............................……   ……......……………….. 
(Signature of researcher)        (Printed name of researcher) 
 
One copy of this form will be kept by the participant; a second copy 
will be kept by the researcher(s). 
Your contact details are kept separately from your interview data. 
